Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Bill Graham, a successful promoter of rock and roll concerts, died testate and his will created individual trusts for his sons, Alexander and David. Nicholas Clainos was the trustee of the trusts and the executor of the estate and Richard Greene, through his firm, provided Clainos legal counsel. On appeal, Alexander and David challenged the district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss, a special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Proc. Code 425.16(b)(1), and related attorney's fees awards. The court affirmed the disposition of the motion to strike in part and reversed in part. The court concluded that striking plaintiffs' conversion and unjust enrichment claims against Clainos was erroneous. The court also concluded that striking plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim against Clainos was erroneous. The court further concluded that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims for conversion, copyright infringement, and declaratory relief against the BGA Defendants and that dismissal of those claims was erroneous. In regards to attorney's fees, the court vacated the post-motion-to-strike fee award to Clainos, as well as the post-motion-to-dismiss fee award to the BGA Defendants. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Graham-Sult v. Clainos" on Justia Law

A trust and an amendment to the trust both contained no contest clauses. In 2009, two of the trust’s beneficiaries filed a safe harbor proceeding seeking a determination that the petition they proposed to file challenging trustee conduct would not trigger the no contest clauses of the trust’s amendment. The probate court concluded the proposed petition did not constitute a contest. At issue on appeal was whether the no contest clause law that became operative in 2010, while the beneficiaries’ application was pending, or the no contest clause law in effect at the time the beneficiaries filed their application applied to the beneficiaries’ proposed petition. The court of appeal held (1) the former no contest law applied, and (2) the beneficiaries’ challenge constituted a contest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) safe harbor proceedings filed before 2010 were not affected by the repeal of the former law, which previously authorized safe harbor applications, and therefore, the probate court correctly ruled on the beneficiaries’ application; (2) the current law governed the question of whether the beneficiaries’ proposed claims triggered the no contest clauses; and (3) under the current law, the no contest clauses in the amended trust were unenforceable against the beneficiaries’ proposed petition. View "Donkin v. Donkin" on Justia Law

The parties in this case, William and Steven Burkhalter, were the sons of Louis Burkhalter. William challenged an unfavorable modification of Louis's revocable trust that occurred just before Louis's death, claiming (1) Steven unduly influenced Louis and tortiously interfered with the trust, and (2) Louis lacked the necessary testamentary intent when he made the modification. The district court directed a verdict for Steven on the tortious interference claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Steven on the testamentary capacity and undue influence claims. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial on the undue influence claim, concluding that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on undue influence, and the error prejudiced William. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict on the undue influence claim, holding that the district court's instruction accurately reflected the law of undue influence and did not unduly emphasize the causation element of the undue influence claim. View "Burkhalter v. Burkhalter" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Eaton appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of his mother Mary Louise Eaton and her guardian Michael Eaton. This appeal arose from petitioner's attempts to be paid legal fees he incurred in guardianship proceedings involving his mother and other siblings. He alleged that he was entitled to the fees because he acted as his mother's attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable general power of attorney. The trial court ruled that an acknowledgement-requirement of RSA 506:6, VII(a) was mandatory and therefore petitioner could not have been acting as Mary Lou Eaton's attorney-in-fact when he undertook the acts for which the legal fees were claimed] as a matter of law. Finding no error in the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Eaton v. Eaton" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was trust property that was transferred from the trust to a limited partnership by consent of the trust beneficiaries. The partnership subsequently transferred the property to a third-party business. The district court (1) imposed a constructive trust on the previous trust property based on the alleged improper transfer made by the partnership to the third party, and (2) entered a personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and the third party holding the former trust assets. At issue on appeal and cross-appeal was whether the in rem jurisdiction over the trust assets conferred upon the district court by Nev. Rev. Stat. 164.010(1) and 164.015(6) permitted the district court to impose the constructive trust and to enter the personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and third-party company. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 164.010(1) and 164.015(6) did not confer jurisdiction upon the district court to enter a constructive trust on the disputed assets and a personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and third-party company because in rem jurisdiction only extends to property, and the disputed assets were no longer trust property after they were transferred to the limited partnership. Remanded. View "In re Aboud Inter Vivos Trust" on Justia Law

