Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Decedent died of injuries incurred in an automobile accident. Decedent was survived by his allegedly estranged wife, Laura Soran, and by his parents and sister. Decedent’s father, in his capacity as personal representative, brought a wrongful death claim brought against Robert Curran, the driver of the vehicle in which Decedent was a passenger when he died, and settled with Curran’s insurance providers for $400,000. A dispute subsequently arose between Decedent’s beneficiaries as to how the settlement proceeds should be distributed. The district court awarded Laura seventy-five percent of the settlement proceeds and divided the remainder among Decedent’s parents and sister. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s distribution order was clearly erroneous in that it misapplied the burden of proof and improperly presumed damages in favor of Decedent’s wife where Decedent’s marital relationship was uncertain. Remanded.View "In re Wrongful Death of Daniel P. Soran" on Justia Law

After H. Kent Dahlke died in 2003, leaving a will he had executed in 2001, there were irregularities in the administration of Kent’s estate, including the probate court’s failure to advise Kent’s surviving wife, Sara Dahlke, of her statutory elective share, and the court’s failure to assure that Kent’s heirs waived a hearing on a decree of distribution. Sara later died. In 2011, five years after the decree of distribution of Kent’s estate was entered and its assets were distributed to the devisees, Sara’s daughter, Susan Jubie, acting as the personal representative of Kent’s estate, the personal representative of Sara’s estate, and individually, sought to set aside the decree of distribution of Kent’s estate. The district court declined to set the decree aside. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the probate process went awry in this case, the law governing finality of judgments required that the decree of dissolution stand.View "Estate of Dahlke" on Justia Law

Defendant Franklin Stephens appealed a circuit court order granting an injunction to plaintiff Hazel Colley. Franklin is nephew to Sara Dees and Colley. In late 2011, Dees was residing at Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center. On approximately January 15, 2012, Stephens checked Dees out of the center and moved her back into her house in Troy. Stephens and an unidentified female companion also moved into the house and began caring for Dees. Colley alleged that Stephens thereafter began restricting access to Dees, preventing Colley and Dees's friends from speaking with her on the telephone or visiting with her outside his or his female companion's presence. Colley, who lives in Opelika, alleged she had previously had a close relationship with her sister and had stayed with her for weeks at a time to help with her medical needs; however, she alleged once Stephens moved into Dees's house Stephens would no longer allow her to stay with Dees overnight. Throughout 2012, Stephens took steps to "assist" Dees: (1) in executing a durable power of attorney; drafting a new will (replacing Colley as executor of Dees' estate and naming himself sole heir); and adding himself to all of Dees' bank accounts. Dees died in early 2013; Stephens thereafter began exercising control of her accounts. As executor, Stephens submitted Dees' will to probate. Colley moved the probate and circuit courts to set aside the power of attorney and will executed in 2012 alleging Stephens procured them via fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. The circuit court granted Colley's request for injunctive relief. On appeal, Stephens argues both that Colley failed to establish by competent evidence the four elements set forth in Alabama case law and that the circuit court's preliminary-injunction order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2). In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "clear on its face" that the circuit court's order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2) because the circuit court failed to state its reasons for entering the preliminary injunction. "This noncompliance obviates the need to consider Stephens's other argument that there was insufficient evidence before the circuit court to merit the entry of a preliminary injunction." The injunction order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephens v. Colley " on Justia Law

Monica Clark, as the personal representative of the estate of Lester Jasmanka, appealed a district court order denying her motion to vacate a 1990 default judgment quieting title to certain mineral interests in Jack and Eugene Peterson. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding: (1) the 1990 judgment was not void and therefore could not be vacated; and (2) the motion to vacate the judgment for fraud and misrepresentation was untimely.View "Peterson v. Jasmanka" on Justia Law

