Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This case required the First Circuit Court of Appeals to explore the parameters of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The underlying litigation was a will contest turned conspiracy case. The plaintiff prevailed in probate court after two and a half years of legal wrangling. By the time Plaintiff was found to be the sole lawful heir of the decedent, the estate's assets were depleted. Seeking retribution, the plaintiff sued several persons involved in the will contest, alleging a wide-ranging conspiracy. In a preliminary ruling, the district court concluded that two of the defendants, a lawyer who had served as a court-appointed discovery master and the lawyer's firm, were immune from suit by reason of quasi-judicial immunity. The court certified this ruling as a partial final judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in certifying the ruling; and (2) the court-appointed discovery master was entitled to share in the judge's immunity from suit, and the law firm whose partner enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity was entitled to share in that immunity for helping the partner to perform his judicial tasks. View "Nystedt v. Nigro" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether the statutory requirements for execution of an attested will prescribed by Tenn. Code Ann. 32-1-104(1) were satisfied when the decedent in this case (Decedent) failed to sign a two-page will but signed a one-page affidavit of attesting witnesses. The trial court held that the will was not properly executed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Decedent's signature on the affidavit satisfied section 32-1-104 because Decedent intended his signature on the affidavit to be his signature on the will. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that Decedent's signature on the affidavit did not satisfy the statute requiring the testator's signature on a will. View "In re Estate of Chastain" on Justia Law

SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, doing business as Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("SSC"), and Bernard Turk, the administrator of Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("Warren Manor") (referred to collectively as "the Warren Manor defendants"), appealed a circuit court judgment denying their joint motion to compel arbitration of the medical-malpractice wrongful-death claims asserted against them by Ethel Gordon ("Gordon"), the administratrix of the estate of Jimmy Lee Gordon, Gordon's husband, pursuant to an arbitration agreement they allege Gordon had entered into with SSC. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the circuit court properly denied the Warren Manor defendants' motion to compel arbitration of Gordon's claims against them because the trial court had yet to conduct a trial to resolve the issue identified by the Supreme Court in "Gordon I" — whether a valid arbitration agreement existed between Gordon and SSC. "Only if that issue is answered in the affirmative may the Warren Manor defendants properly move to compel arbitration. If that trial results in a judgment holding that there is no valid arbitration agreement, then the Warren Manor defendants may file a timely appeal challenging the trial court's ruling excluding any evidence they wished to submit at trial." View "SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC v. Gordon" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute between three daughters regarding the administration of their deceased mother’s estate. The dispute centered around three documents: (1) a will executed in 1987; (2) a revised will the decedent allegedly executed in 2007 or 2008, which contained a clause revoking all prior wills; and (3) an exhibit that was allegedly an accurate (but unsigned) draft of the revised will. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that: (1) the decedent executed a valid will in 1987; (2) the decedent subsequently executed a revised will, but that will was lost; and (3) the revised will had revoked the 1987 will. Because an executed version of the revised will was never located, the superior court concluded it had been destroyed by the decedent, leaving her estate to be administered under Alaska’s statutory scheme for intestate succession. On appeal, one daughter challenged the superior court’s conclusion that the 1987 will was properly revoked. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to determine whether its finding that the revised will was properly executed is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Court also remanded for the superior court to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to overcome the presumption that the decedent destroyed her will. View "Dan v. Dan" on Justia Law

