Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Elijah and Mary Stiny established a trust that, upon their deaths, divided the estate into shares for designated beneficiaries. Mary Stiny amended the trust after her husband’s death, naming her mother, Della Moore, as beneficiary of a 2.66% share. She also specified that if Della Moore predeceased her, the gift to Della Moore would lapse. Della Moore died before Mary Stiny, creating a dispute over who should receive this share. Della Moore’s children entered into an agreement with the trustee to distribute their mother’s share to them, but the trust’s terms did not list them as beneficiaries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reviewed a motion for approval of this settlement. The district court found that the trust was unambiguous: since Della Moore predeceased Mary Stiny, her share lapsed and, under California Probate Code § 21111(b), was to be distributed to the remaining named beneficiaries in proportion to their interests, not to Della Moore’s children. The court also found that the parties’ settlement would improperly modify the trust and that not all beneficiaries had consented to such a modification as required by law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the Survivor’s Trust unambiguously provided that Della Moore’s gift would lapse if she predeceased Mary Stiny, and that the anti-lapse provision did not apply due to explicit language to the contrary. The court further held that the requirements for modification of an irrevocable trust under California law were not met, as not all beneficiaries consented and the reasons advanced for modification did not outweigh the trust’s material purpose. The judgment denying approval of the settlement was affirmed. View "Stiny Trusts v. Robins" on Justia Law

The case centers on the estate of Charles Frazier, who, after becoming very ill in late 2019, was cared for by Michael and Kelly Pagano. During this period, Frazier executed a new trust with the Paganos’ assistance, granting them a substantial portion of his assets. Shortly before his death in January 2020, Frazier expressed regret over this change to his nephews, Jeff and Theodore Haun, and executed another trust to revert his estate plan. After Frazier’s passing, the Paganos filed a civil complaint alleging Haun and Jeff had exerted undue influence over Frazier for personal benefit. Haun, as trustee of the January 2020 trust, then initiated a probate petition claiming financial elder abuse by the Paganos.The Superior Court of San Diego County consolidated the competing probate petitions for trial. After eight days of trial, the court found the Paganos had exerted undue influence over Frazier in the creation of the December 2019 trust and committed financial elder abuse. Haun and Jeff, however, were not found to have unduly influenced Frazier regarding the January 2020 trust. The court granted Haun’s petition, denied Kelly’s petition, awarded Haun compensatory and statutory damages, and entitled him to attorney’s fees. The court determined all attorney’s fees incurred by Haun were inextricably intertwined with his defense and prosecution of the elder abuse claims, making apportionment impractical.On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed whether Haun could recover attorney’s fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a), a unilateral fee-shifting provision, given the intertwined nature of his prosecution and defense. The court held that the statute does not bar recovery of fees for defense work that overlaps with prosecution of a successful financial elder abuse claim by a prevailing plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed, and costs of appeal were awarded to Haun. View "Haun v. Pagano" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when one attorney, after obtaining a $5 million default judgment against another attorney in California, sought to collect on that judgment by levying two Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) belonging to the judgment debtor. The debtor argued that because he had moved to Florida, Florida’s statutory exemptions should apply, shielding his IRAs from collection. He also claimed the IRAs were funded from a surrendered life insurance policy held in a private retirement plan, asserting exemptions under California law for both the policy and the retirement plan.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the claim of exemption. Initially, the court tentatively applied Florida law but later decided the law of the forum state—California—should govern exemption claims. Ultimately, the court found the debtor failed to prove that the IRAs qualified for any exemption under California law, including the private retirement plan exemption or that the funds were necessary for his support. The court denied the claim of exemption, permitting the creditor to levy the IRAs.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that California law applies to collection actions in California courts regardless of the judgment debtor’s domicile. It further concluded that a surrendered life insurance policy is not necessarily exempt from collection and, once surrendered, is treated as matured, requiring proof that the proceeds are necessary for support. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings, applied a de novo review to legal questions, and affirmed the order denying the exemption. Thus, the IRAs were subject to collection, and the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Bagby v. Davis" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, operating a camp for children with cancer, owned several buildings situated on land owned by a married couple. The couple, both involved in the nonprofit’s leadership, decided to sell the ranch property that included the camp’s buildings. During negotiations, the couple represented to the nonprofit’s board that appraisals did not specify values for the nonprofit's buildings and that the nonprofit’s share of sale proceeds should be calculated by square footage. Relying on these representations, the nonprofit accepted a portion of the sale proceeds. Subsequently, the nonprofit discovered that the appraisals had, in fact, assigned higher specific values to its buildings, resulting in a claim for damages against the couple for misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District granted partial summary judgment to the couple on certain claims, but, after a bench trial, found in favor of the nonprofit on claims for constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The court calculated the nonprofit’s damages but reduced the award by 50%, applying comparative negligence and the doctrine of avoidable consequences. The court denied attorney fees and prejudgment interest to both parties. Both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the doctrine of election of remedies did not bar the nonprofit’s appeal, as seeking satisfaction of a judgment is not inconsistent with seeking a greater award on appeal. The Court ruled that it was reversible error for the district court to reduce damages based on comparative negligence or a duty to mitigate, as those doctrines did not apply to the equitable and fiduciary claims at issue. The Court affirmed the district court’s rejection of the couple’s affirmative defenses of superseding intervening cause and unclean hands, as well as the finding that the wife breached her fiduciary duty. The denial of prejudgment interest and attorney fees was affirmed, but the nonprofit was awarded costs on appeal. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in the nonprofit’s favor for the full damages amount and reconsideration of prevailing party status. View "Camp Magical Moments, Cancer Camp for Kids, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Lloyd Haack passed away in March 2024, leaving behind a purported will that named his son, Howard Haack, as the sole beneficiary and personal representative. Shawn Renee Logan, claiming to be Mr. Haack’s financial advisor, petitioned for probate and expressed belief in another will, but no such document was found. The court admitted the existing will to probate and appointed Howard Haack and Bailey Baxter as co-personal representatives. Logan contested Howard’s appointment, alleging forgery, but her petition was dismissed for lack of standing. Kristy Martinez, Haack’s granddaughter, was determined to have standing to contest both the will and the appointment. She then filed a petition contesting the will’s validity within the probate case, requested a jury trial, and the co-personal representatives responded with affirmative defenses and a motion to dismiss, arguing the will contest required a new civil action separate from the probate matter.The District Court of Fremont County held a hearing to address these procedural questions. The co-personal representatives relied on prior Wyoming Supreme Court decisions, including Matter of Estate of Meeker and Matter of Estate of Rowe, arguing that statutory requirements and civil procedure rules necessitated a separate civil action for will contests. Martinez, however, argued that Wyoming law permits such contests to proceed within the probate matter itself and cited Gaunt v. Kansas University Endowment Association and Russell v. Sullivan for support.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the certified questions from the district court. Employing statutory interpretation and examining relevant precedent, the Court held that Wyoming statutes do not require a will contest to be filed as a completely separate civil action with a new case number and heading. Instead, a will contest under Wyo. Stat. § 2-6-301 et seq. can proceed as a separate proceeding within the existing probate matter. Accordingly, the Court answered the certified question in the negative and declined to address the second question regarding jurisdictional defects. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Haack" on Justia Law

