Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court certifying that a certain prior order was a final judgment as to defendants other than Appellant in this case, holding that the certification was an abuse of discretion.This case arose in the context of estate planning carried out by the parents of five children, including Appellant. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred in certifying a final judgment as to certain defendants under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1315 and that the court erred in overruling her motion to review the settlement agreement and instead approving the agreement. The Supreme Court vacated the order certifying a final judgment, holding that there was no final judgment because the district court did not make adequate specific findings to support certification under section 25-1315. View "Ryan v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

Tamera Erskine, as the personal representative of the estate of Joann Bashinsky ("Ms. Bashinsky") appealed: (1) a probate court order awarding fees to the temporary guardian and conservator for Ms. Bashinsky previously appointed by the probate court; and (2) an order awarding fees to a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Ms. Bashinsky in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator filed by John P. McKleroy, Jr., and Patty Townsend. McKleroy and Townsend separately appealed the probate court's order dismissing with prejudice of all remaining pending matters following Ms. Bashinsky's death. At issue in this case was whether Ms. Bashinsky was competent and had the capacity to manage her considerable financial estate. When the case was filed, no one knew how long she would survive or whether she was sufficiently competent to continue to care for her financial security. The Alabama Supreme Court granted McKleroy and Townsend's motion to dismiss appeal no. 1210153. As to Erskine's appeal, no. 1200401, the Court determined the December 11, 2020, order awarding fees to Hawley and his attorneys was not a "final settlement" of a guardianship or conservatorship, and it was not otherwise a final judgment, and therefore it was not an appealable order. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the case remanded for the probate to enter a final judgment. View "McKleroy Jr., et al. v. Ash, et al." on Justia Law

Allie Construction, Inc., obtained writs of garnishment against the estate of Willard Mosier one day shy of the 20th anniversary of obtaining a judgment against his widow Debra Mosier, a beneficiary of his estate. The Alabama Supreme Court found Allie Construction properly commenced an enforcement action, and that action should be allowed to proceed. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred. The circuit court judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Allie Construction, Inc. v. Mosier" on Justia Law

Orlando Bethel appealed a circuit court order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. 2022, Zoe Sozo Bethel died intestate in Florida; she was survived by her spouse, Brennan James Franklin (spouse), and their five-year-old daughter. After the decedent's death, the spouse arranged for the body to be cremated in Florida and had the cremated remains shipped to Hughes Funeral Home and Crematory in Alabama, where the spouse's mother, Mikki Franklin, was employed. A dispute arose between the spouse and the decedent's father, Orlando Bethel, concerning the right to control the disposition of the ashes. Bethel filed an emergency petition seeking a determination that the spouse and decedent had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death and that the spouse had therefore forfeited his right as an "authorizing agent" to control the disposition of ashes. Bethel requested that he, rather than the spouse, be granted the right to control the disposition of the ashes. While the probate action was pending, the father filed a motion at circuit court for a temporary restraining order or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction enjoining the spouse, the spouse's mother, and the funeral home ("the defendants") from further "dividing, diminishing, splitting up or otherwise disposing of" the ashes. A five-day restraining order was entered, but ultimately the preliminary injunction was not, and later the probate entered a final order dismissing the father's petition. The probate court did not address the father's allegation that the spouse and the decedent had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying the father's motion for a preliminary injunction pending a final hearing on the merits of the probate appeal. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Bethel v. Franklin, et al." on Justia Law

