Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

After the death of Gary Wayne Johnson, who died without a will in 2021, his sister, Zoa Ann Manners, opened his estate and filed a creditor’s claim. Her claim was based on a document titled “Article of Agreement,” which Gary had prepared, signed, and delivered to her in 2002. Zoa Ann argued that this document created a contractual obligation for Gary, and subsequently his estate, to distribute a one-fourth interest in certain real property (specifically, Lots 12 and 13 of Lenzi Farms Subdivision) to her and her sisters, in accordance with their parents’ wills. The document was notarized but never recorded, and its language referenced the parents’ testamentary intentions.The Chancery Court of Marshall County held a hearing on Zoa Ann’s claim. After considering her testimony and the document, the chancery court found that the Article of Agreement was ambiguous, lacked sufficient clarity to convey a present interest in land, and did not meet the requirements of a deed or a contract. The court denied her claim against the estate. Zoa Ann appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision, holding that the Article of Agreement did constitute a valid deed conveying a vested future interest in the property, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Article of Agreement did not create a contractual obligation nor did it operate as a valid deed, as it failed to convey a present interest in the property and was testamentary in nature. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court of Marshall County, denying Zoa Ann’s claim. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Gary Wayne Johnson v. The Estate of Gary Wayne Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant, a former U.S. Coast Guard employee, was convicted by a jury of murdering two co-workers in Alaska. At the time of the government’s collection action, he held approximately $450,000 in a Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account, a federal retirement savings plan. His wife had a statutory right to a joint and survivor annuity from the account, and federal law generally requires spousal consent for lump-sum withdrawals. Following his conviction, the government sought to collect the entire balance of his TSP account as restitution for the victims’ families.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska initially ordered restitution from the defendant’s retirement and disability income, including his TSP funds, but limited lump-sum withdrawals from the TSP without spousal consent, instead permitting monthly payments. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the restitution order, holding that the district court could not use the All Writs Act to bypass statutory garnishment limits and remanded for a determination of whether the defendant’s benefit streams constituted “earnings” subject to a 25% garnishment cap under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.On remand, the district court issued amended restitution orders authorizing the government to collect the entire TSP account balance as a lump sum. The defendant appealed, arguing that statutory spousal protections limited the government to periodic garnishments. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the government may only cash out a defendant’s TSP account to satisfy a restitution order under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act if the plan’s terms would allow the defendant to do so at the time of the order. Because spousal consent was required and not obtained, the court vacated the restitution orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

In 1998, a husband and wife established separate family trusts, naming their three adult children as beneficiaries. Upon the death of the last surviving parent in 2016, their son became the sole trustee, responsible for managing the trusts and eventually distributing the assets equally among the siblings after seven years. The principal asset was agricultural land, and the trust agreements gave the son an option to purchase this property within sixty days of the last parent’s death. However, he did not exercise this option until 2022, shortly before the trusts were set to terminate, and purchased the property from the trusts for over $2 million, funding the purchase with mortgage loans.The son’s sisters filed a petition in the Minnesota District Court, alleging that he breached his duties as trustee by improperly exercising the purchase option and seeking his removal, restoration of the property to the trusts, and other relief. The district court found that the purchase option had lapsed sixty days after their father’s death, and that the son had breached his fiduciary duties. The court ordered the son’s removal as trustee, appointed one sister as successor trustee, and directed the son to return the property to the trusts. The court also ordered further investigation into possible reimbursements and scheduled ongoing review hearings, reserving some issues for later determination.The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed the son’s interlocutory appeal as premature, finding that the district court’s order was not immediately appealable under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03(b), which allows appeals from orders granting or denying injunctions. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s order was neither an injunction nor the functional equivalent of one, and thus not subject to immediate appeal under Rule 103.03(b). The Supreme Court clarified that statutory remedies under the Trust Code, such as removal of a trustee or restoration of property, do not constitute injunctions for appellate purposes. View "In re Johnson Trust" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a woman and her daughter regarding the daughter’s alleged misuse of property held in an irrevocable trust for which she served as trustee. The mother initiated a lawsuit in Massachusetts state court, asserting several state-law claims against her daughter and her daughter’s then-husband. Subsequently, the daughter filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona, which triggered an automatic stay of the state court litigation. The bankruptcy court initially granted the mother’s motion for relief from the automatic stay and for permissive abstention, allowing the state court case to proceed. However, after delays in the state court proceedings, the daughter moved for relief from that order, and the bankruptcy court vacated its prior order and reimposed the automatic stay.After the bankruptcy court’s March 2021 order reimposing the stay, the mother filed adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court, which were consolidated and tried. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the daughter on all claims and entered final judgment in July 2022. The mother then appealed the March 2021 order to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) rather than Rule 60(b)(1). The district court concluded that the appeal was timely because it believed the March 2021 order was not immediately appealable, and it affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, under Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, the bankruptcy court’s March 2021 order was a final, appealable order because it definitively resolved a discrete dispute within the bankruptcy case. Since the mother did not appeal within the required fourteen days, her appeal was untimely, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "FANTASIA V. DIODATO" on Justia Law

