Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Robert Mead died in 2011, survived by his daughters, Roberta Jean Mead and Bobbi Jo Harr. Roberta initiated intestate proceedings, but Bobbi Jo petitioned for formal probate of Robert’s purported will. Roberta and Bobbi Jo filed cross-motions for summary judgment about the will’s validity and enforceability. The district court concluded that the will was valid and enforceable and granted judgment in favor of Bobbi Jo. Roberta appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the will was valid and enforceable because it was properly executed and not the result of undue influence. View "In re Estate of Mead" on Justia Law

The decedent died in Monroe County in Spring, 2013. She had three adult children who survived her: Alice Harper-Taylor, William C. Harper, and James R. Harper. The decedent's husband died in 2002. Alice filed in Monroe County a petition to probate a 1995 will allegedly executed by the decedent. In her petition, Alice acknowledged that there was in existence a 2007 will that purported to be the will of the decedent, but she challenged the validity of the 2007 will on several grounds, including lack of mental capacity and the existence of a reciprocal will by the decedent's husband that had been admitted to probate in 2002. The Monroe County probate judge recused himself from hearing the petition, and the Supreme Court appointed a special probate judge to hear the proceedings in Monroe County. Meanwhile, in early 2014, William filed a petition in Escambia County to probate a 2007 will allegedly executed by the decedent. Alice filed a motion to dismiss and/or to stay the proceeding in Escambia County until the proper venue for the probate proceeding was determined. The Escambia Probate Court admitted the 2007 will to probate and issued letters testamentary to William, as the personal representative named in the 2007 will. Alice appealed the Escambia Court's decision, while William filed a motion to dismiss Alice's petition to probate the 1995 will in Monroe County. The Monroe Probate Court granted William's motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Alice appealed the Monroe Probate Court's grant of the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will (case no. 1130884). In case no. 1130587, Alice appealed the Escambia Probate Court's admission to probate the 2007 will, and in case no. 1130884, she appealed the Monroe Probate Court's order granting the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that venue in this case was proper in the Monroe Probate Court, therefore, the Court reversed the Escambia Court's judgment admitting the 2007 will. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Monroe Court erred in dismissing Alice's petition. The case was remanded to Monroe County for further proceedings. View "In the matter of the Estate of Alice Earle F. Harper" on Justia Law

In 1998, a trust was established for the care of Evelyn A. Nabity. In 2011, Evelyn amended the trust agreement that changed the identity of the trustees. In 2012, Evelyn’s son, Robert, petitioned for the appointment of a guardian, conservator, and guardian ad litem for Evelyn and for registration and administration of the trust. Robert argued that Evelyn had not been competent to amend the trust agreement and requested a determination of the proper trustees. In the trust administration proceeding, the county court found that Evelyn was not competent to execute the trust amendment and entered an order declaring Robert and his brother cotrustees. In the guardianship proceeding, the county court set aside a health care power of attorney Evelyn executed in 1998 and ordered Robert to serve as Evelyn’s permanent guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was clear and convincing evidence that Evelyn was incompetent to execute the amendments to the trust agreement; and (2) the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator for Evelyn did not deny her the benefit of a valid health care power of attorney. View "In re Trust Created by Nabity" on Justia Law

Robert Haege died in 2006. Three months earlier, Haege made a will, in which he left his “personal assets” to his brother and sister, and in which he left his “business interests, both tangible and intangible, real or personal, connected to the business known as Traditional Fine Art, Ltd.” to his brother, sister, and two longtime employees. After Haege died, questions arose about the disposition of property associated with Traditional Fine Art, Ltd., insofar as Traditional Fine Art was a sole proprietorship and, therefore, had no legal existence separate and apart from Haege himself. The will was admitted to probate, and Sharon Haege England (sister) was appointed executrix of his estate. England failed to distribute any property to James Simmons and Elery Stinson, the two employees. The employees filed suit against England, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the meaning of the will with respect to the property associated with Traditional Fine Art. The trial court ruled in favor of England, concluding that, because Traditional Fine Art was only a sole proprietorship, the property associated with the business was merely the personal property of Haege. Simmons and Stinson appealed, and in a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. To the Supreme Court, England did not dispute the fundamental premise of the decision of the Court of Appeals, that a sole proprietor could separately dispose in his will of personal property connected with his sole proprietorship and his other personal property. Instead, England argued that Haege did not actually intend to separately dispose of any property associated with his sole proprietorship. Taking the will as a whole, the Supreme Court concluded that the most natural and reasonable understanding of the provisions of the will was that Haege left his personal property that amounted to "business interests . . . connected to the business known as Traditional Fine Art, Ltd." specifically including, but not limited to, membership certificates that he owned, to Simmons, Stinson, and his brother and sister, and he left all of his other personal property to his brother and sister alone. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "England v. Simmons" on Justia Law

