Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether that court erred in determining that the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiff's "complaint for breach of contract" in this litigation involving the ultimate distribution of plaintiff's father's estate. The court concluded that res judicata was a bar to the present suit where plaintiff's restyling of her complaint in terms of a breach of contract theory of recovery did not revive her cause of action for fraud that was defeated on appeal from a summary judgment ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Crowe v. Elder" on Justia Law

The Bank of New York Mellon, acting in its capacity as trustee of trusts established to hold residential mortgage-backed securities, settled claims that the originator and servicer breached obligations owed to the trusts. Then, as a condition precedent to the settlement, the Bank initiated an Article 77 proceeding in New York Supreme Court to confirm that it had the authority to enter into the settlement under the governing trust documents and that entry into the settlement did not violate its duties under the governing trust agreements. On appeal from an order of the district court denying petitioners' motion to remand the proceeding to New York Supreme Court, the court considered the application of 28 U.S.C. 1453(d)(3) and 1332(d)(9)(C), exceptions to the federal jurisdiction conferred by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub.L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. The court held that the case fell within CAFA's securities exception as one that solely involved a claim that "related to the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to" a security. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, reversed the order of the district court, and instructed it to vacate its decision and order and remanded the matter to state court. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Walnut Place LLC" on Justia Law

Lisa Mullins, the widow and administrator of the estate of Charles Mullins, filed a complaint against Appellants, a doctor and a medical facility, alleging negligence in the treatment of Charles that resulted in his death. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate. The court of appeals remanded the matter, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on Lisa's alleged contributory negligence and denying Appellants' motion for a new trial. On remand, Lisa filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge sitting in the court of common pleas from retrying the issue of the medical negligence of Appellants at a second jury trial. The court of appeals granted the writ to prevent the judge from retrying the negligence issue in the case against Appellants. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that the court erred in determining that a retrial of the negligence claim against Appellants patently and unambiguously violated the court's mandate in the prior appeal. View "State ex rel. Mullins v. Court of Common Pleas (Curran)" on Justia Law

Dean Durand crashed his Ford Bronco into a motorcycle driven by Daniel Gutierrez, ultimately resulting in Gutierrez's death. Defendant admitted that while at the business establishment operated by Defendant Meteor Monument, L.L.C., he had consumed seven twelve-ounce cans of beer and a twenty-four-ounce can of malt liquor. He also testified that he ingested heroin and crack cocaine shortly before the accident. Gutierrez's estate and family successfully sued both Durand and Meteor for Gutierrez's wrongful death. Only the verdict against Meteor was at issue in this appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to find that it was reasonably apparent to Meteor that Durand was intoxicated at the time he was last served alcohol. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in holding that Meteor was on notice that the negligent supervision claim included Durand as an employee. In addition, "scope of employment" may be a factor in a negligent supervision claim; both Gutierrez and Meteor requested a scope-of-employment instruction and agreed with the trial court's answers to the jury questions regarding that instruction. As a result, that error was invited, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Meteor's motion for a new trial. The Court remanded the case for the appellate court to address an unresolved issue regarding punitive damages. View "Estate of Gutierrez v. Meteor Monument, LLC" on Justia Law

