Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

After the death of Theresa A. Meyers, questions arose regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees charged to her estate and a revocable trust she had established. The personal representative of Meyers’ estate and cotrustees of her trust initially agreed with the law firm representing them to a percentage-based fee, first at 2% and later reduced to 1% of the gross assets. Following the discovery of additional assets and the likelihood of litigation, the law firm and the remaining fiduciaries entered a written agreement switching to hourly billing. One cotrustee, however, did not sign this modification. After the law firm completed its services, some beneficiaries and devisees challenged the attorney fees as excessive, prompting a review under Nebraska law.The County Court for Douglas County held a consolidated hearing and found that the attorney fees charged by the law firm were fair, reasonable, necessary, and not excessive, taking into account the complexity of the estate, the services performed, and expert testimony. The county court also found no conflict of interest in the firm’s representation of both the personal representative and the cotrustees. The court did not address whether the written fee modification was effective. Dissatisfied, the challengers appealed.The Nebraska Court of Appeals determined that the written hourly fee agreement was ineffective because not all cotrustees had consented, as required by the trust. The appellate court thus applied the original 1% fee structure and found that this amount was reasonable. The law firm sought further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by addressing the effectiveness of the written fee agreement, as the challengers had not properly raised the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court found no error on the record regarding the reasonableness of the fees as determined by the county court. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded with directions to affirm the county court’s order. View "In re Estate of Meyers" on Justia Law

A dispute arose among four adult brothers regarding the division of their parents’ estate. After their mother’s death, two of the brothers, Brittin and Kent, reported to the San Diego Police Department that their mother was missing, despite knowing she had died of natural causes. Their intention was to cast suspicion on their siblings, Todd and Wade, with whom they had a contentious relationship. The police briefly investigated before learning of the mother’s death and closing the matter. The phone call from the police deeply distressed Wade, a recovering alcoholic who had been sober for 15 years. Within a week, Wade relapsed, drove his motorcycle while intoxicated, and died in a crash. A psychologist testified at trial that the distress caused by the police inquiry precipitated Wade’s relapse.The Superior Court of San Diego County presided over a jury trial in which Todd, both individually and as Wade’s successor in interest, pursued claims for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligence, and conspiracy. The jury found Brittin and Kent liable for negligence and IIED, and determined their conduct was a substantial factor in causing Wade severe emotional distress and his subsequent death. Damages were awarded to both Wade’s estate and Todd, including punitive damages. The defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial were denied.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendants conceded the jury’s factual findings but argued that their actions were not, as a matter of law, the legal cause of Wade’s death. The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that under the broader scope of liability for intentional torts, the defendants' intentional infliction of emotional distress was a legal cause of Wade’s death. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the denial of JNOV, upholding all damages awards. View "Fisher v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Several charitable trusts were established between 1930 and 1969, each naming Memorial Hospital in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, as a beneficiary. The trusts specified the use of funds for purposes such as maintaining “free beds” or supporting general hospital operations. Memorial Hospital operated as an acute care hospital until financial difficulties led to its closure in 2018, at which point it ceased providing inpatient and emergency services. Some outpatient services continued on the campus, but Memorial Hospital was no longer a functioning hospital. Bank of America, as trustee, sought judicial guidance under the cy près doctrine to designate new beneficiaries for the trusts whose purposes could no longer be fulfilled due to the hospital’s closure.Upon review, the Providence County Superior Court found that the closure of Memorial Hospital rendered the trusts’ original purposes impossible, and that each settlor evidenced a general charitable intent. The court conducted a bench trial, considering expert testimony, historical context, and proposals from various organizations, including Kent County Hospital, The Miriam Hospital Foundation, and Progreso Latino. The trustee and several parties proposed a split between The Miriam Hospital Foundation and Progreso Latino, while others argued for Kent County Hospital as the successor beneficiary. The court ultimately rejected both proposals, finding that neither alternative met the settlors’ intent to support actual hospital care.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case on appeal. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding that the cy près doctrine applied and that The Miriam Hospital, as an acute care hospital offering inpatient and emergency services, was the closest alternative beneficiary to fulfill the original charitable purposes. The Court clarified that the trust proceeds must be used by Miriam Hospital for inpatient and emergency care, consistent with the settlors’ intent. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Neronha" on Justia Law

