Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Dr. James Haviland was a medical doctor who practiced in the Seattle area. Several years after the death of his first wife, the 85-year-old Dr. Haviland met 35-year-old Mary Burden who worked at the hospital where he was a patient. Following his discharge, the two began dating, and the doctor agreed to pay towards Ms. Burden's education and gave her an additional "nest egg." The couple married in 1997. The day before the wedding, Dr. Haviland changed his will to include his new wife, and revised it several more times during the marriage. The 2006 amendment allowed the doctor's total probate estate to pass to his new wife, excepting several special bequests. Ms. Haviland amended the doctor's living trust, transferred securities for her own benefit, and made multiple large cash gifts to her family members. Large sums of money were also transferred from the couple's joint checking account to Ms. Haviland's separate account. After Dr. Haviland died, his children contested the multiple amendments to his will. The trial court ultimately found that the estate was "so depleted by Mary's transfer of funds that, after distribution of specific bequests, the total value of the estate is a negative." The court invalidated the will after finding that the 2006 amendment was the product of undue influence. During the pendency of the contest, the Washington legislature amended the slayer statutes to disinherit those who financially abuse vulnerable adults. In light of the amendments, the administrator of the doctor's estate requested the trial court to determine whether Ms. Haviland should have been disinherited based on her conduct with respect to Dr. Haviland and as found by the trial court. The court determined that the abuser statutes did not apply to deny Ms. Haviland benefits from the estate since the statutes were triggered by financial abuse. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the petition filed during probate to adjudicate whether an individual is an abuser was the triggering event for the statutes to apply, and as such, acted prospectively applied to the Haviland estate. Ms. Haviland appealed the appellate court's holding. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concurring that the abuser statutes act prospectively, and that the filing of the abuser petition during probate is the trigger. View "In re Estate of Haviland" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an attorney-client relationship that existed between a religious trust (Trust), and the Trust's attorneys at a law firm (Law Firm) continued after the Trust was reformed cy pres. Specifically, the Supreme Court was required to determine whether the district court's reformation of the Trust altered the Trust to such an extent that it could no longer be considered the same client for purposes of the attorney-client privilege and the Utah Rules of Professional Misconduct. The district court (1) ordered Law Firm to disgorge privileged attorney-client information to the reformed Trust (Reformed Trust), concluding that reformation of the Trust did not sever the attorney-client privilege; and (2) disqualified Law Firm from representing Movants in substantially related matters in which Movants' interests were materially adverse to the Reformed Trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Trust and Reformed Trust were not the same client, and therefore, there was no attorney-client relationship between Law Firm and the Reformed Trust; and (2) therefore, the district court erred when it disqualified Law Firm from representing Movants and ordered Law Firm to disgorge privileged attorney-client information to the special fiduciary of the Reformed Trust. View "Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Decedent died testate, devising her estate in equal shares to her two surviving children, Daughter and Son. Daughter paid the estate's bills with her personal funds for several years. In April 2010, Daughter filed Decedent's will and petitioned to be named the personal representative. The probate court allowed the will, denied Daughter's request, and named an attorney as personal representative (PR). The PR caused a creditor's notice to be published in the newspaper beginning October 16, 2010. On January 19, 2011, Daughter filed a reimbursement claim against the estate for $40,871. The PR disallowed the claim, but the probate court allowed the majority of Daughter's claim, disallowing only her claim for reimbursement of telephone bills. Son appealed, arguing that Daughter's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the probate court and remanded, holding that the probate court erred in (1) finding that because Daughter's claim was filed within four months of first publication of the creditor's notice in the newspaper, it was timely; and (2) failing to consider Son's claims of waiver and unjust enrichment. View "Estate of Gray" on Justia Law

Decedent created an inter vivos revocable trust. Until her death, Decedent served as the trust's sole trustee. At Decedent's request, Attorney drafted the trust documents and a pour-over will. Bank was named successor trustee of Decedent's trust. After Decedent died, the personal representative (Representative) of Decedent's estate sued Attorney and Bank. Against Attorney, the petition alleged claims of negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty and contract based on the alleged failure of Defendants to protect Decedent's assets from tax liability. The district court granted Defendants' motions of summary judgment. Specifically, the court held that Representative's tort claims for legal malpractice did not survive Decedent's death. The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Representative's cause of action did not accrue until after Decedent's death, it did not qualify as a survival action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1801 and was therefore barred. View "Jeanes v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Claimant brought a claim before the Claims Commissioner seeking damages from the State as the coadministrator of the estate of her deceased daughter, who had died while confined in a correctional institution. In the course of Claimant's case, the Commissioner issued subpoenas to the Charlotte Hungerford Hospital requesting information about the decedent's treatment there. The Hospital refused to comply with the subpoena, arguing that the Commissioner had no authority to issue subpoenas to nonparties. The trial court enforced the Commissioner's subpoena, and the appellate court affirmed. Subsequently to the Supreme Court's certification of the Hospital's appeal, Claimant settled underlying case, and consequently, the State no longer sought to enforce the subpoenas. The Supreme Court dismissed the Hospital's appeal as moot and vacated the judgments of the lower courts, as the Court could no longer grant relief. View "State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp." on Justia Law

