Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Tamika Foster died after giving birth at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC). Her estate filed suit against the Center. After a verdict for the plaintiffs, UMMC appealed, claiming that the plaintiffs produced nothing more than an unreliable autopsy report to establish medical negligence, and that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow two doctors to testify about the autopsy. But because the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict and because UMMC failed to make a proffer of the doctors' expected testimony, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Foster" on Justia Law

The United States District Court certified the following question to the South Carolina Supreme Court: "Does the 'dual persona' doctrine allow an injured employee to bring an action in tort against his employer as a successor in interest who, through a corporate merger, received all liabilities of a predecessor corporation that never employed the injured person but allegedly performed the negligent acts that later caused the employee's injuries, or is such action barred by the exclusivity provision of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act?" The decedent-employee of Walterboro Veneer, Inc. died resulting from a fall into a vat of heated milling solution while trying to access a leak to repair. the defendant-employers removed the case to federal court and subsequently moved to dismiss the case brought by the employee's estate, arguing that they were immune from suit under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Each defendant sought dismissal based on the Act's exclusivity provision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that South Carolina recognizes the "dual persona" doctrine: "under South Carolina law, whether the dual persona doctrine applies in a particular case turns on whether the duty claimed to have been breached is distinct from those duties owed by virtue of the employer's persona as such. In this case, that determination lies with the federal court." View "Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors" on Justia Law

Defendant owned a first-priority security interest in LLC. The Cass Trust owned LLC membership interest, and the Cass Trust and Cohen Trust owned common stock shares in Corporation. The Cohen and Cass trustees later made an agreement with Company to sell the membership interests in LLC, including Defendant's first priority security interest in LLC, and Corporation's assets. A dispute arose over whether Defendant was entitled to know details of the sale agreements. Before the sale agreements were to close, Defendant sued the trusts, LLC, and Corporation in Missouri, alleging that the trustees engaged in self-dealing and financially manipulated Corporation and LLC to dilute Defendant's ownership interest. After learning of the lawsuit, Company refused to close the transaction without additional substantive requirements. After closing, the Cohen and Cass trustees filed this lawsuit against Defendant, alleging that Defendant tortiously interfered with their existing contracts and prospective business relationships by filing the lawsuit then faxing to Company a suit copy. The trial court dismissed the claims. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Defendant could not interfere with a contractual relation by giving Company "truthful information." The Supreme Court reversed because at the time the instant suit was filed, the court of appeals was not in a position to decide the truth of the claims set out in the Missouri action. View "Cohen v. Battaglia" on Justia Law

Curley Haisch and his wife Rose owned Mulehead Ranch. Joe Duling was the Haisches' financial advisor as well as a realtor and broker. When Curley was ninety years old, he decided to sell the ranch and signed a listing agreement with Joe. Approximately one year later, Joe suggested that Curley and Rose form a charitable remainder trust (Trust) into which the ranch and chattels could be gifted. Curley and Rose executed the Trust, to which the Ranch was transferred. The Trustee then sold the Ranch to Joe and Lynne Duling. Later, it was discovered that the Trust contained multiple defects. The Trustee brought suit against the Dulings, their businesses, and the Mulehead Ranch on behalf of the Trust and the Haisches. The complaint alleged negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. A jury found in favor of the Trust awarded Plaintiffs $1,568,200, including punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on damages, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give a proper instruction on the statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiffs' claims for future tax consequences related to the defects in the Trust; and (2) the court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Bailey v. Duling" on Justia Law

In 1995, Katelyn Janson was severely injured in an automobile accident. A lawsuit ended with a settlement in which two annuities were established, both of which guaranteed payments to Katelyn starting in 2001 and established that, if Katelyn died before fifteen years expired, annuity payments would be made to her estate. Katelyn's mother and conservator, Candy Bradison, moved Katelyn to Wyoming in 2001 and to Minnesota in 2003. In 2006, Katelyn died. In 2010, Bradison sought, on behalf of Katelyn's estate, a refund of the amount the estate previously paid to the Minnesota Department of Revenue, arguing (1) the annuity payments were not includable in Katelyn's estate because Katelyn did not own the annuities; and (2) Katelyn was a Wyoming domiciliary at the time of her death. The tax court concluded (1) Katelyn was a Minnesota domiciliary at the time of her death; and (2) the annuity payments were includable in Katelyn's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Katelyn's intangible property had a situs in Minnesota at the time of her death and could be taxed in accordance with Minnesota's estate tax provisions; and (2) Katelyn was the beneficial owner of the annuity payments, and the value of the payments was properly included in her estate. View "Bradison vs. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendants in this suit included the St. Labre Indian Education Association, Inc. and the St. Labre Home for Indian Children and Youth (collectively, St. Labre). After St. Labre experienced a decrease in government funding, St. Labor began a fundraising campaign that NCT asserted resulted in millions of dollars donated to St. Labre through efforts that marketed the plight and need of NCT. NCT filed suit against Defendants alleging (1) St. Labre's fundraising system created a constructive trust on behalf of NCT and St. Labre wrongfully converted those funds to its own use, thus unjustly enriching itself; (2) contract and fraud type issues; and (3) St. Labre unconstitutionally committed cultural genocide against NCT. The district court dismissed all of NCT's motions. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on NCT's claim for unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive trust that may arise from St. Labre's fundraising activities after 2002; (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding St. Labre's fundraising activities before 2002; and (3) affirmed the court's grant of summary judgment on all of NCT's remaining claims. View "N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Roman Catholic Church" on Justia Law