A 76-year-old man petitioned to adopt a 40-year-old woman whom he had known for six years. The parties participated in evidentiary hearings, and a court-appointed investigator prepared a report. Testimony revealed inconsistencies regarding the stated purpose of the adoption, particularly concerning the petitioner’s claim that the adoption would allow the adoptee to care for him, despite evidence that the adoptee’s health issues prevented her from working. The court also noted that the adoptee was unaware adoption would sever her legal relationship with her mother, with whom she lived and received financial support. Additionally, concerns arose regarding the petitioner’s mild cognitive impairment and unaccounted trust distributions.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the petition and evidence. The court found that the adoption was not in the best interests of the adoptee, considering the potential negative impact on her relationship with her biological mother, possible contentious inheritance issues, and inconsistencies in the petitioner’s stated goals. The court also considered the medical evidence and concluded the doctor’s report did not sufficiently address the petitioner’s cognitive capacity or awareness of the adoption’s implications. Based on these findings, the court denied the adoption petition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings and reviewed the denial of the adoption decree for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, nor did the court abuse its discretion or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of K.J.K." on Justia Law

Elijah and Mary Stiny established a trust that, upon their deaths, divided the estate into shares for designated beneficiaries. Mary Stiny amended the trust after her husband’s death, naming her mother, Della Moore, as beneficiary of a 2.66% share. She also specified that if Della Moore predeceased her, the gift to Della Moore would lapse. Della Moore died before Mary Stiny, creating a dispute over who should receive this share. Della Moore’s children entered into an agreement with the trustee to distribute their mother’s share to them, but the trust’s terms did not list them as beneficiaries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reviewed a motion for approval of this settlement. The district court found that the trust was unambiguous: since Della Moore predeceased Mary Stiny, her share lapsed and, under California Probate Code § 21111(b), was to be distributed to the remaining named beneficiaries in proportion to their interests, not to Della Moore’s children. The court also found that the parties’ settlement would improperly modify the trust and that not all beneficiaries had consented to such a modification as required by law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the Survivor’s Trust unambiguously provided that Della Moore’s gift would lapse if she predeceased Mary Stiny, and that the anti-lapse provision did not apply due to explicit language to the contrary. The court further held that the requirements for modification of an irrevocable trust under California law were not met, as not all beneficiaries consented and the reasons advanced for modification did not outweigh the trust’s material purpose. The judgment denying approval of the settlement was affirmed. View "Stiny Trusts v. Robins" on Justia Law

