Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Lorraine Flaws died testate but was predeceased by her named beneficiaries. Because Flaws' will did not designate contingent beneficiaries, the administration of her estate was governed by the laws of intestate succession. Prior to a hearing to determine heirs, a motion for partial summary judgment was filed claiming that Lorraine's niece, who was born to Lorraine's brother out of wedlock, did not have standing under the pertinent statutes to assert that she was an heir of the estate. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the niece did not comply with S.D. Codified Laws 29A-2-114, which sets forth the methods and time limits an individual born out of wedlock must comply with in order to establish parentage for purposes of intestate succession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a question remained as to whether Yvette failed to comply with any of the methods and time limits in the statute for establishing paternity. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Flaws" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Buhrman, the sole trustee of the Clifton Pike Family Trust, a testamentary trust established under Clifton Pike's will, appealed the decision of the probate court granting the petition of the two adult children of Clifton and Doris Pike to combine the assets of Doris's estate into Clifton's trust, terminate both parents' trusts, and direct that the assets be distributed. At issue was whether a spendthrift provision precluded the termination of the trusts. The Supreme Court affirmed after noting that a trust may be terminated early when its purpose has been accomplished or when there is no good reason for the trust to continue, holding that Buhrman failed to meet his burden that the spendthrift provision was a material purpose of the trust. View "In re Pike Family Trusts" on Justia Law

William J. Mason appealed the probate court's order denying his petition to probate the will of Frances E. Hobbs. At issue was whether the petitioner proved that the will was properly executed or that the signature to the will was in Mrs. Hobbs' handwriting. The court held that, because the trial court did not err in concluding that the petitioner failed to prove that the document was the will of Frances E. Hobbs, the judgment was affirmed. View "Mason v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The current beneficiary of several discretionary trusts brought claims of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against the trustee and her lawyers. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing because she did not allege a likelihood that the trusts' corpus were insufficient to pay her discretionary distributions. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Looking to Illinois law, the court reasoned that plaintiff has an equitable interest in the trust property that gives her standing to enforce the trusts. There is a fiduciary relationship between her and the trustee that gives rise to equitable remedies. View "Scanlan v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law

This case concerned a family dispute over ownership of what had been the family home in Woburn. At issue was whether a party could establish that she lacked the capacity to contract, thus making the contract voidable by her, in the absence of evidence that she suffered from a medically diagnosed, long-standing mental illness or defect. The court concluded that its evolving standard of contractual incapacity did not in all cases require proof that a party's claimed mental illness or defect was of some significant duration or that it was permanent, progressive, or degenerative; but, without medical evidence or expert testimony that the mental condition interfered with the party's understanding of the transaction, or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence would not be sufficient to support a conclusion of incapacity. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to support a determination of incapacity where Susan, among other things, understood at the time that she was participating in a mediation to discuss settlement of the lawsuit, was aware that the subject of the mediation was to resolve the dispute regarding the family home, participated in the mediation, and listened to the arguments of counsel. Therefore, the court vacated the motion judge's order and remanded for entry of an order enforcing the settlement agreement. View "Sparrow v. Demonico & another" on Justia Law

After the decedent's death, the decedent's daughter probated her 2008 will and qualified as executor for the will. The decedent's remaining children sued the daughter to challenge the will. The trial court ruled that the 2008 will had been impeached and Decedent's 2007 will should proceed to probate, holding (1) Decedent lacked testamentary capacity when she executed her contested will, and (2) the contested will was the result of undue influence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred where (1) the trial court's decision that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity was based on an incorrect view of the law and an improper weighing of the evidence; and (2) the evidence in this case rebutted the presumption of undue influence. Remanded. View "Weedon v. Weedon" on Justia Law

Judy Maretta, as the named beneficiary of a Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy, received FEGLI benefits upon the death of her ex-husband. Jacqueline Hillman, the widow of the deceased, filed an action against Maretta, claiming that pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 20-111.1(D), Maretta was liable to her for the death benefits received. Maretta claimed that the state law was preempted by 5 U.S.C. 8705 and 8705 because the state statutes granted FEGLI benefits to someone other than the named beneficiary in violation of FEGLIA's terms. The circuit court concluded that section 20-111.1(D) was not preempted by FEGLIA and entered judgment against Maretta. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Maretta, holding that because Congress intended for FEGLI benefits to be paid and to belong to a designated beneficiary, FEGLIA preempts section 20-111.1(D). View "Maretta v. Hillman" on Justia Law

John McGee (Jack) appealed the grant of summary judgment and a judgment as a matter of law in favor of his brother Willis McGee individually and in his capacity as executor of their mother Elizabeth's estate. Wills appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees when his brother contested their mother's will. Shortly after Willis presented the will for probate, Jack filed suit to contest the will. He claimed it was not executed as required by law, Mrs. McGee lacked testamentary capacity, and that the will was the product of undue influence. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Willis on all counts of Jack's complaint except the undue-influence count, which was tried to a jury. However, at the close of Jack's case, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law (JML) in favor of Willis on that count, "with leave for [Willis] to prove reasonable costs and fees." Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed part, and reversed part of the trial court's decision. The Court found that Jack presented no credible evidence to support any ground upon which he challenged his mother's will. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court erred in refusing to award Willis fees and costs. The Court remanded the case with regard to an issue of whether Jack converted certain items from his mother's estate prior to her death, but in all other respects, affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "McGee v. McGee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and as personal representative of the estate of George D. Knutkowski, asserted claims against defendant, the decedent's widow, for, among other things, failing to repay two loans that decedent made to defendant. Defendant filed an answer denying that she had failed to repay any loans but did not raise any other defenses to the loan claims. Defendant subsequently moved to amend her answer to add the statue of limitations, laches, and waiver as affirmative defenses to the loan claims. The Master in Chancery granted that motion in a Final Report and plaintiff filed exceptions to the Final Report. The court held that the Master correctly exercised his discretion in allowing the amendment. Therefore, plaintiff's exceptions to that decision were denied. Plaintiff's exception to the Master's decision not to award him the attorney's fees and costs he incurred in opposing the amendment was also denied. View "Knutkowski v. Cross" on Justia Law

Leo Geier, an heir to his mother Minnie Geier's estate, petitioned for supervised administration of the estate and removal of the estate's personal representative. After hearing evidence, the circuit court denied the petition. Leo appealed. Appellees, Minnie's estate and the personal representative, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that Leo did not appeal from a final order and that not all the required parties were served with a notice of the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that although the order of the circuit court was one from which Leo could appeal, the Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal was granted because not all of the heirs were served with notice of the appeal. View "In re Estate of Geier" on Justia Law