Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Rudolph Bettez died. Rudolph was survived by his three sons - Robert, Ronald, and William - and his second wife, Joyce. Robert Bettez petitioned the probate court to admit Rudolph’s September 2009 to probate. In July 2012, The will was admitted to probate by a consent order. In August 2012, William Bettez appealed, alleging that Defendants - Robert, Ronald, and attorney Daniel Stone - collectively exerted undue influence over Rudolph in order that he exclude William from any share of his estate and that Rudolph lacked testamentary capacity when he executed the will. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in its determination that no evidence of undue influence had been set forth in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Bettez v. Bettez" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the number of mineral acres owned by Todd Hall in a tract of land in Dunn County as a result of a conveyance from Harry L. Malloy to Todd Hall's predecessor in interest, Edwin Hall. Todd Hall claimed he owned 9 net mineral acres in the land and the "Family Mineral Trust" claimed he owns 4.5 net mineral acres in the land. After review of the chain of title for the disputed mineral interests, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that the Family Mineral Trust had no right, title, or interest in disputed mineral interests in a tract of land in Dunn County and in quieting title in the disputed mineral interests to Todd Hall. The Court concluded Harry L. and Lorraine Malloy's 1983 divorce judgment did not convey Harry L. Malloy's after-acquired title in the disputed mineral interests to Lorraine Malloy, which then would have passed the interests to the Family Mineral Trust. View "Hall v. Malloy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are trustees under “Coogan Trust Accounts,” which are statutorily required accounts to preserve 15 percent of a minor’s gross earnings for artistic or creative services for the benefit of the minor until the minor turns 18 or is emancipated (Fam. Code, 6750.) They filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others against Bank of America, alleging breach of written contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unlawful and unfair business practices. The complaint claimed that the bank made withdrawals from Cogan Trust Accounts, including for monthly service fees, without court approval. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed. A bank may not debit a Coogan Trust Account for service fees without court approval (section 6753 (b)). The state law prohibition on a debit by a national bank is not preempted by federal law. View "Phillips v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas W. Sefton, Jr. (Thomas Jr.) appealed a judgment awarding him $565,350, plus interest, from the estate of his grandfather, Joseph W. Sefton, Jr. (Grandfather). Grandfather died in 1966. In Grandfather's will, Grandfather created a testamentary trust for the benefit of his son, Thomas W. Sefton (Father), during Father's life. Upon Father's death, the Trust terminated and its assets were to be distributed. The probate court, interpreting the Court of Appeal's prior opinion in this matter, determined this sum to be the " 'substantial' share" of Grandfather's estate to which Thomas Jr. was entitled. Thomas Jr. argued the probate court misinterpreted "Sefton I" and therefore improperly limited his award from Grandfather's estate. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the probate court's interpretation of Sefton I, while reasonable, was in error. The " 'substantial' share" determined by the probate court was not the correct measure of Thomas Jr.'s award from Grandfather's estate under the facts of this case. In this opinion, the Court resolved the ambiguity from its earlier opinion and clarified the award to which Thomas Jr. is entitled. View "Sefton v. Sefton" on Justia Law

Amine Britel died intestate in 2011. Appellant Jackie Stennett, the mother of A.S., a child born out of wedlock, petitioned to administer Amine’s estate and for A.S. to be declared Amine’s heir. The court denied Jackie’s petitions. It granted the petition of respondent Mouna Britel (Amine’s adult sister) to administer Amine’s estate, which petition listed respondent Rhita Bhitel (Amine’s mother) as Amine’s surviving parent. The Court of Appeal affirmed the court's order, concluding that Probate Code section 6453(b)(2)’s phrase, “openly held out,” required the alleged father to have made an unconcealed affirmative representation of his paternity in open view. The Court also concluded substantial evidence supported the court’s finding Amine did not openly hold out A.S as his child. Further, the Court concluded section 6453(b)(2) did not violate the state or federal equal protection rights of nonmarital children or of nonmarital children who can prove paternity using DNA tests. View "Estate of Britel" on Justia Law

John McConnell created a trust naming his three children - James McConnell, Kathleen Hewitt, and Amy Sheridan - as beneficiaries. A decade later, Hewitt filed an application for, inter alia, a trust accounting and removal of a trustee. Plaintiffs in error represented Hewitt during the proceedings on the application. The probate court approved a stipulated agreement authorizing certain distributions to Hewitt and Sheridan from the trust. McConnell appealed, claiming that he did not receive notice of the probate proceedings and would not have consented to the terms of the stipulated agreement if he had had the opportunity to participate. The trial court issued an order to show cause why McConnell’s appeal should not be sustained and the probate court’s order vacated. The court ordered the Plaintiffs in error to appear at the hearing on the order to show cause. The plaintiffs in error appeared at the hearing and testified about their involvement in the proceedings before the probate court. Thereafter, the plaintiffs in error filed this writ of error challenging the trial court’s authority to order that they appear in court. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that the trial court’s order was not a final judgment from which a writ of error may be brought. View "McConnell v. McConnell" on Justia Law

