Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Caroline H. Walsh passed away in January 2012, and her son, John H. Walsh, was appointed executor of her estate. He was responsible for filing the Massachusetts estate tax return and paying the taxes by October 2012. Walsh hired an accountant who died unexpectedly, then worked with two other accountants over several years, but delays persisted due to Walsh’s failure to provide necessary documents and dissatisfaction with property appraisals. Ultimately, the estate tax return was filed nearly seven years late, along with the tax owed and a request for abatement of interest and penalties. No extension to file or pay had ever been requested.The Commissioner of Revenue assessed over $145,000 in interest and $112,327.10 in penalties for late filing and late payment. The estate’s abatement request was denied, and it appealed to the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board. After a hearing, the Board found that Walsh did not demonstrate reasonable cause for the delays, citing evidence that Walsh had failed to provide requested information and noting the absence of credible justification for the late filing. The Board affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the appeal, addressing constitutional and statutory arguments. The Court held that the interest assessed was remedial, not punitive, and thus not a “fine” under the excessive fines clauses of the Eighth Amendment or Article 26. Even assuming the penalties were fines, the Court found they were not grossly disproportional to the offense. The Court also rejected claims that the Board’s structure violated separation of powers or that a jury trial was required. Finally, it held that statutory caps on penalties did not limit the accrual of interest. The Court affirmed the Board’s decision. View "Estate of Walsh v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The dispute centered on farmland in Chouteau County, Montana, inherited by Linda Reynolds and Gerald Cook, who formed the Cook-Reynolds Partnership to lease and operate the land. Gerald and his wife, Karin Cook, became involved in probate proceedings in Idaho, where Karin, as personal representative of the Estate of Ann Lafferty Pfeifer-Murphy, misappropriated funds to benefit herself, Gerald, and their company. Gerald executed promissory notes pledging land in Chouteau County as collateral, but these actions did not reference the Partnership. In Idaho, the Estate and its beneficiaries sought restraining orders against Gerald, Karin, their company Pneumex, Inc., and the Partnership, but only Gerald was served regarding the Partnership.Subsequently, Gerald and Karin entered into a settlement agreement confessing to a judgment exceeding $1 million, with Gerald purporting to bind the Partnership as a debtor. The Idaho court entered judgment against the Partnership and others. The Estate domesticated this judgment in Montana’s Twelfth Judicial District Court and sought to execute it against the Partnership. Linda, the managing partner, challenged the Idaho judgment, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and that she had no knowledge or authorization of Gerald’s actions on behalf of the Partnership. The District Court held a hearing but ultimately the Partnership’s motion for relief was deemed denied by operation of rule due to the court’s inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s denial de novo. It held that the Idaho court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Partnership because Gerald did not have authority to bind the Partnership in the proceedings, and Linda neither authorized nor ratified Gerald’s actions. The Montana Supreme Court also found the Partnership’s motion was made within a reasonable time. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial and vacated the Idaho judgment as to the Partnership, while leaving the judgment intact as to other debtors. View "In re Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy" on Justia Law

A woman was the primary caregiver for her friend, residing in her friend’s condominium for several years. After the friend passed away, ownership of the condo transferred to a living trust, and the caregiver became trustee. She continued living in the condo for a month to recover from illness and remove her belongings. The friend’s nephew contacted local police, claiming the right to evict her, and presented officers with a superseded will listing him as a beneficiary but not mentioning the condo. The officers accompanied the nephew to the condo, told the caregiver she had ten minutes to leave, threatened her with arrest, pushed her out, and took her key.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio reviewed the case after the caregiver sued various parties, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The court granted summary judgment to some defendants but denied it for the officers, reasoning that the caregiver, as trustee, held a possessory interest in the condo, and the officers’ actions constituted active participation in an eviction without proper legal authority. The court relied on Sixth Circuit precedent to find the seizure unreasonable and the right clearly established.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court held that the caregiver had a possessory interest in the condo at the time of the eviction, the officers actively participated in the eviction, and their conduct was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because there was no court order or exigent circumstances justifying the seizure. The court further held that existing precedent clearly established the unlawfulness of the officers’ actions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, leaving the officers subject to further proceedings. View "Bender v. Village of Mariemont" on Justia Law

