Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Facebook and others complaining that Facebook's program, Beacon, was causing publication of otherwise private information about their outside web activities to their personal profiles without their knowledge or approval. Beacon operated by updating a member's personal profile to reflect certain actions the member had taken on websites belonging to companies that had contracted with Facebook to participate in the Beacon program. At issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in approving the parties' $9.5 million settlement agreement as "fair, reasonable, and adequate," either because a Facebook employee sat on the board of the organization distributing cy pres funds (DTF) or because the settlement amount was too low. The court concluded that objectors' contention that the settling parties were prohibited from creating DTF to disburse cy pres funds was without merit, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in so concluding. The court also concluded that the settlement was fundamentally fair; the notice in this case adequately apprised class members of all material elements of the settlement agreement and therefore complied with the requirements of Rule 23(e); and the district court properly limited its substantive review of the agreement as necessary to determine that it was "fair, adequate, and free from collusion." View "Lane, et al v. Facebook, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

This appeal came before the Supreme Court from a declaratory judgment action brought by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho (Farm Bureau). Farm Bureau brought suit in response to a claim for insurance benefits filed by the personal representatives of the estate of a deceased policyholder (the Estate). Farm Bureau requested a judgment declaring that the Estate was not an "insured" under the decedent's insurance policy and was therefore not entitled to payment of wrongful death damages under the Policy's underinsured motorist coverage. The district court granted the Estate's motion for summary judgment, determining that Idaho's wrongful death statute, entitled the insured's Estate to recover damages for wrongful death and that the Policy provided coverage for those damages. Farm Bureau appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: as to the Estate, the Court determined that under the plain language of the wrongful death statute, the Estate was not legally entitled to recover damages for itself, but only to bring an action on behalf of the heirs to recover their damages. "The Estate stepped into [the decedent's] shoes for those claims, and Farm Bureau made those payments to the Estate. Farm Bureau's payment of these legitimate claims under the insurance contract does not constitute a change of position or an admission that coverage exists for other claims. We hold that these payments do not prevent Farm Bureau from arguing that it is not required to pay the Estate for damages that [the decedent] was not legally entitled to recover." View "Farm Bureau v. Estate of Eisenman" on Justia Law

Lloyd Tuttle Jr. appealed the circuit court's judgment holding that execution of a check payable to his wife, Grace Tuttle, excluded the funds from Grace's augmented estate and that therefore Lloyd's written consent or joinder was not required when Grace, before her death, gifted the funds to her son. Lloyd also appealed the circuit court's judgment holding him liable for more than one-half of an indebtedness evidenced by a note executed by him and Grace as co-makers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Lloyd's check to Grace did not exclude those funds from Grace's augmented estate, and therefore, the circuit court erred by failing to include the funds in Grace's augmented estate; and (2) the circuit court erred by requiring Lloyd to pay more than one-half of the total joint indebtedness, as Lloyd was liable for only one-half of the indebtedness. View "Tuttle v. Webb" on Justia Law

After Michael G. Kampros's death, Mark Green and Sophie Gibson became trustees of the Michael G. Kampros Family Trust. Willow Rapela, Kampros's daughter and the successor trustee, requested removal of Green and Gibson pursuant to section 75-7-706(2)(d) of the Utah Trust Code. The district court granted her request with respect to Gibson but declined to remove Green. The district court held that Green had more experience and better qualifications than Rapela to manage the Trust's assets. As a result the district court concluded that Green's removal would not serve the best interests of the Trust's beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly concluded that removal of Green did not serve the beneficiaries' best interests; (2) the district court correctly held that Green's personal interests the LLCs in which the Trust also owned interests did not constitute an impermissible conflict of interest because Kampros knew about Green's interests at the time he appointed Green trustee; and (3) the district court permissibly compared Green's and Rapela's experience and qualifications when evaluating whether removal would serve the beneficiaries' best interests. View "Rapela v. Green" on Justia Law

