Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

William Stephens had two children who were born out of wedlock, Frank Debter and Vickie Estes. Stephens died in 2011; he executed his last will and testament in early 2006. In it, Stephens made several specific bequests of money, and he left the residue of his estate to Estes. He did not make Debter a beneficiary under the will. Debter filed a caveat to executor Roy Stephens' petition to probate the decedent Stephens' will in solemn form, challenging the validity of the will. Debter claimed that the will was a product of undue influence and that the decedent Stephens intended for Debter to share in his estate as if he were a formally legitimated child. The probate court rejected Debter's caveat, and Debter appealed to the superior court. Once there, the executor filed a motion for summary judgment which the superior court summarily granted in 2014. Instead of filing a timely notice of appeal from this ruling, Debter filed a motion for new trial, asserting that he had discovered new material evidence which undermined the superior court's summary judgment decision. The trial court denied Debter's motion for new trial, prompting this appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal because his notice for appeal was untimely filed. The Court noted that Debter did not present evidence that would qualify as "newly discovered evidence" to challenge the grant of summary judgment to the executor; he merely presented evidence that he should have, but failed to, produce earlier in the case. View "Debter v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Under the terms of the will of Etta Jurgens (the decedent), Janice Litherland was to receive certain real estate if it was owned by Etta at the time of her death. Gary Jurgens (Jurgens) and Velda Lenners were also beneficiaries under the decedent’s will. Prior to the decedent’s death, Jurgens, as the decedent’s attorney in fact, sold the property. Under a separate provision of the will, the proceeds from the sale were deposited into the decedent’s bank accounts and divided equally among Litherland, Jurgens, and Lenners upon the decedent’s death. Litherland later brought this action against Jurgens and Lenners for unjust enrichment, intentional interference with an inheritance, and conspiracy. The district court dismissed Litherland’s action. Litherland appealed, challenging the district court’s dismissal of her claims for interference with an inheritance and conspiracy. At issue on appeal was whether Nebraska recognizes a cause of action for the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the tort as a cause of action that is permitted in Nebraska and therefore affirmed the district court, concluding that without such an underlying tort, both of Litherland’s claims challenged on appeal failed. View "Litherland v. Jurgens" on Justia Law

Appellant Helen Wilson was an elderly woman residing at the Palmer Pioneer home with her husband. Helen previously lived in her own house but was unable to manage her medications and nutrition independently. Her son and grandson lived with her but were unable or unwilling to help. After Adult Protective Services received several reports of harm, a temporary emergency guardian was appointed for Helen; the guardian placed her in an assisted living facility and then in the Pioneer Home. Despite her limited financial means, Helen continued to support her son and grandson, who remained in her house. The master observed that Helen needed help managing personal care because she “was previously unable to maintain the level of necessary care prior to the petition being filed” and her family had previously “interfered with [personal care assistants].” And the master found that Helen needed assistance applying for benefits and managing her assets due to her “limited math abilities,” “age-related cognitive decline,” “tendency to give away more money than she can afford,” and “extremely tight budget,” which made “[h]er ability to receive benefits . . . a major factor in maintaining her current level of independence.” Accordingly the master gave the guardian authority to provide for Helen’s personal care, apply for insurance and government benefits, and“control [Helen’s] estate and income . . . to pay for the cost of services that the guardian is authorized to obtain on behalf of [Helen].” He recognized that Helen should be free to give away her discretionary income, but that she needed “a partial guardian [to] ensure that she only gives money away after her own necessities, including adequate nutrition, medication, and housing costs, have been met.” Before the superior court ruled on the master’s recommendations, the public guardian filed a motion for sale of Helen’s residence to help defray costs required to meet her daily needs. Helen appeals the appointment of a partial public guardian and full conservator, particularly for their role in making decisions on her behalf, and for selling her house. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wilson v. Alaska Dept. of Law" on Justia Law

