Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a dispute over the ownership of the land upon which a boardwalk and dock was constructed by the deceased. At issue was whether plaintiff estate established that its decedent acquired title to a certain parcel of land by adverse possession. The court held that the evidence that the deceased possessed, used, and controlled the disputed land for the 21 years prior to and including 1984 was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession and grant summary judgment in plaintiff estate's favor. The court need not determine whether it acquired title to the disputed property pursuant to the doctrine of practical location. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed. View "Estate of Becker v Murtagh" on Justia Law

ACS and FKI appealed the district court's decision to dismiss their suit for equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B), for lack of jurisdiction. ACS and FKI argued that the district court: (1) erroneously interpreted two Supreme Court cases as requiring dismissal of their claims; (2) abused its discretion in denying their motion for a default judgment against one of the defendants; (3) should have concluded that Chapter 142 of the Texas Property Code was preempted by ERISA; and (4) should have deferred to the FKI Plan administrator's determination of liability. Pursuant to the three-part test in Bombardier Aerospace Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot, & Wansbrough, the court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the ERISA claims against Larry Griffin, Judith Griffith, Willie Earl Griffin (the Trustee), and the Larry Griffin Special Needs Trust for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court found it unnecessary to address the remaining arguments. View "ACS Recovery Services, Inc., et al. v. Griffin, et al." on Justia Law

Pooled Advocate Trust, Inc. (PATI), the managing corporation for a Medicaid pooled trust, brought a declaratory judgment action on Medicaid eligibility issues associated with the trust and named the South Dakota Department of Social Services (DSS) as a necessary party. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment for PATI. Fred and Gladys Matthews transferred assets to the pooled trust. When the Matthews subsequently applied for Medicaid long-term care benefits, DSS imposed a penalty period because they were over age sixty-five at the time of the transfers. PATI petitioned for further relief, seeking a declaration that DSS could not impose penalty periods for transfers made by pooled trust beneficiaries age sixty-five or older. The circuit court granted PATI's petition. The Matthews also appealed DSS's application of a penalty period, but an ALJ upheld the decision and another circuit court affirmed. DSS appealed the circuit court's order granting PATI's petition and the Matthews appealed the other circuit court's affirmance of the ALJ's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the administrative appeal and reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that transfers of assets into pooled trusts by beneficiaries age sixty-five or older may be subject to a transfer penalty period for Medicaid eligibility purposes. View "In re Pooled Advocate Trust" on Justia Law

Trustee sought an order allowing him to remove the life tenant (Defendant) from property owned by the trust. The probate court issued an order in conformity with Trustee's petition after Defendant was defaulted for failing to appear. Defendant filed a complaint in superior court purportedly appealing from the decision of the probate court. The trial justice concluded that Defendant had failed to comply with the requirements for filing a claim of appeal from the probate court and granted Trustee's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Defendant's appeal for failure to comply with every relevant provision of the statute governing appeals from the probate court, and therefore, the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "Ims v. Audette" on Justia Law

A circuit court dismissed Plaintiff Jimmy Steven Fowler Jr.'s wrongful-death action for failing to timely serve presuit notice on the defendants as required by Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36(15) (Rev. 2003). The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that: (1) he presented evidence which raised a presumption of timely presuit notice; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for reconsideration; and (3) the defendants, John Paul White, M.D., Marilyn Lehman, R.N., and The Sanctuary Hospice House, Inc. (collectively, Sanctuary), waived the affirmative defense of lack of presuit notice because they failed to timely pursue the defense while actively participating in the litigation. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding the trial court's finding that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a presumption of presuit notice was supported by substantial evidence. The trial court was within its discretion in denying Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. And Plaintiff's waiver argument was procedurally barred because he raised it for the first time on appeal. View "Fowler v. White" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) provided Medicaid benefits for Virginia Lee Cushing during the final years of her life. After her death, DHHS filed a claim against Cushing's estate for recovery of the benefits pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 68-919. The personal representative of the estate appealed from an order of the county court allowing the claim and awarding interest. At issue on appeal was whether DHHS timely presented its claim and, if so, whether it was proved as a matter of law. The Supreme Court concluded the claim was both timely presented and proved as a matter of law but modified the award of interest. View "In re Estate of Cushing" on Justia Law

The property at issue in this case was the interest of Respondent, the judgment debtor, in a spendthrift trust. The district court issued a temporary injunction prohibiting Respondent from disposing of any money or property he had received, was due to receive, or will receive from the trust. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on its plain language, Minn. Stat. 575.05 authorizes a district court to enjoin the deposition of a judgment debtor's property only if that property is in the hands of the judgment debtor or a third party or is due to the judgment debtor at the time the district court issues its order; and (2) because the judgment creditor, Appellant Fannie Mae, did not argue that Respondent's interest in the trust was Grossman's property that was currently in the hands of Grossman or a third party or currently due to Grossman, the requirements of section 575.05 were not met. View "Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant William McNamara appealed a district court order distributing the undistributed assets of the estate of Edith Harms. The district court determined Edith Harms' will required the undistributed assets be distributed to the estate of Arne Harms. William McNamara argued the district court erred by considering the terms of the will because a prior agreement controlled. Alternatively, Petitioner argued the district court's interpretation of Edith Harms' will was erroneous, contending that will directed the undistributed assets be distributed to the Edith Harms testamentary trust. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly determined the prior agreement did not control but erred in its interpretation of Edith Harms' will. The Court reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the matter of the Estate of Harms" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Eaton appealed the denial of his motion for payment of legal fees, arguing that the Cheshire County Probate Court erred in finding that the imposition of a guardianship does not require the proposed ward to pay a good-faith petitioner's attorney's fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the probate court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re Guardianship of Mary Louise Eaton " on Justia Law

Insured held a life insurance policy issued as part of a federal employee benefit plan. When Insured divorced from his first wife, the divorce decree and property settlement required Insured (1) to maintain the life insurance policy, and (2) to designate the first wife and their grandchildren as equal beneficiaries. Subsequently, Insured remarried, designated his second wife as the sole beneficiary to the life insurance policy, and increased the insurance coverage. Insured and second wife later divorced. When Insured died, the second wife remained the sole beneficiary on the life insurance policy. The first wife and grandchildren filed suit, asserting equitable claims over the life insurance proceeds. The trial court granted summary judgment to the second wife, determining that federal employee benefit law preempted the equitable state law claims and that the policy proceeds accordingly belonged to the second wife. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act did not preempt the equitable claims and that the first wife and grandchildren were entitled to a constructive trust over at least a portion of the proceeds. Remanded. View "Hardy v. Hardy" on Justia Law