Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This case concerns a dispute over the calculation of nonparticipating royalty interests (NPRI) in oil and gas produced from a tract of land in McKenzie County, North Dakota. The plaintiffs, as trustees of three family trusts, each hold an undivided one-third interest in a 2% royalty on all oil and gas produced from the NW¼NE¼ of Section 31-154-97, based on a 1951 royalty deed. The land in question abuts the Missouri River, and a portion of it lies below the ordinary high-water mark, which is owned by the State of North Dakota. Continental Resources, Inc. operates an oil well on a spacing unit that includes this tract, while third-party defendants own the minerals above the high-water mark, subject to the trusts’ royalty interests.The District Court of McKenzie County previously found that the trusts’ NPRI did not include State-owned acreage below the high-water mark, and adopted Continental’s calculation of the royalty payment factor, which excluded the State’s acreage and included an upward adjustment for equitable distribution. The court also held that Continental’s suspension of royalty payments was permissible under the “safe harbor” provision of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1, denied the trusts’ request for an accounting, and awarded costs to Continental, concluding the trusts were not the prevailing party. The trusts appealed, arguing errors in the NPRI calculation, the application of the safe harbor provision, and the determination of the prevailing party.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court’s amended judgment. It held that the 1951 royalty deed unambiguously grants the trusts a 2% royalty on all oil and gas produced from the entire described tract, including State-owned acreage. The court remanded for recalculation of the NPRI, reconsideration of the safe harbor provision, determination of outstanding royalties and accounting, and proper allocation of costs and disbursements, finding the trusts to be the prevailing party. View "Garaas v. Continental Resources" on Justia Law

Dr. Padma Rao brought a defamation suit against JP Morgan Chase Bank and its employee, Keifer Krause, after Krause informed the administrator of her late mother’s estate that Rao, acting under a power of attorney, had designated herself as the payable on death (POD) beneficiary of her mother’s accounts. This statement led the estate administrator to accuse Rao of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in probate court. The dispute centered on whether Rao had improperly used her authority to benefit herself, which would be illegal under Illinois law.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court, but Chase removed it to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois before any defendant was served, invoking “snap removal.” The district court dismissed all claims except for defamation per se. On summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that Krause’s statements were not defamatory, could be innocently construed, and were protected by qualified privilege. Rao appealed both the dismissal of her consumer fraud claim and the grant of summary judgment on her defamation claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first addressed jurisdiction, dismissing Krause as a party to preserve diversity jurisdiction. The court affirmed the dismissal of Rao’s consumer fraud claim, finding she had not alleged unauthorized disclosure of personal information. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the defamation per se claim against Chase, holding that Krause’s statements could not be innocently construed and that a qualified privilege did not apply, given evidence of possible recklessness. The case was remanded for a jury to determine whether the statements were understood as defamatory. View "Padma Rao v J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A woman and her long-term partner jointly purchased a duplex in Florida, signing both a promissory note and a mortgage as joint obligors and joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The note required monthly payments and a $100,000 balloon payment. After making all monthly payments, they failed to pay the balloon payment when due. The partner died shortly thereafter, and the woman became the sole owner of the property. The lender sent a default notice, and the woman entered into a forbearance agreement but did not pay the balloon payment. The lender filed a creditor’s claim against the deceased partner’s estate, which was rejected, leading the lender to sue the estate for the unpaid amount.The District Court of Fremont County, Wyoming, found the estate liable for the full balloon payment and associated costs, and also found the woman jointly liable as a co-obligor. The estate then sought contribution from the woman, arguing she should pay her share of the debt. After a bench trial, the district court determined that both the woman and the estate were each responsible for 50% of the balloon payment and related fees, applying Florida’s doctrine of equitable contribution. The court rejected the woman’s arguments that she should not be liable due to alleged inequitable conduct by the estate or because the deceased partner had intended to pay the balloon payment himself.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s application of Florida law and its equitable determinations. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the woman was jointly liable for 50% of the balloon payment and associated costs. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the doctrine of equitable contribution, its rejection of the unclean hands defense, or its allocation of attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Hutton v. Dykes" on Justia Law

