Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on the validity of a 1995 Florida divorce decree. Sarath Sapukotana (Sarath) and Palihawadanage Ramya Chandralatha Fernando (Fernando) were married in Sri Lanka in 1992. Sarath moved to the United States a year later. In 1995, a Florida court entered an uncontested divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Sarath and Fernando. In 2004, Sarath then married Martha Gay Weaver Sapukotana (Martha) in Mississippi. Sarath died intestate in 2008 from injuries which led to a wrongful death suit. The trial court granted Martha’s petition to be named the administratrix of the estate, over the objection of Fernando, Sarath’s first wife. This allowed Martha to file, and later to settle, the wrongful death claim. Fernando claims that the 1995 Florida divorce decree was fraudulent and void for lack of service of process, and that she instead was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate and to the proceeds of the wrongful death action. Fernando filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s decision to appoint Martha as administratrix of Sarath’s estate. The chancery court dismissed Fernando’s motion and held that Martha was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate. Fernando appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, finding that the chancery court lacked authority to vacate the 1995 Florida divorce decree. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Sarath Sapukotana" on Justia Law

In IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., the Court of Appeals held that, where parties include a New York choice-of-law clause in a contract, such a provision demonstrates the parties’ intent that courts not conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis. In the instant case, Plaintiff was a New York not-for-profit corporation that administered a retirement plan and a death benefit plan. Decedent was enrolled in both plans. Decedent named Appellants as beneficiaries. Both plans stated that they shall be governed by and construed in accordance with New York law. After Decedent died, a Colorado court admitted his will to probate. Plaintiff was unsure to whom the plan benefits should be paid after Decedent’s death and commenced a federal interpleader action against Decedent’s Estate, the personal representative (PR) of the Estate, and Appellants. A federal district court directed Plaintiff to pay the disputed funds to the PR, concluding that Colorado’s revocation law terminated any claims to the plans by Appellants. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered by extending the holding in IRB to contracts that do not fall under Gen. Oblig. Law 5-1401 and clarifying that this rule obviates the application and both common-law and conflict-of-laws principles and statutory choice-of-law directives, unless the parties expressly indicate otherwise. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died in 2011. The contestants of her will objected to the petition to admit to probate either the decedent’s February 2011 will or her August 2001 will, alleging that the wills were invalid because the decedent lacked testamentary capacity and because the devises were the result of undue influence. After a trial, the jury found that the 2011 will was valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to instruct the jury regarding a “presumption of undue influence”; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion responding to a jury question or in admitting, in part, a video of the execution of the 2001 will. View "In re Estate of Clinger" on Justia Law

Following Steve Broome’s death, his ex-wife Elizabeth Strickland and his children, Stephen Broome and Jesse Broome, filed claims against Steve’s estate for child support arrears, other unpaid support obligations, and for life insurance proceeds. The chancellor dismissed all of the claims, holding that the claims were not valid because they were not reduced to a judgment before Steve’s death and that the claims were barred by res judicata. After review, the Supreme Court held that the chancellor erred in dismissing the claims, since Elizabeth, Stephen, and Jesse presented sufficient evidence to satisfy Mississippi Code Section 91-7-149. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Strickland v. Estate of Steve Alan Broome" on Justia Law

Appellant was a signatory to a family settlement agreement concerning a will that was subsequently approved by the circuit court. The agreement distributed a portion of the assets of the decedent’s estates to the estate of a minor, K.P. Appellant later filed a motion to set aside the family-settlement agreement, alleging that, after the circuit court had approved the agreement, Appellant discovered that K.P. was not the decedent’s natural child and that K.P.’s mother had falsely claimed that K.P. was the decedent’s natural child. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s motion on the basis of res judicata, finding that the issues of paternity and proportionate entitlement to inherit had already been litigated. The court also dismissed Appellant’s motion to compel discovery as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly concluded that its ruling on res judicata rendered moot Appellant’s motion to compel discovery. View "Norris v. Davis" on Justia Law

Debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's order overruling her objection to the chapter 7 trustee's final report and denying her motion to compel the chapter 7 trustee to abandon $16,893.44 he had received from the Ruth E. Thompson Revocable Trust. The court agreed with the bankruptcy court that pursuant to paragraph 5.3.4 of the trust agreement, debtor's interest in the Trust was fully alienable by her on the petition date, and her interest in the Trust was not excluded from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(2). Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order. View "Thompson-Rossbach v. Doeling" on Justia Law

