Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Louis G. Hannum, Jr. (Louis Jr.) appealed a district court's order removing him for cause as the personal representative of the estate of Louis G. Hannum, Sr. (Louis Sr.). Louis Sr. passed away in 2010, and was survived by his children, Louis Jr., Mike and Mark; and his grandchildren, Monika, Veronica, Michelle, Naomi, Zachary, Esther and Jim. Louis Sr. was predeceased by his daughter, Cheryl Gallagher, who was Esther’s and Jim’s mother. Louis Jr. filed an application for informal probate of will and appointment of personal representative of Louis. Sr.’s estate on September 2, 2010. Notice was sent to Louis Jr., Mike, Mark, Esther and Jim, but not to the remaining grandchildren. Naomi did, however, know of Louis Jr.’s appointment because Naomi was Louis Jr.’s daughter and she was acting as his counsel. It is unclear whether Zachary, Louis Jr.’s son, was aware of these proceedings. Notably, Louis Jr. did not send notice to Louis Sr.’s grandchildren Monika, Veronica and Michelle. In its Order, the District Court concluded that Louis Jr. violated numerous fiduciary duties, and as a result, his removal for cause was appropriate. In its conclusions of law, the District Court determined that Louis Jr. had failed in his duty to administer the probate according to the 2005 Will, a duty imposed by 72-34-101, MCA, when he included the value of certain alleged promissory notes and distributed them between himself and Mark without authority under the 2005 Will. The court additionally found that Louis Jr. failed in his duty to avoid conflicts of interest, in his duty to use ordinary skill and prudence, in his duty to exercise discretionary powers reasonably, and in his duty to file or otherwise deliver to interested parties, within nine months of his appointment, an inventory of estate assets that included a full and true value of the decedent’s interest in every item listed in the inventory. In reaching its decision, the the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court relied on substantial credible evidence. Though the Court disfavors removing a personal representative, the District Court has broad discretion in its decision to remove a personal representative, and the Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse that discretion when it removed Louis Jr. for cause. View "Estate of Hannum" on Justia Law

Defendant Noland Hospital Montgomery, LLC ("NHM"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying NHM's motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment in NHM's favor. NHM contended that it was entitled to a summary judgment on the basis that the applicable statute of limitations for this wrongful-death action barred the claims asserted against it by Wheatton K. Pynes, individually and as executor of the estate of Houston Earl Pynes. "The disposition of this petition require[d] an interpretation of the interplay between Rule 9(h), Ala. R.Civ. P., relating to fictitiously named parties, and Rule 15(c), pertaining to the relation back of amendments to pleadings." Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Pynes v. Jackson Hospital" on Justia Law

Regions Bank ("Regions"), as sole trustee of the J.F.B. Lowrey Trust ("the Lowrey Trust"), appealed a circuit court's order that denied Regions' motion to award it attorney fees and costs. Sam G. Lowrey, Jr., and Shelby Lowrey Jones, two of the current beneficiaries of the Lowrey Trust ("the beneficiaries") cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of Regions on their breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. The beneficiaries claimed that Regions failed to protect and preserve the assets of the Lowrey Trust, which consisted primarily of approximately 20,000 acres of timberland located in Monroe and Conecuh Counties and which have been the subject of much intra-family litigation. The trial court entered a detailed order in favor of Regions, rejecting the beneficiaries' claims of mismanagement of the trust assets and taxing costs against the beneficiaries. Regions filed a bill of costs and a supplemental bill of costs detailing all the expenses incurred in defending the claim, and attaching supporting documentation. The beneficiaries filed a motion to review taxation of costs and a motion to vacate the judgment. The trial court did not rule on the motions, and all post-trial motions were deemed denied by operation of law. Regions timely appealed, and the beneficiaries filed a cross-appeal. Upon review of the record of the five-day bench trial and the considerable documentary evidence, the Supreme Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision on the beneficiaries' breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Regions on that claim. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling on Regions' motion for attorney fees, and remanded this case back to the trial court for a hearing on Regions' attorney-fee motion to consider the reasonableness of the attorney fee. View "Regions Bank v.Lowrey" on Justia Law

