Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Decedent Robert L. Gilmore executed his Will, which was filed with the probate court upon his death in August of 2010. He bequeathed his entire estate to Respondents Francis D. Daniels and Patricia C. Daniels, who are unrelated to Decedent. Appellant Jennifer Turner was born on November 8, 1972. It is undisputed that Appellant and Decedent did not know each other, but she later learned that Decedent was her biological father. Appellant filed a claim of inheritance with the probate court based on section 62-2-302(b) of the South Carolina Code. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether Appellant qualified as a pretermitted child. Because the presumed facts of this case fell outside the clear language of section 62-2-302(b), the Supreme Court concluded that the probate court, and the circuit court on review, correctly dismissed Appellant's claim. View "Turner v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Joseph McLeod, Decedent's husband, filed a petition for formal administration of Decedent's estate and his appointment as personal representative. McLeod also asserted his right to a share of Decedent's estate. Patricia Mudlaff, Decedent's stepdaughter, also filed a petition for formal administrative and appointment as personal representative, contending that Decedent's marriage to McLeod was invalid because Decedent lacked the mental capacity to consent to the marriage and requesting that the circuit court declare Decedent's marriage void. The circuit court rejected Mudlaff's argument, concluding that annulment was the only method to void a marriage and that Wisconsin law prohibits annulment after the death of one of the parties to the marriage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) annulment is not the exclusive remedy to challenge the validity of a marriage; and (2) in an estate action challenging a marriage, a court may use its declaratory judgment powers to declare that a marriage prohibited by law was void and incapable of validation by the parties to the marriage. Remanded. View "Mudlaff v. McLeod" on Justia Law

In 1968 French founded a successful manufacturing firm that he sold, in 1996, for about $200 million. French executed interlocking irrevocable trusts to benefit his four children upon his death. In 2004 he moved the trust accounts to Wachovia Bank. The trusts held two whole life insurance policies. Wachovia replaced the policies with new ones, providing the same benefit for a significantly lower premium, after months of evaluation and consultation with French and his lawyers. Wachovia received a hefty but industry-standard commission for its insurance-brokerage affiliate. French’s adult children sued Wachovia for breach of fiduciary duty by self-dealing. The district court rejected the claim, based on the trust document’s express conflict-of-interest waiver, and held that the transaction was neither imprudent nor undertaken in bad faith. The court ordered the Frenches to pay the bank’s costs and attorney’s fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trust documents gave Wachovia broad discretion to invest trust property without regard to risk, conflicts of interest, lack of diversification, or unproductivity. The trust instrument overrides the common-law prohibition against self-dealing and displaces the prudent-investor rule. While there is always a duty to administer the trust in good faith, there was no evidence that the bank acted in bad faith. View "French v. Wachovia Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Rick and Lisa Graham filed a petition for a protection from stalking order against Elizabeth Jones in 2006. Jones counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conversion. On June 27, 2007, while her counterclaims against the Grahams were pending, Jones died. On April 17, 2008, the Grahams filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Angela Herring, who was appointed as administratrix of Jones's estate, filed a motion to substitute the estate as the claimant against the Grahams. The district court dismissed the action based upon its determination that substitution was untimely under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-225(a)(1). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and provided an analysis to determine whether a substitution motion was filed within a reasonable time, holding (1) the relevant time period for determining the reasonableness of a delay in substituting a party begins with the statement noting the death and ends with the filing of the motion for substitution; and (2) the standard for determining whether a substitution motion has been made within a reasonable time is to consider the totality of the circumstances, which can include the fact of whether another party would be prejudiced by the substitution. Remanded. View "Graham v. Herring" on Justia Law