After the death of Beverly Davies in 2015, her granddaughter filed a petition in the Utah district court to probate Davies’s will just before the three-year anniversary of Davies’s death. The petition sought to have the will declared valid and to appoint the granddaughter as personal representative. However, after nearly three years of inactivity, the court dismissed the petition without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Almost a year after this dismissal, the granddaughter refiled her petition, this time invoking Utah’s Savings Statute, which generally allows a new action to be commenced within one year of a non-merits dismissal if the original action was timely.Davies’s other grandchildren objected to the refiling and moved for partial summary judgment in the Fourth District Court, arguing that the new petition was untimely under Utah Code section 75-3-107, which requires probate proceedings to be commenced within three years of the decedent’s death. They contended that the Savings Statute did not apply to this probate timing statute. The district court disagreed, holding that the Savings Statute protected the granddaughter’s otherwise untimely petition and denied the motion for partial summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the interlocutory order. The court held that the Savings Statute does not apply to the three-year time limitation in section 75-3-107 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. The court reasoned that the plain language of the Probate Code prohibits commencing probate proceedings more than three years after death, and this prohibition conflicts with the general grace period provided by the Savings Statute. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of partial summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the granddaughter’s second petition was prohibited. View "In re Estate of Davies" on Justia Law

A resident of a memory-care facility in Massachusetts alleged that the facility’s court-appointed receiver, KCP Advisory Group, LLC, conspired with others to unlawfully evict residents, including herself, by falsely claiming that the local fire department had ordered an emergency evacuation. The resident, after being transferred to another facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting several state-law claims against KCP and other defendants. The complaint alleged that KCP’s actions violated statutory and contractual notice requirements and were carried out in bad faith.KCP moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that as a court-appointed receiver, it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that while quasi-judicial immunity barred claims based on negligent performance of receivership duties, it did not bar claims alleging that KCP acted without jurisdiction, contrary to law and contract, or in bad faith. The court thus denied KCP’s motion to dismiss several counts, including those for violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. KCP appealed the denial of immunity as to these counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of absolute quasi-judicial immunity de novo. The appellate court held that KCP’s alleged acts—removing residents from the facility—were judicial in nature and within the scope of its authority as receiver. Because KCP did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction, the court concluded that quasi-judicial immunity barred all of the resident’s claims against KCP. The First Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s denial of KCP’s motion to dismiss the specified counts. View "Suny v. KCP Advisory Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Two children of a decedent alleged that their late stepmother wrongfully transferred assets belonging to their father to herself, depriving them of property they would have received under his will. The assets in question included a house and shares in a corporation. The stepmother, who had married their father after both had children from previous marriages, allegedly used a power of attorney to transfer the property to herself during the father’s cognitive decline. After both the father and stepmother died, the children claimed they were not notified of the stepmother’s estate proceedings and that the disputed property was distributed to the stepmother’s descendants.The District Court for Lincoln County dismissed the children’s complaint, citing the doctrine of jurisdictional priority because a similar proceeding was pending in county court. After the county court dismissed the children’s petition for lack of standing, the district court denied the children’s motion to alter or amend its dismissal, without further explanation. The children appealed, arguing that the district court’s reliance on jurisdictional priority was no longer justified after the county court’s dismissal.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the children had standing to pursue relief under the Nebraska Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which specifically allows a principal’s issue to petition a court to review an agent’s conduct under a power of attorney. The court found that the doctrine of jurisdictional priority no longer applied once the county court proceeding was dismissed. However, the Supreme Court also determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the children would not have inherited the disputed property under the will or by operation of law, even if the transfers were invalid. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the children should be given leave to amend their complaint and reversed and remanded the case with directions to allow amendment. View "Kimball v. Rosedale Ranch" on Justia Law

In 1997, an individual applied to the Utah Division of Water Rights to divert water from a surface source in the Weber Basin for irrigation and livestock purposes. The application was met with protests from the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, among others. After a hearing in 1998 and sporadic communications over the next two decades, the Utah State Engineer ultimately denied the application in 2018. The applicant sought judicial review in the Second District Court, arguing that the denial was improper because the water source contained unappropriated water, the application would not interfere with existing rights, and the application’s 1997 filing date should give it priority.While the case was pending in the Second District Court, the applicant died. His counsel moved to substitute the estate’s personal representative as the plaintiff under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). The district court denied the motion, holding that the claim did not survive the applicant’s death because he had no perfected property right and any inchoate right was not mentioned in his will. The court also found that Utah’s general survival statute did not apply, and dismissed the case. The estate appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed whether the district court erred in denying substitution and dismissing the claim. The court held that the burden was on the movant to show the claim survived death. It found that neither common law nor statute provided for the survival of a claim for judicial review of an administrative denial of a water appropriation application. The court concluded that the claim abated upon the applicant’s death and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Marriott v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

