Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

On October 14, 2010, OneWest Bank sued Standard, as trustee, and unknown trust beneficiaries, to foreclose a “reverse equity” adjustable-rate mortgage on property held by the trust and executed in 2009. Standard filed an answer and counterclaim on July 19, 2011, seeking to rescind the mortgage, alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 15 U.S.C. 1601. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Standard was not an “obligor” under TILA and was not entitled to rescind the transaction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The trustee has legal and equitable title to the property and is the only party with an ownership interest in the property since the beneficiary’s interest is in the trust itself and is considered personal property. Standard, was entitled to receive TILA disclosures, including notice of the right to rescind after it entered into the consumer credit transaction. Because TILA disclosures were not provided to Standard, the three-day right to rescind period was extended to three years. Standard timely exercised its right to rescind when it gave notice on June 2, 2011. View "Fin. Freedom Acquisition, LLC v. Standard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

The estate of husband, William E. Simendinger, appealed an injunction order by the Superior Court that encumbered all real property held by the estate. Husband's estate also challenged the family court's award of attorney's fees. Wife Connie Simendinger and husband were married in 1987. They divorced in 2014. The final order and decree of divorce incorporated a stipulation between the parties, which provided in pertinent part that in lieu of alimony, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $2,250,000 ($50,000 within 30 days and the balance of $2,200,000 in one year). This amount was secured by real estate, and had been owned solely by the husband, free and clear of all mortgages. Wife received the $50,000, but husband did not subsequently pay the $2.2 million balance or secure the unpaid amount in real estate. After the thirty-day deadline passed, wife filed a motion for contempt and enforcement, as well as a motion for attorney's fees. The family court set a hearing date for August 2014 to determine how best to proceed. The decree nisi became absolute on May 3, 2014. Then husband died unexpectedly on July 14. His estate was substituted as party. The family court denied the contempt motion, and enjoined the estate from disposing or otherwise encumbering any real estate that might be subject to the divorce decree stipulation. On appeal, husband's estate argued that the family court abused its discretion by: (1) issuing an injunction against husband's estate absent a hearing to show that husband had violated a court order; (2) including certain "business properties" within the scope of the injunction; and (3) awarding attorney's fees to wife without first clearly establishing a factual basis to support an award of attorney's fees. Upon review of the family court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Simendinger v. Simendinger" on Justia Law

After almost five years of litigation, the probate court issued its final judgment in the formal testate proceeding concerning the estate of Mildred D. MacComb. James Richman appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected Richman’s brief and his amended brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. Richman asked that the Court reconsider the rejection of his amended brief and the dismissal of his appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion for reconsideration, as Richman failed to comply with the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure and a direct order from the Court. View "In re Estate of MacComb" on Justia Law

Larry Butler, individually and as executor of the Estate of Elizabeth S. Butler, appealed a circuit court judgment declaring void the will of Elizabeth S. Butler executed in October 2012, and setting aside the Probate Court's admission of that will to probate. Ned Butler, Sr. ("Ned"), and Elizabeth Butler ("Betty") were married and had three children, Ned N. Butler, Jr., Steve Butler, and Michael Robin Butler ("Robin"). In July 2008, after numerous discussions about their estate, Ned and Betty executed a document entitled The Butler Family Trust, a joint revocable living trust that contained provisions for the well being of themselves, their children, and their grandchildren. Ned and Betty executed wills identical in all material respects that provided that their assets pour over into The Butler Family Trust at their deaths. In September 2011, Ned and Betty executed new wills that were virtually identical to their July 2008 wills with the exception that different alternate executors were named. Ned died in late 2011. In October 2012, Betty executed a will in which she expressly revoked all other wills and codicils. The distribution of Betty's estate in this new will differed from the distribution of her estate as provided in The Butler Family Trust; Larry was named executor of her will. Betty died in late 2013. The Probate Court admitted Betty's 2012 will to probate in 2014. The following day, Ned Jr.'s children filed a complaint with the Circuit Court against Larry, individually and as executor of Betty's estate, contesting Betty's 2012 will. The circuit court set aside Betty's will and declared it void. Larry moved to vacate the circuit court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in applying 43-8-250, Ala. Code 1975, to the facts of this case because, as he contended, there was language in the Butler Family Trust prohibiting Betty from changing the trust after Ned's death, but that there was no language in either the Family Trust or Betty's earlier wills creating a contract that prohibited her from changing anything else. The circuit court denied the motion, and Larry appealed. Because the evidence did not establish that Betty entered into a contract not to revoke her will or a devise, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court's judgment declaring Betty's 2012 will to be void and setting aside the probate court's order to admit that will to probate because Betty had executed a contract not to revoke her 2011 will was erroneous. View "Butler v. Butler" on Justia Law