The case centers on the estate of Charles Frazier, who, after becoming very ill in late 2019, was cared for by Michael and Kelly Pagano. During this period, Frazier executed a new trust with the Paganos’ assistance, granting them a substantial portion of his assets. Shortly before his death in January 2020, Frazier expressed regret over this change to his nephews, Jeff and Theodore Haun, and executed another trust to revert his estate plan. After Frazier’s passing, the Paganos filed a civil complaint alleging Haun and Jeff had exerted undue influence over Frazier for personal benefit. Haun, as trustee of the January 2020 trust, then initiated a probate petition claiming financial elder abuse by the Paganos.The Superior Court of San Diego County consolidated the competing probate petitions for trial. After eight days of trial, the court found the Paganos had exerted undue influence over Frazier in the creation of the December 2019 trust and committed financial elder abuse. Haun and Jeff, however, were not found to have unduly influenced Frazier regarding the January 2020 trust. The court granted Haun’s petition, denied Kelly’s petition, awarded Haun compensatory and statutory damages, and entitled him to attorney’s fees. The court determined all attorney’s fees incurred by Haun were inextricably intertwined with his defense and prosecution of the elder abuse claims, making apportionment impractical.On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed whether Haun could recover attorney’s fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a), a unilateral fee-shifting provision, given the intertwined nature of his prosecution and defense. The court held that the statute does not bar recovery of fees for defense work that overlaps with prosecution of a successful financial elder abuse claim by a prevailing plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed, and costs of appeal were awarded to Haun. View "Haun v. Pagano" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when one attorney, after obtaining a $5 million default judgment against another attorney in California, sought to collect on that judgment by levying two Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) belonging to the judgment debtor. The debtor argued that because he had moved to Florida, Florida’s statutory exemptions should apply, shielding his IRAs from collection. He also claimed the IRAs were funded from a surrendered life insurance policy held in a private retirement plan, asserting exemptions under California law for both the policy and the retirement plan.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the claim of exemption. Initially, the court tentatively applied Florida law but later decided the law of the forum state—California—should govern exemption claims. Ultimately, the court found the debtor failed to prove that the IRAs qualified for any exemption under California law, including the private retirement plan exemption or that the funds were necessary for his support. The court denied the claim of exemption, permitting the creditor to levy the IRAs.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that California law applies to collection actions in California courts regardless of the judgment debtor’s domicile. It further concluded that a surrendered life insurance policy is not necessarily exempt from collection and, once surrendered, is treated as matured, requiring proof that the proceeds are necessary for support. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings, applied a de novo review to legal questions, and affirmed the order denying the exemption. Thus, the IRAs were subject to collection, and the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Bagby v. Davis" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, operating a camp for children with cancer, owned several buildings situated on land owned by a married couple. The couple, both involved in the nonprofit’s leadership, decided to sell the ranch property that included the camp’s buildings. During negotiations, the couple represented to the nonprofit’s board that appraisals did not specify values for the nonprofit's buildings and that the nonprofit’s share of sale proceeds should be calculated by square footage. Relying on these representations, the nonprofit accepted a portion of the sale proceeds. Subsequently, the nonprofit discovered that the appraisals had, in fact, assigned higher specific values to its buildings, resulting in a claim for damages against the couple for misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District granted partial summary judgment to the couple on certain claims, but, after a bench trial, found in favor of the nonprofit on claims for constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The court calculated the nonprofit’s damages but reduced the award by 50%, applying comparative negligence and the doctrine of avoidable consequences. The court denied attorney fees and prejudgment interest to both parties. Both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the doctrine of election of remedies did not bar the nonprofit’s appeal, as seeking satisfaction of a judgment is not inconsistent with seeking a greater award on appeal. The Court ruled that it was reversible error for the district court to reduce damages based on comparative negligence or a duty to mitigate, as those doctrines did not apply to the equitable and fiduciary claims at issue. The Court affirmed the district court’s rejection of the couple’s affirmative defenses of superseding intervening cause and unclean hands, as well as the finding that the wife breached her fiduciary duty. The denial of prejudgment interest and attorney fees was affirmed, but the nonprofit was awarded costs on appeal. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in the nonprofit’s favor for the full damages amount and reconsideration of prevailing party status. View "Camp Magical Moments, Cancer Camp for Kids, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Lloyd Haack passed away in March 2024, leaving behind a purported will that named his son, Howard Haack, as the sole beneficiary and personal representative. Shawn Renee Logan, claiming to be Mr. Haack’s financial advisor, petitioned for probate and expressed belief in another will, but no such document was found. The court admitted the existing will to probate and appointed Howard Haack and Bailey Baxter as co-personal representatives. Logan contested Howard’s appointment, alleging forgery, but her petition was dismissed for lack of standing. Kristy Martinez, Haack’s granddaughter, was determined to have standing to contest both the will and the appointment. She then filed a petition contesting the will’s validity within the probate case, requested a jury trial, and the co-personal representatives responded with affirmative defenses and a motion to dismiss, arguing the will contest required a new civil action separate from the probate matter.The District Court of Fremont County held a hearing to address these procedural questions. The co-personal representatives relied on prior Wyoming Supreme Court decisions, including Matter of Estate of Meeker and Matter of Estate of Rowe, arguing that statutory requirements and civil procedure rules necessitated a separate civil action for will contests. Martinez, however, argued that Wyoming law permits such contests to proceed within the probate matter itself and cited Gaunt v. Kansas University Endowment Association and Russell v. Sullivan for support.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the certified questions from the district court. Employing statutory interpretation and examining relevant precedent, the Court held that Wyoming statutes do not require a will contest to be filed as a completely separate civil action with a new case number and heading. Instead, a will contest under Wyo. Stat. § 2-6-301 et seq. can proceed as a separate proceeding within the existing probate matter. Accordingly, the Court answered the certified question in the negative and declined to address the second question regarding jurisdictional defects. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Haack" on Justia Law

The case involves the family of a deceased inmate who alleged that certain medical professionals and a health services foundation, after performing an autopsy at the request of correctional authorities, removed and retained the decedent’s organs without family consent. The family contended they were not informed or asked for permission regarding the autopsy or retention of organs, and only learned the organs were missing when preparing the funeral. They claimed to have relied on statements from hospital staff that such practices were standard, and only discovered in December 2023, through media reports, that retention of organs without next-of-kin consent was allegedly unlawful.The Montgomery Circuit Court reviewed and denied the defendants’ consolidated motion to dismiss, finding that statutory limitations could be tolled due to alleged fraudulent concealment. The court determined that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could justify equitable tolling under Alabama law, and that the family’s claims were not time-barred because they filed suit within two years of learning the alleged conduct was illegal.On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a petition for writ of mandamus by the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation and Dr. Stephanie Reilly. The Court held that mandamus relief was appropriate because, from the face of the complaint, the claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. The Court reasoned the causes of action accrued by November 6, 2021, when the family learned the organs were missing, and rejected arguments for tolling or for treating the alleged conduct as a continuous tort. The Court distinguished between statutes of limitations governing different claims, and found that all claims against the petitioners except the AUAGA claim were time-barred. It therefore granted the petition and directed dismissal of all claims against the petitioners except for the AUAGA claim. View "Ex parte University of Alabama Health Services Foundation" on Justia Law