Redginald Laren appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment in favor of Krystal Demoney-Hendrickson and the Estate of Cynthia K. Juker. In 1994, Larsen purchased unimproved property in Twin Falls County, Idaho. In 2014, Larsen and Cynthia Juker were in a romantic relationship. Despite participating in an unofficial ceremony resembling a wedding in 2018, the two were never legally married. Shortly after the relationship began, Larsen and Juker moved into a home Juker owned. In 2019, Larsen and Juker entered into a contract to develop his Twin Falls property. About a month later, Juker unexpectedly died. According to Larsen, he and Juker entered into a series of oral agreements around the time they sought financing to improve the Twin Falls property: she would sell her property and they would use the proceeds to pay down the loan for the Twin Falls improvement. In contrast, the Estate contended Juker died intestate and never indicated her wishes for what was to become of her real property. The Estate sold Juker’s property and the proceeds were not applied to the Twin Falls property loan. Both the Estate and Larsen moved for summary judgment on their claims for partition by sale and declaratory judgment. The district court granted the Estate’s motion and denied Larsen’s motion. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Estate. After ascertaining the parties ownership interests, the Supreme Court determined the trial court had to determine whether partition by sale was warranted. View "Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed in part and reversed in part the orders of the probate court and district court in these probate and partition matters, holding that remand was required.Dwight and Betty Lyman, as Trustees of their living trust (Lyman Trust), owned a parcel of property as tenants in common with George Fisher and another parcel in common with George's deceased parents. George sold his parents' interests in the two parcels to the Childs Trust. Lyman Trust filed a petition in the district court seeking to partition the parcels and filed a motion in the probate court seeking to set aside the sale. The probate court denied the motion, and the district court dismissed the partition petition without prejudice for failure to join Childs Trust as a required party. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Lyman Trust's appeal of the probate court's actions, holding that Lyman Trust lacked standing in the Fisher probate action; and (2) reversed the district court's judgment dismissing Lyman Trust's partition action, holding that the court erred by dismissing the action rather than ordering the joinder of Childs Trust, and dismissal was not harmless. View "Lyman v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Defendants Levorn and Levern Davis appealed a circuit court's judgment in favor of the estate of Henry Brim. In 2006, Brim sold property to Levern, executing a promissory note and mortgage for a principal of $56,000. The interest rate was 7% per year, and payments were to be made monthly. The final installment was scheduled to be August 2045. On April 16, 2015, Levern executed a quitclaim deed in which he transferred his interest in the property to his brother, Levorn. In 2017, Brim filed suit, alleging defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage. Defendants denied they were in default and disputed the balance owed on the note. Brim asked the trial court to enter a judgment declaring that defendants were in default; to determine the amount still owed on the promissory note; and to authorize Brim to foreclose the mortgage. Brim died in 2019; Darryl Hamilton, as the personal representative to Brim's estate, was substituted as plaintiff. Defendants unsuccessfully challenged Hamilton's substitution into the promissory note action. The circuit court thereafter found defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage, the amount owed was $26,125.50; and that Hamilton could proceed with foreclosure proceedings. Defendants argued on appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court that the trial court erroneously denied their motion to reconsider the order substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the motion for substitution was not filed until nearly 31 months after the filing of the suggestion of death. The Supreme Court found after review of the trial court record that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it denied defendants' motion to reconsider and dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to set aside its order substituting Hamilton as plaintiff, set aside its order finding defendants in default of the note and mortgage, and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1). View "Davis v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Baptist Foundation and various heirs of the decedent’s wife both claimed ownership over certain mineral interests devised in the decedent’s will at the time of the decedent’s death in 1969. The will left most of the estate, including the mineral interests, to the Mississippi Baptist Foundation as trustee, with income from the trust going to the decedent’s wife for life, then to his sister for life, and then to benefit the Mississippi Baptist Foundation’s foreign missions. In 1969, Mississippi had mortmain laws (repealed in 1992 and 1993), the relevant portion of which provided that after ten years in the possession of certain proscribed institutions, including religious institutions, real property reverted to the decedent’s heirs if the institution failed to sell the property within that ten-year time period. The Mississippi Baptist Foundation and the heirs disagreed as to when the ten-year period began in this case, and, if it applied, whether the mortmain laws were unconstitutional. The trial court found that the mortmain laws were triggered on the date of the decedent’s death in 1969 and that the mortmain laws were constitutional. Because the Mississippi Baptist Foundation had a possessory interest in the mineral interests in 1969, and because it failed to timely assert any claims regarding the property after it gained possession in 1969, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Mississippi Baptist Foundation v. Fitch, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court entering a declaratory judgment finding that the death benefit of a term life insurance policy owned by Dr. James Rocconi was payable to his children and not to Teresa James, Rocconi's ex-wife, holding that James was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.After Rocconi died, his children and the executor of his estate brought a declaratory judgment action asking the circuit court to find that they were the beneficiaries of Rocconi's life insurance policy. James counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy provided for payment of the death benefit to her. The circuit court entered judgment for Rocconi's children and executor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that James was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error. View "James v. Mounts" on Justia Law