Wayne Morrison and his children contested the administration and distribution of two family trusts established by Wayne’s parents. The primary asset in both trusts was a fractional ownership of the Farnlun property. Wayne’s sister, Christina Thompson, acted as trustee for both trusts, and her daughter, Carolyn Hastings, was co-trustee of one. Wayne alleged breaches of trust and fiduciary duty, sought an accounting, and later added claims of fraud and partition by sale, naming Christina’s husband and children as additional parties. Christina, as trustee, sought to distribute trust assets in-kind to keep the Farnlun property in the family, while Wayne and his family opposed, favoring a sale and monetary distribution.The parties agreed to consolidate Wayne’s lawsuit and Christina’s petitions before the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Blaine County. The Morrisons moved to remove Christina and Carolyn as trustees, which the court denied. The court granted the Thompsons' motions for summary judgment, dismissing the partition claim, enforcing a no-contest clause that disinherited Wayne from one trust, approving in-kind distribution, and determining trust asset values and interests. The court also awarded attorney fees to the Thompsons against the Morrisons’ share of one trust.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decisions. The Court affirmed all rulings: it found no abuse of discretion in the denial of trustee removal, held the Morrisons lacked standing for partition since they did not have a present possessory interest in the property, and upheld enforcement of the no-contest clause to disinherit Wayne. The Court found no error in the trust asset valuation and distribution and affirmed the attorney fee award and its assessment against the Morrisons’ share. The Supreme Court also awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the Thompsons, to be assessed against the Morrisons’ trust share. View "Morrison v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case maintained residences in Connecticut, Arizona, and Florida, dividing his time among them. After his death, his estate’s executor filed a Connecticut domicile declaration, which triggered an audit by the Department of Revenue Services. The audit division, weighing several factors, determined the decedent was domiciled in Connecticut, making his estate subject to Connecticut estate tax. The commissioner’s appellate division affirmed this determination, and the executor appealed to the Superior Court, arguing the decedent was a Florida domiciliary and raising claims of procedural due process violations during the audit process.Upon de novo review, the Superior Court heard testimony and admitted numerous exhibits regarding the decedent’s personal, social, and property ties to Connecticut and Florida. The court found these connections to be generally equal but concluded that the executor failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was not a Connecticut domiciliary. Thus, it upheld the tax assessment. The court also rejected the executor’s claim of procedural due process violations, holding that any such errors were cured by subsequent review and the de novo trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, under General Statutes § 12-391 (h) (1), the proper standard for an estate challenging a domicile determination in an estate tax appeal is the preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence. The court concluded that the Superior Court erred by applying the higher standard, reversed the judgment upholding the commissioner’s assessment, and remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of domicile under the correct standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the procedural due process claim, finding that the de novo review cured any procedural deficiencies. View "Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services" on Justia Law

A woman died in a hospital after giving birth by cesarean section, having suffered a rare and severe complication known as placenta accreta spectrum, which led to a massive hemorrhage. She underwent an emergency hysterectomy and was transferred to the intensive care unit for postoperative management. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children, brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against multiple medical providers and the hospital. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only one doctor and a medical staffing agency as defendants.In the Superior Court of Rockdale County, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony alleging breaches of the standard of care by the remaining defendants. The jury found both liable and awarded $42 million in total damages: $10 million for pain and suffering to the estate and $32 million for wrongful death to the children. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for a new trial, and refused to apply Georgia’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, finding it unconstitutional and waived due to the defendants’ failure to raise it earlier. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, awarding over $11 million.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain defense expert testimony or in granting the challenged jury instruction, as the defendants had affirmatively waived any instructional error. The court affirmed that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages could not constitutionally be applied to the judgment. Finally, it upheld the award of attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs’ settlement offer complied with statutory requirements and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the guardianship of an adult ward. The mother, who previously served as the ward’s guardian from 2010 to 2020, was removed from that role by the Circuit Court on an ex parte basis and replaced by the Office of Public Guardian (OPG), initially as a temporary successor and later by agreement as the enduring guardian. In 2021, the mother sought removal of OPG and to be reinstated as guardian, but the court denied her motion, finding no cause for OPG’s removal and determining she was not an appropriate successor. In December 2024, the mother renewed her motion, citing improvements in her ability to serve as guardian and concerns about OPG’s performance. After hearings, the court again denied her request, concluding she had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that OPG was not acting in the ward’s best interests or that there was cause for removal.Following the denial of her reconsideration motion, the mother appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The trial court had required the mother to demonstrate cause for removing OPG as guardian, which it interpreted as necessary under the governing statute. The Supreme Court reviewed whether this was the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that RSA 464-A:39 does not require a showing of cause to remove an adult guardian; the sole statutory inquiry is whether removal is in the ward’s best interests. The trial court erred by imposing a requirement for cause, thus adding language not found in the statute. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the proper legal standard. View "In re Guardianship of T.M." on Justia Law

