Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This case concerned a dispute over the disposition of shares of stock in a family held business after the death of the business’s founding generation. Plaintiff, one of the founder’s children and a stockholder, filed suit after the death of her mother, Norma, to whom shares in the business were transferred upon the founder’s death. Plaintiff alleged that a shareholders’ agreement controlled disposition of Norma’s shares and that the business was required to purchase those shares. Defendants argued that Norma’s estate planning documents controlled the disposition of Norma’s stock, and accordingly, those shares were to go into an inter vivos trust. The circuit court concluded that the shares were to pass to the inter vivos trust established by Norma’s estate planning documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the shareholders’ agreement governed disposition of Norma’s shares of the business’s stock. View "Jimenez v. Corr" on Justia Law

Anthony Aulisio, Jr., appealed a jury verdict that found defendants, consisting of his homeowner association's management company (Optimum Professional Property Management and Debra Kovach), the patrol service it employed (BLB Enterprises, Inc., dba Patrol One, and Bill Bancroft), and a towing company (PD Transport, dba Southside Towing, and John Vach), did not wrongfully tow and convert his Jeep vehicle, nor convert the personal property it contained. CAAJ Leasing Trust (CAAJ), which Aulisio created as sole grantor, trustee, and trust beneficiary, owned legal title to the Jeep and also appeals. CAAJ appeals the trial court's ruling at the outset of trial that CAAJ "can't participate in the proceedings" with Aulisio appearing in propria persona as the trust's sole trustee and sole beneficiary. The trial court relied on precedent that an executor or personal representative may not appear in propria persona in court proceedings outside the probate context on behalf of a decedent's estate because representing another person or entity's interest in a lawsuit constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. But if a sole trustee is also the trust's sole settlor and beneficiary, the rationale of these cases ceases to apply: no interests are at stake except those of one person. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that a sole trustee of a revocable living trust who is also the sole settlor and beneficiary of the trust assets he or she is charged to protect does not appear in court proceedings concerning the trust in a representative capacity. Instead, he or she properly acts in propria persona and does not violate the bar against practicing law without a license. The judgment as to CAAJ was reversed, and the case remanded so Aulisio may appear in propria persona to assert his interest as the sole beneficial owner of the Jeep as a trust asset. The Court affirmed the judgment against Aulisio in his individual capacity concerning his personal property in the Jeep. View "Aulisio v. Bancroft" on Justia Law

Steven C. Lester died on August 17, 2011. Pamela Lester, the personal representative of Steven’s estate, published a Notice to Creditors advising them to file claims within four months of the notice. On a later date, Pamela mailed a notice directly to Michelle Lamphere, which provided a later deadline by which Lamphere was required to file her claim. Lamphere met that deadline, but Pamela denied the claim. Lamphere subsequently filed a petition to allow the claim. Pamela moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations provided for creditors’ claims. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Lamphere’s claim was time-barred because it was not filed within four months after the publication of the Notice to Creditors. Lamphere appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether she was an unknown, known, or reasonably ascertainable creditor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it resolved a disputed question of material fact regarding Lamphere’s status as a creditor and granted judgment to Steven’s estate. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Lester" on Justia Law

Margaret Gray died in 2007, leaving a will that devised her estate to her surviving children, Ernest Gray and Elizabeth Tasker. In 2011, Elizabeth filed a claim against the estate seeking reimbursement for payments she made to maintain her mother’s properties since 2007. The probate court ordered that the estate pay Elizabeth $45,419. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to apply 18-A Me. Rev. Stat. 3-803(b), the applicable statute of limitations. On remand, Elizabeth argued that the court should allow her claim against the estate based on a theory of unjust enrichment, which, she argued, would fall outside of the scope of the statute. The court concluded that Elizabeth’s claim was time-barred pursuant to section 3-803(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the time limitations established in section 3-803(b) for a claim against an estate apply to a claim for unjust enrichment, and therefore, Elizabeth’s claim was time-barred. View "In re Estate of Gray" on Justia Law

