Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Debtors appeal the judgment of the bankruptcy court denying in part their motion under 11 U.S.C. 522(f)(1) to avoid certain liens held by the Estate of Leon Jerome Heimer. The court held that the amount the Heimer estate advanced to pay off the loans secured by the bank's lien against debtors' vehicles was not secured by a judicial lien. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment. View "Carter, et al. v. Estate of Leon J. Heimer" on Justia Law

This case arose when debtors inherited an IRA worth $170,000. When debtors filed for bankruptcy, they sought to exempt the inherited IRA from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(12). The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the exemption, arguing that inherited IRAs did not qualify for exemption under section 522(d)(12). After the bankruptcy court ruled for the trustee, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court. Because the court held that inherited IRAs were exempt from the bankruptcy estate, upon de novo review, pursuant to section 522(d)(12), the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Chilton, et al. v. Moser" on Justia Law

Janice Willis executed a general warranty deed reserving a life estate in her home for herself and conveying the remainder to her Eddie in fee simple. While Janice was still alive, Eddie died, and his interest passed to his children. Janice subsequently sought reformation of the deed based on unilateral mistake of the grantor in the absence of fraud. The trial judge granted a directed verdict for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that, under Crawford v. Willoughby and its progeny, reformation of a deed was unavailable as a remedy in this case. View "Willis v. Willis" on Justia Law

Two beneficiaries of the Moncur Revocable Family Trust petitioned the trial court to remove the co-trustees of the Trust on the grounds that the co-trustees violated various fiduciary duties. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding (1) the co-trustees did not violate their fiduciary duties by using a surrogate bidder to purchase Trust property at a public auction without obtaining permission from the beneficiaries, and by holding the Trust real property auction after an auction to dispose of personal property held in the Trust; and (2) the remaining allegations that the co-trustees breached their fiduciary duties were without merit. View "In re Estate of Moncur" on Justia Law

Certain remainder beneficiaries of the Florence Y. Wallbaum Revocable Living Trust petitioned the trial court to interpret the terms of the trust and to determine whether the trustee breached its fiduciary duties. The trial court (1) found the Trust was ambiguous; (2) after considering extrinsic evidence, found that the settler of the trust, Florence Wallbaum, intended for the trustee to use trust principal to maintain the Wallbaum residence; and (3) ruled the trustee did not breach its fiduciary duties in administering the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding (1) the Trust was ambiguous; (2) Florence intended Trust principal to be used to maintain the Wallbaum residence; and (3) the trustee did not violate any fiduciary duties. View "In re Wallbaum Living Trust" on Justia Law

Ira B. Warne executed a partial revocation of and amendment to the Ira B. Warne family protection trust, the purpose of which was to terminate the interest of one of Ira's sons, Thomas Warne, who had been designated as a beneficiary in the original trust instrument. On summary judgment, the district court (1) invalidated the partial revocation based on the Supreme Court's holding in Bans v. Means; and (2) held that Thomas was entitled to one-half of the personal property of Ira's estate pursuant to the distribution provisions of Ira's will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the partial revocation complied with Utah Code 75-7-605, which statutorily overruled the holding in Banks; and (2) the distribution of Ira's personal property was governed by the terms of the trust, rather than by Ira's will, and therefore the district court erred in awarding Thomas one-half of that property. Remanded for consideration of whether Ira's partial revocation was a product of undue influence. View "Warne v. Warne" on Justia Law

This case involved fifteen years of litigation relating to two testamentary trusts. Plaintiff Veronica Baumgardner McKee Arrington (Arrington), claimed that the trustee of both trusts, William Ready, mismanaged the trusts' property, improperly allocated the trusts' funds, and wrongfully refused to render an accounting of the trusts' assets. The Chancery Court of Lauderdale County found that the trustee had acted properly and within his discretion in managing the trusts and that the trustee should not be required to render an accounting. Aggrieved, Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Chancery Court. "A chancellor’s factual findings will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." If Plaintiff's assertions were correct, then almost $225,000 difference between the chancellor's total and Plaintiff's purported total amounts to an abuse of discretion by the court. The Supreme Court noted that it was unclear from the record how Plaintiff arrived at her allegations. Accordingly, the Court found find that upon remand, a formal accounting of the decedent's expenses should be conducted and that her conservatorship should be reimbursed for any expenses relating to her care and maintenance. View "In The Matter of the Estate of Baumgardner" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Sherry Jensen (formerly known as Sherry Nesemeier), appealed a district court order that denied her motion to construe the phrase "personal property" in her father Eugene Camas's will to include tangible and intangible property located in his residence, and that denied her motion for formal probate with supervised administration. Petitioner moved for formal probate with supervised administration, alleging it was necessary to protect her interests because her brother Kevin Camas intended to distribute only nominal items of tangible personal property to her. Petitioner also moved for an order construing the phrase "personal property" in the bequest to her to include tangible and intangible property located in her father's home. The district court found the language of Eugene Camas's will unambiguously limited "personal property" to tangible personal property physically located within the residence. The district court determined the will's residuary clause demonstrated Eugene Camas's intent to bequeath all other types of property to Kevin Camas. The court also found formal or supervised administration of the estate was unnecessary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error with the district court's holding and affirmed denial of both of Petitioner's motions. View "Estate of Camas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Donna Morris brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for unlawful arrest and excessive force on behalf of her deceased husband, William Morris III, against Defendants Officer Jaime Noe and the City of Sapulpa, Oklahoma. She alleged Defendants violated her husband's rights when Noe forceably arrested him and caused him injury. Defendant Noe moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied his motion. Defendant Noe then appealed. Finding that Mr. Morris "posed no threat to Noe or others," and that the officer had reason to believe Mr. Morris was "at most, a misdemeanant," the Tenth Circuit held Defendant was not entitled to qualified to immunity on either of Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Morris v. Noe" on Justia Law

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether that court erred in determining that the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiff's "complaint for breach of contract" in this litigation involving the ultimate distribution of plaintiff's father's estate. The court concluded that res judicata was a bar to the present suit where plaintiff's restyling of her complaint in terms of a breach of contract theory of recovery did not revive her cause of action for fraud that was defeated on appeal from a summary judgment ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Crowe v. Elder" on Justia Law