Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Sarah Chitwood was friends with Marjorie Ellmaker. In 2003, Chitwood contacted an attorney to draft a durable power of attorney, naming Ellmaker as her attorney-in-fact. She later had the attorney draft a will. At that time, Chitwood was 85 years old and a widow with no living children. She executed the will, which left a cake plate and glass horse to a married couple who were her friends, her cats to another friend, and the remainder of her estate to Ellmaker. In 2005, Chitwood wanted to sell part of the real property she owned in McCall. She was introduced to Calvin Tabor, a member in A1 Real Estate, LLC which was in the business of flipping houses and buying land to resell. He found a group of investors willing to purchase Chitwood's property. Chitwood entered into a written real estate contract to sell her property to "A1 REAL ESTATE LLC AND/OR AS ASSIGNED." An addendum to the real estate contract stated that Chitwood would finance $227,000 of the purchase price by two promissory notes from A1 Real Estate, LLC, one for $150,000 and the other for $77,000. The addendum also stated that the notes would be secured by A1 Real Estate, LLC and that upon default liens could be placed on the assets of that company. The original note listed "A1 Real Estate LLC" as the borrower, and Tabor signed it "as member of A1 Real Estate." Chitwood died in 2007. The attorney who had drafted her will prepared two affidavits of "Non-Probate" for Ellmaker to sign. In one affidavit, Ellmaker averred that Chitwood died leaving a last will and testament; that Ellmaker was the sole heir; that all of Chitwood's debts, the expenses of her last illness, her funeral expenses, and the applicable estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that upon her death Chitwood owned real property, which was described; and that the affidavit was made for the purpose of transferring the real property to Ellmaker. Ellmaker recorded that affidavit. In the other affidavit, Ellmaker averred that Chitwood had died; that she left a will which was not probated; that Ellmaker was the sole heir; that all of Chitwood's debts, the expenses of her last illness, her funeral expenses, and the applicable estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid; and that the affidavit was made for the purpose of transferring Chitwood's interest in the real estate contract with A1 Real Estate LLC, the promissory note dated May 9, 2005, and "the Agreement dated 2007" to Ellmaker. Ellmaker recorded this affidavit too. Then in 2010, Ellmaker filed this action against Tabor and A1 Real Estate LLC. alleging that Tabor breached an oral contract to pay the note and that all defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, failed to pay the promissory note when due, and had been unjustly enriched. Tabor moved for summary judgment on the ground that he signed the promissory note as a member of A1 Real Estate, LLC and that he was not personally liable on the notes and did not guarantee payment of the note. On the same date, he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Ellmaker lacked standing to bring this action because the estate of Chitwood had not been probated, no personal representative had been appointed, and the three-year statute of limitations for instituting probate proceedings had expired. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. The court refused to admit Chitwood's will into evidence and therefore held that Ellmaker had no legal basis for enforcing the promissory note. The court also granted Tabor's motion for summary judgment on all of the claims asserted against him. Ellmaker appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ellmaker v. Calvin Tabor" on Justia Law

The objector is a beneficiary of the 2005 Brown Revocable Trust, which provided that upon Brown’s death, the objector would receive a house for the care of Brown’s cats. Brown’s conservator, Siegel, filed a probate court petition seeking approval of the sale of that specific property. Siegel contended the sale was necessary for the benefit of the settlor, Brown, who resided in assisted living, because the conservatorship estate lacked funds to maintain Brown’s care during her life. The trustee agreed. The probate court conducted an overbid for the property. Upon receiving a satisfactory bid, the court ordered the property sold. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the objector’s argument that the order granting the petition to sell the property violated Probate Code section 21402 regarding the abatement order for trust assets. The trust requires the trustee to apply trust principal to provide for Brown’s care. If the sale of assets becomes necessary, the trust expressly states that all remainder interests, which include the objector’s rights to the house, are secondary. The court noted the precarious nature of the trust estate and that work needed to repair the house and would cost over $225,572.33, although it is appraised at only $685,000. View "Siegel v. Fife" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Redland family’s dispute over ranch property that some Redland children (“Children”) claimed that their father (“Father”) agreed to place in a family trust. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in entering summary judgment, as questions of fact existed on the issues of whether Children’s claims against Father were barred by the statute of frauds and the statute of limitations. On remand, the district court determined that Children’s claims were not barred and ordered that the disputed property, with the exception of property on which Father resided (“residential property”), be immediately transferred to the family trust. With regard to the residential property, the court ordered that the property be transferred to the trust upon Father’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the district court (1) did not err in holding that an enforceable agreement existed that required placing the disputed property in the trust; (2) did not err in determining that the statute of limitations did not bar Children’s claims; and (3) erred in its disposition of the residential property. Remanded with directions that the residential property be immediately transferred to the family trust subject to Father’s life estate in the property. View "Redland v. Redland" on Justia Law