The City of Glendale and various other parties sought to set aside the Department of the Interior's decision to accept in trust, for the benefit of the Tohono O'odham Nation, a 54-acre parcel of land known as Parcel 2. The Nation hoped to build a destination resort and casino on Parcel 2, which was unincorporated county land, entirely surrounded by the city. This appeal related the the status of the land as trust. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government after that court concluded that the Secretary of the Interior reasonably applied the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat. 1798, and that the Act did not violate the Indian Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment. View "City of Glendale, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Twenty-year-old Xavier Zurndell Moore pled guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of his mother's live-in boyfriend, Robert Williams. The fatal bullet had been purchased from the Walmart in Indianola, Mississippi. Robert's daughter and his estate filed a wrongful-death suit against Walmart, alleging that it unlawfully had sold ammunition to the underage Moore and that the sale proximately had caused Robert's death. The trial court granted summary judgment for Walmart based on this Court's decision in "Robinson v. Howard Brothers of Jackson, Mississippi," (372 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979)). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, even though the store had violated federal law by selling a firearm and ammunition to a minor, the minor's subsequent murder of a third party had not been foreseeable; the seller, therefore, was not civilly liable for the death. Based on "Robinson," the Court found that Moore's criminal act was not foreseeable and that Walmart reasonably could assume that Moore would follow the law. Therefore, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Walmart. View "Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

Marilyn Monroe LLC and its licensee sued Milton Green in the federal district court, claiming ownership of Marilyn Monroe's right of publicity and alleging that Milton Greene was violating Marilyn Monroe LLC's rights by using Monroe's image and likeness for unauthorized commercial purposes, including the advertising and sale of photographs of Monroe. At issue in this case was whether appellants inherited a right of publicity, which was created and deemed posthumous by the states of California and Indiana decades after her death, through a residual clause in her Last Will and Testament. The court concluded that because Monroe's executors consistently represented during the probate proceedings and elsewhere that she was domiciled in New York at her death to avoid payment of California estate taxes, among other things, appellants were judicially estopped from asserting California's posthumous right of publicity. View "Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, et al." on Justia Law

In 1941, Anna Child Bird executed a will with a testamentary trust that benefitted her sons, her grandsons, and their issue. At the time the will was executed, the law provided that an adopted child was excluded from the definition of "child." In 1958, the statute was amended to redefine the term "child" to include an adopted child. By its terms, however, the 1958 amendment applied only to testamentary instruments executed after 1958. In 2009, another amendment made the 1958 amendment applicable to all testamentary instruments regardless of when executed. Plaintiff was the biological great-grandchild of Anna, and Plaintiff had two adopted brothers. Plaintiff's father was a biological grandson of Anna. Plaintiff had been receiving income distribution from the testamentary trust established by Anna in her will. The Supreme Court concluded that the retroactive application of the 2009 amendment to Anna's trust, with the effect that Plaintiff's interest in the trust would be divided into three parts to cover her and her two adopted brothers, was unconstitutional. Remanded. View "Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A." on Justia Law

Eliot Hoff appealed a circuit court order that remanded the administration of the conservatorship of his grandmother, Susan Bibb Kidd, to the Jefferson Probate Court. In 2006, the probate court adjudged Kidd to be an incapacitated person and appointed Mark Goolsby as conservator of her estate. Sometime in August 2008, Goolsby sold some personal property in Kidd's estate to Anita Kidd Goyer, one of Kidd's three daughters. When another of Kidd's daughters, Susan Louis Hoff, and her son Hoff found out about the sale, they filed an objection in the probate court. Meanwhile, on September 29, 2009, Kidd died. On February 21, 2011, the probate court issued an order that, among other things, approved the August 2008 sale of Kidd's personal property to Goyer. The Hoffs promptly moved the probate court to reconsider. An initial hearing on their motion was held on June 8, 2011; however, the matter was continued and another hearing scheduled for September 15, 2011. On June 24, 2011, Goolsby petitioned the probate court to be appointed administrator of Kidd's estate because he could not conduct business as conservator after her death. The Hoffs thereafter also filed a motion to continue the hearing scheduled for September 15, 2011. The probate court ruled on those motions, setting the hearing on the Hoffs' motion to reconsider and denying Goolsby's motion to be appointed administrator of Kidd's estate. Instead, the probate court, on its own motion, appointed attorney Elizabeth W. McElroy, the general administrator for Jefferson County, as administrator of Kidd's estate. Hoff appealed the order entered by the circuit court remanding the administration of the conservatorship of his grandmother to the probate court, arguing that he had properly petitioned for removal. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded Hoff did not have standing to seek removal, that the circuit court's order of remand was properly entered. View "Hoff v. Goyer " on Justia Law

As a beneficiary of a trust created by her grandfather, Plaintiff-Appellant Courtney Evans brought an action against the trustee, Peter F. Moyer, for an accounting and distribution of income. The district court generally ruled in Mr. Moyer's favor, and Plaintiff appealed arguing that the district court's interpretation of the trust was erroneous and Mr. Moyer's accounting was insufficient. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its interpretation of the trust. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Evans v. Moyer" on Justia Law