Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This is an appeal of a federal income tax refund suit filed by the Estate of George Batchelor (“Estate”). Counts I and II of the Estate’s three-count complaint involve Batchelor’s personal income taxes for 1999 and 2000. Count III concerns the Estate’s attempt to claim a credit for its 2005 income taxes for payments it made in settlement of various lawsuits against Batchelor. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying res judicata to bar the government’s claims in Counts I and II and reversed the district court's decision. Since the Estate has failed to identify an applicable deduction identified in 26 U.S.C. 691(b), the court found no error in the district court’s determination that the Estate cannot avoid section 642(g)’s bar on double deductions, and therefore affirmed on Count III. View "Batchelor-Robjohns v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s husband executed a will prior to his marriage to Plaintiff that devised nothing to Plaintiff. After the decedent died, Plaintiff requested that her statutory share be set out. The trial court affirmed in part the judgment of the probate court, concluding (1) the value of the statutory share should be calculated based on the value of the estate as of the date of distribution rather than the value of the estate at the time of the decedent’s death; (2) with respect to the period prior to the date of distribution, Plaintiff was entitled to an average yield of one third of the estate during that time; (3) the probate court properly appointed distributors to set out the statutory share; (4) Plaintiff’s claim to a statutory share was not barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and election of remedies; and (5) the statutory share should be calculated prior to the subtraction of taxes from the value of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Dinan v. Patten" on Justia Law

In 2002, James Edmonds executed a will that left all of his personal property to his wife, Elizabeth, and the remainder of his property to a revocable living trust. After James died, his original will could not be located. Elizabeth filed a complaint seeking to have a copy of the will and trust to be probated. The trial court ordered that a photocopy of the 2002 will be probated, concluding that Elizabeth had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not revoked. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts were sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that James did not destroy the original 2002 will with the intention of revoking it. View "Edmonds v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

When decedent Robyn R. Lewis died in 2010, a will was admitted to probate that was executed by Decedent in Texas in 1996. Objections to probate were filed by various members of Decedent’s family. The Surrogate dismissed the objections to the 1996 will and admitted it to probate. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision and decree. The Court of Appeals modified the orders of the Appellate Division by remitting to Surrogate’s Court for further proceedings, holding that crucial issues remained sufficient to raise the presumption that Decedent revoked her 1996 will. View "In re Lewis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint on behalf of two estates, claiming that financial institutions fraudulently transferred real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed on the ground that a non-attorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an estate, even though plaintiffs claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their respective estates. Each signed the notice of appeal as the “Authorized Representative” of the estates. Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 1654. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the sole beneficiary of an estate without creditors may represent the estate pro se. The purpose of protecting third parties is not implicated when the only person affected by a nonattorney’s representation is the nonattorney herself. The tradition that “a corporation can only appear by attorney,” has not been extended to estates. View "Bass v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

Glenn Solberg appealed a district court judgment dismissing his petition for allowance of a claim against the estate of Lyle Nelson, his deceased mother's second husband. Lyle Nelson died in 2012. He was married to Solberg's mother, Lillian (Solberg) Nelson, who died in 2003. Solberg's father died in the 1960s. Under Lillian Nelson's will, Solberg was devised 25 mineral acres located in Williams County. He also was devised "one hundred (100) mineral acres out of what I have remaining at the time of my death in and under other real property, in appreciation for breaking up some of my land during my lifetime." A codicil to his mother's will devised Solberg an option to purchase certain farmland in Williams County previously owned by his parents at $275 per acre. The option was for two years from the date of his mother's death. In the probate of Lillian Nelson's estate in 2003, Solberg received 25 mineral acres located in Williams County. Solberg filed a claim against Lyle Nelson's estate, claiming under his mother's will and codicil that he was entitled to 100 mineral acres and to purchase farmland owned by his parents at $275 per acre. First National Bank and Trust of Williston, as personal representative of Lyle Nelson's estate, disallowed the claim, stating Lillian Nelson owned only 25 mineral acres at her death, which were conveyed to Solberg. Solberg then petitioned the district court to allow the claim. The Bank moved to dismiss the claim, arguing Lillian Nelson did not own any additional mineral acres at the time of her death, Lyle Nelson did not own or possess any of Lillian Nelson's mineral acres and the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Solberg opposed the motion and requested the court to take judicial notice of his parents' Williams County probate documents. The court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss. The district court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss Solberg's claim, stating "grounds for dismissal exist as argued in the [Bank's] Brief." No further explanation was provided. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the court's order did not provide an adequate explanation of the legal basis for its decision, and it was unable to properly review the case. The district court also erred under N.D.R.Ev. 201(c) by not addressing Solberg's request to take judicial notice of his parents' Williams County probate documents. The Court reversed the judgment dismissing Solberg's claim against Lyle Nelson's estate and remanded to the district court with directions to explain the legal basis for its decision and address Solberg's judicial notice request. View "Estate of Nelson" on Justia Law