The litigation resulting in these consolidated appeals stemmed from disputes within the Cohen family. Maurice placed his assets the “Maurice Trust,” and after he died, the trust assets were passed to trust (“the QTIP Trust”), and to a charitable organization (“Fund”). After Maurice’s wife died, the remaining assets of the QTIP Trust rolled over to the Fund. Later, half of the Fund’s assets were given to a new charity, the C-S Foundation (“C-S”). The Fund’s successor, the FPE Foundation (“FPE”) filed this federal case against the Cohens’ two children, one of their spouses, and the advisor to the co-trustees of the QTIP Trust. FPE filed this federal case against members of the Cohen family, alleging that certain Defendants exceeded their powers as co-trustees of the QTIP trust and that the co-trustees’ advisor breached his fiduciary duty to that trust. C-S intervened and counterclaimed against FPE. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause contained in the Maurice Trust. The district court allowed the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendants did not waive their right to arbitration, and thus, dismissal was appropriate; and (2) C-S’s counterclaim was subject to the arbitration clause in the Maurice Trust. View "FPE Found. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each applied for Medicaid institutional care coverage shortly after purchasing a short-term annuity. The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS) classified each of their annuities as a resource when determining Medicaid eligibility. This classification meant that the value of each annuity precluded them from receiving Medicaid assistance and resulted in a penalty period of ineligibility. The district court held that the plaintiffs’ purchases of the short-term annuities were sham transactions intended only to shield resources from Medicaid calculations, and affirmed DHS’s imposition of a period of Medicaid ineligibility, but held that, contrary to DHS’s arguments, a Pennsylvania statute that purported to make all annuities assignable was preempted by federal law. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, finding that the statute was preempted, but reversed in part, citing “safe harbor” provisions, under which, certain annuities are not considered resources for purposes of Medicaid eligibility, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(1)(F). The court noted the qualifications for safe-harbor protection: the annuity must name the state as the remainder beneficiary, be irrevocable and nonassignable, be actuarially sound, and provide for payments in equal amounts during its term, with no deferral and no balloon payments. The court rejected the state’s argument that the annuities were “trust-like.” View "Zahner v. Sec'y Pa. Dept. of Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2010, the divorce court entered a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage of Charles Dahl and Kim Dahl. Kim appealed, challenging several of the district court’s rulings in the divorce case. Kim also appealed the dismissal of her claims in a separate, but related, lawsuit involving marital assets contained in the Dahl Family Irrevocable Trust. The district court consolidated, sua sponte, these cases for the purposes of appeal and remanded the consolidated case to the divorce court, holding that the Trust should have been joined as a party to the divorce action. View "Dahl v. Dahl" on Justia Law

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law

A.M.M. was the mother of eight adult children, including Timothy McCann. Timothy filed a petition requesting that he be appointed A.M.M’s sole guardian and conservator. After a trial, the district court found that A.M.M. was an incapacitated person, appointed attorney Casey Emerson as guardian and appointed Timothy, Timothy’s brother, and attorney Douglas Wold as joint conservators. The district court later awarded attorney fees to Wold and Emerson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by denying Timothy’s motion to vacate, nor did the court err in its ruling on any of the issues therein; (2) did not abuse its discretion by striking Timothy’s reply brief for untimely service; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it limited the powers of the conservators to act on behalf of A.M.M. in her role as a corporate director or signatory; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by ordering payment of attorney fees to either Wold or Emerson. Lastly, Timothy’s allegations of attorney misconduct were not properly before the Court. View "In re Guardianship of A.M.M." on Justia Law

Howard H. Mills (the Decedent) died, survived by three sons - Howard W. (Howard), John, and David. On August 21, 2014, Howard petitioned for formal probate of Decedent’s will and appointment of a personal representative. The district court informed the parties that any objections may be filed within fourteen days, by October 6, 2014. Neither John nor David filed an objection by the district court’s deadline. On October 15, 2014, Howard moved the district court for entry of default against John and David for failure to object to the petition. Before an actual default was entered, John and David each filed motions to set aside the default. After a hearing at which neither John nor David was present, the district court issued an order denying John and David’s requests to set aside the defaults. The district court subsequently appointed Howard as personal representative and admitted the will to formal probate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by determining that David failed to establish good cause for not filing timely and potentially meritorious objections to the initiation of the formal probate proceedings. View "In re Estate of Mills" on Justia Law

Gerri Rogers appealed a Probate Court order removing her as the personal representative of the estate of Ilse Martha Nagel. Appellee Sigrid Hansen argued that Rogers's appeal should have been dismissed because dismissed because Rogers failed to post bond as required by section 12-22-24, Ala. Code 1975. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with Hansen and dismissed the appeal. View "Rogers v. Hansen" on Justia Law