In "Norman v. Gober,"(707 SE2d 98 (2011)), the Supreme Court considered whether eleven-year-old William Howard Norman had standing to challenge the will of his maternal grandmother, Margaret Scheer, because he was not an heir-at-law when his caveat was filed. The Court found that Norman lacked standing to challenge the will because he was not "a person who will be injured by probate of [the] [W]ill, or who will benefit by its not being probated." After this opinion was issued, the Co-Executors filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and served discovery requests on the other beneficiaries to ascertain the facts surrounding the caveat. The appellant beneficiaries filed a motion to dismiss the Co-Executors’ petition for failure to state a claim, arguing there was no uncertainty of law and therefore no justification to request a declaratory judgment. Specifically, Appellants contended that (1) the prior caveat filed by Norman, which was dismissed for lack of standing, was not an actual will contest, and, therefore, the in terrorem clause could not have been violated by anyone, even by attribution and (2) the rights of the parties had already accrued and no uncertainty remained requiring direction from the court. The probate court denied the motion to dismiss and later denied Appellants’ motion for reconsideration. Finding no error in the probate court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Norman v. Gober" on Justia Law

The United Effort Plan Trust, a charitable trust, was established by members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS church). Following allegations of trustee mismanagement, the district court removed these trustees, reformed the Trust according to secular principles, and appointed a special fiduciary to manage the Trust subject to the court's supervisory jurisdiction. The special fiduciary later sought court approval for the sale of Trust property with alleged religious significance. Members and bishops of the FLDS church (Appellants) sought to intervene in the administration proceedings, asserting that their ecclesiastical interests in the Trust entitled them to intervene. The district court denied intervention. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) Appellants lacked a statutory right to intervene under Utah. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1); and (2) Appellants lacked a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation to intervene under rule 24(a)(2). View "In re United Effort Plan Trust" on Justia Law

Allegations of sexual abuse were made against Allen Austin (Decedent) in 2006. Decedent died in 2009. A personal representative of Decedent's estate failed to provide actual notice of the probate proceeding to the children whom Decedent was alleged to have sexually abused. Because of the failure to notify the children, their claims against the estate were filed beyond the statutory six-month window for creditors to file claims against the estate. The trial court dismissed the claims as tardy as the children were not "known or reasonably ascertainable creditors." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the children were known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of the estate, and therefore, their claims were more than merely conjectural; and (2) because due process requires that the personal representative of an estate provide actual notice of the probate proceeding to all reasonably ascertainable creditors of the estate who may have more than a merely conjectural claim against the estate, the children's claims should not have been dismissed. View "Estate of Austin v. Snead" on Justia Law

This dispute centered around a revocable trust Settlor created during her lifetime. Settlor was the trustee of the trust until shortly before her death, when she substituted Judith Cunningham as trustee. After Settlor died, Marylynn Miller, a beneficiary, asked the probate court to order Cunningham to account for the activities of the trust since her appointment and to order Cunningham to reimburse her for attorney fees. Upon the probate court's order, Cunningham rendered the accounting. The probate court then ordered Cunningham to personally pay attorney fees and costs incurred during the course of the proceeding. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the ruling that Cunningham had a duty to account to Miller for the period preceding Settlor's death, as, pursuant to Iowa Code 633A.3103, the settlor alone is entitled to accounting for the period the trust is revocable; and (2) reversed the order requiring Cunningham to personally pay the fees and costs incurred litigating that issue, as there was no evidence Cunningham was guilty of malfeasance, fraud, or abuse. View "In re Trust of Trimble" on Justia Law