Appellant Erika Fabian brought this action for legal malpractice and breach of contract by a third-party beneficiary, alleging respondents attorney Ross M. Lindsay, III and his law firm Lindsay & Lindsay made a drafting error in preparing a trust instrument for her late uncle and, as a result, she was effectively disinherited. Appellant appealed the circuit court order dismissing her action under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP for failing to state a claim and contended South Carolina should recognize a cause of action, in tort and in contract, by a third-party beneficiary of a will or estate planning document against a lawyer whose drafting error defeats or diminishes the client's intent. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fabian v. Lindsay" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1983, Defendant law firm represented Alice Lawrence and her three children in litigation arising from the death of her husband and their father, a real estate developer. For over three decades, Lawrence and Seymour Cohn, the decedent’s brother and business partner, litigated issues surrounding the sale of the decedent’s properties and the distribution of the proceeds. After Cohn and Lawrence settled the matter, this dispute followed between Lawrence and Defendant with respect to the law firm’s fee and the validity of gifts made by Lawrence to three law firm partners. Lawrence died in 2008. Thereafter, the Lawrence estate argued that a revised retainer agreement between the parties was void procedurally and substantively and made claims for refund of the gifts. The Court of Appeals held (1) the revised retainer agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable and was therefore enforceable; and (2) the Lawrence estate’s claim for return of the gifts was time-barred. View "Matter of Lawrence" on Justia Law

The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing Linda St. Peter, acting in her capacity as the trustee of the Osorio Irrevocable Trust, from selling a property held by the trust. Linda filed a motion for relief from the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the district court dissolved the temporary injunction. The property was then sold to a third party. Karlene Khor, Linda’s sister, appealed, arguing that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it dissolved the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the issue because the property had been sold and the issue was therefore moot. View "Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

The trustees of the Hollis W. Plimpton, Jr. Family Trust filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the trust as drafted correctly expressed the intent to the settlor that his estate be eligible to obtain the optimal benefit of allowable federal and state estate tax marital deductions. Alternatively, the trustees sought an order rewording a portion of the trust to ensure that it accomplished the settlor’s intent. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that a judgment enter in the county court declaring that this was not a suitable occasion for the type of relief sought and dismissing the complaint, as the apparent objective of the parties - to insure by declaration or reformation that no person in the future misconstrues the document - is not something that justifies judicial involvement. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Babcock" on Justia Law

George C. Houser established the George C. Houser Trust, which established two trusts for the benefit of Mary R. Houser during her lifetime and gave her a power of appointment over one of the trusts (the marital trust). Upon Mary’s death in 1993, the principal remaining in the George C. Houser Trust was divided into two share trusts, one for each of the Housers’ sons. After George’s death in 1983, Mary established the Mary R. Houser Trust - 1991 and exercised her power of appointment over the marital trust property by appointing it to the trustees of the Mary Houser Trust. The trustees filed a complaint seeking reformation the trust established under Article Fourth of the Mary R. Houser Trust - 1991 to correct a drafting error that they contended frustrated the intent of Mary and George to provide for their descendants in an efficient and tax-advantageous manner. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that the family trust be reformed by correcting the mistake in drafting, which inadvertently frustrated Mary’s estate planning objectives. View "Connell v. Houser" on Justia Law

The Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action to collect a loan secured by two parcels of real estate which had been made to a husband and wife. After the husband died, the loan went into default. The Bank and wife agreed to a private sale of one of the parcels that was her separate property and Bank filed the foreclosure action on the remaining parcel to obtain a deficiency judgment. The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary adjudication of its judicial foreclosure cause of action and determined that the Bank was entitled to obtain a deficiency judgment against the representatives of the husband's estate (appellants). The court concluded that, because the Bank failed to show the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure 726 for creditors seeking deficiency judgments by disposing of the property at issue outside of judicial foreclosure and without appellants' consent or waiver, the Bank has waived any right to a deficiency against them. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "First CA Bank v. McDonald" on Justia Law