This action concerned the Will of Dennis Lawlor, who died in 2012. Audrey and John Stoican filed a complaint contesting the Will, claiming, inter alia, that Dennis lacked testamentary capacity at the time the Will was executed and that he was subject to undue influence. The Stoicans then moved to remove the personal representative and the Estate’s attorneys, alleging conflicts of interest. The district court concluded that the Stoicans lacked standing to contest the Will or to petition for the removal of the personal representative or the Estate’s attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred when it determined that Audrey would not succeed to the Estate if the Estate passed by intestacy, and for this reason, the court erred when it determined that Audrey lacked standing to contest the Will; and (2) did not err when it determined that Audrey lacked standing to petition for the removal of the personal representative for cause. View "Stoican v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Kenneth Butler was employed with Colgate-Palmolive Company at the time he died intestate in October 2006. In 2007, Kenneth’s son and sole heir, Franklin Burch, as administrator of Kenneth’s estate, petitioned for a determination and allocation of severance benefits. A district judge entered an allocation order dividing Colgate-Palmolive’s obligations under its severance package on behalf of Kenneth. The court ruled that Kenneth’s father, Leo, was entitled to $63,640 and Kenneth’s estate was entitled to $176,359. Leo moved to set aside the allocation order. The judge denied the motion. Nearly four years later, Burch filed a petition for partial distribution seeking $120,000 from Kenneth’s estate. The partial distribution was approved. Thereafter, Leo’s estate sought to appeal the partial distribution order and also challenged the allocation order and the subsequent rulings refusing to set it aside. The district court disallowed the late appeal, concluding that Leo’s estate had no interest in Kenneth’s estate to pursue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Leo’s estate had no interest in the assets of Kenneth’s estate to preserve when the order of partial distribution was issued because Leo did not take a timely appeal of the allocation order to preserve his interest. View "In re Estate of Butler" on Justia Law

Sherri Light, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Steven Light, appealed a judgment entered after a bench trial determining GRB Financial Corporation held a valid and enforceable security interest in a ring purchased from Royal Jewelers, Inc., and authorizing GRB Financial to foreclose its security interest in the ring. Royal Jewelers was a jewelry store in Fargo operated by three brothers, Richard, Brent and Gregory Olson. The brothers also owned a separate corporation, GRB Financial, which operated as an indirect lender taking assignments of loans from retailers, including Royal Jewelers. Steven Light was a customer of Royal Jewelers for several years. In September 2009, Steven owed about $40,000 on an open credit account with Royal Jewelers. Steven Light purchased a wedding ring for Sherri on his open credit account (for over $50,000). At some point, Steven issued a $25,500 check to Royal Jewelers, which was applied to the oldest purchases on his account. That check was returned for insufficient funds. Royal Jewelers' monthly statements reflected Steven thereafter paid about $65,000 on his account from October 2009 through December 2010. Sherri stated Steven's payments were applied to the invoice number on the charge receipt for the ring and the ring was paid for by December 2010. In December 2010, Royal Jewelers, with Steven's consent, assigned Steven Light's debt with Royal Jewelers and the security for that debt to GRB Financial. Steven Light and GRB Financial executed a note modification agreement changing repayment terms, extending the maturity date of a prior note modification agreement between the parties and pledging nine additional items as security for modification. The exhibit describing the items was not separately signed by Steven Light, but included the ring on a list of nine items. Steven died in February 2012. Royal Jewelers and GRB Financial sued Sherri, individually and as personal representative of Steven Light's estate, for a determination that GRB Financial had a valid security interest in the ring. After a bench trial, the district court found no stated preference or agreement existed between the Lights and Royal Jewelers that Steven's payments would be first applied to the ring. The court found even if an agreement existed, it was unenforceable under the statute of frauds because it was not in writing. The court determined that in the absence of any agreement or designation about how payments would be applied to Steven's debt, Royal Jewelers was entitled to apply his payments to first reduce the amount owed on his oldest purchases. The court also determined the evidence did not establish the Lights detrimentally relied on Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements about application of payments to Steven Light's account. The court further concluded Steven's gift of the ring to Sherri was subject to Royal Jewelers' security interest in the ring and GRB Financial, as an assignee of Royal Jewelers, had a valid and enforceable security interest in the ring. Sherri Light argued on appeal that the district court clearly erred in determining the Lights did not manifest an intent or desire under N.D.C.C. 9-12-07(1) that Steven's payments on his account would be applied first to pay for the ring. She argued her testimony about Steven's assurances that he made arrangements with Royal Jewelers for application of his payments to the ring and about witnessing Steven's manifestation of that intent when the ring was purchased on October 2, 2009, was corroborated by Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements, indicating Steven's payments were applied to pay for the ring and not for his prior purchases. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding the Lights did not manifest an intent that payments on an open credit account with Royal Jewelers would be applied first to the purchase price of the ring and in finding the Lights did not detrimentally rely on Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not err in determining GRB Financial had a valid and enforceable security interest in the ring. View "Royal Jewelers, Inc. v. Light" on Justia Law

Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. 2010, B.D. executed a will which significantly altered the distributions that were in a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable-cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn had sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will, and entered judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father's 2010 will. Because the chancellor applied the wrong legal standard, the Court reversed the chancellor's decision to allow William to continue as executor and remanded for a determination of whether a temporary executor should be appointed. View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law

William Krebes died in 2009, survived by his wife, Helen Durand. The next year, two of Durand’s children petitioned the district court for the appointment of a conservator for Durand because she lacked clarity of mind to make informed decisions regarding her late husband’s estate. The district court agreed and appointed a conservator. The conservator then filed an elective share petition on Durand’s behalf in the probate court. The personal representative of Krebes’s estate opposed the petition, arguing that the elective share statute, Minn. Stat. 524.2-212, required the conservator, before filing for Durand’s elective share in the probate proceeding, to obtain a court order authorizing the filing, and the conservator in this case did not do so. The district court granted summary judgment for the conservator, concluding that section 524.2-212 violated Durand’s equal protection rights because protected surviving spouses are treated differently than non-protected surviving spouses. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that protected and non-protected surviving spouses are not similarly situated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the distinction between protected and non-protected spouses in the section 524.2-212 does not violate equal protection under the Minnesota Constitution. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Durand" on Justia Law

Ruth Mary Higgins Baker ("Ruth") petitioned the Supreme Court for review the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance, without an opinion, of the judgment of the Circuit Court which denied her petition to be appointed the personal representative of the estate of her mother Ruth G. Higgins. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's judgment and, specifically, whether the circuit court had obtained jurisdiction over Higgins's estate. After careful consideration of the trial court and appellate court proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for that court to dismiss the appeal and to instruct the circuit court to vacate its orders removing the matter from the probate court, denying Ruth's petition for appointment as the administrator with the will annexed of Higgins's estate and appointing another administrator instead. View "Ex parte Ruth Mary Higgins Baker." on Justia Law

Attorneys representing the administratrix of an estate settled wrongful-death claims under two insurance policies without filing a wrongful-death lawsuit. The proceeds of the settlement of the first policy were distributed equally to the wrongful-death beneficiaries. The attorneys submitted the proceeds of the second policy to the chancery court and moved for an unequal distribution, arguing that two half-siblings should recover nothing or, if allowed to recover, less than the three other claimants. The chancellor determined that the half-siblings were entitled to recover, and that she had no authority to apportion the wrongful-death settlement proceeds unequally. She divided the proceeds equally among the wrongful-death beneficiaries after awarding attorneys’ fees of forty percent of the amount of recovery. Two of the beneficiaries argued that they should not have been required to pay attorneys’ fees because the attorneys had made numerous attempts to exclude them from any recovery, and then to reduce their share. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s determination that the half-siblings were entitled to an equal distribution but remanded for factual findings on the amount of attorneys’ fees they should be required to pay. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the proceeds must be equally divided. On the issue of attorney fees, four justices held that because the attorneys had an actual conflict of interest with the half-siblings and acted adverse to their interests; and because they could not satisfy the requirements for quantum meruit, they were not entitled to recover any attorneys’ fees from the half-siblings shares. Four justices would have affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dane Richard Eubanks" on Justia Law