Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

On May 29, 2009, Plaintiff Rose McCann filed a petition for divorce against Defendant Walter McCann in the Family Court. A judgment granting the divorce was later signed in early, 2010, leaving the identification, valuation, management, and partition of the community property as the remaining issues in the case. Plaintiff filed a petition for partition of community property, moving the court to appoint various experts to assist in the partition. The Family Court appointed real estate and financial experts to inventory and value the real estate, and determine the value of the remaining property. Thereafter, a “Notice of Filing of Succession” was filed, stating that Defendant's succession had been opened in the District Court under Probate. Plaintiff filed a motion to substitute the succession executrix the decedent's daughter, as the party defendant in the partition proceeding. The succession executrix filed a “Declinatory Exception of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion to Transfer,” seeking to have the partition action transferred to the District Court. The Family Court overruled the exception, denied the motion to transfer, and signed a judgment substituting the executrix into the partition action as the defendant, in place of the deceased Defendant. The executrix unsuccessfully appealed the Family Court's decision. The Supreme Court granted Defendant executrix’s writ application and remanded the matter to the appellate court for briefing, argument and full opinion. On remand, the appellate court by a majority decision again denied the executrix' writ application. The issue now before the Supreme Court was the correctness of the lower courts’ rulings. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Family Court no longer had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the partition of community property when one of the former spouses died. Thus, the Family Court erred in overruling the Defendant executrix’s exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "McCann v. McCann" on Justia Law

This case arose from a trust dispute where appellants subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus to compel Judge Stephens to allow them to appeal from an order dismissing their appeal. The court held that appellants have shown that they have a clear legal right to file a direct appeal from the order dismissing their properly filed direct appeals from the June 7, 2011 order and that granting mandamus relief would not be nugatory because the notices of appeal from the June 7, 2011 order were proper and valid. However, in order for mandamus relief to be granted, appellants must also show that they have no alternative adequate remedy at law. In the present case, Judge Stephens has denied permission to appellants for them to file such an appeal. Therefore, as appellants were unable to obtain "judicial review of the judicial act in question, this case presents the unusual situation where mandamus is a viable means of seeking review of a judicial action." Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the mandamus petition, and the court directed the trial court to issue the writ of mandamus. View "Sotter v. Stephens; White, et al. v. Stephens" on Justia Law

This case concerned commercial property that was subject to a deed of trust and auctioned at trustee's sales twice in 2009. Alleging it was the successful bidder at the second sale, BT Capital, LLC sued the trustee and the trust beneficiary seeking title to the property and damages. The trial court granted summary judgment against BT and dismissed BT's tort claims. While BT's appeal was pending, another trustees sale was conducted in 2010, and a trustee's deed conveyed the property to a beneficiary. The court of appeals subsequently reversed the entry of summary judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the superior court's entry of summary judgment against BT, holding that the case was rendered moot when the property was purchased by the beneficiary at the third trustee's sale in 2010. View "BT Capital, LLC v. TD Serv. Co. of Ariz." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Barbara McDermott appealed a district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Kevin Pifer when the court concluded that Defendant's mother Dorothy Bevan, validly gifted Plaintiff an option to purchase land. In 2001, Ms. Bevan executed a durable power of attorney in favor of Plaintiff who was a distant relative. Thereafter, Plaintiff assisted Bevan with managing her farmland and performing miscellaneous other tasks. Ms. Bevan granted Plaintiff the option to purchase that land in 2004. Ms. Bevan died in 2010, and Plaintiff recorded a notice of his intent to exercise the option. Defendant rejected the attached cashier's check, questioning Ms. Bevan's capacity to execute the purchase option agreement. Plaintiff subsequently sued for specific performance of the purchase option. The district court granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment, concluding the purchase option agreement was valid and enforceable. In its judgment, the district court stated, "This Judgment shall be final for appeal purposes, and there is no just reason for delay." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court inappropriately certified the partial summary judgment under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court abused its discretion in directing an entry of final judgment. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and directed the district court to vacate its portion of the partial summary judgment certifying the judgment as final. View "Pifer v. McDermott" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, appointed the Trust Company of Virginia (TCVA) as conservator of property owned by Amy Falcon Morris when that court declared Ms. Morris to be incapacitated in 2008. Ms. Morris died in 2011 in Alabama, and her will was admitted to probate in the Montgomery County Probate Court. The probate court entered orders compelling TCVA to turn over funds in the conservancy estate to the estate opened in the probate court and enjoining TCVA from expending funds without prior approval. TCVA moved to vacate those orders, and the probate court denied the motion. TCVA then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ to direct the probate court to vacate those orders on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to enter those orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in this case a writ of mandamus was the appropriate remedy by which to order a vacatur of the probate court's orders. Furthermore, because TCVA was not properly served with process or provided adequate notice of the proceeding before the probate court, the Supreme Court directed the probate court to vacate the contested orders concerning the assets to which TCVA was conservator. View "In re: Estate of Amy F. Morris" on Justia Law