The case involves the family of a deceased inmate who alleged that certain medical professionals and a health services foundation, after performing an autopsy at the request of correctional authorities, removed and retained the decedent’s organs without family consent. The family contended they were not informed or asked for permission regarding the autopsy or retention of organs, and only learned the organs were missing when preparing the funeral. They claimed to have relied on statements from hospital staff that such practices were standard, and only discovered in December 2023, through media reports, that retention of organs without next-of-kin consent was allegedly unlawful.The Montgomery Circuit Court reviewed and denied the defendants’ consolidated motion to dismiss, finding that statutory limitations could be tolled due to alleged fraudulent concealment. The court determined that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could justify equitable tolling under Alabama law, and that the family’s claims were not time-barred because they filed suit within two years of learning the alleged conduct was illegal.On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a petition for writ of mandamus by the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation and Dr. Stephanie Reilly. The Court held that mandamus relief was appropriate because, from the face of the complaint, the claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. The Court reasoned the causes of action accrued by November 6, 2021, when the family learned the organs were missing, and rejected arguments for tolling or for treating the alleged conduct as a continuous tort. The Court distinguished between statutes of limitations governing different claims, and found that all claims against the petitioners except the AUAGA claim were time-barred. It therefore granted the petition and directed dismissal of all claims against the petitioners except for the AUAGA claim. View "Ex parte University of Alabama Health Services Foundation" on Justia Law

A woman, Susan, was one of three beneficiaries of her father Warren’s trust. She believed the trust’s terms were unfair to her compared to her brothers, David and Michael, as her share was subject to restrictive terms and higher taxes. Warren allegedly wanted to amend the trust to make distributions equal among his children, and had consulted an attorney about this. Susan claimed that David and Michael undertook several actions in 2021 to prevent Warren from making this amendment, including interfering with his lawyer, making accusations against Susan, and isolating Warren.Previously, Susan filed a probate petition in Alameda County Superior Court, seeking to remove David as trustee and as Warren’s agent, and alleging elder isolation and similar misconduct by her brothers. The probate petition raised many of the same factual allegations later made in this civil case. After Warren’s death, Susan dismissed her probate petition without prejudice. She then filed a civil complaint, asserting claims for intentional interference with expected inheritance (IIEI) and elder financial abuse. The elder abuse claim was later dismissed, and the IIEI claim proceeded. David filed a demurrer, arguing Susan had an adequate remedy in probate, among other defenses.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case after the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Susan’s complaint. The appellate court held that Susan’s IIEI claim could not proceed because she had an adequate remedy in probate. The court reasoned that the tort of IIEI is only available when probate does not provide a remedy, and Susan, as a beneficiary, had standing and the ability to seek relief in probate but chose to dismiss her petition. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. View "Halperin v. Halperin" on Justia Law

