Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Decedent executed a pour-over will and a revocable inter vivos trust for the intended purpose of disinheriting her surviving Spouse, and thereby effectively destroying his elective share as to the property transferred to the trust. This appeal involved two consolidated cases. The district court granted summary judgment against Spouse in both matters, concluding (1) in the probate matter, the property transferred and held in the trust was not subject to the elective share; and (2) in the related civil action in which Spouse sought $125,000 from the trust as a creditor for work performed during the marriage on a building owned by Decedent and transferred to the trust, the claim was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment in the probate matter because the property transferred to the Trust was never legally the property of Decedent's estate, and therefore, there was no legal basis for making the property a part of Decedent's estate for purposes of the elective share; and (2) the district court properly found that the failure of Spouse to file his civil complaint against the Estate deprived the court of jurisdiction.

Neil Bartelson and Diane Fischer appealed a district court order that concluded the court did not have jurisdiction to decide whether funds expended prior to the appointment of a guardian and conservator were misappropriated. Ralph Bartelson had four children--Jean Valer, Jane Haught, Neil Bartelson, and Diane Fischer. While living with Valer, Ralph Bartelson established a joint checking account, naming both Valer and Haught co-owners with rights of survivorship and allowing them to issue checks from the account. Neil Bartelson and Fischer alleged that Valer and Haught made inappropriate withdrawals from Ralph Bartelson's account, and Neil Bartelson petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and conservator for Ralph Bartelson. In 2008, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that was approved by the court. Under the agreement, Valer was appointed guardian of Ralph Bartelson, and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. (GAPS) was appointed conservator. Ralph Bartelson died one month later, and his will was admitted to informal probate. Valer and Haught were initially appointed as co-personal representatives of Ralph Bartelson's estate, but Neil Bartelson and Fischer later requested the appointment of an alternative representative. The parties entered into a stipulation, agreeing that GAPS would be substituted as the personal representative of the estate and petitioning the court for formal probate. The court then filed an order consistent with the parties' stipulation. GAPS then retained a CPA with forensic accounting experience, to review transfers of Ralph Bartelson's assets to his family members. While the CPA was able to provide a summary of funds expended from Ralph Bartelson's estate and a list of amounts received by various family members, the CPA was unable to determine the reason the family members received these amounts. After the review, GAPS did not pursue a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court erred in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the misappropriation claim. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellee/Counter-appellant, Archie Dicksion filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of his brother. Subsequently, Thomas Powell asserted that he was a pretermitted heir of the deceased. With the family's cooperation, DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests determined that Powell was indeed the son of the decedent. The trial court determined that Powell was an unintentionally omitted child and entitled to his statutory share of the estate. Powell and his half-sister, the decedent's daughter, also challenged the admittance of the holographic will to probate and to Appellant's appointment as the personal representative of the estate. A motion for new trial was denied. Both Powell and the Appellant appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the application of paternity testing to intestate and probate proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that: (1) under the facts presented, the objections to admission of the holographic will were not untimely; (2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 sec. 215, applies to intestate and probate proceedings; and (3) 58 O.S. 2001 sec. 122 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a will.

Appellant bank sued Appellees, a corporation and its members, after loans granted to Appellees went into default and Appellees transferred certain property into a trust. After a jury rendered its verdicts, the circuit court (1) granted foreclosure against the property securing the debts, (2) dismissed Appellant's claim to avoid the transfer of one of the properties in the trust and ruled that the deed of another property in the trust was void, and (3) denied Appellant's various post-trial motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal, holding (1) the circuit court erred in submitting Appellant's foreclosure and fraudulent-transfer claims to the jury because they were equitable in nature; and (2) the circuit court properly granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on Appellee's abuse-of-process claim. Remanded.

Ralph and Wayne Platt were two brothers who, together with their siblings, inherited a ranch. Ralph and Wayne jointly owned and operated one half of the ranch, which they placed in the Platt Ranch Trust. After a dispute, Ralph and some siblings (Appellants) filed suit against Wayne and other siblings (Appellees), asserting a breach of trustee's duties and seeking a partition of the ranch. The district court found that Appellants were entitled to part of the estate and appointed three commissioners to make a partition of the property. The district court affirmed the partition of the estate as recommended by the commissioners with two exceptions. Appellants subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend judgment and/or motion for new partition, arguing that the district court did not have the authority to modify the partition recommended by the commissioners. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, the district court was authorized as a matter of law to unilaterally modify the partition made by the commissioners in order to obviate the parties' objections to the report.

At issue in this case was whether the district court had the authority to appoint an unwilling director trustee of a dissolved corporation for the purpose of defending actions against the corporation that arose post-dissolution and after completion of the winding-up process. Lawrence Canarelli, the trustee in this case, filed a writ for extraordinary relief compelling the district court to vacate its order appointing him as trustee in the underlying matters. The Supreme Court granted the trustee's petition and issued a writ of mandamus, holding that Canarelli could not be compelled by the district court to act as director trustee for the dissolved corporation under the relevant statutes.

The instant action arose from an ejectment proceeding involving a dispute as to whether Respondent Wayne Peelua alleged a cognizable claim to the title of certain real property. Petitioner Deutsche Bank filed a complaint alleging that it was entitled to possession of the property. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court held for Petitioner. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the district court order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA and affirmed the district court, holding that Respondent's affidavit did not meet the requirements of Dist. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12.1, and therefore, the district court had jurisdiction over Petitioner's ejectment action.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the partition of a 40 acre piece of land where the testator's four heirs wanted to sell the land but the testator's grandson had been living on a 2.2 acre tract of land that was part of the 40 acres at issue. The grandson contended that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the heirs because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to his claim that he owned the 2.2 acres at issue. The court held that despite the fact that the grandson had lived on the property at issue for several years, this fact alone was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the requirements for a parol gift of land. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the heirs.

Caveators Celia Beth Simmons (Beth) and Lisa Kay Norton (Lisa) appealed from the grant of summary judgment to the propounder of the will of their father, Charles Powell Norton (Charles). Beth and Lisa contended that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment on their claim that the will was the product of undue influence on the part of their brother, Samuel. The court held that there was simply no evidence that Samuel exerted any influence over Charles in the making of the will and it was therefore not error to grant summary judgment.

Ira Warne executed a partial revocation of and amendment to the Ira Warne Family Protection Trust, the purpose of which was to terminate the interest of one of Ira's sons, Tom Warne, who had been designated as a beneficiary in the original trust instrument. On summary judgment, the district court (1) invalidated the partial revocation based on the Supreme Court's holding in Banks v. Means, and (2) held that Tom was entitled to one-half of the personal property of Ira's estate pursuant to the distribution provisions of Ira's will. The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, holding (1) the partial revocation complied with Utah Code Ann. 75-7-605, which statutorily overruled the Court's holding in Banks; and (2) the distribution of Ira's personal property was governed by the terms of the Trust, rather than by Ira's will, and therefore, Tom was not entitled to one-half of that property. Remanded.