Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Edward Stuchlik died testate and was survived by his wife, Margaret Stuchlik, and five children, including John Stuchlik and Kenneth Stuchlik. John sought removal of Margaret as the personal representative of the Edward Stuchlik estate and removal of Margaret and Kenneth as cotrustees of the Edward Stuchlik Family Trust. John asked the court to appoint him as personal representative and trustee in their place. The county court entered judgment in favor of Margaret and Kenneth. The Supreme Court affirmed in most respects and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) because Margaret was waiting to be discharged as personal representative pending the outcome of this action, any action for her removal as personal representative was without merit; (2) John’s arguments that Margaret and Kenneth should be removed as costrustees based on a theory of a contract for wills or an oral trust between Margaret and Edward were irrelevant to the petition to remove a costrustee; but (3) the court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider allegations pertaining to the extent Margaret’s and Kenneth’s activities as general partners of a partnership related to their fitness as costrustees. View "In re Estate of Stuchlik" on Justia Law

Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-618 is an exception to Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-617’s general rule that no will is effective unless a petition is filed for probate of the will within six months of the date of the testator’s death. After Betty Jo Strader’s will was found in her attorney’s office more than four years after her death and court intestacy proceedings were underway, district court admitted Betty Jo’s will to probate under its interpretation of section 59-618. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by admitting Betty Jo’s will to probate under the statutory exception to section 59-617 after the six-month time limit had expired because her will was not knowingly withheld. View "In re Estate of Strader" on Justia Law

Charles William White (“Bill”) and his son Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”), were partners in a business that owned and operated convenience stores. In 2000, during the course of the partnership, Bill married Anita White. In 2005, Tommy bought his father’s share of the partnership for $42,600, but in dissolving the partnership, Bill and Tommy neglected to execute and file deeds transferring the partnership’s real property. In early 2009, Bill’s health declined rapidly, and Anita and Tommy began to clash over Bill’s healthcare. During this time, Tommy realized that he and his father had failed to execute deeds transferring the partnership’s real-property assets. Tommy used a durable power of attorney his father had given him years before to execute quit-claim deeds transferring the partnership property to himself. Bill and Anita continued to clash over who had authority to make healthcare decisions for Bill, so Tommy filed a petition for a conservatorship for his father’s benefit and sought appointment as his father’s conservator. Anita filed a counterclaim to challenge Tommy’s fitness to serve as his father’s conservator and sought to have Tommy return all assets he had transferred to himself using his father’s power of attorney. The chancellor agreed that a conservatorship was appropriate, but he appointed a third party as Bill’s conservator. Bill died in 2009, and at that time, the conservator filed a motion asking to be discharged from his duties and to be allowed to distribute the assets of the conservatorship to Bill’s estate. The parties agreed to an order discharging the conservator and to a distribution of funds held by the conservator to Bill’s estate. The chancellor’s order made no mention of Anita’s action to set aside the deed transfers. In 2010, Anita filed suit to set aside the quit-claim deeds and to redeem the real property Tommy had acquired using his father’s power of attorney. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The chancellor held that Anita’s action was barred by res judicata, granted Tommy’s motion, and denied Anita’s cross-motion. The Supreme Court found that the judgment dismissing the conservatorship was not a final judgment on the merits, and reversed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Charles William White" on Justia Law

After Kenneth Vanderwerff’s death, Janetta Gardiner, Vanderwerff’s romantic partner for the three years before his death, filed a petition for a “judicial declaration of common law marriage.” The district court granted the declaration of marriage, and Gardiner was appointed as personal representative of the estate. Four of Vanderwerff’s cousins (Cousins) moved to set aside the marriage determination under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and to intervene in the marriage action. The court granted intervention to the Cousins and set aside the declaration of marriage. Approximately two years after Gardiner’s petition was granted, the court dismissed the marriage case of its own accord for untimely service under Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)(i). The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the declaration of marriage, holding that the district court improperly set aside the declaration of marriage, granted intervention, and sua sponte dismissed the case for failure of service. View "Gardiner v. Vanderwerff" on Justia Law

The Trustee for the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq., filed suit against hundreds of BLMIS customers who withdrew more from their accounts than they had invested and profited from Madoff's scheme. Defendants moved to dismiss the actions on the ground that the payments received by BLMIS customers were securities-related payments that cannot be avoided under 11 U.S.C. 546(e). Section 546(e) establishes an important exception to a trustee's clawback powers and provides that certain securities-related payments, such as transfers made by a stockbroker in connection with a securities contract, or settlement payments cannot be avoided in bankruptcy. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the payments were shielded by section 546(e) and dismissal of the relevant claims under Rule 12(b)(6). View "In re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC" on Justia Law