In the second of two lawsuits brought by appellant Francie Bonnell against her daughter and son-in-law, respondents Sabrina and Steven Lawrence, Appellant appealed the grant of summary judgment from the first suit, along with its associated fee award. The underlying case arose from a $135,000 payment that Bonnell made to retire the mortgage debt on her daughter’s home ("Lindell premises"). Bonnell saw the payment as an advance on what her daughter would eventually inherit anyway, but with a catch: She expected, in return, a life estate in the premises, allowing her to live in the home, rent-free, for the rest of her life. The daughter acknowledged the $135,000 payment. However, she viewed it as a loan (which she and her husband repaid when they deeded Bonnell a different home with equity of $135,000). No writing memorialized the latter agreement, and the facts of the case questioned whether there was one. In her first suit, Bonnell asserted a variety of legal and equitable claims, all premised on her claimed life estate in the Lindell premises. Bonnell's attorney had withdrawn, and she continued in proper person. She received the motion for summary judgment, but she did not file a written opposition to it, and it was granted by written order. More than a year later, Bonnell obtained new counsel, who filed this second suit on her behalf. Although filed in the same judicial district and repeating the claims in the first suit, the second suit went to a new district court judge. The Lawrences moved to dismiss the second suit for failure to state a claim under NRCP 12(b)(5). They argued that res judicata barred relitigation of Bonnell’s claims and that, to the extent Bonnell identified grounds for avoiding the prior summary judgment, she could and should have asserted them by motion under NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3) within the six-month deadline specified in the rule. The district court credited the Lawrences’ arguments, rejected Bonnell’s, and dismissed the second suit with prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bonnell v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the duty of care owed by a medical facility when performing nonmedical functions. The Court took the opportunity of this case to recognize that when a medical facility performs a nonmedical function, general negligence standards apply, such that the medical facility has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm as a result of its actions. Here, the complaint alleged that appellant, a cognitively impaired patient who required a guardian to make medical and financial decisions for her, was exploited by a third party after a social worker employed by the respondent medical facility provided the third party with a preprinted general power-of-attorney form, which the patient subsequently executed in furtherance of her discharge from the facility. The manner in which the medical facility allegedly discharged the patient could lead a reasonable jury to find that the patient's financial injuries were a foreseeable result of the facility's conduct. Thus, the Supreme Court found that district court erred when it found that the medical facility owed the patient no duty beyond the duty to provide competent medical care and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the order dismissing this action and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "DeBoer v. Sr. Bridges of Sparks Fam. Hosp." on Justia Law

Robert Lee Kitchens, Jr., and his wife, Mary L. Kitchens, died as a result of injuries received in a collision between their automobile and a train owned and operated by Illinois Central Railroad Company ("Illinois Central"). The Administratrix and wrongful-death beneficiaries of the Kitchenses' estate filed a wrongful-death action against several parties, including the parent company of Illinois Central, Canadian National Railway Company. Canadian National moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The circuit court granted the plaintiffs ninety days to conduct discovery "to justify piercing the corporate veil" and reserved ruling on the motion to dismiss pending completion of the discovery. Canadian National filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal, and the Supreme Court granted the petition. Upon review, the Court found that the plaintiffs did not allege with particularity the applicability of piercing the corporate veil to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the circuit court's order permitting further discovery, reversed the circuit court's failure to grant Canadian National's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the circuit court for the entry of a final order of dismissal without prejudice. View "Canadian National Railway Co. v. Waltman" on Justia Law

When Edith Entrekin was admitted to a nursing home in Alabama, she signed a contract requiring the arbitration of "all claims or disputes" that she or the executor of her future estate might have against the nursing home. After Entrekin died, the executor of her estate brought an action against the nursing home for damages under Alabama's wrongful death statute. The district court denied the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration. The issue on appeal to the Eleventh circuit centered on whether a decedent's agreement with a nursing home to arbitrate any claims that she or her executor may have in the future against the nursing home bind her executor to arbitrate a wrongful death claim against the nursing home under Alabama law? The Court found it was "compelled" to follow the Alabama Supreme Court's holdings and compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim in this case. The Court reversed the district court's order denying the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Entrekin v. Westside Terrace, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a claim filed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare in the probate proceeding of George D. Perry, the deceased spouse of Medicaid recipient Martha J. Perry. The Department sought to recover funds under I.C. 56-218 from the sale of the couple’s home (their only significant asset) to recoup Medicaid benefits paid to Martha during her lifetime. The magistrate court disallowed the Department’s claim for recovery, finding that Martha had no interest in the real property because George, acting for Martha under a power of attorney, conveyed the property to himself before his death. That decision was upheld on appeal to the district court. The Department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the district court erred in finding that federal law preempted the Department's ability to recover from George's estate what was once Martha's community property during the marriage. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Id. Dept. of Health & Welfare v. McCormick" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the requirements for determining whether a claimed amount of attorney fees was reasonable. After extended litigation to settle his parents’ estate, Kim Bailey, the estate’s personal representative, asked the magistrate court for an award of attorney fees from estate funds. The magistrate court found that Bailey was entitled to reasonable fees to be determined under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and ordered Bailey to provide an accounting of his attorney fees, including the time his attorney spent providing legal services. Bailey’s attorney notified the court that he was unable to comply with the order, explaining that he did not keep time records because the attorney-client contract expressly stated that the fee would not be based upon an hourly rate, but upon the attorney’s opinion of the reasonable worth of his services. The beneficiaries of the estate challenged the sufficiency of the accounting. The magistrate court denied Bailey’s request for fees and concluded that without time records it could not determine a reasonable fee amount in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A). The district court upheld the denial of fees, and Bailey timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court and affirmed. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the probate court requiring her to provide an accounting of her actions as attorney-in-fact for her mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined (1) the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to call Plaintiff to account for her actions as attorney-in-fact for her mother; (2) the defendant, who was named as the second successor attorney-in-fact, had standing to make an application to the probate court for an accounting of Plaintiff's actions in her role as attorney-in-fact; and (3) the probate court properly ordered Plaintiff to submit an accounting of her activities as attorney-in-fact for her mother in the absence of a showing of cause for the accounting. View "In re Bachand" on Justia Law