Appellees (husband and wife) created The Dorothy M. Miller Family Irrevocable Trust, naming Mrs. Miller as settlor, and her and her husband as co-trustees. The sole beneficiaries of the trust were appellees and their only child. Appellees transferred title to their house and farm to the trust, but did not pay realty transfer tax on the transfer, claiming it was an excluded transaction under the Realty Transfer Tax Act as a transfer to a "living trust." The Department of Revenue issued a Realty Transfer Tax Notice of Determination providing the transfer was subject to realty transfer taxes, plus applicable interest and fees. Appellees unsuccessfully petitioned for redetermination with the Department’s Board of Appeals. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that Mrs. Miller's testimony that she intended the Trust to be a substitute for her will was sufficient to define it as a living trust. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court found the Miller Trust failed to meet the statutory definition of a living trust or will substitute. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for calculation of transfer tax. View "Miller v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

After Mary Lou Fox died, Plaintiff, Mary Lou's daughter and the administratrix of Mary Lou's estate, sued Mary Lou's former husband, Robert Fox. Plaintiff alleged that Mary Lou jointly owned 960 acres of farmland with Robert, that Robert deprived Mary Lou of her ownership interest in the land, and that Plaintiff was thereby deprived of an inheritance from Mary Lou. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Robert, concluding that Mary Lou had no ownership interest in the 960 acres. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each cause of action brought by Plaintiff failed because Mary Lou had no claim to a right of ownership in the 960 acres and Plaintiff had no authority supporting her claims. View "Niesche v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Lester and Harriet Shoup created an inter vivos trust. After Lester and Harriet died, the couple's only children, Gregory and Larry Shoup, filed a motion to terminate the trust. Gregory and Larry argued that the trust had fulfilled its purpose because it only provided for Lester and Harriet during their lives and no trust provision existed directing disposition of the remaining trust assets. Lee and Linda Shoup, Gregory's children, objected, arguing that the trust had not fulfilled its purpose and that two letters found with the original trust document provided instructions on the disposition of trust assets. The circuit court terminated the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly determined that the letters would substantially change the trust if given effect, but that the change was prohibited because the trustees did not consent to the letters in writing; and (2) correctly concluded that the trust had fulfilled its purpose and should be terminated. View "In re Sunray Holdings Trust" on Justia Law

Helen Schroeder was a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband Harry, when a log truck collided with the rear of the automobile. Harry was killed, and Helen was severely injured. A consequence of the accident was that Helen suffered diminished mental capacity. In a federal lawsuit, Helen claimed the truck driver was at fault and denied that Harry was negligent. After the federal judge denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Helen settled the federal suit. Helen then sued Harry’s estate in state court, claiming Harry was partially at fault. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the estate on judicial estoppel grounds. But, because the federal judge stated his denial of summary judgment was based on his finding of genuine issues of material fact as to the truck driver’s negligence, not “Harry Schroeder’s potential contributory negligence,” the Supreme Court reversed. View "Clark v. Neese" on Justia Law

After Joan Marusich died, the State ex rel. Department of Health, Office of Healthcare Financing/Equalitycare (Department) filed a lien against the home Joan owned as tenants by the entirety with her husband, William Marusich, who predeceased Joan. The Department filed the lien to recover the cost of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of William. Joan's Estate filed a petition against the Department to remove a false lien. The district court granted summary judgment against the Estate on the validity of the lien. After the district court entered a final judgment on the amount of the lien, the Estate appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly granted summary judgment upholding the Department's lien; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Estate's motion to amend the petition. View "Estate of Marusich v. State ex rel. Dep't of Health, Office of Healthcare Fin./Equalitycare" on Justia Law