Lee Paulson's mother and siblings appealed a district court's orders that interpreted his will in favor of his fiancee, Robyn Risovi, denied a motion for reconsideration, and order distribution of his estate. Lee Paulson and Risovi were engaged to be married, with a wedding set for July 18, 2009. On June 26, 2009, Lee Paulson and Risovi executed an antenuptial agreement. The antenuptial agreement contained several terms: an agreement by Lee Paulson to name Risovi as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, an agreement by Lee Paulson that his will would transfer specific real property to Risovi, and an agreement by Lee Paulson to establish a testamentary trust for the benefit of Risovi's daughter. On the same date, Lee Paulson executed a will. The will established the trust for Risovi's daughter, devised real property to "my wife, Robyn," bequeathed all of his tangible personal property to "my spouse, Robyn," if she survived him, and devised his residuary estate to "my spouse, if my spouse survives me[.]" Article Six of the will outlined the definitions governing the will, and provided, "My spouse's name is Robyn Risovi and all references in this Will to 'my spouse' are to her only." A footnote followed this statement: "This Will has been prepared in anticipation of the upcoming marriage of . . . Lee Paulson and Robyn Risovi set for July 18, 2009." Lee Paulson died on July 15, 2009. The district court declined to read the antenuptial agreement together with the will to determine Lee Paulson's testamentary intent, as encouraged by the Paulson family, because the antenuptial agreement was not incorporated into the will by reference. The Paulson family appealed, and the appeal was remanded to determine if the estate was supervised. After further review, the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's interpretation of the will in favor or Risovi. View "Estate of Paulson" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Philip Sprague appealed an order that denied his petition for formal probate of a will allegedly executed by Harriet O. Clemetson. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly applied the law by presuming that a missing will is revoked, and because the lower court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, it affirmed the order. View "Estate of Clemetson" on Justia Law

Respondents-Appellants Brian Wicklund and Deborah Williams, the surviving children of Maurice Wicklund, appealed an order that granted a petition by Maurice Wicklund's surviving spouse, Petitioner-Appellee Betty Wicklund, for an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from Maurice Wicklund's estate. The surviving children claimed their father intended to transfer North Dakota mineral interests to them under a will and Trust agreement, and they argued the district court erred in failing to address issues relating to their father's intent and erred in granting the surviving spouse an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from his estate. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's decision effectuated Maurice Wicklund's intent from the plain language of his will and the Trust, but the court's findings were inadequate to explain the bases for granting Betty Wicklund an elective share, administration costs, and personal representative fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Wicklund" on Justia Law

The State and Testator's heirs disputed Testator's $3 million estate. Testator, by way of a handwritten will, attempted to disinherit all of his heirs but was unsuccessful in otherwise affirmatively devising his estate. The district court (1) determined that Testator's handwritten will was a valid testamentary instrument that revoked his earlier will, and (2) applied the common law, deeming Testator's disinheritance clause unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) deeming the disinheritance clause unenforceable, as Nev. Rev. Stat. 132.370 abolishes the common law rules that would otherwise render a testator's disinheritance clause unenforceable in these circumstances; (2) determining that Nev. Rev. Stat. 132.130 precludes the doctrine of dependent relative revocation but did not err in determining that it was inapplicable under the facts of this case; and (3) determining that Testator's estate did not escheat, as escheat was triggered under the facts of this case. View "In re Estate of Melton" on Justia Law

J.C. and Betty Lockhart owned a life estate in an undivided one-fourth interest in 160 acres in Monroe County, Mississippi. After the death of J.C., Betty Lockhart filed a complaint to partition by public sale the land that she shared with her in-laws, Bolin and Orene Hamilton. The Hamiltons also owned a life estate in the same property, and they maintained the property as their homestead. Additionally, Lockhart sued Richard and Peggy Collins, who have a future interest in the property as remaindermen. The trial court dismissed Lockhart's petition, and Lockhart appealed. Because Lockhart failed to meet the statutory requisites for a partition sale, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's ruling. View "Lockhart v. Collins" on Justia Law

In a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, a question arose concerning the application of the Commonwealth's homestead protection statute, G.L.c. 188, section 1, to a beneficiary of a trust. Finding no controlling precedent in the court's decisions, the Bankruptcy Court judge certified the following question: "May the holder of a beneficial interest in a trust which holds title to real estate and attendant dwelling in which such beneficiary resides acquire an estate of homestead in said land and building under G.L.c. 188, section 1?" The court confined its answer to the 2004 version of the homestead statute and answered the certified question in the negative. The court rejected the debtor's claims and concluded that even though the debtor resided in the Lowell property and used it as her home, as the owner of a fifty percent beneficial interest in the trust that holds to the property but who did not direct or control the trustee, she could not validly claim a homestead exemption for the property under the 2004 act. View "Boyle v. Weiss" on Justia Law