This matter involved allegations of breach of duty made by a common stockholder of a Delaware statutory trust against the trustee of that trust, as well as claims by the stockholder against those entities she alleged aided and abetted the breach. Plaintiff failed to make a pre-suit demand against defendant trustees, who she conceded were independent and disinterested when they took the actions complained of. The court found that plaintiff's claims were derivative and not direct. To survive a motion to dismiss in these circumstances under Section 3816 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (DSTA), 12 Del. C. 3816, a plaintiff must plead particularized facts raising a reasonable doubt that the actions of the trustees were taken honestly and in good faith. Because a careful reading of the complaint disclosed that plaintiff failed to so plead, her complaint must be dismissed. View "Protas v. Cavanagh, et al." on Justia Law

After witnessing Blair Hamilton accidentally kill himself in October 2009, Lyndon Hart in August 2011 filed a petition to extend time to file a creditor's claim against Hamilton's Estate for the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the actions of Hamilton. The circuit court denied the petition. Hart appealed and served his notice of appeal only on the Estate's attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Estate's motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to serve notice of appeal on all the heirs was denied, as in this case, the heirs were not parties in a creditor's claim against an estate; and (2) because Hart did not present or file a claim, the Court could not reach the merits of Hart's argument on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to extend time to file a creditor's claim. View "In re Estate of Hamilton" on Justia Law

Michael Joyce, who was frequently exposed to airborne asbestos while working, died of lung cancer. His last documented exposure to asbestos dust was while working for Commercial Welding. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer later awarded the estate of Joyce benefits on a petition for an award of compensation and ordered benefits paid to Mary Joyce, Michael's widow, on a petition for death benefits. Commercial Welding appealed the hearing officer's decision as well as the hearing officer's determinations that (1) it had not cured a previously established violation of the Board's "fourteen-day-rule" because it had not paid interest on the required payment imposed for the violation, and (2) it was not permitted to offset the amount of the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary by the amount of the payment for the fourteen-day rule violation. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the hearing officer's decision. The Court (1) disagreed with the hearing officer's decision that interest was due on the required payment to the Estate, but (2) agreed that the required payment amount could not be used to offset the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary. View "Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from the tragic death of a teenager Ashlie Bunch. Ashlie’s adoptive father, Steven Bunch (Bunch) brought an action under RCW 4.24.010, against the treatment center where Ashlie committed suicide, McGraw Residential Center. Ashley’s adoptive mother, Amy Kozel, sought to join the lawsuit as a necessary party under CR 19(a). The superior court denied Kozel’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding that Kozel satisfied statutory standing requirements and CR 19(a), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr." on Justia Law

The Estate appealed the Tax Court's decision that it owed additional estate taxes. At issue was whether gift taxes paid by the donee trustees of a Qualifying Terminable Interest in Property (QTIP) trust, based on a 26 U.S.C. 2519 deemed inter vivos transfer of the QTIP property within three years of the donor's death, must be included in the transferor's gross estate under the so-called "gross-up rule" of section 2035(b). The court held that it did. Therefore, the court held that the decedent paid the gift tax on the section 2519 transfers of the Residual Trusts and her estate should be increased under the gross-up rule by the value of the gifts paid. View "Estate of Anne W. Morgens v. CIR" on Justia Law