Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A group of trustees managing an ERISA-regulated pension plan invested in six classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), some issued as notes under indenture agreements and others as trust certificates. The trustees alleged that companies servicing the underlying mortgages mismanaged the loans, acted in self-interest, and failed to protect investors’ interests, in violation of their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The investments included three classes of notes and three classes of trust certificates, each backed by pools of residential mortgages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the underlying mortgages constituted plan assets under ERISA. The district court ruled that only the RMBSs themselves, not the mortgages behind them, were plan assets as defined by the Department of Labor’s regulation. Consequently, it granted summary judgment to all defendants, holding that the servicers did not owe ERISA fiduciary duties regarding the mortgages, and denied the trustees’ cross-motion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the notes issued under indenture agreements were not equity interests and did not confer plan asset status on the underlying mortgages. However, it found that the trust certificates were beneficial interests in the trusts and thus qualified as equity interests under the Department of Labor’s regulation. As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part (regarding the notes), vacated in part (regarding the trust certificates), and remanded for further proceedings, including determination of whether the servicers acted as fiduciaries with respect to the trust certificates. View "Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

The decedent died intestate in January 2018, survived by his spouse and two adult children from a prior marriage. The spouse successfully petitioned to be appointed personal representative of the estate. After several years of inactivity in the probate proceedings, the spouse’s attorney withdrew due to her lack of cooperation. The decedent’s son then petitioned to have the spouse removed as personal representative, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The District Court granted the petition, replaced the spouse with the son as personal representative, and found the spouse liable for any damages resulting from her breach of duty.Subsequently, the son petitioned the District Court for determination of heirs, adjudication of intestacy, approval of final account, and distribution of the estate, alleging the spouse had improperly transferred funds to herself. The son proposed that the spouse receive certain assets already in her possession, and that the remainder of the estate be divided between the two children. Notice was sent to the spouse, but she did not appear or object. The District Court distributed the estate according to the son’s proposal and discharged him as personal representative. Over a year later, the spouse, with new counsel, moved under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to set aside the decree, arguing lack of proper notice and improper distribution. The District Court denied the motion, finding she had not demonstrated grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s order. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the spouse’s Rule 60(b) motion because proper notice was given, the spouse was not entitled to relitigate issues via Rule 60(b) that should have been raised on direct appeal, and her arguments did not establish the specific grounds required for relief. View "Estate of: Lea" on Justia Law

A man designated his sister as the beneficiary of his employer-issued life insurance policies, amounting to $150,000, with instructions that she distribute the proceeds to his three daughters. The man, suffering from declining health, relied on his sister to manage his finances, legal affairs, and healthcare decisions, creating a fiduciary relationship. After his death, the sister claimed the insurance proceeds for herself, contrary to the instructions. The daughters sought a constructive trust over the proceeds, claiming the sister was to hold the funds in trust for them, while the sister denied any fiduciary breach and asserted entitlement under the policy.The Allen Superior Court, after a bench trial, found no undue influence or fraud in the beneficiary designation but concluded that the sister breached her fiduciary duty by failing to distribute the proceeds as instructed. The court imposed a constructive trust in favor of the daughters, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the deceased intended for them to receive the insurance money. The sister appealed, arguing that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted such state-law remedies and that the evidence did not meet the required standard. The Indiana Court of Appeals twice reversed the trial court, holding that ERISA preempted the remedy, but the Indiana Supreme Court remanded for application of the correct standard of proof without reaching the preemption issue.The Indiana Supreme Court, upon further review, held that the sister waived her ERISA preemption argument by not raising it in the trial court. The court affirmed the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust, concluding that the findings of a fiduciary relationship and breach of duty were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the daughters. View "Geels v. Flottemesch" on Justia Law

