Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Appellants Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, Uni-Health Post-Acute Care - Tanglewood, LLC (Tanglewood), and UHS-Pruitt Corporation (collectively, Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death and survival action involving Appellants' allegedly negligent nursing home care. Tanglewood is a skilled nursing facility located in Ridgeway, owned and controlled by Appellants. In January 2007, Tanglewood and Respondent Darlene Dean entered into a nursing home residency agreement in which Tanglewood assumed responsibility for the care of Respondent's mother, Louise Porter (the patient). The same day, Respondent signed a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. The patient did not sign either the residency agreement or the Agreement on her own behalf, although she was competent at the time of her admission to Tanglewood. Moreover, Respondent did not have a health care power of attorney empowering her to sign on the patient's behalf. In 2009, the patient fell three separate times within a ten day period, fracturing her hip in the third fall. Over the next two months, the patient underwent two hip surgeries; however, due to complications following the surgeries, the patient died on September 30, 2009. In late 2011, Respondent (acting in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate) filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, as well as an expert affidavit in support of her NOI. Respondent also alleged claims for survival and wrongful death. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Relying on "Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc.," (678 S.E.2d 435 (2009)), the circuit court invalidated the Agreement in its entirety and refused to compel arbitration between the parties. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Respondent's argument that Appellants' waived their right to enforce the Agreement was without merit. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the circuit court consider her remaining arguments (concerning Respondent's authority to sign the Agreement and whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties) prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration between the parties. View "Dean v. Heritage Healthcare" on Justia Law

Ruth married Donald on the same day that she executed a will. Ruth died the following day. Donald was appointed personal representative, and the will was informally admitted to probate. Jennifer, Ruth’s daughter, filed a petition for a formal adjudication of intestacy and for her appointment as personal representative, alleging that Ruth lacked the capacity to execute the will. The probate court denied Jennifer’s petition and admitted the will to probate, concluding that Donald sustained his burden of showing due execution of the will and that Jennifer failed to prove the absence of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err in its evidentiary rulings and did not err in finding that Ruth had the requisite testamentary capacity to execute a will.View "Estate of O'Brien-Hamel" on Justia Law

Liftin died in 2003, survived by his wife, then a citizen of Bolivia, and his son, John, who became the executor of the estate. Although John is an attorney, he retained his former law partner, who practiced tax planning. The executor had to file a federal estate-tax return, Form 706, 26 U.S.C. 6018(a), within nine months after the date of death. The statute authorizes an extension for no more than 6 months, 26 U.S.C. 6081(a). The executor obtained an extension so that the new deadline to file and to pay the tax was June 2, 2004. There were uncertainties regarding the marital deduction, 26 U.S.C. 2056(a), which is available if a surviving spouse is a citizen or becomes a citizen before the day on which the return is made. Mrs. Liftin began the process of applying for citizenship in February 2004. The estate was also engaged in litigation with Mrs. Liftin relating to her rights under a prenuptial agreement. Neither uncertainty had been resolved as of June 2, 2004. In January 2004 John made an estimated payment of $877,300, sufficient to cover the taxes due even if the estate could not claim the marital deduction. John relied on his attorney’s advice that “a late Form 706 could be filed after the extended due date” without identifying any basis for delaying filing. In 2005, Mrs. Liftin became a citizen. John, did not file the estate-tax return until 2006, when Mrs. Liftin and the estate settled their litigation. The return stated a tax liability of $678,572.25, entitling the estate to a refund of $198,727.75. The IRS assessed a $135,714.45 late-filing penalty under 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1). The Claims Court and Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Liftin v. United States" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama, the Alabama Department of Finance, and the Comptroller of the State of Alabama, nonparties to the underlying action, appealed a circuit court order denying the State's motion to intervene as of right. Mrs. Frances Ann Yarbrough died intestate with no heirs that were in the line of descendant distribution. As a result, her assets escheated to the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court ordered the Estate to pay certain expenses of the Estate, and then to pay the balance of the Estate's funds to the State of Alabama. In that same order, the Court ordered the State of Alabama to pay the escheated funds to the St. Clair County's Circuit Clerk's office to be used by the Clerk 'to rehire some of the employees lost to proration.' The State, through its counsel Mr. Bledsoe, stated that the Estate's escheated funds must be used or applied in furtherance of education in accordance with the Alabama Constitution.Through counsel, Mr. Bledsoe, declared that there was no objection to disbursing the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. Based on that representation, the Estate moved the Supreme Court to Alter, Amend, or Vacate its earlier order to direct the State to pay the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. The State objected to the Supreme Court's order. In turn, the Supreme Court treated the objection as a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, filed it with the circuit clerk, and set the matter for a hearing. Because the State was not a party to this matter, the State did not receive direct notice of the hearing. The Estate's counsel, Ms. Williams, however, provided the State notice of the hearing by e-mail to Mr. Bledsoe. The State did not appear at the hearing, and the Supreme Court denied the relief requested by the State. The circuit court then denied the State's motion to intervene. Because the circuit court failed to follow the Supreme Court's order, it reversed the circuit court's order denying the State's motion to intervene. "The circuit court exceeded its authority in attempting to appropriate the escheated funds." All issues having been decided on both the motion to intervene and the underlying action, a judgment was rendered for the State. View "Alabama et al. v. Estate Yarbrough" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal with prejudice of their Maryland quiet title claim. Where, as here, a property is encumbered by a deed of trust and its release is conditioned on a party's performance under a note, determining who holds title to the property necessarily involves determining whether the party has performed under the note. Therefore, the court could not decouple the questions of plaintiffs' personal liability and the security interest in the property. In this case, plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefits of a quiet title action because they are not authorized by statute to resolve clouds on a legal title which they do not own. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The court also held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The administrators of Decedent’s estate listed residential real estate for sale. Decedent’s common law spouse objected to the proposed sale, claiming it was her marital home. The district court recognized the surviving spouses’s common law rights but nonetheless approved the sale. The buyers took possession and made improvements to the home. Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for consideration of the homestead interest of the spouse. On remand, the district court gave the surviving spouse the option of taking possession of the home upon paying the buyers a substantial part of the cost of their improvements to the home or receiving the proceeds from the estate’s sale of the real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the surviving spouse could retake possession upon payment of the approximate value of the home before the improvements were made less any credit to which she was entitled from the buyers for rent during the period the spouse had been dispossessed; and (2) the spouse could transfer title to the buyers and receive the proceeds from the estate’s sale of the home plus credit for rent from the date of the conveyance to the buyers until the date of judgment.View "In re Estate of Waterman" on Justia Law

