Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

When Rachel Anderson (formerly Rachel Rodgers) was six years old, a horse kicked her in the face and she sustained serious injuries. Her many fractures and lacerations required multiple surgeries and she suffered severe cognitive and emotional trauma. Rachel's family hired respondent Richard McMenamin to pursue a personal injury action against the owner of the horse. In 1997, the Superior Court approved a personal injury settlement of $3 00,000.00 and the creation of the "Rachel Marguerite Rodgers Trust." McMenamin hired respondent attorney William Dussault to draw up the trust agreement. After attorney's fees and other costs, a net amount of$187,160.66 entered the trust. Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, NA served as trustee. The agreement also created a trust advisory committee (T AC) composed of petitioner's mother, Andrea Davey (formerly Andrea Rodgers) and McMenamin, were tasked with making distribution decisions for Rachel's benefit. Rachel later took issue with how her trust has been administered, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and legal malpractice. Rachel questioned several purchases with trust money that she said were never used for her benefit - a vehicle, computers and software and a house (which was purchased in the name of her mother's boyfriend). Furthermore, Rachel questioned the trustee and legal fees that were charged to the trust as excessive and at above market rates. Rachel sued her mother, McMenamin, Wells Fargo, and Dussault, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and malpractice. Motions for summary judgment were filed by Dussault, McMenamin, and Wells Fargo. The court granted their motion. The superior court then dismissed all of Rachel's remaining claims, including claims against her mother. Rachel appealed as to McMenamin, Dussault, and Wells Fargo, but chose not to appeal her claim against Andrea. The appellate court affirmed. At issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether the superior court's approval of annual accountings of Rachel's trust under the Trustees Accounting Act (TAA), chapter 11.106 RCW, barred this suit, which was timely under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), chapter 11.96A RCW. The Supreme Court found that because Rachel was not represented by a guardian ad litem when the court approved the trust's annual accountings, she did not have notice of these proceedings and accordingly could bring a breach of trust action under TEDRA. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated its award of attorney's fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Dussault" on Justia Law

In 2009 Betty and Wayne submitted a tax return on behalf of a Betty Phillips Trust, signed by Betty, who was listed as the trustee, claiming income of $47,997. A second return on behalf of a Wayne Phillips trust, was signed by Wayne, but Betty was listed as trustee. This return reported income of $1,057,585. Both returns claimed that all income had gone to pay fiduciary fees, so that the trusts had no taxable income. The Wayne Trust claimed a refund of $352,528. The Betty Trust claimed $15,999. The IRS issued a check for $352,528. They endorsed the check and deposited it into a joint account. The returns were fraudulent. The IRS had no record of any taxes being paid by the trusts. In December, the IRS served summonses. That month, the couple withdrew $244,137 remaining from their refund proceeds using 13 different locations. They followed the same strategy the next year, but did not receive checks. A jury convicted Betty of conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to claims (18 U.S.C. 286), and of knowingly making a false claim to the government (18 U.S.C. 287.1). The district court sentenced her to 41 months’ imprisonment and ordered them to pay $352,528 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the court improperly admitted evidence, and that the government constructively amended the indictment and violated Betty’s right against self‐incrimination.View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Appellee, as special administrator of the estate of Rufus Owens and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Owens, filed a lawsuit against Pine Hills Health and Rehabilitation, LLC and others for injuries Owens sustained during his care and treatment at Pine Hills. Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. Appellee argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because there was no evidence of mutual assent where the agreement was signed by Appellee as the "responsible party" but did not bear the signature of a representative of Pine Hills. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no objective evidence of mutual assent, and therefore, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable.View "Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Hanover College, the beneficiary of two trusts, filed petitions requesting that the trusts be terminated. Old National Bancorp, d/b/a Old National Trust Company, as trustee for both trusts, filed responses to Hanover’s petitions. The trial court granted the petitions and ordered the two trusts dissolved and the trust assets distributed to Hanover. Rather than seek a stay of the trial court’s dissolution orders, Old National appealed. The court of appeals dismissed Old National’s appeal, concluding (1) Old National lacked standing in its representative capacity because it failed to obtain a stay of the trial court’s termination orders and was therefore no longer the trustee of the trusts; and (2) because Old National did not intervene in its individual capacity at trial it could not be an aggrieved party on appeal. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed Old National’s appeal, holding that the trustee lacked standing to pursue the appeal in its representative capacity and did not appeal in its individual capacity. View "Old Nat’l Bancorp v. Hanover College" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Faith Krueger appealed and Grand Forks County cross-appealed a judgment in favor of the County in Krueger's action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, trespass to chattel, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision of a public administrator. In July 2012, Krueger sued the County alleging she lost over $300,000 in property and assets after Barbara Zavala, the Grand Forks County Public Administrator, was appointed her guardian and conservator. Krueger claimed the County was liable for Zavala's actions under N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03 because Zavala was a county employee. Krueger argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying her motion to compel discovery, denying her motion for a continuance, denying her claim for damages for mental anguish, erred in its evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and by allowing certain statements by the County's attorney during closing arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Krueger v. Grand Forks County" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lonnie Brockmire (“Decedent”) died intestate. Decedent was survived by his only biological child, Sherri, and Sherri’s daughter, Bella. Sherri was adopted by her stepfather after she became an adult and prior to Decedent’s death. After Decedent died, Sherri sought a partial distribution of Decedent’s estate to Bella. The circuit court granted the distribution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bella had no right to inherit Decedent’s estate pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 474.060.1 and 474.010(2) because (1) Sherri was not a “child” of Decedent at the time he died, and (2) even if she was, Sherri did not predecease Decedent.View "In re Brockmire" on Justia Law

Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. In 2010, B.D. executed a will which granted significantly more property to William and consequently, less to Bronwyn than did a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn has sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will was reversed, and granted judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father’s 2010 will. The Court affirmed the chancellor’s decisions to permit William to pay attorneys with funds obtained from his father’s estate and to permit William to continue as executor, and the chancery court’s decision to deny attorney fees to the estate. View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law

In 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. issued a mortgage to Robert Collopy, who transferred the mortgaged property to a trust. Collopy died later that year. In 2010, the Bank of New York Mellon, which had assumed trustee responsibility for administration of the mortgage, filed an action to foreclose on the mortgage, naming Collopy, in his individual capacity and as trustee of the trust, as the defendant. Collopy’s heir and co-trustee, Bobbie King, defended against the foreclosure action. In 2013, after an unfavorable ruling in the foreclosure action, the Bank filed a petition for the formal appointment of a special administrator to Collopy’s estate. The probate court dismissed the petition as untimely under Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 3-108(a), which prohibits the initiation of appointment proceedings more than three years after the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bank’s petition was properly denied for having been filed outside the three-year limitations period in section 3-108(a). View "Estate of Collopy " on Justia Law

After Frederick McCollor died in 2010, Frederick’s wife, Patricia, brought suit against the couple’s children, John and Cheryl, for violation of the Improvident Transfers of Title Act (ITTA), undue influence, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The suit stemmed from actions John and Cheryl took at the end of Frederick’s life, including persuading Frederick and Patricia to transfer Frederick’s home to John and Cheryl and transferring over $22,000 from Frederick’s account to a joint account while John acted under a power of attorney obtained from Frederick five days after Frederick had a stroke. The superior court (1) concluded that the transfer of the real property was obtained through undue influence and was therefore void pursuant to the ITTA; (2) determined that John breached his fiduciary duty as the holder of Frederick’s power of attorney with regard to his transfer and use of Frederick’s money; and (3) ordered that the real property be held in constructive trust for the benefit of Frederick’s estate, and that John reimburse the estate in the amount of $22,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "McCollor v. McCollor" on Justia Law

Four children-beneficiaries to the estate of Evelyn Copelan contested her will. Appellants sought to probate a will in which their mother left almost her entire estate to them, leaving only one dollar each to the appellees. In turn, the appellees opposed the admission of the will to probate, claiming that their mother was without testamentary capacity when she executed the will, and asserting that their mother made the will under the undue influence of the appellants. The probate court admitted the will to probate, the appellees sought review in the superior court. Following a jury trial, the superior court entered a judgment for the appellees, denying the petition of the appellants to probate the will. The appellants sought the Supreme Court's review. But finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Copelan v. Copelan" on Justia Law