Paul retained attorney Patton to draft an amendment to his revocable living trust. Paul signed the “Trust Amendment,” which, as drafted by Patton, named his wife, Helen, and his children, Stephen, David, Alan, and Nancy, as beneficiaries. Stephen and David also are the successor trustees. Following Paul’s death, they petitioned the probate court to modify the Trust Amendment, alleging it failed to conform to Paul’s intentions by erroneously granting Helen an interest in brokerage accounts and personal and real property. In that probate court action, Patton admitted the Trust Amendment did not reflect Paul’s intention that his brokerage accounts and personal and real property be divided among his children. Stephen and David settled the probate court action with Helen. The children filed the legal malpractice action, alleging that Patton failed to exercise reasonable care in performing legal services by failing to draft the Trust Amendment in a manner consistent with the decedent’s intentions. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the children could not establish Patton owed them a duty as beneficiaries; they should be permitted to amend their complaint to allege such a duty. View "Paul v. Patton" on Justia Law

In 2009, claimant sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. Claimant had preexisting multilevel degenerative disc disease and a history of intermittent low back pain with some bilateral radiation to his legs. SAIF, the employer's workers' compensation insurer, accepted a claim for a lumbar strain. Claimant subsequently sought acceptance of a combined condition, which SAIF ultimately denied on the ground that the accepted injury was no longer the major contributing cause of the combined condition. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld SAIF's denial, and claimant sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals. On appeal to that court, claimant contended that, in determining the compensability of his claim, the board erroneously had framed the inquiry in terms of whether the accepted condition continued to be the major contributing cause of his disability or need for treatment. In claimant's view, the proper inquiry was whether his accidental injury continued to be the major contributing cause of his combined condition. Claimant contended that there was no evidence that that injury was no longer the major contributing cause of his disability or need for treatment. While judicial review was pending before the Court of Appeals, claimant died of causes unrelated to his workplace injury, without a surviving spouse or other beneficiary entitled to a death benefit. The Court of Appeals held that claimant's estate, through his personal representative, was not authorized to pursue the claim to final determination under ORS 656.218(3) on the grounds that: (1) the estate was not one of the "persons" described in 656.218(5); and (2) the phrase "unpaid balance of the award" in the second sentence of subsection (5) restricted an estate's entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits that were awarded before a worker's death. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: in the absence of persons who would have been entitled to receive death benefits if the injury causing a deceased worker's disability had been fatal, an award of permanent partial disability benefits that is finally determined after the worker's death pursuant to ORS 656.218(3) is payable to the worker's estate under ORS 656.218(5). The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sather v. SAIF" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections (DOC), took advantage of a statutorily created inmate trust fund to place money in the custody of the DOC for his use while serving his sentence. Plaintiff filed suit in Leavenworth District Court pursuant to the Kansas Uniform Trust Code (KUTC) alleging that Defendants were in breach of trust by charging various fees against the balance held in his inmate fund. Defendants successfully moved to transfer venue to Norton District Court. Plaintiff filed a motion to transfer venue back to Leavenworth District court, claiming that because the inmate trust fund was administered at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Leavenworth County, his claims under the KUTC could only be brought in Leavenworth District Court pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 58a-204. The Norton District Court denied Plaintiff’s motion and granted summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff could have filed his suit in Norton County under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-602(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the inmate trust is a trust subject to the KUTC; and (2) the KUTC establishes exclusive venue in the county were the inmate trust fund is administered - i.e., in Leavenworth County. View "Matson v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this petition for the appointment of a guardian over their father. After the probate court denied Plaintiffs’ petition, Plaintiffs appealed. The superior court dismissed the complaint seeking review from the probate decision for Plaintiffs’ failure to adhere to statutory deadlines. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 9-21-6 arguing that the dismissal of the probate court appeal was improper. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the superior court, holding that Plaintiffs’ failure to have satisfied the requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws 33-23-1(a) constituted excusable neglect, and therefore, justice required that Plaintiffs’ appeal be allowed to proceed under section 9-21-6. View "Duffy v. Estate of Scire" on Justia Law