Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Washington Trust Bank (WTB) was the trustee of the trust created by Althea Bowman's last will and testament. Althea's four surviving children were the trust beneficiaries. Three of these beneficiaries argued to the district court that the Trustee exceeded its authority by encumbering a commercial property held by the trust with a deed of trust, and advancing funds to a fourth beneficiary. In that transaction, separate divisions of WTB acted as trustee (Trustee) and as the beneficiary of the deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee. Two of the beneficiaries appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order of dismissal because the Court concluded the Bowmans lacked standing and they asserted claims that were not ripe. View "Blankenship v. Washington Trust Bank" on Justia Law

Two nieces, acting as co-guardians for their elderly uncle, sued their uncle's former caregiver for misuse and misappropriation of his assets; the caregiver counterclaimed for compensation for services rendered. After a bench trial, the superior court: (1) determined the caregiver had committed fraud and breached fiduciary duties; (2) awarded damages against the caregiver for her misuse and misappropriation of the uncle’s assets; (3) awarded the caregiver some compensation for her services in quantum meruit; and (4) ordered the caregiver's name removed from title to the uncle's house. The caregiver appealed. Because the superior court's findings of fact were well supported, and its application of equitable considerations was well within its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Shears v. Myers" on Justia Law

Robert Eastman claimed Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. ("MVS"), the company that supplied sand to his employer Marathon LeTourneau, failed to warn him of the dangers posed by sandblasting. At trial, MVS requested a "sophisticated user/learned-intermediary" jury instruction. Although the requested instruction was an incomplete statement of the law, the trial judge refused the instruction for an erroneous reason and failed to instruct the jury properly on the submitted defense. The jury returned a verdict for Eastman, and MVS timely appealed, raising eight issues, including the trial judge's refusal to grant the sophisticated-user jury instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that issue dispositive, and reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Eastman" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Walbridge appealed a superior court order that denied her petition to establish her homestead right exempt from the mortgage held by Respondents the Estate of Raymond Beaudoin, Jr. and its co-administrators Steven Beaudoin and Raymond Beaudoin, III. Petitioner owned property in Rochester that she purchased with her then-husband. At that time, it was undeveloped land. Petitioner executed a mortgage on the property and released her homestead rights to that property. Allegedly unbeknownst to Petitioner, her husband executed a mortgage deed and promissory note on the property in favor of the decedent Raymond Beaudoin once a home was built there. The mortgage on the property did not list it as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. Petitioner and her husband divorced, and pursuant to the divorce decree, she was awarded all right, title and interest in the property. The property was foreclosed upon. Petitioner filed a petition to establish that her homestead right to the property was exempt from Respondents' mortgage. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that her homestead right in the property was not established until she actually, physically occupied it. She contended that her "obvious intention of present and immediate occupancy of the home . . . followed by [her] actual occupancy within a reasonable time, was equivalent to actual occupancy." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Walbridge v. The Estate of Raymond A. Beaudoin, Jr." on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a controversy over a phrase in a trust. The language at issue established the calculation of the price of trust property offered for sale to certain trust beneficiaries. One of the trust beneficiaries filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking judicial interpretation of the disputed provision. The trial court concluded that the disputed phrase was unambiguous and that the option price was the fair market value as determined by the appraisal. The court of appeals reversed after reviewing the trust document de novo, finding that the option language was susceptible to more than one interpretation and that the option price was the federal and/or Ohio qualified-use value. At issue on appeal was what standard of review an appellate court should employ in reviewing legal issues in a declaratory-judgment action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the de novo standard of review is the proper standard for appellate review of purely legal issues that must be resolved after the trial court has decided that a complaint for declaratory judgment presents a justiciable question. View "Arnott v. Arnott" on Justia Law

This case concerned the tax sale of certain property to KSSO, LLC. The circuit court entered partial summary judgment awarding quiet title to the property to Catherine Ndegwa as trustee of the Mrema family revocable trust. KSSO, LLC asserted that the circuit court improperly entered summary judgment in favor of Ndegwa and the trust because there was a sufficient question of material fact as to whether KSSO provided Ndegwa with timely and sufficient notice of Plaintiffs' right to redeem the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the circuit court's order did not resolve a single, distinct judicial unit, and therefore, was neither a final nor appealable judgment in this case. View "Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC" on Justia Law

The Estate of Stanley Pinkham appealed a superior court judgment granting Cargill, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment on the Estate’s complaint. In 2004, Mr. Pinkham consumed a boneless turkey sandwich that contained a piece of bone. The turkey was "manufactured" by Cargill, Inc. The bone caused an esophageal tear requiring surgery (Mr. Pinkham died several years later after sustaining his injury. He did not sue for wrongful death). Three affidavits that the Estate relied on to defeat Cargill's motion for summary judgment were held inadmissible at trial. After consideration, the trial court granted Cargill's motion noting that Maine had not established the requisite test to use when evaluating a strict liability claim for allegedly defective food pursuant to its strict liability statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Estate argued that it provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The Estate further argued that the court erred in concluding that the Estate failed to meet its burden of proof to establish facts from which a fact-finder could infer that Cargill’s boneless turkey product was defective. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that summary judgment was not proper given the facts presented in this case, and vacated the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Stanley Pinkham v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Daniel drove a truck for Cryogenic Transportation to a plant owned by Airgas Carbonics. Upon exiting the Airgas plant, Daniel fatally collided with a passing train operated by Illinois Central Railroad Company. Illinois Central filed suit against Cryogenic Transportation and Michael Daniel's widow, Clydine Daniel, as representative of Michael's estate, seeking recovery for damage to its property resulting from the collision. Clydine filed a counterclaim sounding in negligence and added Airgas as a counterclaim defendant, seeking recovery for damages resulting from Michael's death. The district court dismissed the counterclaim against Airgas for failure to state a claim, concluding that Airgas owed no duty to Michael at the time of the collision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that after Michael exited Airgas's plant, Airgas did not owe him a duty under Mississippi tort law. View "Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative. View "Gates v. Glass" on Justia Law

Following trial, a jury declared that a Will and Revocable Trust executed by Thomas Hines, Sr. in 2002 were invalid as they were the product of undue influence. Steve and Deborah Davidson, executors of the Hines estate, appealed that ruling. The Davisons contended that the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence did not support the jury's finding. Furthermore, the Davidsons argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence upon which the jury ultimately relied in reaching its decision. Finding no error nor abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions and the jury's verdict. View "Davison v. Hines" on Justia Law