Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Shortly before she passed away, Darlene Patterson executed an amendment to the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust, which removed Darlene's son, Ronald Patterson, as a beneficiary. After Darlene died, Ronald filed a lawsuit against the Trust and Darlene's estate, seeking a declaration that the amendment was void because it violated the terms of the Trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ronald, ruling that the amendment was invalid because it attempted to completely divest Ron of his interest in the Trust without revoking the Trust based on its interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in Banks v. Means. The trustee, Randy Patterson, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Amendment was valid under a provision of the Utah Uniform Trust Code, which statutorily overruled the Court's holding in Banks.

Dewey Monroe, a member of a limited liability company, died. Through his will, Dewey bequeathed his entire estate to his daughter, Janet. Janet asserted that Dewey transferred his membership in the company to her. Lou Ann Monroe, the company's managing member, responded that Janet had inherited only Dewey's right to share in profits and losses of the company and to receive distributions to which he would be entitled. Janet filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking declaratory judgment that she had inherited her father's full membership in the company and that Lou Ann and Joseph Monroe, who was named in the company's operating agreement as a successor managing member, had been validly removed from their positions. The circuit court ruled that Janet was not a member of the company and thus lacked the authority to remove Lou Ann and Joseph from their positions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the company's operating agreement lacked specific language that would constitute an exception to the rule of dissociation set forth in Va. Code Ann. 13.1-1040.1; and (2) therefore, Dewey was dissociated from the company upon his death and Janet became a mere assignee, entitled only to Dewey's financial interest.

Appellants Eleanor and Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer petitioned the Supreme Court to challenge the Court of Civil Appeals' decision which upheld the trial court's determination regarding Appellee-Trustee JP Morgan Chase Bank's previously-adjudicated ability to draw on the trusts's principal. The trust in question named Appellant Eleanor Reed as beneficiary, and authorized payments of up to half of its income payable quarterly, for her support and well-being. In 1998, Reed filed a Petition for Instructions in district court in Tulsa County, requesting the court determine what distributions were permitted under the Trust. Specifically, Reed sought instructions for the co-trustee, Bank One Trust Company, N.A., to pay certain of Reed's expenses from the Trust's principal. In 2007, Reed and three of her four children, Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer, filed suit to modify the terms of the trust to allow Appellee JP Morgan Chase to make payments from the remaining half of the trust's principal. Appellants stated that Reed was "an incapacitated person afflicted with Alzheimer's disease, and her condition constitutes an emergency condition which will necessitate her being housed in a nursing home. She is wheel-chair bound, 84 years old, and in precarious health." Appellants maintained that Testator would have wanted Reed, his only child, to have the use of the remaining Trust funds to provide for her well-being. Appellees objected to the suit, arguing that the Testator's intent regarding the payment from principal had been determined in a 1998 Order and, as such, the claims asserted in the Amended Petition are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no connection between the 1998 Order and the issue presented to it on appeal: "[w]hile we agree that the subject matter, the parties, and the capacity of the parties remain the same, we cannot agree that the cause of the action is the same as that in the 1998 matter. The focus of the 1998 lawsuit was to provide instructions to the trustee to make payments from half of the Trust corpus on behalf of Reed. This payment was expressly provided for in the Trust instrument. In the present action, Appellants [sought] due to an unforeseen medical emergency, to modify the express terms of the Trust and to show that Testator would have intended Reed's present needs be cared for even if it meant invading the remaining half of the Trust corpus." The Court vacated the appellate court's opinion in this matter and remanded the case back to the trial court for determination of whether modification should be allowed under the terms of the trust.

The "last will and testament" of Ted Watkins named his ex-stepdaughter Petitioner Diana Kinsey as executrix of his estate, and bequeathed all of his property to her. A year following his death, the estate was closed, and Petitioner was discharged from her executrix duties. Several years later, she filed a wrongful-death action against various silica-related entities in circuit court for Mr. Watkins' death from silicosis. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations or alternatively, that Petitioner lacked standing to file the action. The circuit court dismissed all defendants with prejudice. In its review of the case, the Supreme Court only dealt with the issue of whether Petitioner's claim was time barred by the statute of limitations, and indeed found that her claim was so barred. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's action.

