Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In September 2021, Aaron Welch died intestate, leaving behind a widow, Kristin Welch, and two minor children from his previous marriage. Kristin Welch, appointed as the administratrix of Aaron Welch's estate, filed an application for reservation of homestead & dower with the Pope County Circuit Court, claiming a homestead interest in the mortgaged home she had lived in with her late husband. Katelyn Gipson, the natural guardian of the minor children, argued that Kristin Welch did not have such an interest based on Arkansas Code Ann. § 28-39-201. This statute requires a surviving spouse to have been continuously married to the deceased for more than a year to have a homestead interest. Kristin Welch challenged the constitutionality of this statute, but the circuit court found it constitutional and ruled that she did not have a homestead interest in the property.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that the Arkansas Constitution's provision on homestead rights was gender-based and had been previously declared unconstitutional for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the statutory provision, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-201(d), which is gender-neutral and requires the continuous marriage condition, stands as the controlling law. The court found no error in the circuit court's application of this statute and concluded that Kristin Welch, having been married to the decedent for less than a year, did not have a statutory homestead interest in the property. View "WELCH ex rel. ESTATE OF AARON WELCH v. GIPSON" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a dispute over a trust established by a deceased father, James. Brian Spears, the son, filed a petition seeking to be named a creditor of his father's trust and to remove his stepmother, Therese Spears, as trustee. The trial court dismissed Brian's petition on the grounds that he did not file an amended pleading after the court sustained Therese's demurrer to the petition, with leave to amend. Brian appealed this decision, arguing that he did in fact file an amended pleading, reasserting only his claim to be named as a creditor of the trust.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four agreed with Brian. The court found that Brian's subsequent filing, titled "Creditor's Claim," was intended to be his amended pleading. It provided additional detail about the oral agreements underlying his claim, and it was filed under the same case number as his original petition.However, the court also agreed with Therese that the statute of limitations barred recovery on one of the alleged agreements underlying Brian's creditor's claim. The court found that the two-year statute of limitations for an action based on the breach of an oral contract had expired for one of the agreements before James's death.The court reversed the trial court's order, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that although Brian's creditor's claim is barred by the statute of limitations insofar as it rests on one of the alleged oral agreements, the trial court erred in dismissing Brian's creditor's claim to the extent it rests on the other alleged agreement. View "Spears v. Spears" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of anti-SLAPP motions filed by Tara Crawford, a trustee, and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. The case arose from a dispute over an easement connected to a piece of property sold by Alan Patterson to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of Green Tree Headlands LLC. After Patterson's death, Crawford, as trustee of Patterson's trust, managed the property and argued that the easement had expired based on the terms of the Declaration of Restrictions. McArthur disagreed, asserting that the easement remained in existence. Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, which she later voluntarily dismissed. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and Graves. Crawford and Graves filed anti-SLAPP motions, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate court found that Crawford had a reasonable basis to sue McArthur, as the Declaration of Restrictions, by itself, gave Crawford a factual basis to argue that the easement was temporarily limited and had expired. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed its decision. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court was called to determine issues regarding the distribution of assets under a will and trust, and personal jurisdiction. The case arose from a dispute between two brothers, John R. Luongo and Michael A. Luongo Jr., regarding their mother's estate and a trust she established. The Superior Court had previously divided the property of the estate between the brothers and dismissed two counts of John's complaint, arguing that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Michael.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to distribute the assets under the will and the related trust. The authority to resolve disputes over the distribution of assets under a will rests solely with the Probate Court. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's order distributing the assets of the estate.Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court found that the Superior Court correctly concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Michael for claims related to the trust. This was due to the fact that the trust was established as a Massachusetts trust with its principal place of administration in Massachusetts and the process to transfer the trust’s administration to Maine was not completed by either trustee.The court affirmed the dismissal of Counts 1 and 3 of John’s complaint, related to the trust, but vacated the judgment in all other respects, including Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. The case was remanded for dismissal of the remaining counts of John’s complaint and Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. View "Luongo v. Luongo" on Justia Law

In the case concerning the estate of Frances R. Mason, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled on two key issues. First, it considered whether the Massachusetts Medicaid program, MassHealth, could enforce a lien (known as a TEFRA lien) against a member's property after the member's death. The Court concluded that, under Massachusetts law, MassHealth can only enforce such a lien if the property is sold during the member's lifetime. Therefore, MassHealth could not enforce its lien against Mason's property, which was not sold until after her death. This ruling is a restriction on MassHealth's ability to recover Medicaid benefits paid.Second, the Court addressed the timing of MassHealth's claim for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid on Mason's behalf. The Court concluded that the three-year statute of repose of the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC) does not apply retroactively to bar MassHealth's claim against the estate of a member who died prior to the effective date of the MUPC. Accordingly, MassHealth's claim against Mason's estate, which was filed nearly nine years after her death, was not barred by the MUPC's three-year statute of repose.The facts of the case were as follows: Frances R. Mason was a recipient of Medicaid benefits from MassHealth. From January to August 2008, MassHealth paid for her care in a residential nursing facility. In May 2008, MassHealth imposed a TEFRA lien against Mason's home, as she was expected to be permanently institutionalized in the facility. Mason died in August 2008 without the property having been sold. MassHealth filed a claim to recover the Medicaid benefits paid for Mason's care in August 2018, after the executor of Mason's will had opened formal probate proceedings in June 2017.The disposition by the Court was to affirm the order of the Probate and Family Court judge insofar as it struck MassHealth's lien against Mason's home, and to reverse the order insofar as it dismissed MassHealth's claim against her estate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "In re Estate of Mason" on Justia Law

