Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against MetLife, alleging that MetLife abused its discretion in denying her claim to receive the proceeds of her late husband's life insurance policy under an employee-benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to MetLife. The court concluded based on the evidence - the 1991 form, the husband's will, and the November 2010 form - that MetLife did not abuse its discretion in determining that the husband's son, rather than plaintiff, was the beneficiary of the life insurance proceeds. Even assuming that the substantial-compliance doctrine was available to federal courts in the interpleader context, the court would not extend it to the circumstances presented here. Where an ERISA plan administrator is given discretion under the plan to determine eligibility for benefits, the doctrine does not deprive the administrator from requiring strict compliance with the terms of the plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Hall v. Metropolitan Life Ins., et al." on Justia Law

In 1983, Marilyn and Stanley Hedrick executed a joint will. When Stanley died in 1995, his estate passed to Marilyn. The next year, Marilyn transferred much of her property to the Marilyn M. Hedrick 1996 Living Trust. Sheena Lamach, one of Stanley’s children from another marriage, was not included as a beneficiary of Marilyn’s trust. Marilyn died in 2012, and the estate entered informal probate. Under the terms of the joint will, the residue of Marilyn’s estate, which consisted of the proceeds from the sale of Marilyn’s home and personal property, was to be divided equally among the couple’s six children. Leroy Lamach, the husband and attorney-in-fact of Sheena, filed a petition objecting to the proposed distribution, arguing that the transfer of assets to the trust violated the terms of the joint will and asking that the trust assets be distributed equally among the six children. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lamach, concluding that the joint will prohibited Marilyn from transferring property to the trust after Stanley’s death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the will allowed Marilyn to transfer property into a trust during her lifetime.View "In re Estate of Hedrick" on Justia Law

Ellis and Tomasia Ammons, the propounders of a will of Eulady Thomas, appealed a trial court judgment granting a directed verdict in favor of the caveators in a trial of the caveat to the will. Thomas executed a will in 2007; she was blind at the time. The will left all of her property to her caregiver, Tomasia Ammons, and her husband Ellis. Propounders petitioned to probate the 2007 will in solemn form. Margie Clouds and other members of Thomas's family ("Caveators") objected to the will's validity on the grounds, mainly that Thomas did not sign the will and that the witnesses to the will's execution did not sign it. The probate court admitted the will to probate in solemn form; Caveators appealed to the superior court and demanded a jury trial. Although the jury found that the propounded will was Thomas's valid last will and testament, the trial court granted Caveators' motion for directed verdict. At the time of trial, both witnesses to the propounded will were deceased. Propounders contended that the superior court erred in excluding from trial certain testimony of the attorney who drafted the will and his office assistant, regarding the authenticity of Thomas's signature. The Supreme Court concluded that on this matter, the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony, as the Court found no foundation laid for the assistant to testify that she was familiar with Thomas's signature such that she could recognize it if seen. Although there was conflicting evidence from witnessed as to whether the will had been properly executed, that simply created factual questions for the jury's resolution. The Court concluded that issue had been properly placed before the jury, and it was error for the trial court to grant Caveators' motion for directed verdict. View "Ammons v. Clouds" on Justia Law

After Earl Long died, Earl’s daughter, Brenda Chafin, challenged the validity of Earl’s estate plan, which included certain gifts and amendments to his trust. The circuit court concluded that Earl’s estate plan was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it determined that Earl had the requisite testamentary capacity to carry out his estate plan; (2) the circuit court was correct in determining that Earl’s estate plan was not the product of undue influence; and (3) the circuit court did not err by not requiring the distributions to be equalized under a review of Earl’s entire estate plan.View "In re Estate of Long" on Justia Law

Olive Kathryn Purcella (Kathryn) filed a petition in the Anchorage superior court to reform or terminate the Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust. The superior court held, after trial, that Kathryn had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that she did not intend to execute an irrevocable trust or that the trust was the product of undue influence, and denied her petition. Kathryn appealed, arguing that the factual findings on which the superior court predicated its ruling were in error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust" on Justia Law

