Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law

A.M.M. was the mother of eight adult children, including Timothy McCann. Timothy filed a petition requesting that he be appointed A.M.M’s sole guardian and conservator. After a trial, the district court found that A.M.M. was an incapacitated person, appointed attorney Casey Emerson as guardian and appointed Timothy, Timothy’s brother, and attorney Douglas Wold as joint conservators. The district court later awarded attorney fees to Wold and Emerson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by denying Timothy’s motion to vacate, nor did the court err in its ruling on any of the issues therein; (2) did not abuse its discretion by striking Timothy’s reply brief for untimely service; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it limited the powers of the conservators to act on behalf of A.M.M. in her role as a corporate director or signatory; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by ordering payment of attorney fees to either Wold or Emerson. Lastly, Timothy’s allegations of attorney misconduct were not properly before the Court. View "In re Guardianship of A.M.M." on Justia Law

Howard H. Mills (the Decedent) died, survived by three sons - Howard W. (Howard), John, and David. On August 21, 2014, Howard petitioned for formal probate of Decedent’s will and appointment of a personal representative. The district court informed the parties that any objections may be filed within fourteen days, by October 6, 2014. Neither John nor David filed an objection by the district court’s deadline. On October 15, 2014, Howard moved the district court for entry of default against John and David for failure to object to the petition. Before an actual default was entered, John and David each filed motions to set aside the default. After a hearing at which neither John nor David was present, the district court issued an order denying John and David’s requests to set aside the defaults. The district court subsequently appointed Howard as personal representative and admitted the will to formal probate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by determining that David failed to establish good cause for not filing timely and potentially meritorious objections to the initiation of the formal probate proceedings. View "In re Estate of Mills" on Justia Law

Gerri Rogers appealed a Probate Court order removing her as the personal representative of the estate of Ilse Martha Nagel. Appellee Sigrid Hansen argued that Rogers's appeal should have been dismissed because dismissed because Rogers failed to post bond as required by section 12-22-24, Ala. Code 1975. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with Hansen and dismissed the appeal. View "Rogers v. Hansen" on Justia Law

John McAdams, in his official capacity as Chancery Clerk of Harrison County, was appointed guardian of Sybil Bowden and Jonathan Dunn. In October 2003 the Chancery Clerk opened guardianship accounts for Dunn and Bowden at the Peoples Bank of Biloxi, Mississippi. Woodrow "Woody" Pringle III served as the Chancery Clerk's attorney. The Chancery Clerk was the sole signatory on both accounts. Two years later, Pringle closed the Bowden guardianship, without any authority to do so. The Bank issued Pringle a cashier's check payable to Bowden and Pringle, jointly. Pringle forged Bowden's signature, cashed the check, and retained the funds for himself. The Dunn account required a court order before disbursements could be made. The Bank paid checks drawn on the Dunn guardianship account, in the absence of a court order. The Chancery Clerk filed suit against the Bank alleging gross negligence, negligence, and conversion of a negotiable instrument. The Bank pleaded that the statute of limitations had run on these claims and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion. The Bank petitioned the Supreme Court and was granted leave to file this interlocutory appeal. The Court found that the Chancery Clerk filed his complaint May 8, 2013. The three transactions at issue occurred on January 24, 2005; June 11, 2008; and March 25, 2009. As to the conversion claims, the most recent transaction occurred more than four years before the filing of the complaint (well outside the three-year statute of limitations). However, negligence/gross negligence claims were subject to the "discovery rule." The Bank offered evidence that it sent statements to the Chancery Clerk concerning these transactions on the last day of each month. The Chancery Clerk offered no proof to dispute the Bank's assertion, although he claims he never received a Bank statement because Pringle removed the Bank statements delivered to the Chancery Clerk. "The statute-of-limitations issue is not a question of fact because reasonable minds could not differ [. . .] that the Chancery Clerk lacked diligence in failing to obtain and review any account statements for more than a year and a half on one account and more than eight years on the other." The Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in refusing to grant the Bank its motion for summary judgment because the Chancery Clerk's claims expired due to the applicable statutes of limitation. View "Peoples Bank of Biloxi, Miss. v. McAdams" on Justia Law

Before he died, John Markey entered into a contract with his second wife, Frances, to make and not revoke a mutual will providing that, upon the death of whomever died later, the couple’s estate would be divided equally between John’s son, David, and Frances’s granddaughter. After John died, Frances breached the contract, instead leaving everything to her own children. Approximately nine months after Frances’s death, David filed suit to enforce the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that a breach of contract regarding mutual wills is neither a “claim” in probate nor a will contest and is therefore subject to the three-month statute of limitations for suits challenging the distribution pursuant to a probated will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the statutory definition of “claim” under the Probate Code includes an action for breach of a contract to make and not revoke a will. Remanded to consider the timeliness of David’s claim, considered under the Probate Code. View "Markey v. Estate of Markey" on Justia Law