An individual diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease was admitted to a personal care facility in Kentucky after his spouse, who had been appointed his conservator by a Tennessee court, signed a mandatory arbitration agreement required for admission. The spouse did not specify her capacity when signing. The patient later suffered injuries and died, leading his spouse, as administratrix of his estate, to file suit alleging negligence, wrongful death, and other claims against the facility and its operators.The defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the spouse had authority to sign the agreement under the Tennessee conservatorship order or, alternatively, under Kentucky’s Living Will Directive Act, which allows a spouse to make “health care decisions” for an incapacitated person. The Fayette Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that signing an arbitration agreement was not a health care decision under the Act and that the spouse lacked authority to bind the patient. The court did not rule on unconscionability. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, distinguishing prior cases involving powers of attorney and holding that the Act’s definition of “health care decision” did not include entering arbitration agreements.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed whether a spouse may bind an incapacitated person to arbitration for facility admission under the Living Will Directive Act. The Court held that signing an arbitration agreement is not a “health care decision” as defined by Kentucky law, which limits such decisions to consenting to or withdrawing consent for medical procedures, treatments, or interventions. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the denial of the motion to compel arbitration, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LEXINGTON ALZHEIMER'S INVESTORS, LLC V. NORRIS" on Justia Law

After the death of Roxine Poznich in 2020, her revocable living trust became the subject of a dispute among her five children, who were named as beneficiaries. Sarah Tharrett, one of the children, was appointed successor trustee. David Everett, another child, challenged Sarah’s role and actions as trustee, first by suing for her removal (which was dismissed), and later by objecting to the final trust accounting and distribution. While all other beneficiaries approved the final accounting, David’s objections prevented the trust from being closed. Sarah then filed a declaratory action seeking court approval to distribute the trust assets and requested attorney fees due to David’s conduct.The Bourbon District Court resolved the matter by closing the trust, releasing Sarah from her duties, ordering distribution of the remaining assets, and awarding $4,000 in attorney fees against David’s share. David appealed but accepted his distribution check. Sarah filed a notice of acquiescence, arguing that David’s acceptance of the distribution barred his appeal. The Kansas Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to acquiescence, and denied Sarah’s request for appellate attorney fees, reasoning it lacked jurisdiction to consider the fee request.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that due process violations only void a judgment if they so undermine personal jurisdiction that the party is denied any meaningful opportunity to be heard, which was not the case here. The court affirmed that a trust beneficiary who accepts a distribution cannot later challenge the amount on appeal, as the benefits are inseparable from any additional claims. The court also clarified that appellate courts retain jurisdiction to award attorney fees even if the appeal is dismissed for acquiescence. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of David’s appeal and awarded Sarah $11,320 in appellate attorney fees. View "Tharrett v. Everett " on Justia Law

David Wolfe owned property in Columbia Falls, Montana. In 2000, he executed a will leaving the property to his daughter, Wendy Rae Wolfe. In 2018, David signed a beneficiary deed transferring the property to his brother, Philip M. Wolfe. David passed away in 2023, and Wendy began residing on the property, believing it was hers per the will. Philip, however, claimed ownership based on the 2018 deed and issued a notice for Wendy to vacate.Wendy filed a pro se quiet title action in December 2023, alleging that the will conveyed the property to her and that Philip obtained the deed fraudulently, either by forging David’s signature or through undue influence. Philip counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, granted summary judgment in favor of Philip, concluding that Wendy failed to produce a legally meaningful challenge to the deed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court found that Wendy presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding undue influence and the validity of David’s signature on the deed. The court noted that Wendy’s evidence, including affidavits and personal knowledge of David’s intentions, was enough to warrant a jury’s consideration. The court concluded that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Philip and reversed the decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of David Wolfe" on Justia Law