Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In December 2012, P.M., the son of V.A.M., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and conservator for his father. V.A.M. was 81 years old at the time of the petition; he had seven children. A guardian ad litem recommended the district court appoint a third-party limited corporate guardian and a third-party limited corporate conservator. In May 2013, V.A.M. and some of his children, including D.N., P.M., K.J., and T.M., reached an agreement and stipulated a limited guardianship and limited conservatorship were necessary. The stipulation specified V.A.M.'s rights and the guardian and conservator's duties. The court appointed Guardian, Fiduciary & Advocacy Services as the limited guardian and First International Bank & Trust of Fargo ("Bank") as the limited conservator. T.M. and K.J. responded to the Bank's petition to sell V.A.M.’s farmstead. T.M. stated that he was not opposed to leasing the farmstead, but he was in favor of purchasing the property. T.M. and K.J. opposed the request to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims and claimed V.A.M. had no desire to pursue any legal claims and should not have to pay for pursuing any claims. D.N. responded to the petition, requesting V.A.M. be able to retain his farmstead and the court grant the petition to allow the Bank to assign V.A.M.'s possible legal claims to his children. V.A.M. also responded to the petition. He stated that he was in favor of selling the farmstead to T.M. He also stated that he did not have any claims against T.M., that he was opposed to the Bank assigning any of his claims to his children, and that he was opposed to the Bank providing his financial information and tax returns to his children. After a hearing, the district court approved the sale of the real property and the assignment of claims. The court authorized the Bank to sell the farmstead to T.M. The court also authorized the Bank to assign to V.A.M.'s children, in equal shares, any and all possible claims V.A.M. held for undue influence, lack of capacity, or breach of fiduciary duty. The court ordered the Bank was not authorized to disclose any of V.A.M.'s financial information or tax returns to V.A.M.'s children. T.M. and K.J. appealed the order authorizing V.A.M.'s conservator to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims, arguing that the district court erred in creating a "sub-conservator" to investigate and decide whether to pursue V.A.M.'s legal claims. D.N. argued the court assigned V.A.M.'s legal claims to his children and did not create a "sub-conservator." The Supreme Court was unable to understand the basis for the district court's order, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of V.A.M." on Justia Law

The two children (“Children”) of the Decedent challenged the Decedent’s 2008 last will and testament and inter vivos trust, which changed his 2004 estate plan to leave full ownership of his entire property to his third wife and the Children’s second stepmother (“Stepmother”), thereby effectively disinheriting the Children. The district court reinstated Decedent’s 2004 estate plan, concluding that the Stepmother had exerted undue influence over Decedent’s execution of the 2008 testamentary documents. The court, however, refused to award the Children attorney fees from Decedent’s estate. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that insufficient evidence existed to support the district court’s finding of suspicious circumstances with respect to the 2008 documents. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court, holding (1) the Court of Appeals exceeded its standard of review by making its own findings of fact and reweighing the evidence on the undue influence issue; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees. View "Cresto v. Cresto" on Justia Law

Limestone Products, Inc., jointly owned by Ronald (Ronnie) Lampkin and James Oldrum (J.O.) Smith, Jr., operated with a line of credit personally guaranteed by Lampkin and Smith. Limestone was in the business of selling rock, predominantly to Lampkin's company, Lampkin Construction. Following Smith's death and his estate's subsequent refusal to guarantee Limestone's line of credit, Lampkin formed Delta Stone, a new corporation which operated on the same property, made use of the same facilities, and sold rock to the same clients to whom Limestone had sold. Lampkin sought a declaratory judgment against the Smith estate's executors that he was violating no fiduciary duties in continuing to sell Limestone's inventory. The executors counterclaimed, seeking lost profits and attorneys' fees. The chancellor bifurcated the trial and determined, in the liability stage, that Lampkin had breached his fiduciary duty to Limestone by usurping a corporate opportunity. In the damages phase of the trial, the chancellor heard expert testimony, assigned an award of damages to the Smith estate, and denied the executors' request for attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and punitive damages. The executors appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Finding that the chancellor erred in his calculation of damages, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Lane v. Lampkin" on Justia Law

Bank of the Ozarks was designated as the successor trustee of the Hamilton Family Living Trust. The Trust’s primary beneficiaries were Larry Hamilton and Susan Cossey. The Bank had possession of the Trust’s assets through a custody agreement with the trustees. The Bank sent correspondence to Larry Hamilton rejecting the trusteeship but still reimbursed Hamilton for certain expenses. Cossey later brought a petition for an accounting against the Bank. The circuit court granted the petition, finding that once the Bank reimbursed Hamilton for certain expenses, the Bank accepted the trusteeship by performing duties as a trustee. The Bank appealed, arguing that it had explicitly rejected the trusteeship and was thus not required to perform an accounting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bank accepted the trusteeship by exercising powers as a trustee. View "Bank of the Ozarks v. Cossey" on Justia Law

After Harry Jones died, a notice to creditors was published. Neither Harry’s ex-wife, Katherine Jones, nor her guardian was ever served with a copy of the notice. Less than two years after Harry’s death, the guardian of Katherine, Edwards Golden, filed a statement of claim in the probate court asserting that Harry’s estate owed Katherine money based on a marital settlement agreement. Katherine subsequently died, and Golden was appointed as the curator of her estate. The probate court struck Golden’s claim as untimely. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded to the probate court to determine whether Katherine or her guardianship was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor. Specifically, the court ruled that if a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is never served with a copy of the notice to creditors, the creditor’s claim is timely if filed within two years of the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court approved of the Fourth District’s decision, holding that the three-month limitations period prescribed in Fla. Stat. 733.702(1) is not applicable to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors who are never served with a copy of the notice to creditors, and the claims of such creditors are timely if filed within two years of the decedent’s death under Fla. Stat. 733.710. View "Jones v. Golden" on Justia Law

