Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

After L.C. died, the probate court appointed his son, Bobby, as special personal representative of L.C.'s estate for the limited purpose of investigating and prosecuting all claims relating to nursing home abuse. On behalf of the estate, Bobby subsequently sued Appellees in a wrongful-death action. During the wrongful-death action proceedings, it was revealed that Bobby was a convicted felon who was not qualified to serve as a special personal representative by law. Bobby filed a motion to substitute his brother Ronnie as special personal representative, which the trial court granted. The probate court, however, later vacated its order appointing Bobby, finding the order was invalid from its inception. At issue on appeal was whether Bobby's acts prior to his removal, including his motion to substitute Ronnie, remained valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bobby's acts as a special personal representative were valid until the date of his removal as special personal representative; and (2) accordingly, the probate court erred by finding that the order of appointment was void ab initio. Remanded. View "Taylor v. MCSA, LLC" on Justia Law

L.C. was a nursing home patient when he died. Bobby, L.C.'s son and the special personal representative of L.C.'s estate, filed suit against several nursing home defendants for negligence and medical malpractice. After it was discovered during a deposition that Bobby was a convicted felon and not qualified to serve as special personal representative, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice the complaints against the defendants, concluding that Bobby lacked the authority to act on behalf of the estate because of his disqualification as a felon and that the complaints he filed were nullities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that the actions of Bobby were invalid and that the complaints filed by Bobby were nullities. Remanded. View "Taylor v. MCSA, LLC" on Justia Law

Husband died in 1993, and his will was probated. Wife received almost all of Husband's property pursuant to a residuary clause in the will. In 2011, Wife died. Subsequently, several relatives (Relatives) who had not been formally notified of the 1993 probate proceedings reviewed Husband's will. Relatives brought an action to reopen the estate, claiming that a different residuary clause in Husband's will entitled them to Husband's property. The coexecutors of Wife's estate filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the petition was time-barred under Iowa Prob Code 633.488, which states that a party who did not receive formal notice of the final report and accounting has five years from the final report to reopen settlement of an estate. The district court denied the motion, concluding that section 633.489, which allows estates to be reopened without time limit under certain circumstances, governed Relatives' claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 633.488 was the applicable statute in this case. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Sampson" on Justia Law

A nursing home resident and her community spouse (husband) were penalized based on husband’s purchase of an annuity for himself using funds from his IRA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(f)(1) precluded the transfer of assets because it exceeded husband’s community spouse resource allowance. Section 1396p(c) requires a state to impose a transfer penalty (a period of restricted coverage) if either spouse disposed of assets for less than fair market value during the look-back period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the transfer occurred before the Ohio agency determined that wife was eligible for Medicaid coverage and section 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) permits an unlimited transfer of assets “to another for the sole benefit of the individual’s spouse.” View "Hughes v. Colbert" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the revocation by divorce statute, which provides that, "unless otherwise provided in the will or decree," a divorce revokes a pre-existing will's provisions "relating to" the spouse. Here Decedent and Respondent were divorced in 2006. Three years earlier, Decedent executed a will that devised property to Respondent. The circuit court held that the revocation by divorce provision applied in this case and that the exceptions did not apply, resulting in the revocation of the will's provision relating to Respondent. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that revocation was not triggered because the exceptions the statute recognized applied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) revocation of provisions in a pre-existing will relating to the divorced spouse is effective upon the subsequent divorce unless there is provided in the will or decree a statement that the decedent intended the bequest even after the parties divorced; and (2) in this case, Decedent did not clearly or unequivocally state his intent in his will or in the divorce decree that Respondent should receive the property at issue even after the divorce. View "Nichols v. Suiters" on Justia Law

Appellant Joanne Fitzsimmons Balkam appealed the superior court's partial summary judgment decision that reversed a probate court decision that had granted her permission, as executor of her mother's estate, to physically partition and sell parts of a real estate property to make a division between the heirs of her mother's residual estate. The appellees were two of her brothers, Dennis and James Fitzsimmons. The issues raised in executor's appeal were whether the probate court had the power to allow the heirs to choose which property they received and whether the executor had the power to contract for a survey. Dennis and James raised five issues on appeal: the first two contested the probate court's ruling on their claim of waste and their claim that the accounting was flawed; the last three addressed the power of the executor and the probate court with respect to the distribution of the property: (1) whether executor had the power to subdivide the estate, (2) whether executor's proposed division met the requirement of the will that the estate be distributed into "as nearly equal shares as possible", and (3) whether the probate court's division was proper under its power to partition in 14 V.S.A. 1729. The superior court, in granting appellees' motion for partial summary judgment, and denying the motion for the license to sell real estate, disagreed with the probate court, and found that because legal title to real property passes to beneficiaries immediately upon the death of a testator, the executor had "limited ability to affect the beneficiaries' ownership of the real property" and could not partition the property. Whether or not by mistake, however, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not take up all the issues before it. Dennis and James filed a motion to reconsider the remand to the probate court, asking the superior court to deal with the remaining issues. Executor did not respond to that motion, but instead filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court requesting that it reverse the superior court's summary judgment order regarding executor's power to partition the property. While the Supreme Court held that the executor has the power to partition or sell the property to distribute to testator's children, it did not suggest that the power was unlimited. "The executor is bound by the requirement that the distribution shares be as equal as possible." The Court found the superior court erred in its reasoning on whether the executor had the power to subdivide. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated the trial court must move on to the fourth and fifth questions in light of executor's action pursuant to her distribution power. It must also answer the first and second questions. View "In re Estate of Fitzsimmons" on Justia Law

