Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a change in the federal estate tax law after an alleged wrongful death could give rise to a viable claim under the Wrongful Death Act. The Appellate Division concluded that the estate tax losses alleged by plaintiffs would not compel the factfinder to engage in speculation. It held that by the time the trial court ruled on the motion for reconsideration, the estate tax laws for 2011 and 2012 had been established, and a jury guided by expert testimony would have been in a position to calculate damages. The panel accordingly reinstated plaintiffs’ claims for estate tax losses as the measure of damages asserted as an element of their wrongful death claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Wrongful Death Act did not authorize claims for damages based on estate taxes paid by a decedent’s estate because such claims do not fit within the statutory cause of action defined by N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 and the alleged damages do not constitute "pecuniary" losses as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:31-5. View "Beim v. Hulfish" on Justia Law

In 1993, Gloria Hall executed a will that devised all personal and real property to her husband. In 2002, Gloria’s husband filed for divorce. In 2004, Gloria devised a new will which revoked all earlier wills and which devised nothing to her husband. The probate and family court later appointed a temporary guardian for Gloria due to her dementia. In 2007, the temporary guardian signed a separation agreement with Gloria’s husband that stated that neither Gloria nor her husband would modify the wills each had executed in 1993. After Gloria died, the county probate court concluded that the 2004 will could not have been revoked by the agreement entered into by the temporary guardian and admitted the 2004 will to probate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err in admitting Gloria’s 2004 will to probate because (1) the parties stipulated that the 2004 was validly executed by a person with testamentary capacity, and the will was not shown to be the subject of undue influence; and (2) the will could not be revoked by the separation agreement because the agreement itself failed to comply with the plain terms of the statute governing will revocation. View "Estate of Hall" on Justia Law

THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, LLC and THI of New Mexico, LLC (collectively THI) operate a nursing home in Hobbs, New Mexico. When Lillie Mae Patton's husband was admitted into the home, he entered into an arbitration agreement that required the parties to arbitrate any dispute arising out of his care at the home except claims relating to guardianship proceedings, collection or eviction actions by THI, or disputes of less than $2,500. After Mr. Patton died, Mrs. Patton sued THI for negligence and misrepresentation. THI then filed a complaint to compel arbitration of the claims. The district court initially ruled that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable and ordered arbitration. Under New Mexico law a compulsory-arbitration provision in a contract may be unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, if it applies only, or primarily, to claims that just one party to the contract is likely to bring. The question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted the state law for contracts governed by the FAA. The Court held that New Mexico law was preempted in this case and the arbitration clause should have been enforced. View "THI of New Mexico at Hobbs v. Patton" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an incomplete date in an attestation clause invalidated a last will and testament when the full date appeared in the first paragraph of the testament and on every page of the testament, including the page of the attestation clause. The district court granted the testator’s daughter’s motion for summary judgment seeking to set aside the will as invalid because the attestation clause was not fully dated and, thus, failed to meet the requirements of La. Civ. Code art. 1577. The court of appeal affirmed. Because the Supreme Court concluded the attestation clause in the notarial testament substantially complied with the requirements of Art. 1577, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Succession of James Jason Holbrook, Sr." on Justia Law

Halley Smith appealed a Chancery Court order which held Smith was not a wrongful-death beneficiary of Justin Smith. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Smith asked the Court to judicially declare that an in loco parentis child qualified as a wrongful-death beneficiary under Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13. Finding that an in loco parentis child does not qualify as a wrongful-death beneficiary, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Justin Michael Smith" on Justia Law

In 2001, Appellant moved into Decedent’s home at Decedent’s request, where he lived and cared for Decedent until Decedent’s death in 2010. After Decedent’s death, Appellant filed a creditor’s claim against Decedent’s estate, seeking compensation for the care and services he provided. Defendants, the co-administrators of the estate, denied Appellant’s claim. Appellant subsequently brought an action against Defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding no question of material fact existed and that Appellant failed as a matter of law on his claims for implied-in-fact contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. View "Symons v. Heaton" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the sale of the Chronicle Publishing Company. After the Martin Family Trusts formed a tiered partnership structure, the Martin heirs commenced a series of transactions designed to create losses that would offset the taxable gain realized from the Chronicle Publishing sale. On appeal, taxpayers argued that the 2000-A Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) was time-barred by the restrictive language in the extension agreements. The court agreed with the district court that the extension agreements between the IRS and First Step encompassed adjustments made in the 2000-A FPAA that were directly attributable to partnership flow-through items of First Ship; the FPAA to 2000-A extended the limitations period for assessing tax beyond the extension agreements and through the present litigation; however, the agreements did not extend to adjustments in the 2000-A FPAA that were not directly attributable to First Ship; and because the district court held more broadly that "the extension agreements encompass the adjustments made by the IRS in the FPAA issued to 2000-A," the court remanded to the district court to make a determination of which adjustments in the 2000-A FPAA were directly attributable to partnership flow-through items of First Ship. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States" on Justia Law

Arnold and Vesta Melby were trustors of separate irrevocable trusts. Both Arnold and Vesta received Medicaid benefits. After the Melbys’ deaths, the Iowa Department of Human Services notified Arnold’s estate that it would seek reimbursement for all Medicaid expenses it had paid on behalf of Arnold and Vesta. The Department then filed an application in the estate seeking a judgment declaring the Melbys had interests in the corpus of their trusts that should be counted as assets available for repayment of the Department’s Medicaid claim. The district court concluded (1) the Melbys’ interests in the trusts were limited to their right to receive the net income from the trusts’ assets, and (2) the Department’s right to recover the Medicaid payments could be enforced against such income, but not against the corpus of the trusts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Department’s right to recover Medicaid payments under the facts of this case extended beyond the Melbys’ net income interests; and (2) the district court erred in determining the scope of medical assistance for which recovery was authorized by the general assembly. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Melby" on Justia Law

Paul Ligor, the son of Mary Hiller, applied for informal probate and was appointed personal representative of Hiller’s estate after her death. Three of Ligor’s siblings filed multiple actions, including a petition to remove Ligor as personal representative and a complaint seeking review of Ligor’s conduct as Hiller’s agent. The probate court (1) found Ligor had solicited a power of attorney when Hiller was not of sound mind and then wrongfully depleted Hiller’s assets and estate before and after Hiller’s death; (2) found Ligor had breached his fiduciary duty owed to Hiller; and (3) ordered Ligor to repay to Hiller’s estate the sums he wrongfully took. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the siblings’ breach of fiduciary duty claim; and (2) the remainder of Ligor’s arguments on appeal were not properly preserved. View "In re Estate of Hiller" on Justia Law

Defendant, a financial advisor to Decedent, was sued by identified beneficiaries of Decedent’s signed written estate plan. The beneficiaries alleged that Defendant was negligent in the performance of his duties, and therefore, the beneficiaries did not receive what they were supposed to receive under the plan. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Defendant, a non-attorney, owed no duty to the beneficiaries. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment entered against plaintiff Steve Bristol and his spouse, holding that Bristol was owed a duty by Defendant and that Bristol raised a genuine of material fact as to whether Defendant’s negligent performance of his agency responsibilities caused Bristol not to receive a specific devise set forth in Decedent’s will; and (2) affirmed the judgment with respect to the charitable recipient plaintiffs, as their damages were too speculative to establish damages. View "St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo, Ill. v. Ingram" on Justia Law