Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In June 2020, the Sussex County Division of Social Services, Office of Adult Protective Services (APS), filed a complaint seeking a plenary guardianship for "Hank," an alleged incapacitated person. Steven J. Kossup was appointed as Hank's attorney, and Brian C. Lundquist was appointed as his temporary guardian. They ensured Hank had stable housing, financial assistance, and medical care. Despite APS's recommendation for a plenary guardian, Kossup and Lundquist argued for a limited guardianship based on Hank's improved circumstances and an expert psychologist's report.The trial court denied the fee applications submitted by Kossup and Lundquist, who sought compensation for their services from APS. The court found no basis for such awards in the Adult Protective Services Act (APS Act) or Rule 4:86-4(e). The Appellate Division affirmed, noting that the APS Act and relevant statutes only authorize fee awards from the estate of the alleged incapacitated person, not from APS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that there is no support in the governing statutes, court rules, or case law for fee awards against APS. The American Rule, which requires litigants to bear their own legal costs, applies, and exceptions in Rule 4:42-9(a) and Rule 4:86-4(e) do not authorize fee awards against APS. The Court emphasized the importance of pro bono service in guardianship matters and suggested that attorneys should be informed if they are expected to serve pro bono. The Court also acknowledged the significant contributions of Kossup and Lundquist in securing necessary services for Hank. View "In re A.D." on Justia Law

The decedent, Marc F. Thurrell, executed a will in 1997, leaving his estate to his father and, if his father predeceased him, to his uncle. Both the father and the uncle died before the decedent. At the time of the decedent's death, the uncle's children and the decedent's sister (the respondent) were alive. The respondent argued that the estate should pass to her under New Hampshire's anti-lapse statute, RSA 551:12, as the sole surviving lineal descendant of the father, or alternatively, through intestacy.The Circuit Court (Moran, J.) granted a petition for estate administration, listing the uncle's children as beneficiaries and appointing the petitioner as executor. The respondent objected, arguing that the estate should pass to her under the anti-lapse statute or through intestacy. The trial court ruled that the bequest to the father lapsed due to a survivorship requirement, but the bequest to the uncle did not lapse, applying the anti-lapse statute to pass the estate to the uncle's children. The respondent's motion for reconsideration and subsequent motion to determine heirs were denied.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the decedent's will did not express an intention for the will to lapse or for the anti-lapse statute to be inapplicable to the uncle's bequest. The will's language indicated that the decedent intended for the anti-lapse statute to apply to the uncle's bequest, allowing the uncle's children to inherit. The court also found that the intentional omission clause in the will did not preclude the uncle's children from inheriting, as they were provided for in the will through the anti-lapse statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying RSA 551:12 to the residual bequest to the uncle and properly denied the respondent's motion to determine heirs. View "In re Estate of Thurrell" on Justia Law

Mable Hrynchuk named Bryan Kenton as the sole beneficiary of her estate, which included her residential property. After her death, the homeowner’s association foreclosed on the property and sold it to Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills. Kenton, through his attorney-in-fact, Foreclosure Recovery Services, sought to redeem the property as a successor in interest. Saticoy Bay refused, asserting that Kenton was not the successor in interest and had no rights of redemption under Nevada law.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of Foreclosure Recovery Services, holding that Kenton was the successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. Saticoy Bay appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that a will beneficiary is immediately vested with a beneficial interest in devised property upon the testator’s death and is therefore the testator’s successor in interest for the purposes of NRS 116.31166. The court concluded that Kenton, as the sole beneficiary of Hrynchuk’s will, was her successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. The court also determined that Foreclosure Recovery Services provided all necessary documentation to Saticoy Bay to establish its right to act on behalf of Kenton in redeeming the property. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills v. Foreclosure Recovery Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Gordon Clark, acting on his own behalf and as the executor of his late wife’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo, Santander Bank, and other defendants, alleging various tort claims and violations of federal law related to the foreclosure of his wife’s home. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ordered Clark to obtain outside counsel to represent the estate, as it had other beneficiaries and creditors besides Clark.The district court reviewed the probate records and concluded that Clark, a pro se litigant, could not represent the estate due to the presence of other beneficiaries and creditors, including Santander Bank. The court directed Clark to retain counsel for the estate by a specific date, failing which his claims on behalf of the estate would be dismissed. Clark’s motion for reconsideration was granted, but the court adhered to its decision. Clark’s second motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the district court’s rulings denying an estate representative’s motion to proceed pro se. The standard of review for such decisions was determined to be de novo, as they involve the application of law to the facts of a given dispute. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motion to proceed pro se, as the estate had other beneficiaries and creditors. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. View "Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Susan McHugo Inouye sought damages and equitable remedies against Gregory McHugo, Nancy McHugo, and the estate of Patricia Bixby McHugo, alleging that Patricia breached a contract for mutual wills made with Susan’s father, John McHugo, under which Susan was a beneficiary. The trial court dismissed Susan’s claims, concluding that Patricia’s notice of intent to revoke her will during John’s life meant there was no detrimental reliance and thus no enforceable contract. Alternatively, the court found that John consented to rescission of the mutual-wills contract.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, initially reviewed the case. The court found that John had notice of Patricia’s intention to change her will and did not alter his own estate plan in response. The court concluded that there was no detrimental reliance by John and that mutual consent was not required to revoke the contract. The court also suggested that John’s inaction indicated his consent to rescind the contract. Susan appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the mutual-wills contract was enforceable on its own terms and that unilateral notice of intent to revoke was insufficient to rescind the contract. The court held that mutual consent was required to revoke the contract, as explicitly stated in the contract. The court found that the trial court’s conclusion that John consented to rescission was inadequately supported by the record, as mere inaction did not constitute consent. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Inouye v. Estate of McHugo" on Justia Law