A February 2008 automobile accident resulted in the death of the driver who was purportedly at fault. His son was issued letters of office to serve as independent administrator of the driver’s estate. The limitations period for plaintiff’s claim of personal injuries was two years. Just before that limitations period was to expire, plaintiff filed suit, apparently unaware of the driver’s death. Her action against a dead person was invalid. Attempts to serve process were unsuccessful, but a special process server eventually notified the plaintiff that the defendant was dead. The Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/13-209, allows a two-year extension of the limitations period under certain conditions, including when a plaintiff moves to substitute the decedent’s personal representative as defendant. The plaintiff did not do so, but obtained the circuit court’s permission to have an employee of plaintiff’s attorney appointed as “special administrator” to defend the estate, a procedure that has no statutory authorization. The circuit court dismissed the action on limitations grounds, but the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Upon learning of the defendant’s demise, the plaintiff should have sought leave to amend the complaint to substitute as defendant the decedent’s son, as decedent’s personal representative, and should have then served process on that representative. The plaintiff failed to use reasonable diligence. View "Relf v. Shatayeva" on Justia Law

The chancery court found that certain property once owned by Gocher and Reba Morrow vested in their estates at the time of their deaths and passed by intestate succession in equal shares to their three sons, Phillip, Ronald, and Joel. Phillip appealed, arguing that he held a remainder interest and the property vested in him at his parents’ death. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the chancery court erred by not quieting and confirming title to the property in Phillip, and reversed the Court of Appeals and the chancery court. View "Morrow v. Morrow" on Justia Law

Constance created an LLC and a revocable trust. Constance transferred her real estate to the LLC and directed that, upon her death, her remaining property be transferred to the Trust. After Constance's death, her son David, as trustee of the Trust and as manager of the LLC, filed a declaratory action to allow the sale of the real estate pursuant to the Trust. Constance's other children, as beneficiaries of the Trust and members of the LLC, filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment that the LLC should govern disposition of the real property and sought an accounting. The district court determined that the Trust would control the disposition and that David did not breach his fiduciary duties. The court of appeals affirmed. David subsequently moved for attorney fees and postjudgment interest, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order and denied the beneficiaries' request for attorney fees, holding (1) the award of attorney fees and costs was outside the scope of the mandate given by the court of appeals, and therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion; and (2) the beneficiaries were not entitled to attorney fees on the ground that David's motion was frivolous. View "Klingelhoefer v. Monif" on Justia Law

Petitions regarding several Peires family Trusts all requested that the Court of Chancery: (1) approve the resignation of the current trustees; (2) confirm the appointment of Northern Trust Company as the sole trustee; (3) determine that Delaware law governed the administration of each Trust; (4) confirm Delaware as the situs for each Trust; (5) reform the trusts' administrative scheme; and (6) accept jurisdiction over the Trusts. The Peierls' Petitions stemmed from their general frustration with Bank of America's lack of communication and responsiveness regarding the handling of Trust assets. Accompanying the Petitions were resignations of the Trusts' current trustees, all expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of Chancery. The appointment of a new corporate trustee is also expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of Chancery. In case number 11,2013, the Supreme Court upheld the Vice Chancellor's decision not to address the Petition in so far as it related to the 1960 Trusts, because New Jersey retained primary supervision over those Trusts. The Court held that the Vice Chancellor erred in determining that he could not exercise jurisdiction over the 1969 Trusts and address the Petition's merits. In case 12,2013: The Supreme Court concluded the Vice Chancellor properly concluded that no actual controversy existed relating to the approval of trustee resignations, the appointment of a new corporate trustee, the confirmation of Delaware as the situs, or the declaration that Delaware law governed the administration of the Trust at issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Vice Chancellor properly denied the requests to reform the Trust Agreement, and to retain jurisdiction over the Trust. In case 13,2013: because the Trusts were not then-currently being administered in Delaware, there was no basis to conclude that Delaware law would apply to the Trusts' administration. Therefore, whether the Court of Chancery could properly reform the Trust Instruments was a matter governed by the laws of the Trusts' administration. In this case, the laws were of Texas for the 1953 Trusts and New York law for the 1957 and 1975 Trusts. Because the Vice Chancellor properly concluded that he was "not in a position to address the requests for reformation," the Supreme Court affirmed the Vice Chancellor's decision to refrain granting reformation relief. View "Matter of: Ethel F. Peierls Charitable Lead Unitrust" on Justia Law