Before she died, Decedent executed a Will. The Will had an “Exhibit A” attached to it at the time the Will was submitted to probate. The exhibit set forth bequests made by Decedent to various relatives. Both Exhibit A and the Will contained handwritten notices. After a dispute arose between the co-executors of the Will and some of the beneficiaries of the Will concerning the administration of Decedent’s estate, the co-executors filed a petition for declaratory relief. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the beneficiaries, concluding (1) Exhibit A to the Will was properly incorporated by reference into the Will; (2) the handwritten notations found on the Will and Exhibit A that were made after the date the Will was executed were “surplusage” and could be disregarded; and (3) Decedent intended Exhibit A to be incorporated into the Will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to allow Exhibit A to be incorporated by reference into the Will.View "Cyfers v. Cyfers" on Justia Law

After Tonia Begley died, Robert Bartee and Wiley Begley qualified as co-administrators of Begley’s estate. Wiley Begley subsequently died. Thereafter, Bartee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against an emergency department physician. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that Bartee lacked standing to sue alone. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bartee had standing to file the action under the doctrine of survivorship because the power of appointment given to Bartee and Wiley Begley as co-administrators of the estate to prosecute a wrongful death action could be exercised by Bartee as the sole remaining survivor. Remanded.View "Bartee v. Vitocruz" on Justia Law

In November 2006, The Good Samaritan Home, a nursing home where Venita Hargis was living, told Hargis’s family that Hargis had suffered a fall. Hargis died later that month as a result of the injury she sustained in the alleged fall. In November 2009, Hargis’s family discovered that Hargis’s injury had been caused by an attack from another resident and not by a fall. In October 2011, Hargis’s Estate filed a wrongful death complaint against Good Samaritan, alleging that Good Samaritan negligently caused Hargis’s death and then fraudulently concealed its negligence. Good Samaritan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to the Estate’s failure to file the action within two years of Hargis’s death. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that fraudulent concealment does not extend or delay the two-year statutory period to file a wrongful death action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that if a plaintiff makes the necessary factual showing, the fraudulent concealment statute may apply to toll the Wrongful Death Act’s two-year filing period.View "Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc." on Justia Law

Mary Leila Beasley Schaeffer and the estate of Emma Glass Beasley appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages on mismanagement-of-trust and conversion claims in an action by William Poellnitz, as administrator of the estate of Edwin Glass Young, Adele Young Sommers, and Willard Young. The Beasleys raised five issues on appeal: (1) it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (JML) on the mismanagement-of-trust claim; (2) it was entitled to a JML on the conversion claim; (3) punitive damages were not warranted, or in the alternative, the trial court improperly apportioned the punitive damages and that they were excessive and must be vacated or remitted; (4) it was entitled to a JML on the Youngs claim to a one-half ownership interest in the furnishings and heirlooms from the estate or to a reduction of the value of those furnishings and heirlooms; and (5) it was entitled to a JML on all of its counterclaims for moneys loaned to the Youngs. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying the Beasleys motions for a JML as to the mismanagement-of-trust claim. The Court also reversed the award of punitive damages with respect to that claim. The trial court also erred in denying the motion for a JML filed by Emma's estate as to the conversion claim. The Court affirmed as to the conversion claim against Mary, including the amount of the compensatory damages awarded the Youngs on that claim. However, because there was no clear and convincing evidence that Mary "consciously and deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice," the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it awarded punitive damages on the conversion claim against Mary, as well as against Emma's estate. The Court affirmed the judgment as to the Young branch's one-half interest in the furnishings and heirlooms in the house and on the Beasleys counterclaims for money loaned. View "Beasley v. Poellnitz" on Justia Law