Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Decedent was the sister of Linda Hyde and the mother of Kelli Martin. Martin petitioned the district court to adjudicate that her mother died intestate and to appoint her as Decedent's personal representative. Hyde opposed the petition, asserting that Decedent had previously executed a will naming Hyde as executrix. The district court concluded that Decedent had revoked the will, and therefore ruled that Harless died intestate and that Martin was entitled to be appointed as personal representative. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Decedent's will was a valid will that Decedent did not revoke. Remanded with instructions that Decedent's will be probated. View "In re Estate of Harless" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, relatives of Decedent, sought Attorney's services in the administration of Decedent's estate. Plaintiffs later brought this professional negligence case against Attorney and his firm (Defendants), claiming that Attorney failed properly to disclose a conflict of interest to Plaintiffs, Attorney erroneously advised Plaintiffs to execute disclaimers that should be regarded as invalid and ineffective, and Attorney caused the estate to incur additional taxes by failing to include the purportedly disclaimed property in the qualified terminable interest property election on the estate tax return. The district court (1) entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the conflict of interest claim, and (2) dismissed as time barred Plaintiffs' claims regarding the disclaimed property and associated tax return elections. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment regarding the conflict of interest; but (2) reversed the judgments on Plaintiffs' remaining claims, holding that the district court erred when it concluded that the statute of limitations barred the claims. Remanded. View "Guinn v. Murray" on Justia Law

Ky. Rev. Stat. 386.180 mandated that testamentary trustees make a choice of compensation between either an annual fee or a fee at the termination of the trust. Plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of testamentary trusts managed by Trustees. The Caperton Trust, managed by PNC Bank, operated under a termination-fee compensation option, and the Jarvis Trusts, managed by National City, operated under an annual-fee option. After the General Assembly repealed section 386.180 in 2008, the Trustees brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of whether the repeal of the statute affected their compensation, where the two trusts at issue were in existence for many years before the statute was repealed. The trial court granted the Trustees' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the repeal of section 386.180 eliminated all restrictions on the calculation of trustee fees. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the repeal of section 386.180 was complete and unlimited, and therefore, trustees of testamentary trusts could collect reasonable fees on trusts that predated the repeal of the statute. View "Jarvis v. Nat'l City" on Justia Law

John Huscusson died leaving three adult daughters as heirs of his estate: Tina Banner, Deborah Vandeford and Karen Nee. In his will, Huscusson specifically revoked his previous will, which had been executed in 2006 and had provided that Huscusson's daughters were to share equally in the estate. The 2012 will named Banner as executrix. It provided that Huscusson was "extremely disappointed" in Vandeford and Nee and that each of them was to receive a specific bequest in the amount of $10. Banner was not given a specific bequest. Vandeford and Nee filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an interpretation of the will. Following a hearing, the probate court determined that the will was plain and unambiguous; that it did not contain a residue clause; and that, therefore, the lapsed gift of the residue must pass by intestacy. Banner appealed and after review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Banner v. Vandeford" on Justia Law

Donald Hughes and John Hughes appealed circuit court judgment vacating a deed and imposing a constructive trust upon real property formerly owned by Henry Hughes and Emma Lucille Hughes, both of whom are deceased. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction of the claim at issue, it vacated the judgment and dismissed the appeal. View "Hughes v. Robbie Branton " on Justia Law

Dorothy Gopher, an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe, died intestate in 2008. Dorothy was survived by seven children (the siblings), and her estate consisted only of a ceremonial tribal flag. One of the siblings, filed an application for informal probate in the district court. As proceedings commenced in district court, several siblings filed a petition before the Blackfeet tribal court to name two other siblings as personal representatives in their parents' estates. The two siblings then filed consecutive motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in district court. The district court continued its proceedings and denied the motions to dismiss. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction and ordered the estate to transfer the flag to co-trustees of a constructive trust on the estate. Meanwhile, the Blackfeet tribal court declined to assert jurisdiction over the estate property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it assumed jurisdiction over the probate of the estate. View "In re Estate of Gopher" on Justia Law

After John Irvine died, the proceeds from three of his investment accounts were paid to his estate. John's mother, Va Va, sought a declaratory judgment that she was the sole beneficiary of all three accounts. John's stepson, Michael, opposed the action. Both Va Va and Michael filed summary judgment motions. Va Va argued that John intended to benefit his estate under the laws of intestacy, not under the terms of his 1983 will, which included Michael as a beneficiary, and that John intended for her to be the contingent beneficiary for all three accounts. To support her contention, Va Va offered testimony from John's financial planner, who testified that he erroneously believed that John did not have a will when he executed beneficiary designation forms for a number of accounts. Va Va argued that the written contracts should be reformed for mutual mistake. The district court concluded that Michael was entitled to summary judgment under the contract terms and that no legal basis existed to require reformation of the contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) the contracts could not be reformed; and (2) proceeds from John's investment accounts were properly paid to his estate. View "Estate of Irvine v. Oaas" on Justia Law

In 2009 McCausland, executed a “Last Will and Testament” naming Fluharty as executor and bequeating the residue of his estate to a Trust, established in 2002. Months later, McCausland was physically incapacitated and living in a nursing care facility. It is alleged that McCausland dictated the terms of a new will to his nephew, Brown. McCausland did not sign or mark the typewritten will, and no one signed or marked it on his behalf. Two of McCausland’s health care providers in the nursing home signed the will and subsequently attempted to attest the document by signing affidavits averring that they “did witness [McCausland] stating that the new last will and testament contained his final desires.” In 2010, McCausland died and the original will was probated and recorded. More than a year later, the petitioners sought to have the original will revoked and the second will admitted to probate. The trial court held that, under W. Va. Code § 41-1-3, the second document is not a valid will. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. A testator’s failure to sign his non-holographic will, or to request that it be signed on his behalf, renders the will void under these circumstances. View "Brown. v. Fluharty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the estranged great grandchildren of Elsie and legatees to one half of her residuary estate under a will dated 2004 and admitted to probate following Elsie's death in 2010. The defendants are Audrey, Elsie's sister and legatee to the remaining half of her residuary estate, and Elsie’s former neighbors, Toni, Bruce, and Mike. Elsie's will nominated Toni as executrix; Toni and Audrey took possession of significant assets from Elsie during Elsie’s life. Toni and Bruce began providing assistance to Elsie and her husband in 2004 under a contract providing that Toni and Bruce would be paid $500 per week and would receive $8000 for assistance given in the past. The agreement provided that Toni and Bruce would be paid from her estate, rather than during her lifetime. The trial court found that that Toni, while acting as an agent under the power of attorney, did not arrange for Elsie’s assets to pass at death to the defendant, that the assets in question were retitled by Elsie personally. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Toni was in a confidential relationship with Elsie and the burden was on the defendants to rebut the presumption that the transactions were the result of undue influence. View "Ayers v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal by caveators to determine the validity of the self-proving affidavit attached to the testator's will. The Court found that the affidavit did not substantially comply with the requirements of a self-proving affidavit under OCGA 53-4-24. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's conclusion which held otherwise. View "Martina v. Elrod" on Justia Law