During the course of their marriage, Caroline, a citizen of Canada, made more than $75,000 in loans to Kimberly, of Ohio, which were never repaid. A federal district court dismissed Caroline’s contract and tort lawsuit. While appeal was pending, Kimberly died and Caroline substituted the Estate as the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, finding that neither the domestic relations exception nor the probate exception to federal diversity under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) applied. Because a court in Canada had dismissed divorce proceedings upon notice of Caroline’s death, there was no risk of a decision incompatible with a divorce decree, and, at the time Caroline filed the federal complaint, the property that she sought was not “in the custody of a state probate court.” View "Chevalier v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

Attorney William Salzwedel appealed a $96,077.14 judgment surcharging him for excessive attorney's/trustee's fees, medical expert fees, and costs incurred while acting as the temporary trustee of the Moore Family Trust. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the finding that the fees were unreasonable, and Salzwedel's trust accounting demonstrates that the fees and expenses were excessive. The court found that Salzwedel was repeatedly warned that he had a conflict of interest acting as trustee and as the attorney for a mentally impaired client in a conservatorship proceeding. He had never served as a trustee or been involved in a conservatorship before but perceived it as a license to zealously fight for Moore no matter what the cost. The court denied Salzwedel's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Friend v. Salzwedel" on Justia Law

Diversicare Leasing Corp. d/b/a Canterbury Healthcare Facility ("Canterbury") appealed an order denying its motion seeking to compel arbitration of a wrongful-death claim filed by Betty Hubbard, as the personal representative of the estate of Johnathan Hubbard. Johnathan was diagnosed with cerebral palsy when he was six months old, which caused him to be developmentally delayed and to suffer from a seizure disorder. Johnathan could not walk and was confined to a wheelchair his entire life. He could not speak; he could not feed, clean, or dress himself; he had no use of his hands; and he could not otherwise communicate his needs to others. Johnathan spent various periods of his life in residential-care facilities. Betty made all health-care decisions relating to Johnathan's care and executed all documents in furtherance of that care. Betty executed a number of documents upon Johnathan's admission to Canterbury, including the admission agreement and the arbitration agreement made the basis of this appeal. Johnathan was found unresponsive by the Canterbury staff in early 2011, and was transferred to a local hospital. Johnathan was diagnosed with sepsis; he died on February 21, 2011. Betty sued Canterbury asserting a wrongful-death claim. Canterbury moved the trial court to compel arbitration of Betty's wrongful-death claim and to stay the claim pending the arbitration. Betty argued in response to the motion to compel that she lacked the legal authority to bind Johnathan to the arbitration agreement because at the time the agreement was executed Johnathan was incapacitated and was 21 years old and had reached the age of majority, and she did not hold his power of attorney nor had she been appointed his personal representative or guardian by any court. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Canterbury's motion to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings. Canterbury appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Betty could not be bound to the arbitration agreement in her capacity as the personal representative of Johnathan's estate when she signed the arbitration agreement in what amounts to her capacity as Johnathan's relative or next friend. View "Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

August Schreiber’s (the decedent) will devised three lots and five certificates of deposit (CDs) to named beneficiaries (the beneficiaries). Before the decedent died, he sold the lots and the CDs. The personal representative, who was also the residuary beneficiary of the will, concluded that the decedent spent the process of the sales prior to his death. The personal representative filed a final accounting and petition for distribution calling for the beneficiaries to receive nothing and the residuary beneficiary to receive the net distributable estate. The district court denied the final accounting and petition for distribution. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that the decedent did not intend ademption of his specific devise of the lots, so the proceeds of the sale of the lots were to be distributed to the beneficiaries, regardless of whether the original funds could be traced; (2) incorrectly concluded that the decedent did not intend ademption of the devise of the CDs and thus erred in ordering the personal representative to distribute to the beneficiaries the value of those CDs; and (3) did not err when it denied the final accounting submitted by the personal representative. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Schreiber" on Justia Law

Virginia Jepsen executed her last will and testament on July 1, 2009, and died on November 16, 2011. On December 20, 2011, the superior court admitted Jepsen's will to probate, declared the estate was solvent, and appointed Julie Miles as personal representative (PR) with nonintervention powers. On March 22, 2012, Jepsen's adult son, Mack, filed a petition contesting the validity of Jepsen's will. Mack's attorney e-mailed the petition to the PR's attorney the same day it was filed. There was nothing in the record showing that the PR affirmatively agreed to accept e-mail service on her attorney in lieu of personal service on the PR. On April27, 2012, the PR filed a response to Mack's petition, denying its substantive allegations but not raising any affirmative defenses. On October 31, 2012, the PR filed a motion to dismiss Mack's petition because it was not personally served within 90 days of filing. The trial court initially granted the PR' s motion but reversed itself on reconsideration, holding that service under RCW 11.24.010 went solely to personal jurisdiction and that any objection on that basis was waived. The PR appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the will contest petition was never personally served on the personal representative, so the action was therefore never fully commenced and should have been dismissed. View "In re Estate of Jepsen" on Justia Law