Korie Saylor appealed the grant of summary judgment denying her claim for an elective share of the estate of her deceased husband, Woodie Saylor. Woodie and Korie married in October 2005. Woodie died in May 2011. In addition to Korie, Woodie was survived by Jonathan Saylor, an adult son from Woodie's previous marriage. Contemporaneously with the filing of the petition to probate Woodie's will, Jonathan, as personal representative of the estate, also filed a document executed by Korie. In that document, Korie acknowledged that she had received notice of the filing of the petition to probate Woodie's will, and she consented to the admission of the will to probate without further notice to her. Korie did not file a petition for an elective share within six months after the will was admitted to probate. Jonathan objected objected to Korie's request for an extension of time to file her petition for an elective share. The probate court entered an order granting Korie's request for an extension of time and an order allowing Korie's claim to take an elective share of the estate. The latter order did not adjudicate the amount of that elective share; it set a date on which the probate court would conduct a hearing to determine that amount and then enter a further order with respect thereto. In November 2012, the personal representative filed a motion for a summary judgment at the circuit court as to Korie's claim for an elective share, alleging that the probate court should have denied Korie's claim on grounds that her petition was not timely filed and that, under the circumstances presented, the probate court had no authority to extend the time for Korie to exercise her right of election. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court was correct in rejecting Korie's untimely petition for an elective share. View "Saylor v. Saylor" on Justia Law

The McTaggarts filed suit against the former trustee and trust advisor of their family trust, alleging improper handling of their trust funds. The former trustee and trust advisor moved to dismiss the case or have the case stayed pending arbitration, based on an arbitration provision in a wealth-management agreement between the former trustee and trust advisor. The trial court found that, because the McTaggarts did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration provision and because the agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party beneficiaries, the arbitration provision was not binding on the McTaggarts. The former trustee and trust advisor appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pinnacle Trust Company, L.L.C., EFP Advisors, Inc. v. McTaggart" on Justia Law

Raymond Adams petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Autauga Circuit Court: (1) to remove Clifford Wayne Cleveland II ("Chip" or "Chip Cleveland") as coexecutor of the estate of Clifford Wayne Cleveland; (2) to vacate its order prohibiting the estate from hiring an attorney or a certified public accountant ("CPA"); (3) to compel Chip and his sister, Celeste Cleveland Minor, to produce property and assets of the estate that are in their possession; and (4) to impose sanctions on Chip and Minor. Upon careful consideration of the facts in record, the Supreme Court agreed with Adams that the circuit court erred in substituting Chip as a coexecutor of Cleveland's estate. However, because the circuit court had not yet ruled on Adams's motion to remove Chip as coexecutor, Adams did not demonstrate that the circuit court refused to perform an imperative duty. Similarly, Adams did not demonstrate that, at this time, he was entitled to a writ of mandamus, directing the circuit court to vacate its order prohibiting the hiring of an accountant or an attorney to assist with the administration of the estate, or to direct the circuit court to grant his motions to compel production of estate property and assets and to impose sanctions against Chip and Minor. Therefore, the Supreme Court denied Adams's petition for mandamus relief. View "In re: Cleveland II v. Raymond Adams" on Justia Law

Thomas Cabatit was survived by two sons, Jerediah and Joseph, who were given equal shares of Thomas’s Estate after his death. In his will, Thomas designated his sister, Julibel, as the personal representative of his Estate. Julibel subsequently retained Steven Canders and Maine Legal Associates, P.A. (collectively, MLA) to represent her in probate of the Estate. Jerediah and Joseph later filed a petition to surcharge Julibel and remove her as personal representative, alleging mismanagement of the Estate. The probate court removed Julibel and designated Joseph as the successor personal representative. Thereafter, Joseph, in his capacities as a beneficiary and as the personal representative of the Estate, sued MLA, alleging that MLA breached duties it owed to the Estate and to Joseph as a beneficiary by giving Julibel improper advice. The superior court granted summary judgment for MLA, concluding that the scope of the attorney-client relationship did not include a duty to the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no attorney-client relationship existed between Joseph in his role as successor personal representative of the Estate and MLA; and (2) MLA did not owe a duty to Joseph as a nonclient. View "Estate of Cabatit v. Canders" on Justia Law

The trial judge denied the appellants' motion to compel arbitration on the ground that there was no binding arbitration agreement. The trial judge ruled that Tamera Nelson did not have authority to sign an arbitration agreement on behalf of her grandmother, Arda Lee Churchill (who was a resident of the Grace Living Center-Chikasha until her death), so no valid arbitration agreement existed. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that no valid arbitration agreement existed because Tamera Nelson was not authorized to make health care decisions for her grandmother under the circumstances. The Health Care Power of Attorney required that Arda Lee Churchill's physician certify that she was not capable of making her own health care decisions and no such certification was made. View "Johnson v. Convalescent Center of Grady, LLC" on Justia Law