An individual established a revocable living trust in 2011, naming her three adult children as successor beneficiaries. One son, Lin-Chuan, was designated to receive all real property and a portion of bank accounts. Lin-Chuan died in 2016, before the trust creator, and was survived by his three children. After the trust creator died in 2019, the remaining child, acting as temporary successor trustee, sought a probate court determination that the transfer of trust property to Lin-Chuan failed because he predeceased the settlor. The trustee argued the transfer should lapse and be distributed according to intestacy, effectively excluding Lin-Chuan’s children as beneficiaries.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the matter following the trustee’s motion for summary adjudication. The court found that a provision in the trust stating any named person failing to survive the settlor by thirty days would be deemed to have predeceased the settlor constituted a “contrary intention” under California’s antilapse statute (Probate Code section 21110), thereby preventing Lin-Chuan’s children from taking the property. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the trustee, determining the gifts to Lin-Chuan would lapse.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, examined whether the trust expressed a clear intent to override the statutory presumption favoring the descendants of a predeceased beneficiary. The Court held that the trust provision did not constitute a survival requirement sufficient to defeat the antilapse statute, as it lacked explicit language disinheriting Lin-Chuan’s children. The Court reversed the probate court’s order, directing it to deny summary adjudication and allow Lin-Chuan’s children to benefit under the trust. View "In re Tung Trust" on Justia Law

An elderly businesswoman, after being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, had her great-nephew act as her agent pursuant to a power of attorney. As her condition deteriorated, the agent managed her finances and addressed two instances of financial elder abuse. In the final months of her life, following further health declines, her agent—on the advice of attorneys—created a limited partnership and transferred nearly $17 million of her assets into it. The businesswoman died within weeks of these transfers, leaving her with only about $2.15 million outside the partnership.When the executor filed the estate tax return, he reported only the value of the partnership interest—appraised at approximately $11 million—rather than the value of the assets transferred into the partnership. This resulted in a substantial reduction in the estate’s tax liability. The Internal Revenue Service audited the return, determined that the gross estate should include the full value of the transferred assets under I.R.C. § 2036(a), and assessed a 20% penalty for underpayment. The executor disputed these findings before the United States Tax Court.The United States Tax Court upheld the IRS’s deficiency notice and penalty. It found that the transfers were not made pursuant to a bona fide sale for a legitimate non-tax purpose, and that the estate had been negligent in its reporting. The executor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. It held that the estate failed to demonstrate any substantial non-tax reason for the asset transfers, so the bona fide sale exception to § 2036(a) did not apply. The court also upheld the 20% penalty, finding no clear error in the Tax Court’s determination that the estate lacked reasonable cause and did not act in good faith. View "Fields v. CIR" on Justia Law

A professor who graduated from the University of Iowa during the Jim Crow era left a portion of his estate to the university for a scholarship. The scholarship was to be awarded to Black students majoring in physical sciences, preferably chemistry. The university accepted the gift and has administered the scholarship for nearly thirty years, awarding it annually to Black students in chemistry. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, which barred race-based admissions practices, the university became concerned about its ability to administer a race-restricted scholarship and initiated a proceeding under Iowa Code section 540A.106(3) to modify the terms, proposing that the scholarship instead be awarded to first-generation students.The Iowa District Court for Johnson County dismissed the university’s application without prejudice. The district court reasoned that no legal authority had conclusively established that administering the scholarship in its current form would be unlawful. The university responded with an amended application and asserted that it was now unlawful to carry out the original purpose. The district court again found insufficient legal authority and dismissed the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It determined that, in light of recent legal developments and the SFFA decision, it had become at least impracticable for the university to distribute the scholarship funds under the race-based restriction. The court held that modification of the scholarship terms was warranted under Iowa Code section 540A.106(3), but found no support in the record for the university’s proposed change to first-generation students. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, providing guidance for considering other modifications and ensuring participation by advocates for donor intent. View "In Re Ezra L. Totton Scholarship" on Justia Law