This case, delivered by The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, concerns the right of succession to the role of estate administrator, specifically in situations where a third-party administrator has been appointed. The deceased, George Landing, Jr., left behind two minor daughters and no will. His ex-wife initially served as the estate's administrator. She later voluntarily resigned and appointed Jim McGough, a local attorney and guardian to Landing's daughters, to the position.One of the daughters, Emma Landing, sought to replace McGough as the administrator of her father's estate upon reaching the age of majority. She argued that under 58 O.S. § 135, she had superior right to the role and the court could not refuse her request. The District Court of Tulsa County denied her request, prompting her appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court held that the trial court had discretion in appointing the estate's administrator and that it did not abuse this discretion in refusing Emma's request. The court rejected Emma's argument that she had an absolute right to replace the existing administrator. It noted that granting such a right would lead to uncertainty and confusion in probate matters and could undermine the orderly settlement of estates. The court also affirmed that the trial court had not found Emma incompetent to serve as administrator but had simply decided there was no good reason to replace McGough. The order of the District Court was therefore affirmed. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LANDING" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, the appellant, Yvette Rosenberg, contested the validity of a beneficiary deed executed by her late uncle, Alex Brandt, which left two properties to Marilyn Sanders, Brandt's former girlfriend. Rosenberg claimed that Sanders procured the deed through undue influence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sanders, holding that Rosenberg had not presented evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Sanders unduly influenced Brandt in executing the deed. The court of appeals reversed, adding a new ninth factor to the existing eight-factor test for undue influence, namely the relevance of a grantor's post-execution statements.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the trial court's decision and held that adding a grantor's post-execution statements as a new ninth factor in the undue influence test was unnecessary. The Court found that Brandt's post-execution statements were not relevant to the claim of undue influence as they did not address his state of mind, mental condition, or the circumstances present at the time of the execution of the deed. The Court concluded that Rosenberg's evidence of susceptibility and the existence of a close relationship between Brandt and Sanders were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The Court also found that Rosenberg's inferences did not create a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Sanders exerted undue influence at the time of executing the deed, or whether the deed was the product of Sanders' undue influence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanders. View "ROSENBERG v SANDERS" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, a dispute arose over the distribution of a deceased person's estate, particularly a 1978 Ford pickup truck. The decedent was Ronald Glen Kemmer, who died intestate and was survived by his four adult children: Travis Kemmer, Becky Mastley, Collette Cole, and Ronda Gilge, referred to as the Heirs. Travis Kemmer served as the Personal Representative (PR) of the Estate. The Heirs could not agree on the disposition of the truck, and a conflict arose over whether a binding agreement had been reached and whether Travis Kemmer, as PR, had breached his fiduciary duties by not drafting a written agreement on the truck's distribution.The Court found that the PR was not obligated to draft a formal written agreement. The plain language of Montana's Uniform Probate Code (MUPC) requires a written contract executed by all successors to alter the amounts to which they are entitled under the laws of intestacy, and this requirement was not fulfilled in this case. The Court also held that the PR had no duty to piece together emails and texts to determine whether there was a meeting of the minds among successors or to take responsibility for putting any such agreement in writing.As such, the Court reversed the District Court's order that had concluded that the PR had a duty to draft a written agreement and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Kemmer" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the primary issue was whether two documents, both named as the will of Janice Evensen, met the statutory requirements to be valid holographic wills. Holographic wills are handwritten wills that may be deemed valid even if they do not satisfy the usual requirements for valid wills, such as being properly witnessed, as long as the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator’s handwriting.Janice Evensen had created two wills - one in 1994 and another in 2007. Both wills were typewritten but contained handwritten alterations and additions by Evensen. Neither was properly witnessed. After Evensen's death, the Alaska Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Alaska SPCA) sought to have both wills recognized as valid and admitted to probate.The Supreme Court held that the 1994 will met the statutory requirements for a valid holographic will and reversed the superior court's contrary conclusion. The court found that Evensen's handwritten additions to the 1994 will satisfied the statutory requirement that the “material portions” — words identifying the property and the devisee — be in her handwriting. Therefore, the 1994 will was a valid holographic will, and it reflected Evensen's testamentary intent.However, the court affirmed the superior court's decision rejecting the 2007 will. The court found that since the original of the 2007 will was never found, there was a rebuttable presumption that Evensen had revoked it. The Alaska SPCA failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption of revocation. Therefore, the 2007 will was not a valid will.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Janice V. Evensen" on Justia Law

In this case from the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court considered an appeal from a successful will contest. The decedent, Rita A. Walker, died at the age of 84 and her son, Mark E. Walker, filed a petition for formal probate of a will purportedly executed by Rita shortly before her death. This will named Mark as the sole beneficiary and personal representative of Rita's estate, omitting her three other sons. One of these other sons, Michael J. Walker, contested the will, alleging that Rita lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution and that the will was the product of undue influence.The county court held a bench trial and concluded that while the will was validly executed, it would not admit it to probate because Mark had failed to prove Rita's testamentary capacity at the time of execution and that the will was the product of undue influence. The court ordered the case to proceed intestate and appointed Michael as personal representative.Mark appealed, arguing that the county court erred in excluding from evidence a document purported to be a prior will signed by Rita, which he contended was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant to the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the document was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant. The court found that the document had a tendency to show that Rita had a constant and abiding scheme for the distribution of her property, rebutting charges of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity. Therefore, the court reversed the county court's order refusing to admit the proposed will to probate and remanded the case for the county court to reconsider the existing record, including the contested document, in determining whether Mark met his burden of proving testamentary capacity and whether Michael met his burden of proving undue influence. View "In re Estate of Walker" on Justia Law