Ronald (Ron) and Dorothy Arnold appealed the district court's decision to grant a constructive trust property interest in favor of Ron's sister, Mary Snider (Toni) and her husband, Steve Snider. The property in question is a cabin and accompanying forest service permit for land located in Valley County. Toni and Ron's father built the cabin and willed it, along with the permit, to his wife, Bette Arnold. The district court imposed a constructive trust on the property in favor of the Sniders finding that Bette transferred the property to both the Arnolds and the Sniders in 1983. The Arnolds appealed the decision, arguing that the Sniders failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a constructive trust and the district court's finding that Bette intended to give the property to both parties was clearly erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the opinion of the district court. View "Snider v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Danielle Quemada, the daughter and personal representative of Richard Ortega (Decedent), initiated this action to set aside two quitclaim deeds. At the time of the Decedent's death, he had three children: Richard Ortega, Jr., Denise Mota, and Quemada. On January 12, 2012, Respondents, Efren Arizmendez and Gilbert Acosta filed a petition to adjudicate the intestacy of the Decedent and to be appointed as the personal representative of the Decedent's estate. The proceeding was assigned to the magistrate court. Thereafter, Quemada filed a petition for appointment as personal representative, which was granted. On April 20, 2010, Quemada filed a verified Petition, invoking the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA) to set aside two of the deeds. She alleged that the deeds to the properties should have been set aside because the Decedent signed them based on Celia Ortega's fraudulent misrepresentations, undue influence, and design to intentionally interfere with inheritance. During a telephonic status conference, the district court granted Quemada leave to file an amended petition narrowing the issues in dispute, and the parties stipulated to waive a jury trial. Quemada filed an unverified Amended Petition which was identical to the original Petition, except that it left out the intentional interference with inheritance cause of action. The district court ruled in response to a Rule 12(b) motion of Respondents that Quemada could not pursue a claim for damages, nor any claim against Celia Ortega, having failed to allege either in the Amended Petition. The Respondents answered the Amended Petition and shortly thereafter moved for summary judgment. Subsequent to the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision, finding that no genuine issues of material fact existed, and that Respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quemada appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Quemada v. Arizmendez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the grandchildren of Larry Hose, filed the instant action against Anthony Hose, individually and as administrator of the estate of Larry Hose, alleging that Plaintiffs were sexually and physically abused by Larry Hose, and that the estate of Larry Hose was closed through fraudulent conduct without an accounting for the claim Plaintiffs had against the estate. After the complaint was filed, three other individuals were added as defendants. The circuit court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs on the issue of liability. The circuit court then certified to the Supreme Court the questions asking the Court to determine whether an affidavit was sufficient to give notice of a claim against the estate of Larry Hose and whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint filed in this case. The Court found that the affidavit was sufficient in giving notice of a claim against the estate and that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. View "Hose v. Estate of Hose" on Justia Law

This action came before the Court of Chancery on a petition for a decree of distribution in an estate matter. Petitioner and his sister, Respondent, were the intestate heirs of their mother's estate. Ordinarily the estate would be divided evenly between the two of them. Petitioner argued, however, that his sister was not entitled to any additional funds from the estate because (1) she benefited when the estate's property was sold and the proceeds were used to pay off a mortgage she owed on the property, which had the effect of decreasing the amount available in the estate for distribution to the heirs, and (2) Respondent's actions as administratrix depleted the value of the estate. The Court of Chancery ordered that all of the assets in the estate should be distributed to Petitioner, concluding that, after accounting for the benefit Respondent received when the mortgage was paid off, and the loss caused to the estate by the breach of Respondent's fiduciary duties, there were no funds remaining in Respondent's share of the estate. View "In re Riley" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death and survival action involving a train collision, Appellant Connie Carson as personal representative of the estate of Beryl Harvey, argued on appeal that the circuit court erroneously excluded certain evidence, charged the jury, and permitted an inconsistent verdict in the survival action. Upon review of the circuit court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's evidentiary determinations and jury charge, but reversed the circuit court's decision denying Appellant's request for a new trial nisi additur and remanded the survival action for a new trial. View "Carson v. CSX Transportation" on Justia Law

Through interrogatories, a jury determined that David Keever, individually and in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Henry Keever, failed to prove that he had adversely possessed certain land whose record title was held by James R. Dellinger, Jr. and Frank Troutman. Specifically, the jury found that, although Keever had proven all other elements of adverse possession, he had failed to establish exclusive possession. Keever appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court made improper evidentiary rulings. Finding no errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Keever v. Dellinger" on Justia Law