In this case, Robert Z. Maigetter and Barbara J. Berot jointly owned a co-op apartment in Washington, D.C., which Berot's son, Alexis Kyriakopoulos, used. After Berot was diagnosed with terminal cancer, she and Maigetter executed parallel wills, with Berot expressing her wish for the co-op to pass to Kyriakopoulos. Berot passed away in May 2020, and Maigetter sought advice from their attorney, Sarah A. Eastburn, resulting in several email exchanges. Kyriakopoulos sued Maigetter to enforce an alleged contract to will the co-op to him, claiming Maigetter agreed to this arrangement before Berot's death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and, after an in-camera review, ordered the production of twelve emails between Maigetter and Eastburn, finding them probative of Berot's intentions and subject to the testamentary exception to the attorney-client privilege. The District Court certified a narrow question for appeal regarding the scope of the testamentary exception, specifically whether it applies only to communications made by the deceased or also to communications made by others discussing the deceased's statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the District Court's application of the testamentary exception exceeded its traditional bounds. The Third Circuit held that the testamentary exception applies only to communications between the deceased client and their attorney, not to third-party communications made after the client's death. The court emphasized that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and can only be waived by the client or through an implied waiver in specific circumstances, which did not apply here. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court's order compelling the production of the emails and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kyriakopoulos v. Maigetter" on Justia Law

Allison Littlefield filed a verified petition against her brothers, Scott and David Littlefield, and her aunt, Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust. The petition sought their removal as co-trustees, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the Trust, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Allison claimed that the appellants misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, restricted her use of the Ranch, and failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who allegedly harassed Allison and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike the petition under California's anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the appellants failed to show that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that the petition was based on protected activity. The court noted that the appellants' motion failed to identify specific allegations of protected activity and improperly sought to strike the entire petition or all causes of action without distinguishing between protected and unprotected conduct.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The court held that any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit, as it did not demonstrate that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

Silvia Villareal created a revocable living trust in 2005, which she amended twice. The 2018 restatement of the trust, prepared with an attorney, provided that her three children, Leticia Linzer, Arturo Villareal, and Sonia Godoy, would each receive a one-third interest in her home upon her death. In 2019, Silvia amended the trust again, without an attorney, to state that her children could only sell their shares to each other for $100,000, aiming to keep the home within the family. After Silvia's death, Arturo and Sonia petitioned the probate court to declare the 2019 amendment void, arguing it unreasonably restrained their ability to sell their interests.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of Arturo and Sonia, determining that the 2019 amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation in violation of Civil Code section 711. The court declared the amendment void and upheld the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document. Leticia, the trustee, objected, arguing that section 711 did not apply to testamentary gifts and that the 2019 amendment did not impose an unreasonable restraint.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the probate court's decision, holding that section 711 applies to testamentary instruments and that the 2019 amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The court found that the amendment's restrictions on selling the property only to siblings for a fixed price were unreasonable and void. The court also rejected Leticia's argument that the 2019 amendment created a new testamentary trust, concluding that Silvia intended to add to the existing trust rather than create a new one. The court affirmed the probate court's order, maintaining the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document. View "Godoy v. Linzner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the Carolyn Patricia Young Family Trust, alleged that defendants, the trust protector and trustee, were conspiring to withhold trust funds improperly. The alleged conspiracy aimed to preserve assets for the trustee, who is also a residuary beneficiary. Plaintiff sought an ex parte application to suspend the defendants' powers and appoint an interim trustee. The Superior Court of Orange County granted the application, suspending the defendants' powers, appointing an interim trustee, requiring a bond, setting a review hearing, and prohibiting the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization.Defendants appealed the order. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the order was not appealable. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the appealability of the order. The court held that orders suspending trustees and appointing interim trustees in probate court are not directly appealable. The court emphasized that such orders are provisional and not final, aligning with the broader policy against piecemeal appeals.The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that neither Probate Code section 1300 nor section 1304 provided a basis for appealability. The court also found that defendants lacked standing to appeal the portions of the order imposing a bond requirement and prohibiting the use of trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization. Additionally, the court denied plaintiff's motion for sanctions, despite concerns about defendants' counsel's conduct, which the court found troubling but not sufficient to warrant sanctions in this instance. View "Young v. Hartford" on Justia Law

A credit union filed a claim in probate court, asserting that the decedent owed money on a car loan. The estate mailed a notice of disallowance to the credit union, but the credit union claimed it never received the notice. The estate argued that the claim was time-barred because the credit union did not request a hearing within twenty days of the notice. The credit union conducted an internal investigation and submitted an affidavit stating it never received the notice and that the person who signed for it was not an employee of the credit union but an agent of the U.S. Postal Service.The Iowa District Court for Linn County imposed sanctions on the credit union and its attorneys for violating Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413(1), which requires that filings be well-grounded in fact and law after reasonable inquiry. The court found that the credit union's investigation was insufficient and that the attorneys made incorrect assertions about the mailing. The Iowa Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions. The Supreme Court found that the credit union and its counsel conducted a reasonable investigation under the circumstances, given the time constraints and the information available. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of the investigation should be assessed based on the time of the filing, not with hindsight. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustained the writ of certiorari, vacated the sanctions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dupaco Community Credit Union v. Iowa District Court for Linn County" on Justia Law