John Warren Shepperd, who never married and had no children, died without having executed a will. Fourteen second cousins from John’s maternal side and Jason Shepperd, John’s half-uncle from John’s paternal side, survived John’s death. The administrator of John’s estate sought judicial assistance to determine the proper distribution proportions of John’s estate where all the heirs were collaterals and the estate must be separated into paternal and maternal parts. The circuit court held that, because of Jason’s half-blood status, Jason could only take a one-half share of John’s estate that was to pass to John’s paternal side, and the remainder of John’s estate was to go to the fourteen maternal second cousins. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Va. Code Ann. 64.2-200(A)(5) requires John’s estate to be separated into two moieties, each valued at one-half of John’s estate, with one moiety half passing to John’s maternal kindred and the other moiety passing to John’s paternal kindred; (2) the maternal side moiety passes to John’s fourteen second cousins, and the other moiety passes to John’s paternal kindred; and (3) Va. Code Ann. 64.2-202(A) requires John’s paternal side moiety to be distributed entirely to Jason.View "Sheppard v. Junes" on Justia Law

Shirley Gregg Dean (Shirley) and Marion Casey Dean (Casey) married in 1978. Shirley died in 1999. At the time, Shirley’s daughters (the sisters) decided not to probate their mother’s estate, basing their decision on their belief that Shirley had an oral contract with Casey for him to provide for them in his will. After Casey died in 2010, the sisters sued Casey’s estate for breach of an oral contract between Casey and Shirley. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the sisters, concluding that they carried their burden of proving that there was an oral agreement between Casey and Shirley to leave one-third of Casey’s estate to Shirley’s children if Shirley predeceased Casey. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court ruling that a contract existed between Shirley and Casey, holding that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence as to the terms of the agreement between Casey and Shirley.View "Dean v. Morris" on Justia Law

Debtor transferred her interest in real property to AGC, a corporation wholly owned by her husband. Seven months later, debtor declared bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court concluded that the conveyance was constructively fraudulent. The bankruptcy court found AGC did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it paid for the property or intended to pay for it on the date of the property's purchase. The bankruptcy court also found that, at the time of the purchase, the parties intended that AGC would serve as the property's tenant, not the property's owner. AGC also did not prove that it intended to own the property on the date of acquisition. Therefore, the bankruptcy court found no justification for a resulting trust. The district court found no fault in the bankruptcy court's findings of fact, but nonetheless reversed. The court reversed the district court insofar as it found a resulting trust to sever debtor's legal and equitable interests in the property. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.View "Anderson v. Architectural Glass Construction" on Justia Law

In February 2011, two years and four months after Plaintiff learned she had been disinherited by her mother, Plaintiff filed a complaint against financial advisor Bradley Lott for fraud and constructive fraud. A jury found that Lott had committed constructive fraud but that Plaintiff knew or should have known before February 2007 that the fraud occurred. Based on the jury’s findings, the district court dismissed the action, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding (1) the evidence did not support a finding that Plaintiff could have discovered the fraud sooner, and (2) therefore, the district court erred by dismissing the case based on the statute of limitations. Remanded for a new trial.View "Erdelyi v. Lott" on Justia Law

Regions Bank, as sole trustee of the J.F.B. Lowrey Trust, appealed a circuit court order that awarded Regions $312,257.36 from the Lowrey Trust as reimbursement for attorney fees and expenses Regions incurred as trustee during the successful defense of an action brought against Regions by Sam G. Lowrey, Jr., and Shelby Jones, two of the beneficiaries of the Trust. The beneficiaries sued Regions, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, claiming Regions failed to protect and preserve the assets of the Lowrey Trust, which consisted primarily of approximately 20,000 acres of timberland located in Monroe and Conecuh Counties and which have been the subject of much intra-family litigation. Hurricane Ivan made landfall and moved over Monroe and Conecuh Counties, causing severe wind damage and destruction of much of the standing timber owned by the Lowrey Trust. In their complaint, the beneficiaries asserted that Regions should have purchased casualty-loss insurance on the timber, should have sold most of the timberland before Hurricane Ivan in order to diversify the investments of the trust estate, should have cut the timber more rapidly, or should have pursued some combination of these tactics in order to preserve the corpus of the Trust. The trial court entered a detailed order in favor of Regions, rejecting the beneficiaries' claims of mismanagement of the trust assets and taxing costs against the beneficiaries. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Regions was entitled to reimbursement of fees and expenses and costs arising out of the litigation. The trial court exceeded its discretion by reducing Regions' reimbursement by both a line-by-line reduction and a percentage reduction. The trial court's January 8, 2013 was reversed in its entirety and remanded for consideration of the reasonableness of each aspect of Regions' reimbursement request. View "Regions Bank v. Lowrey" on Justia Law