Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether a surviving spouse's elective share, as defined in Iowa Code 633.238, includes pay-on-death (POD) assets. The probate court ruled that three of Karen Myers's assets, a checking account, certificate of deposit, and an annuity, all payable on her death to her daughters, should be included in the elective share of her surviving spouse, Howard Myers. The assignees of Howard's elective share argued that the elective share should include POD assets under Sieh v. Sieh, which held the elective share includes assets in a revocable trust. The executor argued that the General Assembly, by amending section 633.238 in 2009, expressly limited the surviving spouse's elective share to four categories of assets listed in the statute, none of which included POD assets. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the probate court, concluding that the 2009 amendment to section 633.238 trumps Sieh, and the controlling statutory language omits POD assets from the surviving spouse's elective share. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Myers" on Justia Law

At issue in this will contest was whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury as to the existence of the presumption of testamentary capacity. In this case, the decedent bequeathed her dog and a cash gift for the dog's care to Appellant and bequeathed the remainder of her residuary estate to charity. Appellant contended that, under the facts of this case, the presumption disappeared, and it was error to instruct the jury regarding the presumption. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the presumption of testamentary capacity does not necessary disappear in the face of evidence to the contrary, and moreover, the circuit court did not rule at the motion to strike that the presumption had been rebutted; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in instructing the jury about the presumption. View "Kiddell v. Labowitz" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court entered an order stating that Appellant concealed, embezzled, conveyed away and/or disposed of monies and other property of John Hibsman, Jr.'s estate and finding prima facie evidence of the right of the estate's personal representative to recover an amount "not less than $137,566." At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear Appellant's appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal, determining it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because (1) the order from which Appellant took his appeal was made in a "special proceeding" as contemplated by Wyo. R. App. P. 1.05; but (2) no substantial right of Appellant's was affected by the court's decision, as the proceeding appealed here merely determined a prima facie case that the personal representative could initiate litigation to determine if there was a wrongful taking of at least that amount of money. View "Hibsman v. Mullen" on Justia Law

Eloise Collins died in 2006. In July 2007, Lydia Swain, Collins’ goddaughter, filed a petition to probate two instruments alleged to be Collins’ will: an unwitnessed letter written in 1999 detailing how Collins wanted her property distributed after her death and a partially filled-out commercial will form that, while properly witnessed, did not address distribution of property. A number of Collins’ first cousins (collectively, Lee) challenged the will and the trial court initially granted judgment on the pleadings in their favor, finding that the two documents could not form a valid will. Swain appealed and the Supreme Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the two documents, considered together, created a valid will. On remand, a jury found that the two instruments were indeed “the true Last Will and Testament of Eloise Harley Collins.” Lee appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to grant summary judgment or a directed verdict, improperly instructing the jury on the law regarding codicils, and refusing to include a number of requested instructions in its charge to the jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s verdict in favor of Swain. View "Lee v. Swain" on Justia Law

The parties here were the surviving children of Decedent. Under Decedent's will, they were beneficiaries of a joint life estate interest in farmland. The will provided that no life tenant or remainderman could partition the property during the existence of any life tenancy. Through a codicil, Decedent later added a provision disinheriting any child who contested his will. After the probate court entered the final order in the probate proceeding, Appellees brought a partition action to divide the property. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Appellees were not bound by the will's restriction against a partition because they had not contested the will during the probate proceeding. Appellants then filed a declaratory judgment, claiming that Appellees had forfeited their inheritance by contesting the will through the partition action. The district court dismissed Appellants' action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that Appellants' partition action was not a will contest because it was filed after the estate was closed. View "Martin v. Ullsperger" on Justia Law