After Nada Payich's death, her son, Ivan Payich, sued Sorensen for negligent care of Nada, among other claims. Sorensen subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its application to compel arbitration in the suit filed by Ivan, the Special Administrator for the Estate of Nada Payich. On appeal, Sorensen argued that Nada was a third-party beneficiary of an Arbitration Agreement between Sorensen and Ivan and that the Estate was therefore compelled to arbitrate its claims. The court affirmed the judgment because it found no clear error in the district court's determination that Sorensen failed to prove it executed a valid contract with Ivan. View "GGNSC Omaha Oak Grove, LLC v. Payich" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the interplay between rulings and requirements relating to zoning in connection with a planned development and enforcement of restrictive covenants and deed restrictions applicable to property within the development. Plaintiff obtained municipal zoning approval to reconfigure the lot lines in her two-lot farmstead parcel within the Quechee Lakes subdivision, as well as to construct a dwelling on the second, yet-to-be-developed lot. The Environmental Division affirmed the zoning board's award of the latter permit. Notwithstanding that order, in a declaratory judgment action also initiated by plaintiff, the civil division concluded that plaintiff's proposed construction violated the applicable restrictive covenants and deed restrictions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Environmental Division's decision resolved the dispute, that the civil division improperly considered extrinsic evidence when the disputed deed restrictions were clear on their face, that defendants' challenge to plaintiff's right to build the proposed dwelling was time-barred, and that the character of the development had changed so much that the disputed deed restrictions are no longer valid. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the deed language was ambiguous; plaintiff was instrumental in framing the trial court's task as one of construing ambiguous deed language; and plaintiff led the way in introducing extrinsic evidence in support of plaintiff's own interpretation. "Given this record, plaintiff cannot now challenge the trial court's consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the documents." The Court concluded that plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court's decision to consider the testimony about the context surrounding the disputed deed language - both that offered by plaintiff and by defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion for declaratory judgment, the Court reached no other issues plaintiff raised in her appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Marsh Inter Vivos Trust v. McGillvray, et al." on Justia Law

Carolyn Osman had three sons, all of whom were the beneficiaries of Carolyn's estate and various trusts. Carolyn died in 2009 as a result of her son Michael's actions. Her cause of death was strangulation and blunt force trauma to the head. Michael was found not guilty of first-degree murder for reason of insanity. The executors of Carolyn's estate and co-trustees of the trusts subsequently filed a request for declaratory judgment in the circuit court asking the court to declare that Michael was a "slayer" under Va. Code 55-401. The circuit court found that although Michael was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was a slayer under section 55-401 and could not share in the proceeds from his mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that Michael was a slayer under section 55-401, and that as a result, Michael could not inherit his share of his mother's estate. View "Osman v. Osman" on Justia Law

Appellants Robert Buchanan, Jr. and Adele Pope, formerly personal representatives for The Estate of James Brown and trustees of The James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust, appealed circuit court orders that: (1) approved a settlement agreement of pending litigation concerning the estate; and (2) removed Appellants from their fiduciary positions and appointed Russell L. Bauknight as personal representative and trustee. At the heart of this case is the estate of singer-entertainer James Brown, estimated to be worth between $5 million to $100 million. Brown devised all of his personal and household effects to six named adult children, with the remainder left to the James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust. Albert Dallas, Alfred Bradley, and David Cannon were named as the co-personal representatives of Brown's estate and as the co-trustees of the 2000 Irrevocable Trust. Brown's will and trust each contained a no-contest clause, which provided that any beneficiary who challenged the will or the 2000 Irrevocable Trust "shall forfeit his or her entire interest thereunder." Brown expressly disavowed any other potential beneficiaries. In 2001, Brown and Tommie Rae Hynie executed a prenuptial agreement whereby she waived any right to Brown's property or the receipt of alimony, including any claim for an interest in his estate. In 2004, Brown sought to annul the marriage, finding Tommie Rae was married to someone else. The couple had one child born prior to the prenuptial agreement or marriage. The parties dismissed their respective suits in a consent order late 2004, whereby Tommie Rae waived any claim of common law marriage. In 2007, five of the six adult children Brown named in his will and Tommie Rae, brought actions to set aside Brown's will and the 2000 Irrevocable Trust based on undue influence. They alleged Brown's estate should pass by the laws of intestate succession. Tommie Rae claimed that she was entitled to an elective share or an omitted spouse's share of Brown's estate and that her son, James B. (via a guardian ad litem), was entitled to a share of the estate as an omitted child. The probate court transferred these claims to the circuit court. Ultimately, the three original fiduciaries either resigned or were removed from their positions as personal representatives and trustees. A (New) Charitable Trust, similar to the existing Charitable Trust formed from the 2000 Irrevocable Trust, was to be created by the Attorney General (AG) with the advice and counsel of the parties. An Advisory Board was to be established, whose members would "serve at the pleasure of and on such terms as the [AG] shall decide." The number of members on the Advisory Board was to be determined by the AG, but would include a member selected by Tommie Rae and one selected by each of Brown's adult children, and the roles of all members of the board were expressly stated to "be solely advisory." A trust similar to the Brown Family Education Trust was to be established for the education of the grandchildren and their issue, to be funded with $2 million. The circuit court approved the compromise agreement and directed Appellants to execute the agreement. At the request of the settling parties, the circuit court appointed Bauknight to have full authority as the personal representative for Brown's estate and as trustee, and Appellants were removed from those positions. Appellants appealed these rulings as well as additional, related orders, and the Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's removal of Appellants from their fiduciary positions, but, in light of its decision invalidating the circuit court's approval of the compromise agreement, the Court directed the circuit court to appoint new, neutral fiduciaries to oversee these matters. View "In re: The Estate of James Brown" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the death of Decedent and the ensuing dispute between his two sons from a previous marriage and Linda Carraway, whom he married two weeks before his death. Decedent's sons (Sons) challenged the validity of their father's marriage to Carraway (Wife) and the validity of the lost will that Wife sought to have established. Wife claimed she was the sole beneficiary of Decedent's estate pursuant to the terms of his will. After a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Sons. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Wife waived her argument that Sons lacked standing to contest the validity of her marriage to their father; but (2) the trial court erred in allowing into evidence testimony regarding Wife's real property holdings and her late mother's will, and the error was not harmless. View "In re Estate of Smallman" on Justia Law