Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Following an automobile accident in which Ron'Drequez Cortez White was killed by a drunk driver, Elizabeth McElroy, the county administrator for Jefferson County and appointed personal representative of White's estate, hired an attorney to file a wrongful-death action against the drunk driver. The wrongful-death action resulted in a recovery, and, following litigation on the issue of the personal representative's fee, the Circuit Court awarded McElroy a fee from the wrongful-death proceeds. Samuel Rodgers, White's father, contended in the litigation below that, as personal representative, McElroy was not entitled to be compensated for her services from the recovery in the wrongful-death action. Rodgers appealed the circuit court's judgment awarding McElroy a fee to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a personal representative may be compensated out of the proceeds recovered in a wrongful-death action. Upon review, the Court concluded that McElroy was not entitled to compensation out of the proceeds of the wrongful-death recovery for her services as personal representative and that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in awarding McElroy compensation out of that recovery. View "Rodgers v. McElroy" on Justia Law

Four corporations acknowledged they owed the federal government more than $24 million in taxes and penalties, but before the IRS could collect its dues, the corporations transferred all of their assets to other entities. At issue was whether the previous owner of the four corporations, a trust (Trust), was liable to the IRS for the corporations' unpaid taxes and penalties. The tax court looked to state substantive law to determine the Trust's liability and concluded that the Trust could not be held liable because the IRS (1) failed to prove the Trust had knowledge of the new shareholders' asset-stripping scheme, and (2) did not show that any of the corporation's assets were transferred directly to the Trust. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the tax court correctly looked to Massachusetts law to determine whether the Trust could be held liable for the corporations' taxes and penalties; but (2) the tax court misconstrued Massachusetts fraudulent transfer law in making its decision. Remanded for a determination of whether the conditions for liability were met in this case. View "Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Brothers Thomas and Michael Tessier allegedly swindled brothers Frederick and Thaddeus Jakobiec and the estate of their mother out of millions of dollars. This lawsuit covered the Tessiers' theft of almost $100,000 in life insurance proceeds due to a trust benefitting Thaddeus. Thaddeus and various persons affiliated with the trust and estate (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against Merrill Lynch, the company that issued the life insurance policy, claiming that Merrill Lynch made out the insurance proceeds check to the wrong trust entity in breach of the insurance contract, thus allowing the Tessiers to steal the money. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch, concluding that even if Merrill Lynch did breach the contract, its breach was not the cause of Plaintiffs' losses because the Tessiers would have stolen the money even if the check had been made out correctly. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the extensive groundwork laid by the Tessiers for their criminal scheme, they could have and would have stolen the insurance money regardless of how Merrill Lynch made out the check; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch. View "Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife signed a contract to make mutual wills and then executed those wills. Soon after Husband's death, Wife executed a new will that was inconsistent with her previous will. Following Wife's death, the children of Husband's earlier marriage filed an action asserting, among other things, that their stepmother's last will was invalid because it breached the contract to prepare mutual wills and that the will prepared by their stepmother pursuant to the contract to make mutual wills should be admitted into probate rather than her last will. The trial court granted summary judgment to Husband's children, determining that the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration and that, therefore, Wife's last will was null and void. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Husband's children were entitled to judgment as a matter of law sustaining their challenge to the validity of Wife's will because, as a matter of law, the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. View "In re Estate of Brown" on Justia Law

The circuit court found Frieda, Cordelia's elderly mother, to be a protected person. After determining that Cordelia was exploiting Frieda, neglecting her needs, and mishandling her finances, the court directed Cordelia to turn over to Frieda's conservator a full accounting of what she had done with Frieda's assets. Cordelia failed to comply with the order. The mental hygiene commissioner subsequently found Cordelia to be in contempt for failing to account for the disposition of assets belonging to her mother. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that Cordelia was in contempt; (2) affirmed that portion of the $50 per diem contempt sanction that applied prospectively from the actual date of the entry of the order of contempt; but (3) reversed that portion of the sanction that was retroactive, and reversed the sanction insofar as it purported to be for "compensation or damages." View "In re Frieda Q." on Justia Law

Donald died in 2007 at age 84. His will, dated December, 2006, was admitted to probate. The woman he had married one year before execution of that will, Blanca, was named as executor. James, who had been held out by Donald as Donald’s biological son throughout his life, sued Blanca in her individual capacity and as executor, contesting the will. In 2000 James had learned from Donald that James’s mother, who died in 2001, married Donald, after James’ biological father abandoned them. Donald stated that a “secret” adoption had taken place. There is no legal documentation of an adoption. The disputed will states, “I am married to Blanca DeHart. I have no children.” James cited this as evidence of unsound mind and alleged that, during the brief marriage, Blanca became joint tenant on real estate, bank accounts and brokerage accounts worth millions of dollars, and obtained a power of attorney to act on her then-husband’s behalf, exercising control over his real estate dealings and sale of the family farm. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action as to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, contract for adoption and equitable adoption. The court erroneously denied a motion to compel deposition of the attorney who drafted the disputed will. View "DeHart v. DeHart" on Justia Law