After the death of Paul A. Knapp, his son Lance, as personal representative of Paul’s estate, sought to probate Paul’s 2010 will, which primarily left property to his first wife and, if she predeceased him, to his children and grandchildren. Paul’s widow, Barbara, filed claims against the estate, specifically for a share of the marital residence’s proceeds and a statutory maintenance fund. These claims were based on a premarital agreement executed before Barbara and Paul’s marriage, as well as a purported subsequent oral agreement that Barbara would receive 40% of the marital residence due to her financial contributions to its remodel and refinancing.The County Court for Dodge County reviewed the case after Lance, as personal representative, disallowed Barbara’s claims. At trial, evidence showed that while Barbara contributed funds to remodel the residence and participated in refinancing, title to the home remained solely in Paul’s name. The premarital agreement referred to certain rights in a non-existent “Article 9.4” and generally maintained that separate property would remain separate unless jointly titled. The county court found the agreement unambiguous, concluded there was no evidence of a mutual mistake justifying reformation, and determined that Barbara was not entitled to proceeds from the marital residence or a maintenance fund. The court also found insufficient evidence of an enforceable oral contract for transfer of the property.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the county court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the premarital agreement was unambiguous and did not entitle Barbara to the claimed property interests, nor was reformation appropriate. Additionally, the Court found that Barbara had not proven the existence or terms of an enforceable oral contract by clear and convincing evidence. The disallowance of Barbara’s claims was affirmed. View "In re Estate of Knapp" on Justia Law

After the death of Sean Thomas in March 2022, his widow, Jaimie, was named as the sole heir and personal representative of his estate pursuant to his will. She commenced informal probate proceedings in the District Court of Butte-Silver Bow County and began administering the estate. Over time, disputes arose concerning the management of family business assets and the distribution of estate funds, particularly regarding allegations that Jaimie was using estate assets for non-estate purposes, including her personal expenses and legal defense in ongoing litigation about business ownership and obligations.In February 2023, Paul Thomas, Sean’s father, along with related business entities, initiated a separate civil action in the same District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the ownership of a family business and asserting substantial creditor claims against Sean’s estate. Paul later moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the probate proceeding, alleging that Jaimie’s actions as personal representative were rapidly depleting the estate’s assets to the detriment of creditors. The District Court granted a temporary restraining order, followed by an order requiring Jaimie to obtain court approval before making any estate distributions, and declined to require a bond.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court had jurisdiction to restrain Jaimie’s conduct, whether it abused its discretion in doing so, and whether it was required to impose a bond. The Supreme Court held that the District Court had jurisdiction under Montana’s probate statutes, specifically § 72-3-617, MCA, to restrain the personal representative’s conduct even in informal probate. The Court further determined that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the restraint and that a bond was not required under the applicable probate provisions. The decision of the District Court was affirmed. View "In re Estate of Sean Thomas" on Justia Law

A woman sought to challenge the probate of a will and asserted claims seeking recognition as an heir, either as a biological child or by equitable adoption, following the death of a decedent who resided in Tallapoosa County. After letters of administration had initially been issued to her by the Montgomery Probate Court, subsequent proceedings transferred jurisdiction to the Tallapoosa Probate Court, which admitted a document as the decedent’s will and appointed other individuals as personal representatives. The woman then filed a pro se complaint in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, contesting the will and requesting various relief, including a DNA test to establish her relationship to the decedent.The Tallapoosa Circuit Court held a hearing, denied her request to compel DNA testing of the proponents, allowed her to submit her own certified DNA evidence, and later dismissed the action on the ground that she had failed to provide proof of relationship as required. She appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to jurisdictional reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that, due to statutory changes enacted by Act No. 2022-427, original jurisdiction for will contests relating to wills filed for probate on or after January 1, 2023, lies with the probate court, not the circuit court, except in cases where a proceeding has been properly removed to the circuit court. Finding that no removal had occurred, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court made no determination as to the woman’s ability to bring a will contest in the probate court. View "Glenn v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

The trustees of an ERISA-regulated pension plan invested in six classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). Three of these investments were in notes issued by Delaware statutory trusts via indenture agreements, while the other three were in regular-interest certificates issued by trusts governed under New York law and classified as REMICs for tax purposes. The trustees alleged that the mortgage servicers mismanaged the loans and engaged in self-dealing, violating ERISA fiduciary duties. They also claimed that Wells Fargo, as master servicer for some trusts, failed to adequately supervise Ocwen (another servicer) and failed to pursue litigation on behalf of the trusts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding that, under the Department of Labor’s regulation, only the RMBSs themselves—not the underlying mortgages—were plan assets for ERISA purposes. The court determined that both the notes and the regular-interest certificates were treated as indebtedness without substantial equity features, so the look-through exception did not apply. The trustees’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court agreed that the notes issued by the indenture trusts lacked substantial equity features and thus the underlying mortgages were not plan assets. However, it held that the regular-interest certificates represented beneficial interests in the REMIC trusts; under the controlling regulation, the assets of such a trust in which a plan holds a beneficial interest are themselves plan assets. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Ocwen acted as an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the mortgages underlying the REMIC trusts. View "Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