A trustee of a revocable living trust petitioned for instructions regarding whether it could distribute principal, not just income, from a subtrust to the settlor’s only surviving son, David. The trust’s contingent remainder beneficiaries, the Cooks, who are the settlor’s nieces and nephews, contested the petition, arguing that the trust did not permit principal distributions and that the trustee’s proposed modification was improper. The Cooks also sought attorneys’ fees from the trust. The trustee and David supported allowing principal distributions, while the Cooks opposed them.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit (probate court) initially granted the trustee’s petition, allowing principal distributions and ordering attorneys’ fees for all parties to be paid from the trust. The Cooks appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed most of the probate court’s decision but reversed the award of attorneys’ fees to the Cooks. On further review, the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i vacated the probate court’s order due to the lack of required findings and failure to enter an order under Hawai‘i Probate Rules (HPR) Rule 20(a), remanding for further proceedings. On remand, the probate court again denied the Cooks’ request for attorneys’ fees, finding their interest too contingent and their participation not beneficial to all beneficiaries. The ICA affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees but again remanded the merits for lack of an HPR Rule 20(a) order.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that a probate court may award attorneys’ fees to trust litigants if their participation assists the court in resolving the dispute, but a decision on the merits is necessary before determining if such an award is proper. Because the ICA vacated the decision on the merits, affirming the denial of attorneys’ fees was premature. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment as to attorneys’ fees and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Elaine Emma Short Revocable Living Trust Agreement" on Justia Law

In 2018, the plaintiff was placed on an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric hold, resulting in the creation of a confidential record by the Orange County Sheriff’s Department. In 2021, during a legal dispute over their father’s estate, the plaintiff discovered that his sister’s attorney had obtained this confidential record and used it to threaten him in an attempt to force dismissal of his elder abuse lawsuit against his sister. The record had been released by an office specialist at the Sheriff’s Department, who admitted knowing the sister was not entitled to the record but disclosed it anyway, believing she was concerned for the plaintiff’s well-being.A jury in the Superior Court of Orange County found that the office specialist willfully and knowingly disclosed the confidential record, awarding the plaintiff $29,000 in economic damages and $40,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury also found the plaintiff’s sister and her attorney responsible for 25 percent of the damages. However, the trial court granted a motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding there was insufficient evidence of willfulness, declined to treble the damages, and apportioned both economic and noneconomic damages, entering judgment for 75 percent of the total damages against the office specialist and the County.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that “willfully and knowingly” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5330 means intentionally releasing confidential records to someone known to be unauthorized, regardless of intent to harm. The court found substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of willfulness, requiring trebling of damages. The court also held that while noneconomic damages could be apportioned to other tortfeasors, economic damages could not. The case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for $177,000 against the County and the office specialist, jointly and severally. View "Doe v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

After Minnie Pearl Harvey’s death, her son petitioned to probate her will and was granted letters testamentary by the Pike Probate Court. Harvey’s sister, Inez Lee, contested the will and requested a protective order. The probate court responded by revoking the son’s letters testamentary and appointing K. Nickie Bateman, an attorney, as administrator ad litem for the estate. Bateman performed various administrative duties and later submitted an invoice for her services. Lee objected to the invoice, arguing the fees were unreasonable. The parties reached a stipulation to dismiss the will contest, agreeing that Bateman’s fees would be paid from estate funds, and the probate court entered an order consistent with this agreement.The Pike Probate Court held a hearing on Lee’s objection to Bateman’s fees and ultimately found the requested amount reasonable, ordering the estate to pay Bateman’s full invoice. Lee appealed to the Pike Circuit Court, which reviewed the reasonableness of Bateman’s fees. The circuit court determined that Bateman’s hourly rate should be reduced and recalculated her compensation at a lower rate, awarding her less than the amount approved by the probate court. The circuit court left all other aspects of the probate court’s judgment undisturbed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, erred by substituting its judgment for that of the probate court regarding the reasonableness of Bateman’s compensation. Because the record did not include a transcript or statement of the evidence from the probate court hearing, the circuit court was required to presume the probate court’s findings were correct. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bateman v. Lee" on Justia Law