In 1989, Defendant hired a law firm and one of its attorneys (collectively, Plaintiffs) to represent Defendant in her father's probate proceedings. The retainer agreement provided that Defendant would pay Plaintiffs fifteen percent of any amounts she recovered in exchange for any settlement Plaintiffs negotiated on her behalf. Plaintiffs successfully negotiated the probate settlement under the terms of which Defendant was to receive on half the interest and principal payable under a promissory note (Victory note). In 2002, Defendant discharged Plaintiffs as her attorney. In 2005, Defendant settled her claim pertaining to the Victory note in a receivership proceeding. Defendant received more than $1 million as payment of her claim, none of which Plaintiffs received. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against Defendant, alleging that Defendant breached her contract with them by failing to pay fifteen percent of each payment received under the receivership settlement as required by the 1989 retainer agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, reasoning that Plaintiffs earned fifteen percent of any amounts received by Defendant when they successfully negotiated the probate settlement in 1989. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that at the time Defendant discharged Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' right to receive their fee from amounts eventually recovered by Defendant had vested. View "Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III v. Checrallah" on Justia Law

Petitioners Randall Dionne, Cynthia Larson, and James Goodness appealed a district court judgment dismissing their petition for formal probate of Ardis Dionne's will, and denying a N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to vacate the dismissal of James Goodness's petition to void the deed of property to Respondent-Appellee (and personal representative of the estate) Norman Dionne. At the time of her death, Ardis Dionne owned a 1/4 interest in some land in Mountrail County. Norman Dionne was appointed the personal representative, and instituted an intestate probate proceeding. The will left all of Ardis Dionne's property, including the real estate, to her husband James Goodness. Norman Dionne and Cynthia Larson met with Goodness in to persuade him to transfer or sell the real estate to them. Goodness told them he did not want the real estate, and signed a deed that purported to transfer the estate's interest in the property to Norman Dionne for one dollar, and that "[a]fter paying administration expenses and creditor's claims, if any, all of the remaining assets of the estate (including the proceeds from the sale of the land) shall be distributed to James Goodness." But "James Goodness" was crossed but and "Norman for maintenance, 4/25/02" was handwritten in. Goodness and all of Ardis Dionne's children signed the deed. Subsequently, Norman Dionne, as personal representative of the estate, issued a deed to himself in his individual capacity. In 2008, Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson filed a petition to void the deed Norman Dionne had issued to himself and to transfer the land back into the estate for distribution. Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson claimed the parties did not intend all of the land to go to Norman Dionne when James Goodness signed the deed giving up his interest in the land. They claimed the land was supposed to be kept by the estate until Ardis Dionne's mother died, and then be distributed to all six children equally. The district court dismissed the petition on summary judgment, ruling the deed unambiguously transferred the property to Norman Dionne. Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial, ruling the deed was ambiguous and summary judgment was inappropriate. A bench trial was later held to determine the intent of the parties that signed the deed. The district court found the intent of the parties was that the entire property would go to Norman Dionne. A new petition was then filed seeking formal probate of Ardis Dionne's will. Finding the issue res judicata, the Supreme Court held that "[a]dmitting the will to probate [would have been] an exercise in futility. . . Here, if the will [was] valid, James Goodness [was] the sole beneficiary, and signed a valid distribution agreement transferring his whole interest in the property to Norman Dionne. If the [was] not valid, the property [would pass] by intestacy equally to all of Ardis Dionne's children, who also signed a valid distribution agreement transferring their whole interest in the property to Norman Dionne. There is no reason to admit the will to probate. The district court properly granted Norman Dionne's Rule 12(b)(vi) motion and dismissed the petition." View "Estate of Dionne" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a proceeding brought to remedy securities fraud and recover assets that were the fruits of the fraud. The issues on appeal related to enforcement of, and compliance with, an order freezing various assets. The Trust and various individuals appealed from the magistrate judge's sanctioning of certain individuals. The court dismissed the appeals of Jill Dunn and David Wojeski for lack of jurisdiction, affirmed the sanction order as to Lynn Smith, and remanded to allow the Trust to contest the court's order regarding the disposition of trust property and for the magistrate judge to give additional guidance to the receiver as to disposition of the Trust property. View "SEC v. McGinn, et al." on Justia Law

Harold Keith Hunt, the surviving son of Harold Guy Hunt, who died testate in 2009, appealed a November 2011 circuit court order among other things, refused to issue him a deed to the real property devised to him in his father's will until all debts, claims, and costs of administration of the estate had been paid. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as having been taken from a nonfinal judgment. View "Hunt v. Estate of Harold Guy Hunt" on Justia Law