The surviving children of Maurice Wicklund appealed an order granting Betty Wicklund's petition for an elective share, personal representative fees, attorney fees, and funeral and last illness expenses from Maurice Wicklund's estate after remand in "Estate of Wicklund" (812 N.W.2d 359). Finding no abuse of discretion in granting Betty Wicklund's petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Wicklund" on Justia Law

Appellants Dean Olsen, Susan ("Sue") Olsen, Bobby Olsen, Clee Raye Olsen, and Marion Bergquist appealed a district court judgment invalidating transfers of money and real property from Clarence Erickson to the appellants and invalidating Clarence Erickson's will on the bases of lack of capacity and undue influence. The appellants also appealed a district court order denying the appellants' N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b) motion to amend the district court's findings and judgment. Because the district court findings were not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment. The appellants' appeal of the district court's Rule 52(b) order was dismissed.View "Erickson v. Olsen" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was real property owned by Lacy Bryant at the time of his death. Lacy left a will devising a life estate in the realty to his wife, Naomi, and devising the remainder to his youngest child, Brenda Osborn. Lacy’s will was never admitted to probate. Instead, Osborn filed an affidavit for collection of small estate, and later executed and filed an “Administrator’s Deed” transferring the real property from Lacy’s estate to herself. After Naomi died, Appellants, some of Lacy’s heirs, filed an action against Osborn, asking the court to, among other things, declare that the terms of the will were invalid and that Lacy had died intestate. Ultimately, the circuit court found that Osborn had fully complied with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 28-41-101, the statute governing the collection of small estates, and that the Administrator’s Deed was a valid conveyance of Lacy’s real property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that Osborn satisfied the statutory procedures for collection of a small estate and that the Administrator’s Deed was a valid conveyance. Remanded.View "Bryant v. Osborn" on Justia Law

After executing her last will and testament in Montana, Laura Jean Kelly, who neither married nor had children, died at age sixty-two. Laura’s siblings petitioned the district court for a determination that Laura’s interest in a family partnership was not part of her residuary estate. The district court concluded that Laura’s interest in the family partnership was a non-probate asset and did not constitute part of the residue of Laura’s estate. As such, Laura’s partnership interest passed to Laura’s siblings, her “heirs-at-law.” Laura’s niece appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its interpretation of the term “heirs,” its application of Montana law, and its conclusions of law. View "In re Estate of Kelly" on Justia Law

Appellant Louise Shorter Barzey challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act that precluded her, as a non-dependent parent, from recovering benefits for the death of her son, Deron Shorter, from his employer, the City of Cuthbert. Shorter was killed in 2010 while acting in the course of his employment with the City. He was 37 at the time of his death, was not married, and had no dependents. His mother Barzey was his only heir at law. After Shorter's death, Barzey filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking a judgment declaring that she has the right to sue the City. Barzey acknowledged that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy of an employee's heirs for the employee's death during the course of his employment. She also acknowledged that the Act expressly said that the compensation for a deceased employee "shall be payable only to dependents and only during dependency." After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Act's limitation on the recovery of nondependent heirs did not violate Barzey's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. View "Barzey v. City of Cuthbert" on Justia Law

Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer’s daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer’s son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean’s personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean’s claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option.View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law