A Nevada resident, Richard Goldstein, is the sole lifetime beneficiary of a discretionary trust created in Missouri and administered by Bank of America (BOA) from its St. Louis office. The trust was established by Goldstein’s father, and the contingent remainder beneficiaries are Goldstein’s sister and her children, none of whom reside in Nevada. Goldstein requested that BOA transfer the trust’s situs from Missouri to Nevada, but BOA denied the request after consulting its St. Louis team. Goldstein then filed a petition in the Ninth Judicial District Court in Douglas County, Nevada, seeking the court’s jurisdiction over the trust and a construction of the trust’s no-contest clause to allow him to challenge the situs without forfeiting his interest.The district court granted BOA’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee. The court determined that, although statutory in rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010 was satisfied, BOA was a necessary and indispensable party to the proceeding, and personal jurisdiction was required. The court found that Goldstein failed to allege facts supporting either general or specific personal jurisdiction over BOA, and that BOA’s compliance with Nevada’s registered agent statute did not constitute consent to jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the statutory grant of in rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010 does not override the constitutional due process requirements for personal jurisdiction. Because BOA, as trustee, was a necessary and indispensable party, personal jurisdiction was required. Goldstein failed to make a prima facie showing that BOA had sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada related to the petition, and BOA’s business presence in Nevada was unrelated to the trust administration at issue. Thus, dismissal was proper. View "In re Goldstein Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute over the calculation of nonparticipating royalty interests (NPRI) in oil and gas produced from a tract of land in McKenzie County, North Dakota. The plaintiffs, as trustees of three family trusts, each hold an undivided one-third interest in a 2% royalty on all oil and gas produced from the NW¼NE¼ of Section 31-154-97, based on a 1951 royalty deed. The land in question abuts the Missouri River, and a portion of it lies below the ordinary high-water mark, which is owned by the State of North Dakota. Continental Resources, Inc. operates an oil well on a spacing unit that includes this tract, while third-party defendants own the minerals above the high-water mark, subject to the trusts’ royalty interests.The District Court of McKenzie County previously found that the trusts’ NPRI did not include State-owned acreage below the high-water mark, and adopted Continental’s calculation of the royalty payment factor, which excluded the State’s acreage and included an upward adjustment for equitable distribution. The court also held that Continental’s suspension of royalty payments was permissible under the “safe harbor” provision of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1, denied the trusts’ request for an accounting, and awarded costs to Continental, concluding the trusts were not the prevailing party. The trusts appealed, arguing errors in the NPRI calculation, the application of the safe harbor provision, and the determination of the prevailing party.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court’s amended judgment. It held that the 1951 royalty deed unambiguously grants the trusts a 2% royalty on all oil and gas produced from the entire described tract, including State-owned acreage. The court remanded for recalculation of the NPRI, reconsideration of the safe harbor provision, determination of outstanding royalties and accounting, and proper allocation of costs and disbursements, finding the trusts to be the prevailing party. View "Garaas v. Continental Resources" on Justia Law

Dr. Padma Rao brought a defamation suit against JP Morgan Chase Bank and its employee, Keifer Krause, after Krause informed the administrator of her late mother’s estate that Rao, acting under a power of attorney, had designated herself as the payable on death (POD) beneficiary of her mother’s accounts. This statement led the estate administrator to accuse Rao of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in probate court. The dispute centered on whether Rao had improperly used her authority to benefit herself, which would be illegal under Illinois law.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court, but Chase removed it to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois before any defendant was served, invoking “snap removal.” The district court dismissed all claims except for defamation per se. On summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that Krause’s statements were not defamatory, could be innocently construed, and were protected by qualified privilege. Rao appealed both the dismissal of her consumer fraud claim and the grant of summary judgment on her defamation claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first addressed jurisdiction, dismissing Krause as a party to preserve diversity jurisdiction. The court affirmed the dismissal of Rao’s consumer fraud claim, finding she had not alleged unauthorized disclosure of personal information. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the defamation per se claim against Chase, holding that Krause’s statements could not be innocently construed and that a qualified privilege did not apply, given evidence of possible recklessness. The case was remanded for a jury to determine whether the statements were understood as defamatory. View "Padma Rao v J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law