Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Petitioners in this case were current beneficiaries of seven testamentary trusts. Petitioners sought orders approving the resignations of individual trustees, confirming the appointment of Northern Trust Company of Delaware as the successor corporate trustee for each trust, confirming Delaware as the situs of each trust, reforming the trust, and accepting jurisdiction over the trusts. The Court of Chancery dismissed the petitions, declining to adjudicate this multistate trust matter in deference to the courts which asserted jurisdiction over and had an ongoing supervisory role with respect to the testamentary trusts. Specifically, the Court held (1) the petitions for the 1960 and 1969 trusts should be filed in New Jersey and Texas, if appropriate; and (2) the petition for the 2005 trusts should be filed in the jurisdiction where probate matters were ongoing or refiled with supplemental information in the Court of Chancery. View "In re Peierls Family Testamentary Trusts" on Justia Law

Petitioners in this case were current beneficiaries of five inter vivos trusts. Seeking declarations designed to cause Delaware to govern the administration of the trusts so they could be reformed to take advantage of features authorized by the Delaware trust statute, Petitioners requested orders approving the resignations of individual trustees, confirming the appointment of Northern Trust Company of Delaware as the sole successor trustee for each trust, and confirming Delaware as the situs of each trust. The Court of Chancery denied the petitions, holding that the petitions failed primarily because Delaware law did not govern the trusts, as each of the trusts affirmatively selected the governing law of a different jurisdiction. View "In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts" on Justia Law

Petitioners in this case were the current trustees of a Washington charitable trust. Petitioners petitioned the Court of Chancery for orders (1) approving their resignations, (2) confirming the appointment of Northern Trust Company of Delaware as successor trustee, (3) confirming Delaware as the situs of the trust, (4) determining that Delaware law governs the administration of the trust, (5) accepting jurisdiction over the trust, and (6) reforming the trust to include an array of additional administrative positions. The Court accepted jurisdiction over the trust for the limited purpose of considering the application for reformation and held (1) Petitioners' first four requests sought impermissible advisory opinions, and to the extent the petition sought these declarations, it was dismissed; (2) Petitioners' application for reformation was denied, as Petitioners did not advance any recognized basis for reforming the Trust; and (3) jurisdiction over the trust was not retained. View "In re Ethel F. Peierls Charitable Lead Unitrust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the only child of Susan Shore. Susan and her children were beneficiaries of the Shore Family Trust. After Susan died, Plaintiff sued Defendant, the trustee of the trust, alleging (1) Defendant sold the farmland that formed the principal of the of the trust and distributed the proceeds to himself for his personal use, and (2) Plaintiff was unaware of Defendant's actions until within two years before filing suit. Plaintiff's complaint claimed breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and constructive fraud. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the applicable statues of limitations and repose barred all of Plaintiff's claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that three of four of Plaintiff's causes of action were time barred, but his claim based on constructive fraud survived. Remanded. View "Hemphill v. Shore" on Justia Law

MTA, Inc. appealed a circuit court order which held that its claims against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. were subject to an arbitration agreement and compelling MTA to arbitrate those claims. MTA entered into a deferred compensation agreement ("the DCA") with its employee, Yvonne Sanders. Pursuant to the terms of the DCA, MTA was obligated to pay Yvonne $270,000 in 120 equal monthly installments beginning the month following her 50th birthday or, in the event Yvonne died before reaching her 50th birthday, to pay her children, Tiffany Sanders and Roderick Dedrick, a total of $750,000 in 120 equal monthly installments beginning the month after her death. MTA thereafter obtained a $1,000,000 life insurance policy on Yvonne to fund the death benefit provided in the DCA in the event it became payable. On October 22, 1999, Yvonne died at the age of 43. MTA thereafter received the $1,000,000 it was owed under the life-insurance policy. However, MTA did not begin making payments to Tiffany and Roderick as called for by the DCA. Instead, Tiffany and Robert asked MTA to establish a rabbi trust to handle the payments, presumably to allow for more favorable tax treatment for Tiffany and Roderick. MTA executed a trust agreement with Thomas W. Dedrick, Sr., Tiffany and Roderick's uncle and a licensed broker employed by Merrill Lynch, establishing the trust and depositing into it an initial sum of $506,450. The trust agreement also provided that Thomas would act as trustee of the trust. Subsequent to the creation of the trust some intermittent payments were made from the trust to Tiffany and Roderick before payments ceased in late 2009. The sum total of the payments made did not equal $750,000. In 2011, Tiffany and Roderick filed an action against MTA asserting breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims and seeking $213,777, the amount they allege was still due them pursuant to the DCA. Merrill Lynch moved to compel arbitration of MTA's claims against it pursuant to the arbitration provisions in the account-authorization form. MTA opposed that motion, arguing that it was not a party to those contracts, and, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted Merrill Lynch's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed MTA's third-party claims against Merrill Lynch. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed that order, holding that MTA was not a signatory to those contracts and that the scope of the arbitration provisions in those contracts was too narrow to encompass disputes between Merrill Lynch and other entities not a party to those contracts. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MTA, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