John filed suit against his mother, Bernice, both individually and in her capacity as trustee for two trusts. Bernice subsequently died, and John's brother and sister, Richard and Diana, were substituted as defendants. John made three claims - breach of contract, breach of trust, and constructive fraud. John's claims arose after Bernice executed a trust in 2004 and a new will with the express intent to disinherit John. John claimed that Bernice's actions constituted a breach of her joint and contractual will made in 1989 with John's father, Frank. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed and remanded, concluding that an irrevocable 1996 trust created by Frank and Bernice implicitly revoked or modified the 1989 will. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the 1996 trust did not fully revoke the 1989 will; (2) because in 2004 Bernice was still bound by any contractual provisions in the 1989 will that survived the creation of the irrevocable 1996 trust, John could prove a breach of contract to the extent the 2004 will and trust violated the 1989 will's surviving provisions; and (3) summary judgment was not appropriate on any of John's claims. Remanded. View "Boucek v. Boucek" on Justia Law

Barbara Ann Odom appealed a judgment that sustained a caveat to a will, entered after a jury found that the propounded will was invalid due to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, fraud, or monomania. Finding no error in the trial court's conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Odom v. Hughes " on Justia Law

Appellant sued the trustee of his deceased wife's estate, claiming that the trustee improperly transferred Appellant's assets into the trust. Appellant also sought to disqualify the attorney who prepared the trust documents (Attorney) from representing the trustee based on the district court's conclusion that a prior attorney-client relationship existed between Appellant and Attorney, creating a conflict of interest. After the trust litigation settled, Appellant sued Attorney for legal malpractice due to Attorney's failure to verify Appellant's intentions before preparing he documents for his signature. Before trial, Appellant sought to preclude Attorney from arguing that an attorney-client relationship did not exist because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, Attorney could not deny the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The district court denied Appellant's motion. During trial, the district court ruled that evidence of Appellant's intent in executing the documents was precluded by the parol evidence rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion because the issue of an attorney-client relationship between Appellant and Attorney was not necessarily litigated in the trust action; and (2) the district court did not err in applying the parol evidence rule. View " Frei v. Goodsell" on Justia Law

Decedent's will named her daughter Dawn as personal representative of her estate. After the clerk of court accepted Dawn's application for informal probate, Dawn issued a notice to heirs and devisees specifying that the estate was being administered without supervision of the court. Decedent's son, William, subsequently filed a motion for substitute of judge in the proceeding pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804. The district court denied the motion as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the substitution statute did not apply to the informal probate matter because the matter was not under the supervision of the district court and therefore not a "civil action" for purposes of section 3-1-804; and (2) although the proceeding was later converted into a court-supervised administration under which section 3-1-804 would apply, William's motion for substitution was filed prematurely, and was therefore not timely and void. View "In re Estate of Greene" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the administratrix of a Massachusetts estate appointed by a Massachusetts court. Part of the estate was a parcel of real property located in Maine that was later sold. The estate and the IRS agreed to value the back parcel at $950,000. Plaintiff later filed an amended Maine estate tax return, but insufficient funds remained in the estate to pay the Maine assessment. Plaintiff received a notice of assessment for Maine estate tax informing her that, as the estate's personal representative, she was personally liable for the money owed by the estate. Upon Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, the Assessor upheld an adjusted assessment of $98,180. The superior court vacated the Assessor's decision, concluding that the Assessor lacked jurisdiction to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court to administer a foreign estate. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment against Plaintiff, holding that Maine tax law provides the Assessor with the authority to hold a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court personally liable for unpaid Maine estate taxes resulting from the sale of real property located in Maine. View "Metcalf v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

In dispute in this case was whether Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs in litigating the underlying case. In the underlying case, Plaintiffs sued the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) and the State, arguing that the State violated its constitutional duty to sufficiently fund DHHS in order to rehabilitate native Hawaiian beneficiaries and that the DHHL breached its obligations to the beneficiaries of trust lands for several reasons. The first issue in the instant case was the extent to which Plaintiffs "prevailed" in the underlying case. The Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees and costs, holding (1) Plaintiffs prevailed on appeal; (2) Plaintiffs arguably established an entitlement to attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine; but (3) Plaintiffs' request for appellate attorneys' fees was barred by the State's sovereign immunity. View "Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n" on Justia Law