A man and woman who had been in a relationship for five years were married in a ceremony on a dock, officiated by a minister, with only the groom’s minor son physically present at the ceremony. Two adults had previously signed the marriage license as witnesses, but only one of them was arguably present nearby in a vehicle; the other was definitely absent. After the ceremony, the marriage license was properly filed and accepted by the state. The couple lived as husband and wife until the groom’s unexpected death five months later. Following the death, a dispute arose between the widow and the decedent’s father, who acts as personal representative of the estate, regarding the decedent’s property and home.The decedent’s father sought a declaratory judgment in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, arguing that the widow was not the decedent’s legal spouse because the marriage was not solemnized in the presence of two reputable adult witnesses as required by statute. He contended this failure rendered the marriage void, and sought to prevent the widow from inheriting. The Court of Chancery treated this as a petition for annulment under the Delaware Divorce and Annulment Act, but denied relief, finding that the petitioner lacked standing to seek annulment after the decedent’s death and that minor defects in solemnization do not necessarily void a marriage.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the statutory requirements for marriage and found that, despite the absence of one adult witness, the parties had intended a lawful marriage and acted in good faith. The court held that the witness requirement is directory, not mandatory, and the marriage was not void for lack of a witness. The court affirmed the judgment below, holding that the marriage was valid and the petitioner could not seek its annulment. View "Lafon v. Felmlee" on Justia Law

After the death of his father, Richard, the plaintiff, Rich, brought suit against his stepbrother, Tim, and his stepmother, Patti, regarding the management of Richard’s IRA funds. Richard had named Rich and Patti as the primary beneficiaries of his IRA, with 75% and 25% interests, respectively. When Richard’s health declined due to dementia, Tim obtained a power of attorney and was later appointed conservator by an Iowa state court, but Rich was not notified of these proceedings. Tim subsequently withdrew funds from Richard’s IRA, transferred assets between brokerage accounts, and, after Richard’s death, facilitated distributions to Patti. Rich alleged he was not informed about these transfers and was unable to access his inherited share for several months, during which time the funds lost value.Following a three-day trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, a jury found in favor of Rich on claims of fraud and conversion against Tim and unjust enrichment against both Tim and Patti, but found no liability on certain other claims. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Both parties filed post-trial motions. The district court declined to give a jury instruction on undue influence, reasoning that the evidence did not support such a claim, and amended the judgment to prevent duplicative recovery by making Tim and Patti jointly liable for part of the award.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that the refusal to instruct the jury on undue influence was not an abuse of discretion, given the record and Iowa law. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s decision to amend the judgment to avoid double recovery. Furthermore, it rejected Tim’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the fraud verdict, concluding that the jury’s findings of justifiable reliance and damages were supported by the trial record. View "Jeffery v. Townsend" on Justia Law

A businessman and rancher in South Dakota, after dating a Colorado horse breeder for nearly a year, proposed marriage. Shortly before the wedding, he presented her with a prenuptial agreement drafted by his attorney. The agreement waived her right to any share of his estate after his death. The parties signed the agreement at the attorney’s office minutes before their civil ceremony. They were later married in Italy and had two children. The businessman died approximately eight years later. The surviving spouse then petitioned for an elective share of the estate and a family allowance, claiming her signature on the agreement was involuntary and the agreement was unconscionable.The Fourth Judicial Circuit Court of Dewey County, South Dakota, held a trial on her petition. The court granted her request for a family allowance but denied her petition for an elective share. The court found she voluntarily signed the agreement and that it was not unconscionable, emphasizing her education, business experience, and opportunity to review the agreement or consult independent counsel. The court also found that the financial disclosures provided were fair and reasonable, and that the terms of the agreement, including a provision for her in the event of divorce, were not disproportionate or unjust. Stephanie appealed the denial of her elective share.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that the prenuptial agreement was voluntarily executed and was not unconscionable under South Dakota law. It found no clear error in the circuit court’s factual findings and determined that the financial disclosure and circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement satisfied statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement and the waiver of the elective share. View "Estate Of Webb" on Justia Law