S & M, LLC, d/b/a Huntsville Cab Company ("Huntsville Cab"), petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari review of a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals which affirmed a judgment in favor of Kevin Burchel, as personal representative of the estate of Roy William Burchel on Huntsville Cab's claim against the estate damages for loss of use of a commercial vehicle. The issue before the Court was whether the measure-of-damages rule set forth in "Hunt v. Ward," (79 So. 2d 20 (1955)), was consistent with the purpose of compensatory damages, which is "'to make the plaintiff whole by reimbursing him or her for the loss or harm suffered.'" Because the Court concluded that the rule stated in "Hunt" was not consistent with this purpose, the Court modified the rule, reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "S & M, LLC v. Burchel " on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Farrell, Trustee of the David Farrell Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment for defendants Vermont Electric Power Company and Vermont Transco (together, VELCO), the holders of an easement for the construction and operation of electrical transmission lines on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff claimed that VELCO's easement was limited to the installation and operation of transmission lines necessary for the "Queen City Tap Project." He argued that VELCO exceeded the scope of its easement by installing a second transmission line on plaintiff's property in connection with an unrelated transmission-line project. The trial court held that the easement's express terms authorized VELCO to install transmission lines unrelated to the Queen City Tap Project, and that any increased impact on plaintiff's property caused by the new line did not amount to overburdening. "VELCO's easement, by its express terms, authorized its installation of the NRP line on the Property. Such use is also consistent with the easement's purpose - the transmission of electricity - and does not impose an additional burden on the Property requiring further compensation." Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for VELCO was affirmed. View "Farrell v. Vermont Electric Power Co." on Justia Law

Trustee filed a petition to construe an inter vivos trust, taking the position that the interests of the deceased beneficiaries lapsed because they predeceased the surviving settlor and that Appellants, descendants of the settlor's stepsons, were not entitled to share in the remainder of the trust. The circuit court concluded that a beneficiary's interest lapses if the beneficiary predeceases the settlor under the common law, and therefore, Appellants could not share in the trust because their fathers' interests lapsed when they predeceased the surviving settlor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the interest of a beneficiary to an inter vivos trust vests at the time the trust is created, and thus the beneficial interest does not lapse when the beneficiary predeceases the settlor; and (2) therefore, the interests of the deceased beneficiaries did not lapse. Remanded. View "Tait v. Cmty. First Trust Co." on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, Ford Motor Company (Ford) wanted to preserve a confidential settlement agreement between it and the Estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries of Brian Cole (the Coles). The case on appeal was a separate action between the Coles, their attorneys, and among the attorneys themselves regarding expenses, a contingency-fee agreement, and a fee-sharing agreement. The chancellor denied Ford's motion and its "Notice of Intent to Seek Closure of Proceedings and Sealing of Documents." Before the Supreme Court, Ford raised three issues: (1) whether the settlement agreement was a public, judicial record or a private contract, which should be enforced; (2) whether the state's policy encouraging settlement agreements and the parties' interest in abiding by the terms of that agreement were sufficient grounds to protect the settlement from public scrutiny; and (3) whether there was any overriding public interest which would require disclosure of the terms of the settlement agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the settlement agreement was between private parties, did not involve issues of public concern, and was unnecessary to resolve the parties' disputes. Thus, the Court concluded that chancery court erred, in part, by denying Ford's motions. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Brian Cole" on Justia Law

In this dispute over real property, Roslyn Shephard, in her capacity as personal representative of the estates of real property owners (Lessors), terminated the third lease of Lessees based on an alleged violation of the terms of the lease. Shephard then sued Lessees, seeking to invalidate Lessees' third lease due to the fact that she had not signed it on Lessors' behalf. Shephard alternatively sought an order declaring that Lessees had breached the terms of the lease. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging that Shephard had breached the terms of the lease by wrongfully terminating the lease and by failing to provide notice to them of the alleged breach. The district court found in favor of Lessees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the lease was valid without Shephard's signature; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Lessees had not violated the lease; and (3) the district court correctly determined that the terms of the lease entitled Lessees to notice of their alleged breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Shephard v. Widhalm" on Justia Law