Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Kathy and Curtis Rice were married approximately four months before separating and filing for divorce. While they were separated but still married, Curtis died in a work-related accident. Jackie Griffin, Curtis's mother and the administratrix of his estate, claimed Kathy was barred by Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.090(2) from receiving an interest in Curtis's estate. The statute provides that a spouse who voluntarily leaves the other and "lives in adultery" forfeits his or her right to and interest in the other's estate and property. Based on Griffin's proof at trial that Kathy had sexual intercourse with another man the night prior to Curtis's death, the trial court held that Kathy forfeited her interest in Curtis's estate pursuant to section 392.090(2). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory language "lives in adultery" requires more than a single instance of adultery. View "Griffin v. Rice" on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court answered a question of Utah law certified to it by the U.S. district court. The question was, "Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the donor's death under Utah intestacy law?" In this case, after she gave birth, the wife of the donor applied for social security benefits based on the donor's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied the benefits, finding that the wife had not shown the child was the donor's "child" as defined by the Social Security Act. The wife subsequently filed a petition for adjudication of paternity, and the district court adjudicated the donor to be the father of the child. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the state law question to the Supreme Court. The Court held that an agreement leaving preserved frozen semen to the deceased donor's wife does not, without more, confer on the donor the status of a parent for purposes of social security benefits. View "Burns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court answered a question of Utah law certified to it by the U.S. district court. The question was, "Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the donor's death under Utah intestacy law?" In this case, after she gave birth, the wife of the donor applied for social security benefits based on the donor's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied the benefits, finding that the wife had not shown the child was the donor's "child" as defined by the Social Security Act. The wife subsequently filed a petition for adjudication of paternity, and the district court adjudicated the donor to be the father of the child. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the state law question to the Supreme Court. The Court held that an agreement leaving preserved frozen semen to the deceased donor's wife does not, without more, confer on the donor the status of a parent for purposes of social security benefits. View "Burns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

The trustee of a trust established by Carol Vollmer (settlor) commenced this action in the probate and family court seeking reformation of the trust to comply with certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. A judge in that court reported the case to the appeals court, and the Supreme Court granted the trustee's application for direct appellate review. The Court then concluded that the trust should be reformed as requested, holding that reformation was warranted on this record because the proposed reformations would conform to the settlor's intent and would not be adverse to any person's or entity's interests under the trust instrument. View "Rockland Trust Co. v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

At issue in the underlying case was the discharge of by Defendant of the law firm Harrill & Sutter and what attorneys' fees were owed following that discharge. The circuit court ruled that Defendant discharged Harrill for cause and that, as a result, Harrill was entitled to a fee based only on quantum-meruit recovery and not the parties' fee agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's award in quantum-meruit recovery but reversed the circuit court's ruling denying Defendant's request for attorneys' fees on the basis that the circuit court had provided no findings in support of its denial of such fees. On remand, the circuit court found that Defendant was the prevailing party under Arkansas law and granted her attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the issue of attorneys' fees, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant was the prevailing party; but (2) the fee award was not reasonable. View "Harrill & Sutter P.L.L.C. v. Kosin" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted a trust instrument to decide whether the death of Betty Plouf triggered the offset provision of the Plouf Family Trust, and thus, instantaneously satisfied the mortgage lien the Trust held on the home of a beneficiary. The trial court held that it did. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court had inherent authority to revisit an earlier order finding that the Trust had a first-priority lien; (2) the trial court did not err in ruling that the unambiguous terms of the Trust mandated an offset at the time of Betty's death, thus extinguishing the underlying mortgage; and (3) neither party was entitled to appellate attorney fees. View "SBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Plouf Family Trust" on Justia Law

Appellant, individually and as the administratrix of the Estate of Anne Pressley, filed a complaint against Appellees, a medical center (the Center) and three individuals associated with the Center, alleging claims of invasion of privacy and outrage. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, holding (1) a claim for invasion of privacy does not survive the death of a decedent; (2) the claim for outrage failed because it was based on the same conduct as the claim for invasion of privacy; and (3) because Appellant's previous two claims failed, the Center could not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101(a)(1) does not provide for the claim of invasion of privacy to survive the death of the decedent; (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellant's claim for outrage; and (3) because the judgment was reversed on the outrage claim, the circuit court's finding that the Center could not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees must also be reversed. View "Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal came before the Supreme Court from the denial of a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment. The issue was whether George Poppenheimer, a volunteer firefighter, was immune under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for claims arising from an automobile accident. The county court found that a volunteer fire department is not a government entity for purposes of the MTCA and denied Poppenheimer's motion. Aggrieved, Poppenheimer appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the Bridgetown Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD) and its employees receive protection under the MTCA; and (2) whether the county court erred by denying his motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the BVFD is not a governmental entity or instrumentality of the state, but an independent contractor. Also, as a volunteer firefighter, Poppenheimer is not immune from suit arising out of alleged automobile negligence. Thus, the Court affirmed the county court's denial of Poppenheimer's motions. View "Poppenheimer v. The Estate of Coyle, " on Justia Law

Johnson Farms, Inc. and Floyd Johnson filed a complaint against Ethel Halland alleging (1) in her capacity as secretary of Johnson Farms, Inc., Ethel breached her fiduciary duties by diverting corporate funds to herself and others; and (2) Ethel conferred gifts to herself and other family members in contravention of a written trust agreement. The district court granted Ethel's motion for summary judgment, finding that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court also awarded Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Johnson's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. View "Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to answer a certified question about whether the Court's discretionary review of a petition for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches grounds is a decision on the merits when it is accompanied by a written opinion, such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred. The question stemmed from litigation surrounding a probate court's reformation and administration of a charitable religious trust. An association of members of the church and beneficiaries of the trust (the FLDSA) filed a complaint in federal court. Later, the FLDSA filed an extraordinary writ petition in state court asserting claims substantially similar to those in the federal case. The federal court stayed its proceedings. The Utah Supreme Court held that the FLDSA's claims were barred on laches grounds and dismissed the petition. When the federal case reached the court of appeals, the court certified to the Supreme Court its question about Utah preclusion law. The Court answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that a decision like the one reached in state court was a decision "on the merits" for res judicata purposes and would preclude a subsequent action on the same claims between the same parties. View "Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne" on Justia Law