The Boys & Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. ("the Club"), a nonprofit corporation, appealed a judgment entered in favor of the Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc. ("Rotary Inc."), and the Ruff Wilson Youth Organization, Inc. ("Wilson Inc."), in their action against the Club seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In 1996, B.R. Wilson, Jr., one of the incorporators of the Club and a principal benefactor, executed a "gift deed," transferring to the Club approximately 17 acres of real estate ("the property"). In March 2000, the Club sold the property and deposited the proceeds into three separate accounts, two of which were separately earmarked for the Daphne Club and for the Fairhope Club. However, in 2009, the Club discontinued its operations in Daphne and Fairhope, citing "operating deficits" as a contributing factor. It transferred the remainder of the proceeds from the sale of the property to an account in the Community Foundation of South Alabama ("the bank"). Later that year, the facilities in Daphne and Fairhope were reopened by volunteers and former Club personnel, who began operating the youth centers under their own independent management structures. Subsequently, some of these individuals incorporated Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc., under which they continued to operate the facilities in Fairhope and Daphne, respectively. Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc. sued the Club, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Club "ha[d] used," or, perhaps, was "anticipat[ing] using," the proceeds for its own operations, rather than for the use of the facilities then being operated by Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc. They sought a judgment: (1) declaring that the "desire and understanding" of B.R. Wilson expressed in the letter controlled the disposition of the funds, and (2) enjoining the use of the proceeds for anything but the benefit of the youth facilities as operated by Rotary Inc. in Fairhope and by Wilson Inc. in Daphne. The court ordered the termination of the "trust" and the disbursal of the remainder of the proceeds to Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc., respectively. The Club appealed, challenging, among other things, the standing of Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc. to sue over distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc. failed to show that they had standing to challenge the Club's disposition of the proceeds of the sale of the property donated to the Club by B.R. Wilson, Jr. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and dismissed the case and the appeal. View "Boys & Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. v. Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc." on Justia Law

James Kesling executed a holographic will. After James died, the will was admitted into probate and James's three daughters were appointed as co-personal representatives of James's estate. Both the Estate and James's wife, Sandra, petitioned the circuit court to construe the will. The circuit court granted the Estate's motion for summary judgment. Sandra appealed, arguing that the will was ambiguous, and thus, the court erred by not considering extrinsic evidence as to James's intent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) James's intent was clearly expressed within the four corners of his holographic will and extrinsic evidence was not needed; and (2) the unambiguous language of the will demonstrated James's intent to give Sandra a life estate in his property with his three daughters as remaindermen. View "In re Estate of Kesling" on Justia Law

The Estates of Barbara J. Nelson and Sharon M. Bracken challenged the efforts of the Washington State Department of Revenue (DOR) to treat them as having engaged in a present taxable transfer of assets that were actually transferred years ago by Ms. Nelson’s and Ms. Bracken’s late husbands’ estates. DOR relied on the legislature’s adoption in 2005 of definitions from the federal estate tax regime. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that DOR exceeded its authority in enacting regulations that allowed it to treat transfers completed by William Nelson and Jim Bracken years ago as if the estates had elected to defer state estate tax on the transfers, to be paid by their wives’ estates. DOR stood on a different footing than the United States Treasury; "DOR must rely on the asserted authority of our legislature to tax transfers years after the fact absent any deferral agreement by the taxpayer." The Court reversed the trial court and directed summary judgment be entered in favor of the Estates. View "In re Estate of Bracken" on Justia Law

Giles was a prisoner in the Delaware penal system. Campbell worked at the Sussex Correctional Institution. Giles brought excessive force and deliberate indifference claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against officers, including Campbell, based on a confrontation during Giles’s transfer to Sussex and against others regarding his medical treatment after the incident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of several defendants, including Campbell, on the basis of qualified immunity, held a bench trial, and entered judgment in favor of remaining defendants. The Third Circuit remanded the summary judgment. On remand, the Delaware Department of Justice, which had represented defendants, notified the court that Campbell had died in July 2006. Giles moved to substitute the administratrix of Campbell’s estate as a defendant. Neither the suggestion of death nor the motion to substitute was served on the estate. The district court denied the motion to substitute, holding that Giles’s claim was not pending under Delaware law and was extinguished. Giles proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. The Third Circuit vacated denial of the motion to substitute, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the estate. View "Giles v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Kathy and Curtis Rice were married approximately four months before separating and filing for divorce. While they were separated but still married, Curtis died in a work-related accident. Jackie Griffin, Curtis's mother and the administratrix of his estate, claimed Kathy was barred by Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.090(2) from receiving an interest in Curtis's estate. The statute provides that a spouse who voluntarily leaves the other and "lives in adultery" forfeits his or her right to and interest in the other's estate and property. Based on Griffin's proof at trial that Kathy had sexual intercourse with another man the night prior to Curtis's death, the trial court held that Kathy forfeited her interest in Curtis's estate pursuant to section 392.090(2). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory language "lives in adultery" requires more than a single instance of adultery. View "Griffin v. Rice" on Justia Law