Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A circuit court found Appellant David Cannon in contempt of court for violating (1) an order mandating that Appellant give up all authority and cease all activities relating to the James Brown estate, the Brown trusts, and all Brown entities (which he violated by filing amended tax returns without authority); and (2) an order requiring Cannon to pay back money he had misappropriated from Brown's estate. The circuit court ordered Appellant to be incarcerated for six months for contempt. However, the circuit court stated Appellant could purge himself of the contempt "by the payment of the aforementioned [money, with a portion] to be applied towards the payment of attorneys' fees incurred by the various parties, and the payment of a fine." The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings; upholding all of the circuit court's findings regarding the contempt except for the amount awarded towards attorneys' fees and the imposition of the fine. The Court of Appeals found the circuit court abused its discretion as to attorneys' fees because it did not make the necessary factual findings to support the amount awarded, so it "reverse[d] and remand[ed] the issue of attorneys' fees to the circuit court for findings of fact as to the proper amount. On remand, the circuit court held a hearing for the sole purpose of making findings of fact regarding the proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for reimbursing the parties for attorneys' time related to the issue of Appellant's contemptuous conduct, and held that Appellant should pay. Appellant appealed this order, arguing payment of fees was mooted by his serving his jail sentence. The case was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant pay attorneys' fees. Further, the Court held that the issue of attorneys' fees was not mooted by Appellant serving his jail sentence. View "Ex parte: Cannon v. Estate of James Brown" on Justia Law

Janice and Steven Dunwoody were divorced pursuant to a divorce judgment entered in the district court. Steven filed a motion to clarify the divorce judgment, seeking to establish a life insurance trust as provided in the agreement. The district court issued an order clarifying the original divorce judgment by ordering that the trust be established and ordering the cash surrender value of Steven's life insurance policy to be evenly split between Steven and Janice after their youngest child reached the age of twenty-three. Steven appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court improperly disposed of omitted property - the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy - within the purview of a motion to clarify. Remanded. View "Dunwoody v. Dunwoody" on Justia Law

An eastbound driver (Shawn Mickelsen) attempted to make an illegal left turn into a restaurant's exit driveway. The eastbound driver collided with an oncoming westbound driver, killing the westbound driver. The decedent's estate sued the restaurant for wrongful death, arguing that the restaurant was negligent in creating a dangerous condition on its land and failing to take steps to make the condition safe, for example, by warning eastbound drivers not to use the exit driveway in this manner. The superior court dismissed the complaint, holding that the restaurant had no duty to guard against risks created by the conduct of third parties. Because the complaint, read liberally, stated a cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the superior court and remanded for further proceedings: "[i]t may yet be proper for the superior court to dismiss Mickelsen's claim on summary judgment, or it may be that the case must go to trial. But Mickelsen's claim cannot be dismissed as a matter of law based on [the restaurant's] owing no duty of care to passing motorists allegedly endangered by the artificial conditions on [its] property." View "Estate of Shawn Martin Mickelsen v. North-Wend Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Three appellate proceedings were consolidated for a single Supreme Court opinion. All three cases appealed the dismissal of their respective cases from the Etowah Circuit Court. The Appellants all sued Donald Stewart individually and as the trustee of the Abernathy Trust and the Abernathy Trust Foundation, in a line of cases arising out of a toxic tort action against Monsanto Company, its parent corporation and a spin-off. The Monsanto Corporations manufactured and disposed of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). A jury found the corporations liable on claims of wantonness, outrage, "suppression of the truth," negligence and public nuisance. After 500 trials on damages, the parties reached a settlement in 2003. $21 million was placed into a trust (the Abernathy Trust) established to pay health and education benefits for those Plaintiffs who qualified for assistance. Each plaintiff signed a retainer agreement and received and cashed his or her settlement check. Plaintiffs in this case challenged the settlement agreement and the award of attorneys fees. Further, they asked for a trust accounting regarding the use of the settlement funds. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the cases that asked for an accounting of the use of the trust's funds; one case was dismissed as moot; in the third case, the Court granted a writ of mandamus as to all portions of a circuit court order that sought review of the Abernathy trust document as compared to the terms of the settlement agreement. The circuit court was directed to lift any freeze of distributions from the trust. View "Bates v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned a will contest brought by Petitioner-Appellant Tanya Wooden on the basis that the Last Will and Testament of Kathleen R. Conway was executed without testamentary capacity and under the undue influence of W. Cecil Martin, Conway's son, guardian, and a will beneficiary. The magistrate court denied Petitioner's claims, and the district court affirmed on appeal. Because the Court found the magistrate court was presented with substantial and competent evidence on which to base its decision, it affirmed the district court’s appellate decision. View "RE: The Estate of Kathleen R. Conway " on Justia Law