This case came before the Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal from circuit court. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in failing to apply premises-liability law and denying Double Quick, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. The matter arose from a shooting that occurred in the parking lot of a Double Quick convenience store. George Ford, accompanied by his young son, entered Double Quick to make a purchase. Shortly afterward, Cassius Gallion entered the store. Ford and Gallion exchanged words. Gallion exited the store first. Then Ford left the store to pump gas into his car. Because she was worried that Ford and Gallion would fight, the assistant store manager accompanied Ford and helped Ford’s son into the car. At the gas pumps, Ford and Gallion again exchanged words. Mario Moore, who had arrived at the Double Quick but had not yet been inside, approached Ford’s car, intervened in the argument, and threw a punch at Ford. Mario missed Ford, but struck Jackson, who then returned to the store and called the police. Ford then retrieved a pistol from the trunk of his car and shot Mario. Mario died as result of his injury. Dorothy Moore, as administrator of Mario’s estate, filed suit against Double Quick arguing that Double Quick had neglected to protect Mario from injury and death while he was on the store’s premises. The trial court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The trial court held that the case was more similar to a basic negligence action against an employee of Double Quick than a premises-liability action, and that a jury should determine whether the manager's actions were the proximate cause of Mario's injuries. Double Quick appealed the portion of the order denying it summary judgment. "In premises-liability cases, there are two ways to establish legal causation, or foreseeability, in cases of assault by a third person: the requisite 'cause to anticipate' the assault may arise from actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature, or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists on the premises." The Supreme Court found that there was no suggestion in the record that the store manager had any knowledge of Ford's violent nature. Moore failed to prove that the injury was reasonably foreseeable, or that the manager's behavior was the proximate cause of Mario's injury. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial judge should have granted Double Quick's motion for summary judgment.

Petitioner Virginia Beaudoin appealed a district court's dismissal of her motion for summary judgment on a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Defendant Davidson Trust Company. The claim stemmed from Davidson Trust’s mistaken distribution of trust funds to Beaudoin when Beaudoin’s two children were, in fact, the designated beneficiaries. Because the Supreme Court found that Davidson Trust owed Petitioner no fiduciary duty at the time of the alleged breach, the Court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing Petitioner's claim.

Decedent was arrested for contempt of court and was treated for alcohol withdrawal before being jailed. After he was jailed, his repeated requests for medication were denied. He was assigned high risk status and scheduled to be observed every fifteen minutes. A doctor prescribed Haldol and Libruim after observing that he was disoriented. He died soon after, on September 27, 2007. In August 2006, decedent's ex-wife was named administrator of the estate and filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed as time-barred by the two-year Illinois statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have tolled the limitations period because the sole beneficiary of the estate was a minor when the cause of action arose.

In the civil case underlying this appeal, John Poss filed a motion for an order that Marilyn Morris transfer to him property that was the subject of a constructive trust. Before the court ruled on Poss's motion, Morris transferred the property to Skyway Investment Corporation. Poss then filed a motion to appoint a receiver to take possession of the property and to appoint a person to execute the conveyance of the property. The court of common pleas granted the motion. Skyway, which had been joined as a party defendant in the proceeding by the common pleas court, subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Appellee, the county court of common pleas, from proceeding to place the property in receivership and a writ of mandamus to compel the court to vacate its orders concerning the property. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and a person to effect the conveyance of the property in the underlying case; and (2) Skyway had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise its claims.

Hazel Frazier died, leaving behind her husband, Appellant Curtis Bridges, and her seven children, who were the stepchildren of Elree Frazier, a previous husband who died after taking the medication Vioxx. Later, one of the stepchildren brought a claim against Merck Company, the manufacturer of Vioxx, on behalf of Mr. Frazier, for the wrongful death of Mr. Frazier. The settlement proceeds were funneled into the estate of Ms. Frazier for distribution to Mr. Frazier's stepchildren. After Appellant was appointed the administrator for Ms. Frazier's estate, Appellant filed a claim stating that he was entitled to receive one-third of the proceeds obtained from the Merck settlement because of his curtesy interest. The district court rejected Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Ms. Frazier did not have a right to the Merck proceeds during her lifetime nor an individual right to bring suit under the wrongful-death statute, Appellant had no curtesy interest in the Merck settlement proceeds.

In 1990, Roy Sharpe executed an inter vivos trust and a will containing a testamentary trust. According to both trusts, Sharpe preferred his attorney, Charles Brown, to be employed to provide legal advice regarding trust administration and to choose a successor trustee if the need arose. Bank of America eventually served as trustee of both trusts. In 2009, Brown filed a petition to change trustees, asserting that in violation of the terms of the trusts, Bank of America intended to manage the trusts from a location outside the boundaries of Little Rock. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Brown lacked standing to bring the petition. Because the trusts did not provide a means for removing a trustee, Brown obtained no authority from the trusts to bring an action to change the trustees and had no interest in the trusts that granted him standing and permitted him to enforce the terms of the trusts. Remanded with directions to dismiss the case.