Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

by
Petitioner-Appellant Lyle Hollingsworth, as personal representative of the Estate of Audrey Hollingsworth, appeals from a district court judgment determining the distribution of insurance proceeds. Jerry Hollingsworth, Petitioner's brother had lived in a house he shared with their mother Audrey and continued to live there after her death. The house was insured under a farm and ranch policy issued by Nodak Mutual Insurance Company (Nodak) which listed Jerry Hollingsworth as the primary insured, with Audrey Hollingsworth listed as an additional insured. After Audrey Hollingsworth's death, the Estate was listed as the additional insured. The house was destroyed by fire in 2006. Nodak issued several checks made payable to Jerry Hollingsworth and the Estate for the loss. Disputes arose over the various heirs' rights in the insurance proceeds, and Lyle Hollingsworth, as personal representative of the Estate, began proceedings in the informal probate requesting that the district court order a division of the insurance proceeds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment directing division of various components of the insurance proceeds between Jerry Hollingsworth and the Estate. The court concluded that the portion of the insurance proceeds paid for loss of the dwelling should be divided on the basis of the relative percentage value of Jerry Hollingsworth's life estate and the Estate's remainder interest, as calculated by actuarial tables. Finding that there was an "unsupervised probate" of the case, it could not be appealed without a Rule 54(b) certification. Because the district court's judgment resolved some but not all of the disputed between the parties in this case, the disbursement of the insurance proceeds was not a final, appealable judgment. The Supreme Court determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case further, and dismissed the appeal. View "Estate of Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

by
Patricia Shelton filed suit alleging breach of contract a legal malpractice against her former attorneys Defendants-Appellants R. Bruce Owens, Jeffrey Crandall, and Owens and Crandall, PLLC (Owens). During the pendency of her action, Ms. Shelton passed away. Plaintiff-Appellee Lois Bishop sought to assert Ms. Shelton's claims as her personal representative. Owens unsuccessfully argued that the legal malpractice claim abated upon Ms. Shelton's death, and that her breach of contract claim did not state a claim. Owens appealed. Because Patricia Shelton’s legal malpractice claim sounds in tort and abated upon her death, and her breach of contract claim fails to state a claim, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in denying Owens’s motion for summary judgment and in granting Bishop’s motion to substitute as plaintiff. View "Owen v. Bishop" on Justia Law

by
This case involved an ongoing dispute between brothers Ron McCann (Ron) and William McCann, Jr. (Bill) concerning the operation of McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. (Ranch), a closely-held corporation created by their father, William McCann, Sr. (William, Sr.). In 1997, William, Sr.'s shares passed to a trust set up to benefit his wife Gertrude, with Gary Meisner as trustee. In 2008, Ron filed suit against Bill, the Ranch and Meisner (Respondents) alleging a breach of fiduciary duties and seeking equitable relief or, the dissolution of the corporation. The district court granted summary judgment for the Respondents. Ron appealed, arguing that the district court erred in characterizing his claims as derivative and in finding that he failed to satisfy the elements of I.C. 30-1-1430(2)(b). Ron also argued that the court incorrectly limited the scope of discovery. Respondents cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to award them attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Respondents as they failed to establish the necessary elements set forth in I.C. 30-1-1430(2)(b). Furthermore, the Court found that the district court did not err when it denied Respondents attorney fees. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "McCann v. McCann, Jr. " on Justia Law

by
Defendant Louis Giuliano, Jr. contested the will of Testator, Louis Guiliano, Sr. The jury found the will was properly executed, and the superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the executrix and the primary beneficiary of Testator's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err by (1) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff's failure to submit a single transcript of dubious relevance; (2) refusing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial where there was sufficient evidence tending to prove that Testator possessed testamentary capacity when he executed his will, declining to instruct the jury on those issues, and denying Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on those grounds; and (4) excluding from evidence an inventory of Testator's estate. View "Lett v. Giuliano" on Justia Law

by
Testatrix had four predeceased siblings, and Propounder and Caveator were two of five nieces and nephews who were Testatrix's heirs at law. Caveator appealed the probate court's order holding that Propounder carried her burden of proving that the proffered will was the last will and testament of Testatrix and that Testatrix possessed the required testamentary capacity to make a will at the time of execution. The court affirmed the order where Caveator failed to establish sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof. View "Parker v. Kelley" on Justia Law

by
Prine filed a caveat challenging the validity of her father's will on the grounds that he lacked testamentary capacity and was operating under undue influence. The probate court ordered the probate of the will in solemn form, and the superior court granted summary judgment to the estate. The court held that because the record showed that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence at the time the testator executed his will, the judgment was affirmed. View "Prine v. Blanton, et al." on Justia Law

by
This case involved a suit by a holder of auction rate notes issued under an Indenture of Trust and certain "Supplemental Indentures" thereto, against the issuer of the notes, and the trust. Plaintiff claimed that the issuer caused the trust to pay millions of dollars in excessive fees to the issuer and an affiliate of the issuer in breach of limits on those fees set forth in the Supplemental Indentures. The court held that because plaintiff had not pled that it had met any of the conditions precedent to suit required by the no-action clause, the court dismissed plaintiff's claims. View "RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Education Loan Trust IV, et al." on Justia Law

by
Decedent, as CEO of Corporation, purchased a cell phone retail outlet from Creditor for which Creditor accepted a promissory note from Corporation. Decedent signed the note as personal guarantor but died before completing payments. Two related legal actions followed: a California civil suit and this Wyoming probate action. Creditor filed a breach of contract action in California and a timely claim with Decedent's Estate in the Wyoming action. Creditor, however, failed to bring suit within thirty days after the date the Estate mailed a notice of rejection of the claim as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 2-7-718. Creditor then added the Estate as a defendant in the California action. In Wyoming, the probate court ruled that Creditor had not complied with section 2-7-718, that the Estate was not added to the California lawsuit until after the filing window had closed, and that Creditor should not receive equitable relief from strict application of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it declined to provide Creditor equitable relief under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 2-7-703(c) from application of the statute of limitations found in section 2-7-718. View "In re Estate of Graves" on Justia Law

by
Roy Allen died in 2005. After a drawn-out legal struggle, the orphans' court approved an account of his estate in 2009. Before the personal representative (Appellee) would make the distribution under that account, she required that Allen's children sign a document releasing her from liability related to her duties as personal representative. Allen's sons (Appellants) refused to sign and return the document. The orphans' court ordered Appellants to sign, but they again refused. The court of special appeals affirmed the order of the orphans' court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 9-111 entitles a personal representative to obtain a release when she requests one; and (2) an orphans' court may order heirs and legatees to sign such releases when requested. View "Allen v. Ritter" on Justia Law

by
After Billy Machen died, his wife Julia filed a petition to probate Billy's will. Julia filed a copy of the will, which bore no changes or markings. That will bequeathed $10,000 to Billy's son Randy and established a testamentary trust for the benefit of Randy's children in the amount of $20,000. Randy opposed the probate of the will, contending that his father had made changes to it. Randy attached a copy of the same typed will, but this copy contained several handwritten changes. Randy filed a complaint against Julia, asserting that there was a family-settlement agreement and that the will was evidence of that agreement. The circuit court found that Billy, Julia, and Randy entered into a family-settlement agreement whereby Randy was to receive $100,000 for himself and $200,000 as trustee for his children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the undisputed facts showed that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Julia and Randy agreed to distribute the assets of Billy's estate in a manner different from his original, unaltered will, and Julia presented no evidence of fraud, duress, or imposition that would render her agreement with Randy unenforceable. View "Machen v. Machen" on Justia Law