When legendary blues musician Robert Johnson died intestate in 1938, he had no money and appeared to have left no assets to distribute to heirs, so no estate was opened at that time. But the increasing popularity of Johnson's music over the years following his death led Steven LaVere, a music producer from Tennessee who owned Delta Haze Corporation, to contact Johnson's half-sister, Carrie Thompson, about previously unpublished photographs of Johnson. Believing Thompson to be Johnson's only heir, LaVere requested the photographs to launch a new release of Johnson's music. The legatees of Carrie Thompson sought to recover royalties and fees from the use of two photographs that were ultimately used in the project. Among the several reasons the trial court denied their claim was that the statute of limitations had expired. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Anderson v. LaVere" on Justia Law

Respondent Hellen Couture appealed a probate court decision to grant petitioner Thomas Couture's petition to impose a constructive trust for the benefit of the decedent's heirs over certain life insurance proceeds paid to respondent upon the decedent's death. After review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the probate court's decision, and affirmed. View "In re Estate of Lucien Couture" on Justia Law

After Harold Forest Snow died, Linda Moulton, as personal representative, filed a civil action against Susan Snow, alleging that one of the transfers identified in Harold’s codicil was an improvident transfer and a product of undue influence. During discovery, the parties’ attorneys announced that they had settled the case. Neither side, however, would agree to sign the other’s proposed settlement documents. Linda subsequently filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The probate court granted Linda’s motion to enforce, finding that the record contained an “unequivocal stipulation by the parties’ attorneys that the matter was settled” and that the material terms of the agreement were clearly defined in the transcript. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was ample evidence that the parties intended to enter into an enforceable settlement agreement and that the terms placed on the record reflected all of the material terms of the contract; and (2) the probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement without holding a trial or an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Estate of Snow" on Justia Law

After disagreements over Ripley Associates, LLC’s operation arose, the Domenick Marrara, Jr. Trust, which owned a twenty-five percent interest in Ripley, decided to dissociate from Ripley. The Trust and its Trustees filed this proceeding to enforce Ripley’s purchase of the Trust’s distributional interest. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court determined the fair market value of the Trust’s distributional interest in Ripley. The court subsequently ordered that Ripley should pay interest on this amount from the date the court determined the value of the Trust’s distributional interest at the hearing. The Trustees appealed, arguing that they were entitled to receive interest on the Trust’s distributional interest from the date of its dissociation from Ripley. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payment of interest upon a dissociated member’s distributional interest in an at-will limited liability company is calculated from the date of dissociation.View "Marrara v. Ripley Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law

After Decedent died, Decedent’s will was admitted to probate, and all of Decedent’s property was devised to his sister. Appellant petitioned to inherit from Decedent’s estate, claiming that she was the pretermitted child of Decedent and that she was entitled to receive all of his estate as his sole heir. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s petition for failing to file her claim against the Estate and failing to establish her paternity within the 180-day period required under Ark. Code Ann. 28-9-209(d). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s petition due to her failure to satisfy the statutory requirements.View "Bell v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Don Bizek obtained a judgment against Sally Gordon, a trustee and beneficiary of the WPB Trust, and sought to execute his judgment against Gordon's beneficial interest in the WPB Trust. If the disclaimer is valid, it caused Gordon's beneficial interest to descend to Cyndi Vance, Gordon's daughter and successor beneficiary. If the disclaimer is void, Bizek may attach Gordon's beneficial interest in the WPB Trust. The trial court ruled that Gordon's disclaimer was void. However, the court concluded that the presumption created by section 16004 of the Probate Code that a trustee who commingles trust funds with her own funds violates her fiduciary duty to the trust applies only to the relationship between a trustee and trust beneficiaries. In this case, the trial court applied the presumption for the benefit of a creditor of the trustee, not a beneficiary of the trust. Therefore, the trial court committed error and the court reversed and remanded. Bizek was not entitled to the section 16004 presumption and thus had the burden to prove that Gordon's use of WPB Trust funds demonstrated acceptance of her beneficial interest in the Trust. View "Vance v. Bizek" on Justia Law