Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Appellants Dawn Pyeritz sued the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania State police and several of its police officers for the destruction of her personal property, speficially "a black nylon tree stand safety harness, or belt, that allegedly was crucial evidence in a separate civil action." The police seized this item during a criminal investigation of a suspicious death. A trooper agreed to retain the belt in the custody of the police, apparently for a longer time than permitted by internal police regulations. The belt was destroyed before Appellants' counsel asked for its return. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Appellees, which the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Commonwealth Court held that no cause of action exists against a third party – someone other than the original alleged tortfeasor – for negligent spoliation of evidence. The Supreme Court granted review, and now holds that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence. View "Pyeritz v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Andrew Kennery, on behalf of the estate of Gladys Kennery, appealed the decision of the Windham Superior Court that granted the State's motion for summary judgment on his complaint alleging negligence, gross negligence, and civil rights violations against the State, two state troopers, and the Vermont Department of Public Safety (VDPS). Plaintiff's lawsuit stemmed from a "welfare check" the troopers performed on Plaintiff's decedent, Gladys Kennery. Gladys's daughter had requested that the troopers check on her elderly mother, but the troopers searched the wrong residence. Meanwhile, Gladys had collapsed in her backyard and was unable to get back up and reach shelter. Gladys was found the next morning and died twelve days later from hypothermia caused by prolonged exposure to the cold. The superior court held that the State owed no duty of reasonable care in performing the welfare check, thereby defeating Plaintiff's claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants. Genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether a duty of care was created under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A based upon the State's undertaking to perform the welfare check and whether the troopers breached that duty such that the State was liable under the Vermont Tort Claims Act (VTCA). The Court also held that the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim of gross negligence against the troopers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kennery v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Petitioner, as personal representative of her uncle's estate, filed a complaint against respondent alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duties. Respondent moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement petitioner had signed on her uncle's admission. The court held that the district court erred in failing to rule that the court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the arbitration agreement violated public policy. The court also held that the district court erred in failing to rule that the limitations of remedies provisions in this case violated public policy, for they undermined specific statutory remedies created by the Legislature. The court further held that the district court erred in ruling that the limitations of remedies provisions that called for imposition of the American Health Lawyer Association rules was severable. The court finally concluded that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson was inapplicable. View "Shotts, etc. v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

After Decedent died, Decedent's wife moved to admit his will to probate. Decedent's son, Bruce, filed an objection, alleging that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to enter into the will, and that another of Decedent's sons, Neil, exerted undue influence over Decedent. Bruce further sought to set aside a cattle sale and options agreement and lease-cattle agreement, alleging that Decedent's lack of capacity to contract voided the agreements and that the agreements were the product of Neil's undue influence over Decedent. The district court granted the Estate's motion to dismiss, concluding that Bruce lacked standing to contest the will and agreements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bruce's allegations that a previous will existed that devised to him a larger portion of Decedent's estate than did the disputed will created a sufficient basis for Bruce to establish standing to contest the will; and (2) Bruce possessed standing to challenge the validity of the agreements to the extent that they concerned real property. Remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate its order to dismiss and to permit the parties to engage in discovery. View "In re Estate of Glennie" on Justia Law

Defendants Robin Colburn and Ronald and Richard Tennant appealed a superior court order that denied their motion to dismiss this action by Plaintiffs Richard and Cheryl Fellows and Benjamin Bellerose. Plaintiffs were successors-in-interest to property once owned by Defendants' parents. The property was subject to a 1996 lead paint abatement order. Defendants' parents sold the property to Jesus and Eileen Guzman who were not aware of the abatement order when they sold the property to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought suit upon discovery of the abatement order. Defendants argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over them because despite being administrators of their parents' estate, none of the Defendants actually lived in New Hampshire. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts suffiient to justify the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Defendants as either successor trustees or beneficiaries. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient for the court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment. View "Fellows v. Colburn" on Justia Law

In a hierarchical church property dispute, the court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the "neutral principles of law" doctrine set forth in Jones v. Wolf. The court held that neutral principles of law demonstrated that an implied trust in favor of the PCUSA existed on the local church's property to which TPC, Inc. held legal title. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding to the contrary and the judgment was reversed. View "Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over control of property belonging to the oldest church in Georgia, Christ Church in Savannah. At issue was whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the neutral principles doctrine, particularly with respect to OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47. The court held that although those courts could have erred to some extent in their reliance on OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47, they correctly concluded that neutral principles of law showed that the property of Christ Church at issue was held in trust for the benefit of the Episcopal Church.

This case involved a proposed class action settlement between AOL and plaintiffs where the parties agreed that AOL would make a series of charitable donations. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in approving the proposed class action settlement, including a proposed cy pres settlement distribution. The court held that the cy pres distributions here did not comport with the court's cy pres standards. While the donations were made on behalf of a nationwide plaintiff class, they were distributed to geographically isolated and substantively unrelated charities. The court concluded that the district court judge did not have to recuse herself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a) or (b)(4), 5(iii). The court declined to address the issue of whether the class notice was sufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Husband obtained a purchase-money mortgage from Bank to invest in commercial real estate. Wife's signature was forged in executing the purchase-money mortgage. After Husband's death, Bank attempted to foreclose its mortgage, but Husband's Estate and Wife asserted Wife's fraudulent signature voided the mortgage. The district court (1) granted Bank summary judgment, concluding its purchase-money mortgage was superior to Wife's statutory dower interest and the Estate's other debts and charges; and (2) ordered any excess sale proceeds to be paid to the Estate. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the award of summary judgment; but (2) reversed the district court's determination that the foreclosure sale surplus be paid to the Estate, instead holding that Wife's statutory dower interest took priority over the Estate's other debts and charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that a surviving spouse's dower interest, codified in Iowa Code 633.211 as to nonhomestead real property, was not subject to the debts and charges of the Estate of the spouse who died intestate.

Defendants appealed from an order and judgment of the bankruptcy court granting summary judgment on plaintiff's complaint to determine dischargeability pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(B). The court held that plaintiff failed to show that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the plain language of the statute where plaintiff had not met several statutory requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for defendants.