An elderly man, Jerome, experienced significant health decline and was moved into a nursing home, prompting his wife, Janet, to petition the Saginaw Probate Court for a protective order under Michigan law. She requested the transfer of all of Jerome’s assets and most of his income to her, citing her increased financial needs and Jerome’s inability to manage his affairs due to physical and mental health issues. Janet’s petition was filed before Jerome’s application for Medicaid was resolved, and the probate court granted the transfer and set a monthly support payment for Janet.The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in part but vacated the probate court’s order, relying on its earlier precedent in In re Estate of Schroeder, which prohibited consideration of Medicaid eligibility before a formal determination. The case was remanded for a new assessment of need and current valuation of assets. On remand, the probate court again ordered the transfer and support, applied retroactively, but the Court of Appeals vacated this order as well, citing reliance on outdated asset information and the same legal standard regarding Medicaid eligibility.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case after Jerome’s death, holding that the appeal was not moot because Medicaid benefits can be awarded retroactively, even to a deceased individual’s estate. The Supreme Court ruled that probate courts may consider the likely availability of Medicaid benefits before a final eligibility determination when assessing the needs of an individual and their dependents under MCL 700.5401(3)(b). The Court expressly overruled the contrary rule announced in In re Estate of Schroeder, reinstated the probate court’s 2022 protective order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In Re Estate Of Sizick" on Justia Law

Two siblings disputed the administration of their late father’s estate and the status of his ownership interest in a storage company, Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (TPS). The father had founded TPS and, over time, executed several amendments to its operating agreement, some before and some after he began suffering from dementia. After his death, one sibling, who was an attorney, became the personal representative of the estate, managed TPS, and executed additional amendments to the operating agreement that purported to transfer ownership and management control of TPS to herself, often with retroactive effect. The other sibling challenged these actions, claiming they diverted estate assets and breached fiduciary duties.Litigation took place in two venues: a magistrate court probate proceeding and a separate district court action under the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA). The courts and parties often treated the cases as consolidated, although no formal consolidation order was entered. The sibling challenging the amendments sought judicial determination of estate assets, breach of fiduciary duty, and related relief. The magistrate court dismissed the claims against both the sister and TPS, and the district court upheld this dismissal, concluding that the claims should have been brought exclusively in the probate case and were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that claims for judicial determination of the estate’s assets and breach of fiduciary duty fell within TEDRA’s scope and could be brought as a separate civil action rather than exclusively in probate. The Court further found that the sister and TPS were necessary or proper parties to the TEDRA action. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the magistrate and district courts, reversed the dismissal orders, and remanded for further proceedings. It also awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal to the appellant, to be paid personally by the sister. View "Monson v. Monson" on Justia Law

Several cousins are shareholders in a closely held family corporation that owns industrial real estate. The dispute centers on the shares held by a trust established by one family member, Sheila, and who has the right to vote those shares after she became incapacitated and her husband resigned as trustee. The parties disagree about the operation of a buy-sell agreement, which the Levins argue restricts the transfer of voting power over the shares, while the Clapkins assert it allows the shares to be controlled by the children as successor cotrustees. The conflict over control of the trust’s shares led to a series of lawsuits between the parties.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, handling multiple related actions, determined that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the identity of the trust’s trustees. The probate court subsequently ruled in favor of the Clapkins, confirming them as successor cotrustees of the trust. After this order, the Levins filed a new lawsuit claiming the transfer of voting power violated the buy-sell agreement, while the Clapkins, in response, filed a cross-complaint seeking to enforce their right to vote the trust’s shares and to be registered as the record holders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the Levins’ special motion to strike most of the claims in the cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion, holding that the claims did not arise from protected litigation activity but rather from the underlying dispute over voting rights and control of the corporation. The court also dismissed the Clapkins’ appeal from the denial of their request for attorneys’ fees, finding the order was not separately appealable. The main holding is that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because the claims arose from unprotected conduct regarding the internal corporate dispute, not from protected petitioning activity. View "Clapkin v. Levin" on Justia Law