William Stephens had two children who were born out of wedlock, Frank Debter and Vickie Estes. Stephens died in 2011; he executed his last will and testament in early 2006. In it, Stephens made several specific bequests of money, and he left the residue of his estate to Estes. He did not make Debter a beneficiary under the will. Debter filed a caveat to executor Roy Stephens' petition to probate the decedent Stephens' will in solemn form, challenging the validity of the will. Debter claimed that the will was a product of undue influence and that the decedent Stephens intended for Debter to share in his estate as if he were a formally legitimated child. The probate court rejected Debter's caveat, and Debter appealed to the superior court. Once there, the executor filed a motion for summary judgment which the superior court summarily granted in 2014. Instead of filing a timely notice of appeal from this ruling, Debter filed a motion for new trial, asserting that he had discovered new material evidence which undermined the superior court's summary judgment decision. The trial court denied Debter's motion for new trial, prompting this appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal because his notice for appeal was untimely filed. The Court noted that Debter did not present evidence that would qualify as "newly discovered evidence" to challenge the grant of summary judgment to the executor; he merely presented evidence that he should have, but failed to, produce earlier in the case. View "Debter v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Under the terms of the will of Etta Jurgens (the decedent), Janice Litherland was to receive certain real estate if it was owned by Etta at the time of her death. Gary Jurgens (Jurgens) and Velda Lenners were also beneficiaries under the decedent’s will. Prior to the decedent’s death, Jurgens, as the decedent’s attorney in fact, sold the property. Under a separate provision of the will, the proceeds from the sale were deposited into the decedent’s bank accounts and divided equally among Litherland, Jurgens, and Lenners upon the decedent’s death. Litherland later brought this action against Jurgens and Lenners for unjust enrichment, intentional interference with an inheritance, and conspiracy. The district court dismissed Litherland’s action. Litherland appealed, challenging the district court’s dismissal of her claims for interference with an inheritance and conspiracy. At issue on appeal was whether Nebraska recognizes a cause of action for the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the tort as a cause of action that is permitted in Nebraska and therefore affirmed the district court, concluding that without such an underlying tort, both of Litherland’s claims challenged on appeal failed. View "Litherland v. Jurgens" on Justia Law

Appellant Helen Wilson was an elderly woman residing at the Palmer Pioneer home with her husband. Helen previously lived in her own house but was unable to manage her medications and nutrition independently. Her son and grandson lived with her but were unable or unwilling to help. After Adult Protective Services received several reports of harm, a temporary emergency guardian was appointed for Helen; the guardian placed her in an assisted living facility and then in the Pioneer Home. Despite her limited financial means, Helen continued to support her son and grandson, who remained in her house. The master observed that Helen needed help managing personal care because she “was previously unable to maintain the level of necessary care prior to the petition being filed” and her family had previously “interfered with [personal care assistants].” And the master found that Helen needed assistance applying for benefits and managing her assets due to her “limited math abilities,” “age-related cognitive decline,” “tendency to give away more money than she can afford,” and “extremely tight budget,” which made “[h]er ability to receive benefits . . . a major factor in maintaining her current level of independence.” Accordingly the master gave the guardian authority to provide for Helen’s personal care, apply for insurance and government benefits, and“control [Helen’s] estate and income . . . to pay for the cost of services that the guardian is authorized to obtain on behalf of [Helen].” He recognized that Helen should be free to give away her discretionary income, but that she needed “a partial guardian [to] ensure that she only gives money away after her own necessities, including adequate nutrition, medication, and housing costs, have been met.” Before the superior court ruled on the master’s recommendations, the public guardian filed a motion for sale of Helen’s residence to help defray costs required to meet her daily needs. Helen appeals the appointment of a partial public guardian and full conservator, particularly for their role in making decisions on her behalf, and for selling her house. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wilson v. Alaska Dept. of Law" on Justia Law

The litigation resulting in these consolidated appeals stemmed from disputes within the Cohen family. Maurice placed his assets the “Maurice Trust,” and after he died, the trust assets were passed to trust (“the QTIP Trust”), and to a charitable organization (“Fund”). After Maurice’s wife died, the remaining assets of the QTIP Trust rolled over to the Fund. Later, half of the Fund’s assets were given to a new charity, the C-S Foundation (“C-S”). The Fund’s successor, the FPE Foundation (“FPE”) filed this federal case against the Cohens’ two children, one of their spouses, and the advisor to the co-trustees of the QTIP Trust. FPE filed this federal case against members of the Cohen family, alleging that certain Defendants exceeded their powers as co-trustees of the QTIP trust and that the co-trustees’ advisor breached his fiduciary duty to that trust. C-S intervened and counterclaimed against FPE. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause contained in the Maurice Trust. The district court allowed the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendants did not waive their right to arbitration, and thus, dismissal was appropriate; and (2) C-S’s counterclaim was subject to the arbitration clause in the Maurice Trust. View "FPE Found. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each applied for Medicaid institutional care coverage shortly after purchasing a short-term annuity. The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS) classified each of their annuities as a resource when determining Medicaid eligibility. This classification meant that the value of each annuity precluded them from receiving Medicaid assistance and resulted in a penalty period of ineligibility. The district court held that the plaintiffs’ purchases of the short-term annuities were sham transactions intended only to shield resources from Medicaid calculations, and affirmed DHS’s imposition of a period of Medicaid ineligibility, but held that, contrary to DHS’s arguments, a Pennsylvania statute that purported to make all annuities assignable was preempted by federal law. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, finding that the statute was preempted, but reversed in part, citing “safe harbor” provisions, under which, certain annuities are not considered resources for purposes of Medicaid eligibility, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(1)(F). The court noted the qualifications for safe-harbor protection: the annuity must name the state as the remainder beneficiary, be irrevocable and nonassignable, be actuarially sound, and provide for payments in equal amounts during its term, with no deferral and no balloon payments. The court rejected the state’s argument that the annuities were “trust-like.” View "Zahner v. Sec'y Pa. Dept. of Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2010, the divorce court entered a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage of Charles Dahl and Kim Dahl. Kim appealed, challenging several of the district court’s rulings in the divorce case. Kim also appealed the dismissal of her claims in a separate, but related, lawsuit involving marital assets contained in the Dahl Family Irrevocable Trust. The district court consolidated, sua sponte, these cases for the purposes of appeal and remanded the consolidated case to the divorce court, holding that the Trust should have been joined as a party to the divorce action. View "Dahl v. Dahl" on Justia Law