Before he died, John Markey entered into a contract with his second wife, Frances, to make and not revoke a mutual will providing that, upon the death of whomever died later, the couple’s estate would be divided equally between John’s son, David, and Frances’s granddaughter. After John died, Frances breached the contract, instead leaving everything to her own children. Approximately nine months after Frances’s death, David filed suit to enforce the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that a breach of contract regarding mutual wills is neither a “claim” in probate nor a will contest and is therefore subject to the three-month statute of limitations for suits challenging the distribution pursuant to a probated will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the statutory definition of “claim” under the Probate Code includes an action for breach of a contract to make and not revoke a will. Remanded to consider the timeliness of David’s claim, considered under the Probate Code. View "Markey v. Estate of Markey" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the tragic death of Myroslava Kotsovska, who was fatally injured when defendant Saul Liebman, for whom decedent worked as a caretaker, inadvertently struck her with his car. Petitioner Olena Kotsovska, as administratrix of the decedent's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Liebman. Liebman did not dispute that decedent's injuries were the result of his negligence. Instead, Liebman argued that, because decedent was his employee, petitioner could recover only under the Workers Compensation Act. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it would need to decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether decedent was an employee or an independent contractor and explained the factors that it should consider in reaching that conclusion. The judge also informed the jury that it should give whatever weight it deemed appropriate to the facts. The jury returned a verdict in favor of petitioner, found that decedent was an independent contractor and awarded decedent's estate a total of $525,000 in damages. Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. Relying on the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions in "Kristiansen v. Morgan," (153 N.J.298 (1998)), and "Wunschel v. City of Jersey City," (96 N.J.651 (1984)), the panel concluded that the Division had primary jurisdiction over the dispute regarding decedent's employment status. The panel rejected defendant's challenges to the damages award, reversed the judgment on liability only, and remanded the matter to the Division for a determination of decedent's employment status. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Compensation Act divested the Superior Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the decedent's employment status once defendant raised an exclusive remedy provision of the Act as an affirmative defense. Further, the Court addressed whether the jury charge was deficient enough to require reversal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction to resolve the dispute based on the dispute over the decedent's employment status. Further, the Court could not conclude that the jury instruction given confused or otherwise mislead the jury. Consequently, the Court reversed the Appellant Division and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Estate of Kotsovska v. Liebman" on Justia Law

B.K.J. appealed a district court order appointing J.W. and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. ("G.A.P.S"), as her co-guardians. B.K.J.'s niece, J.W., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and a conservator on grounds B.K.J. suffered mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease and dementia and had shown decline in her ability to care for herself and her finances. Particularly, J.W. asserted B.K.J. had over $600,000 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties and had allegedly been taken advantage of monetarily by certain friends and family members. After a hearing for emergency guardianship, the district court appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as emergency co-guardians to B.K.J. pending further hearing. The district court appointed a physician and a visitor to examine B.K.J., and an attorney to represent B.K.J. as guardian ad litem. A hearing was held on the petition. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that a guardianship was necessary for B.K.J., and that she did not oppose the appointment of First International Bank as her conservator. The court-appointed physician, the court-appointed visitor, B.K.J.'s guardian ad litem, and others testified regarding the extent of B.K.J.'s incapacity, the necessity of a guardian, and who should be appointed as B.K.J.'s guardian. B.K.J. testified that she did not want J.W. appointed as her guardian and nominated two of her friends, F.C. and T.C., to be appointed as her co-guardians. The district court appointed First International Bank as B.K.J.'s conservator and appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians, concluding the evidence established they were the proper and best qualified persons to serve as her guardians and represent the best interests of B.K.J. B.K.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of B.K.J." on Justia Law

Mary is the child of the marriage of Marion and Herbert Sanders. Marion executed a will in California, placing her separate property assets in the Trust and providing that Mary would receive the Trust income during her lifetime. Upon Mary’s death, the remainder of the Trust was to be distributed “for the benefit of the then living issue” of Mary. The will defined ‘’issue" as lawful lineal descendants of all degrees, including legally adopted children. If Mary had “no living issue” surviving, Jody was to become the income beneficiary of the Trust. In 2013, Mary adopted Andrew, the adult son of a close friend, and sought a declaration of Andrew's rights. The probate court concluded that Andrew did not fall within this definition of “issue” because he had been adopted as an adult under Texas adoption statutes. The probate court believed that a Texas parent-child relationship did not encompass the same rights and duties as a California parent-child relationship. The court of appeal reversed. California cannot devalue a parent-child relationship simply because it was created, whether by biology or adoption, in a sister state that imposes different rights and duties. Those policy choices do not alter the status of the relationship. View "Sanders v. Yanez" on Justia Law