Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In appeal no. 1120678, Michael D. Beam appealed circuit court orders in a conservatorship proceeding. In appeal no. 1120679, Michael appealed a will-contest proceeding that was then-pending in the same court. Upon review of these cases, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the conservatorship proceeding and that the orders entered by the circuit court in were void and therefore should have been vacated. Because a void order will not support an appeal, the Court dismissed appeal no. 1120678 and directed the circuit court to vacate its orders. View "Beam v. Taylor" on Justia Law

James Huston appealed an order denying his petition to remove Wilma Russell as personal representative of Virgil Huston's estate and from an order denying Russell's petition to determine Virgil Huston's heirs. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the district court did not misapply the law and provided a reasoned explanation for its determination not to remove Russell as personal representative of the estate. The court's decision was not arbitrary, unconscionable or unreasonable, and the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying James Huston's petition to remove Russell as personal representative. View "Estate of Huston" on Justia Law

J.B. Hunt was a judgment creditor of Robert and Frieda Thornton, who were the trustees and life beneficiaries of five trusts, each of which provided that quarterly distributions be made to the Thorntons until their deaths. J.B. Hunt commenced an action to attach the Thorntons’ interest in future distributions from the trusts and to apply them to the satisfaction of J.B. Hunt’s judgment. The circuit court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, determining that a creditor may not claim a quarterly distribution until the date it becomes due. On appeal, J.B. Hunt asserted that Ark. Code Ann. 28-73-501 provides that a creditor may reach future distributions from a trust. Appellees argued that although attachments of future distributions may be authorized by section 28-73-501 in some situations, it was not permissible in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that J.B. Hunt’s complaint improperly sought the Thorntons’ uncertain future distributions from the trusts, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it. View "J.B. Hunt v. Thornton" on Justia Law

The Chancery Court appointed conservators over the person and estate of Stuart Irby. Approximately one year later, Karen Collins Irby, Stuart's ex-wife, filed pleadings to invalidate the conservatorship and set aside the transactions of the conservators. The chancery court denied Karen's petition, and she appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Collins v. Pinnacle Trust" on Justia Law

In 1997, the trusts acquired all shares of AIS with an aggregate basis of $5,612,555. In 1999, the trusts formed Wind River Corporation and contributed their AIS shares in exchange for all Wind River shares. Wind River designated itself a subchapter S Corporation. In 2003, Wind River elected to treat AIS as a qualified subchapter S subsidiary. Before that election, the trusts’ aggregate adjusted basis in Wind River was $15,246,099. After the Qsub election, the trusts increased their bases in that stock to $242,481,544. The trusts sold their Wind River interests to Fox. After transaction costs, the sale yielded $230,111,857 in cash and securities in exchange for the Wind River stock. The trusts claimed a loss of $12,247,229: the difference between the amount actually received for the sale and the new basis in the Wind River stock. The trusts shareholders’ 2003 tax returns showed that capital loss. The IRS determined that a capital gain of approximately $214 million had been realized from the sale to Fox, for a cumulative tax deficiency of $33,747,858. Deficiency notices stated “the Qsub election and the resulting deemed I.R.C. 332 liquidation did not give rise to an item of income under I.R.C. 1366(a)(1)(A); therefore, [the Trusts] could not increase the basis of their [Wind River] stock under I.R.C. 1367(a)(1)(A).” The Tax Court found the increase in basis and declared loss to be improper. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Ball v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law

Lewis Lubar, the trustee of The Clover Trust, filed a complaint for foreclosure against Frederick Connelly. Connelly filed an answer and several affirmative defenses. The superior court granted Lubar’s motion for summary judgment and ordered the sale of Connelly’s residence. Connelly appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of foreclosure and order of sale, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted because (1) Lubar failed to include the minimum required, properly supported, facts in his statement of material facts, and therefore, Lubar failed to demonstrate that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the record was rife with genuine issues of fact material to deciding the issues raised in this case, including Connelly’s affirmative defenses. Remanded. View "Lubar v. Connelly" on Justia Law

After Daniel Nickerson suffered a fatal heart attack, Nickerson’s wife, Cecelia, as personal representative of Nickerson’s estate, filed professional negligence and wrongful death claims against Daniel’s doctor, Dr. Alan Carter, and vicarious liability claims against Mercy Primary Care, Dr. Carter’s employer. A jury found that Dr. Carter was negligent but not the legal cause of Daniel’s death. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court erred in admitting the findings of a medical malpractice screening panel, as the panel chair’s consideration of evidence outside the record violated the Maine Health Security Act and Maine’s procedural rules. Remanded. View "Estate of Nickerson v. Carter" on Justia Law

Denise Scott Ricks sought to admit a self-proving will to probate. After the will was admitted, Adam Dorough, Rufus Dorough, James Dorough, Patrick Dorough, and Robert Dorough brought a will contest at Circuit Court. The Circuit Court declared the will to be valid, and the Dorough brothers appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the Autauga Circuit Court. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court and reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Dorough v. Ricks " on Justia Law

The testator's daughter challenges the propounder's petition to probate a copy of the testator's will. The Probate Court found that the propounder was unable to overcome the presumption that the testator intended to revoke the will created when the original will could not be found. Because there was evidence supporting the probate court's finding, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition to probate. View "Britt v. Sands" on Justia Law

Lois McIntyre was the 1930 "Queen of the Pendleton Round-Up." As queen, she was given a "Queen Outfit" that consisted of a white satin shirt, a white leather vest and riding skirt with black and white fringe, and a black scarf. In 1964, McIntyre's son and plaintiff's husband, inherited the outfit from McIntyre. Shortly after inheriting the outfit, plaintiff and her husband were approached by Lieuallen, who requested that she be given the outfit. However, plaintiff and her husband refused to give it to her. Plaintiff and her husband later decided to display the outfit at the Pendleton Round-Up and Happy Canyon Hall of Fame. They delivered the outfit to Lieuallen for her to deliver to the Hall of Fame for that purpose, but did not gift or transfer ownership of the outfit to Lieuallen. Lieuallen delivered the outfit to the Hall of Fame as directed. In 1972, while the outfit was still on display at the Hall of Fame, plaintiff's husband passed away, and plaintiff inherited the outfit. In 2000, defendant, an heir of Lieuallen, went to the Hall of Fame and demanded return of the outfit on behalf of Lieuallen. The Hall of Fame promptly complied with defendant's request, and defendant gained possession of the outfit. Plaintiff, who is legally blind, was unaware that the outfit had been removed from the Hall of Fame. Plaintiff did not learn of the transfer until June 2007, when the Hall of Fame displays were moved to a new building. Plaintiff then demanded that defendant return the outfit, and defendant refused. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court was whether the six-year statute of limitations applicable to conversion and replevin claims under ORS 12.080(4) incorporated a "discovery rule" to determine when such claims "accrue." The Court of Appeals concluded that the limitation prescribed by ORS 12.080(4) begins to run at the time of the wrongful taking of personal property and that the provision does not incorporate a discovery rule. Thus, it affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint as time-barred. On review, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff's allegations adequately invoked a discovery rule as recognized in "Berry v. Branner," (421 P2d 996 (1966)), and reversed. View "Rice v. Rabb" on Justia Law