Between May 2002 and September 2004, David Robb received multiple loans from his mother, Ruby Robb. On September 13, 2004, Ruby Robb created a living trust identified as the Ruby M. Robb Living Trust ("Trust"), and she named American State Bank as the trustee. In October 2004, David signed a promissory note made payable to Ruby M. Robb. The note did not contain a due date or repayment schedule. David made a number of payments on the note; he made these payments payable to the Trust. However, he stopped making payments after American State Bank ceased administering the Trust. Debbie Rooks, David Robb's sister, became the successor trustee. In 2013, Rooks, in her capacity as trustee, served a complaint on David to recover the amount due on the note David signed, as well as an additional note that he did not sign. Rooks ultimately voluntarily dismissed her claim based on the unsigned note. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of Rooks' motion, she filed an affidavit made by the vice president and trust manager of American State Bank that alleged the note was assigned to the Trust (she filed this affidavit because the schedule of trust assets had been lost, and there was no record evidencing the assignment of the note to the Trust). At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, David argued the Trust did not have standing to sue because Rooks did not present evidence sufficient to show the Trust owned the note. The court found the trust manager's affidavit was sufficient to establish the note had been transferred to the Trust. The court found there were no genuine issues of fact and the note was payable on demand as a matter of law. Robb appealed the district court's order awarding summary judgment in favor of Rooks. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it found there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Rooks v. Robb" on Justia Law

This trust management dispute has made a repeat trip to the Georgia Supreme Court. In their complaint, the plaintiffs raised claims of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust against the defendants by:(1) allegedly failing to make proper accountings to plaintiffs with respect to certain S-Trusts and family entities; (2) by making trust investments in illiquid family-owned entities (leaving the plaintiffs with unmarketable assets when the S-Trust assets are distributed free of trust to each beneficiary upon reaching the mandated age); (3) by creating a distribution scheme that imposes a code of conduct upon each beneficiary to qualify for distributions from trust investments; by creating a conflicts of interest; and (4) by failing to maximize income distributions in favor of growing trust principal. Plaintiffs also asserted claims for an accounting; constructive fraud/recision for failure to disclose and fraudulent misrepresentation regarding certain transactions allegedly improperly obtained the plaintiffs’ written consent; and for attorney fees. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants as to each of plaintiffs’ claims, with the exception of the breach of trust claim for the defendants’ failure, at any time prior to the filing of the lawsuit, to make required periodic accountings to the plaintiffs for the assets held in the trusts. The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred with respect to its ruling that defendants owed the plaintiffs an accounting of the family entities, concluding that the Court of Appeals failed to give due deference to the trial court’s discretion to grant or deny the equitable relief sought in the prayer for an accounting. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for it to reconsider the accounting issue. Upon remand, the Court of Appeals again found fact issues remain for jury determination with respect to whether the defendants breached their fiduciary duty or committed a breach of trust. Court of Appeals also remanded to the trial court the issue of whether the defendants owed the plaintiffs an accounting of the family entities held as trust assets so the trial court could reconsider its decision and exercise its discretion in light of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Defendants petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court directed the parties to address the question of whether a jury had to determine which fiduciary duty applied to the various decisions and transactions made by the defendants. The Supreme Court again reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial court properly ruled with respect to its summary judgment decision. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

These appeals before the Supreme Court were the result of a family dispute that occurred following the death of Mr. B.J. Kirkley in 2011, concerning his will and his interest in Kirkley LLC.Karen Ann Kribel Kirkley, individually and as personal representative of the estate of B.J. Kirkley; Holly Muncie; and J. Alexander Muncie III ("Alex"), as trustee of the Karen Ann Kribel Kirkley Testamentary Trust appealed a circuit court's "order regarding granting of new trial" in favor of Donna Jo Kirkley Phillips and Kirkley, LLC (appeal no. 1130812). Donna Jo and Kirkley LLC cross-appealed the same order, but also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the estate plaintiffs on the basis that the order was not a final order and that the monetary judgment in the case has been satisfied (appeal no. 1130850). The Supreme Court agreed that the circuit court's order was not final, so the appeals were dismissed. View "Kirkley v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant FirstMerit Bank, N.A. sought to enforce a money judgment against defendant-respondent Diana Reese by applying for an order assigning Reese’s interest in two trusts to FirstMerit and an order restraining her from otherwise disposing of her right to payment under the trusts. The trial court denied the motion. FirstMerit appealed, arguing: (1) Cod Civ. Proc. section 708.510 gave the trial court authority and jurisdiction to order Reese to assign FirstMerit funds she receives from the trusts; (2) section 708.520 gave the court authority to issue an order restraining Reese from transferring her interest in the trusts; and (3) section 709.010 did not affect the court’s authority or jurisdiction to enter such orders. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "FirstMerit Bank v. Reese" on Justia Law