Defendant was the wife of Kenneth Otto, who was convicted of the murder of Shamaia Smith. Before his conviction, Otto transferred title to certain property to Defendant. Otto and Defendant subsequently received a judgment of dissolution, which included a division of the marital property. During a hearing in the wrongful death action filed by the estate of Smith against Otto, the trial court found that Smith's estate was a creditor of Otto and that the transfer of Otto's assets to Defendant was fraudulent. Plaintiff, administratrix of Smith's estate, filed an action against Defendant pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with an application for a prejudgment remedy. The trial court concluded that there was probable cause to show that the assets transferred from Otto to Defendant through the dissolution action were fraudulent transfers and awarded Plaintiff a prejudgment remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under the Act; (2) the trial court's determination that the dissolution action was undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Smith's estate was proper; and (3) the trial court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because it could grant practical relief under the Act. View "Canty v. Otto" on Justia Law

Nina and her brother Eddie Russell were co-trustees of several family trusts. The trust estate consisted of the interests held by Nina and Eddie as co-trustees in Russell Realty Associates (RRA), which was created by the siblings' father. Nina and Russell disagreed about several matters and conflicts escalated. Eventually, Eddie, individually and as co-trustee, filed a complaint seeking judicial dissolution and winding up of RRA. The circuit court granted Eddie's complaint for dissolution, finding that the economic purpose of RRA was likely to be reasonably frustrated and that the business could no longer practicably operate in conformity with the partnership agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's findings. View "Russell Realty Assocs. v. Russell" on Justia Law

When Arvid and Lucy Keith were married, Arvid had a son from a previous marriage, Walter Keith (Keith), and Lucy had a daughter, Veronica Lulofs (Lulofs). Arvid and Lucy executed wills in 1987 that were mirror images of each other. Each will left the estate first to the surviving spouse and then to Keith and Lulofs equally. Arvid died in 1996 and his estate passed to Lucy. Lucy then executed a new will 1996 in which she left the entirety of her estate to Lulofs and made no provision for Keith. After Lucy's death, Lulofs attempted to probate Lucy's will, which Keith challenged. The trial court concluded that Keith failed to provide that the 1987 wills executed by Arvid and Lucy were irrevocable, reciprocal wills and accepted Lucy's 1996 will for probate, entering judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in holding that (1) the wills did not form an irrevocable contract between the testators; and (2) Keith's testimony presenting circumstantial evidence that Arvid and Lucy intended for the wills to be contracts was not corroborated as required by the Dead Man's statute. View "Keith v. Lulofs" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died in 1993, leaving an estate of more than $28 million to his wife, Helen Nassif, and his two children. Instead of receiving her bequest in the will, Nassif elected to take a statutory share of the estate. The personal representative, Carlton Green, the decedent's son, litigated a number of issues against Nassif. Green filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court before distributing Nassif's elective share. The court ruled in his favor. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, holding, inter alia, that (1) "enforceable claims," as used in Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 1-101(n), means claims that in fact reduce the assets in the estate or are allowed by the court; (2) assets in a spouse's elective share are valued, when paid in kind by legatees, as of the date of distribution, and when paid in cash as of the date of the spouse's election to take a statutory share; and (3) ordinarily, and under the circumstances here, legatees cannot exercise the option to pay a spouse's elective share in cash thirteen years after the decedent's death. View "Green v. Nassif" on Justia Law

Several years after Decedent died and his will was probated, Plaintiffs, Decedent's three children, filed a verified complaint against Defendants, two of the trustees named by Decedent to manage and control Decedent's trust estate. The complaint alleged breach of fiduciary duty and negligence for failing to transfer ownership of two businesses to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also filed a probate appeal. The superior court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss both the Plaintiffs' probate appeal and their verified complaint. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment to the extent that it dismissed two of the children's probate appeal, as it was not perfected, and the Plaintiffs' verified complaint, as it was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) vacated the judgment insofar as it dismissed one of the children's probate appeal because he was the only plaintiff to properly file an appeal in the superior court. View "Mendes v. Factor" on Justia Law