Rodney Hogen appealed and Steven Hogen, as personal representative of the estate of Arline Hogen, cross-appealed an order approving a final accounting and settlement in the probate of the estate of Arline Hogen. After review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not err in concluding the devolution of real property to Rodney Hogen was subject to the personal representative's power during administration of the estate to seek a retainer for any noncontingent indebtedness Rodney Hogen owed Arline Hogen or the estate. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred to the extent it calculated the estate's retainer based on Barnes County conservation reserve program land, but we otherwise conclude the court did not clearly err in determining the estate's retainer against Rodney Hogen's interest in the estate. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding personal representative fees and attorney fees. In affirming in part, and reversing in part, the Court remanded the case for recalculation of the retainer against Rodney Hogen's interest in the estate after considering the effect of the Barnes County conservation reserve program land on the cash rent for the Barnes County land and on the average per acre cost of production for the Cass County Land. View "Estate of Hogen" on Justia Law

James Broten, Louise Broten, and Linda Schuler are the children of Olaf Broten and Helen Broten ("the parents"). The parents originally owned approximately 480 acres of farmland in Barnes County. In 1979, they executed a quitclaim deed granting the father sole ownership of the farmland, and also entered into a contract for deed with James Broten agreeing to convey him the farmland for $200,000 plus six percent interest paid annually through 2006. The contract for deed was prepared by James Broten's attorney but never recorded. Also in 1979, the parents each executed a last will and testament in which the farmland was to be placed in trust, with the mother receiving the income for life, and the principal distributed equally to the children upon her death. After his father's death, James Broten was appointed as personal representative of the estate. He obtained written waivers of appointment from the mother and his siblings granting him the right to waive all rights of service of notice from his actions, including an inventory and final accounting of the estate. He filed an informal probate of the father's will and conveyed the farmland to himself with his mother receiving a life estate. The deed was recorded. He continued to pay for his mother's living expenses until her death in 2010, but he occasionally withdrew funds from his mother's checking account. After the mother's death in 2010, the sisters were appointed the co-representatives of the mother's estate. Louise Broten became aware of James Broten's conveyance of the farmland to himself. The sisters, as personal representatives and individually, sued James. James appealed a judgment and amended judgment, following a bench trial, finding that as personal representative to Olaf Broten's estate, he had breached his fiduciary duties by transferring real property to himself, and awarding Louise Broten damages in the amount of the fair market value of the property. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Broten v. Broten" on Justia Law

Marian Davis lost control of her vehicle and struck a vehicle driven by Amy Locke. At the time of the accident, Davis was insured by Safeco Insurance Company under a policy with a $100,000 per person coverage. Davis died from her injuries. Locke, who also sustained injuries, filed a claim for damages against Davis’s estate. Prior to trial, Safeco paid Locke $16,306 for her past medical expenses. After a trial, the jury awarded Locke $400,000 in compensation for her injuries. The Estate appealed, and Safeco intervened. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment because Locke was precluded from recovering against the Estate more than the $100,000 insurance limitation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it made findings and conclusions that effectively bound Safeco to a judgment in a case in which Safeco was not a named party, was not represented by counsel, and did not appear. View "Locke v. Estate of Davis" on Justia Law

Dorothy McLean invested in a certificate of deposit (CD) with Black Hills Federal Credit Union (BHFCU). McLean subsequently changed the CD’s payable-on-death beneficiary from Ronald Studt, her son, to David Sholes, her second cousin. Thereafter, McLean executed a general, durable power of attorney naming Studt as her attorney-in-fact. Studt then sent an email to BHFCU requesting the beneficiary on the CD to be changed to him. After McLean died, Studt filed a declaratory judgment action against BHFCU and Sholes to determine the rightful beneficiary of the CD. During a hearing, Studt argued that the language of the power of attorney granted him broad powers to make gifts to himself. BHFCU and Sholes argued, in the contrary, that the power of attorney did not grant Studt the power to self-deal. The circuit court found that the language in the power of attorney was too broad and general and did not specifically authorize self-dealing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it found that the power of attorney did not permit Studt to engage in self-dealing. View "Studt v. Black Hills Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law