Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In Iowa, a ten-year-old boy was treated at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) for a dislodged feeding tube and died the next day. The boy's mother filed administrative tort claims on behalf of the child's estate prior to being appointed as the estate's administrator. The child's parents also individually claimed loss of consortium. The claims were dismissed by the district court, which ruled that the mother lacked authority to file a claim on behalf of the estate prior to her official appointment, and that the parents had not properly filed individual administrative tort claims.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the district court was correct to dismiss the parents' individual claims as no individual administrative tort claims were filed. However, the court determined the district court had erred in dismissing the estate's claims, arguing that the mother's administrative tort claims were valid despite her not being appointed as the estate's administrator at the time of filing. The court explained that a representative may act to protect an estate's interests before being officially appointed and can ratify pre-appointment acts, granting them the same effect as acts that would occur after appointment. The court also confirmed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the plaintiffs' new evidence. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi was asked to interpret Mississippi's Principal and Income Act of 2013 in a case involving the distribution of funds from a trust. The Crider Family Share Trust named Juliette Crider as the income beneficiary and Nathan Ricklin and Megan Woolwine as remainder beneficiaries. The Trustee, Haidee Oppie Sheffield, distributed a significant amount from Muskegon Energy Co. to the income beneficiary. Ricklin and Woolwine contended that this distribution was a breach of fiduciary duty, as they believed the funds should have been allocated to them as remainder beneficiaries. They argued that the distribution constituted a partial liquidation of the energy company's assets, and pursuant to the Principal and Income Act, the funds should have been allocated to the principal (the remainder beneficiaries) rather than the income beneficiary.The Jackson County Chancery Court ruled in favor of Sheffield. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether a distribution is in partial or full liquidation, as per Section 91-7-401(e) of the Principal and Income Act, must be made on a post-tax basis. The court found that after reducing for income taxes paid by the Trust, the distributions from Muskegon Energy Co. fell below the 20 percent threshold that would trigger a partial liquidation. Therefore, the court concluded that the distributions were not in partial liquidation and Sheffield, the Trustee, did not breach any duty owed to Ricklin and Woolwine, the remainder beneficiaries. View "In The Matter of the Crider Family Share Trust v. Sheffield" on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of California, the court interprets the provisions regarding the modification of a revocable trust under California Probate Code sections 15401 and 15402. The dispute revolves around a trust created by Jeane M. Bertsch, which was amended multiple times, with the final amendment excluding her niece, Brianna McKee Haggerty, from distribution. Haggerty challenged the validity of the final amendment, arguing that it was not properly notarized as required by the modification method specified in the trust agreement.The court held that under section 15402 of the Probate Code, a trust may be modified using the procedures set out under section 15401 for revocation, including the statutory method, unless the trust instrument specifies a method of modification and makes it exclusive, or it expressly precludes the use of revocation procedures for modification. The court clarified that merely distinguishing between revocation and modification in the trust instrument does not preclude the use of revocation procedures for modification.The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held that Bertsch’s final amendment was a valid modification, since the trust agreement did not explicitly state that the specified method of modification was exclusive or expressly preclude the use of revocation procedures for modification.The court disapproved previous appellate decisions that were inconsistent with this holding, including King v. Lynch, Balistreri v. Balistreri, Diaz v. Zuniga, Pena v. Dey, Conservatorship of Irvine, and Haggerty v. Thornton. View "Haggerty v. Thornton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed a lower court's decision, finding that David Spurlock's lawsuit to remove the Wyoming Trust Company as the trustee of the C.E. Spurlock Revocable Trust did not trigger the trust's no-contest clause, which would have resulted in his disinheritance. The court determined that while the trust's no-contest clause expressed a desire to avoid litigation, it did not prohibit all litigation. The court noted that other provisions in the trust specifically authorized a beneficiary to bring certain forms of litigation, and that Spurlock's action was not a challenge to the trust or an attempt to impair the trust's function or operations. The court found that the lawsuit was intended to enforce the trust's provisions related to accountings and instructions for dividing assets and did not seek damages from trust assets or seek to change or delay the asset distribution. Therefore, Spurlock's lawsuit did not violate the no-contest clause. The case was remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Spurlock on the trustee's counterclaim. View "Spurlock v. Wyoming Trust Company" on Justia Law

In this case, GayLe Schleve, the personal representative of the estates of Viola J. Heath and Caleb C. Heath, appealed orders from the District Court of Dunn County, North Dakota, that granted Wells Fargo Bank's motions to vacate previous orders establishing the authority of domiciliary foreign personal representatives and letters testamentary related to the estate of Viola J. Heath, and determining heirs and successors in the estate of Caleb C. Heath.Viola and Caleb Heath were residents of Montana who owned mineral rights in Dunn County, North Dakota. After their deaths, litigation ensued over the distribution of these mineral rights. The orders being challenged in this appeal had resulted in the mineral rights being transferred to the heirs of Viola Heath.Wells Fargo, as successor to Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co., the trustee appointed in Caleb Heath's will, claimed an ownership interest in the mineral rights and challenged the transfer of those rights to the heirs of Viola Heath. Wells Fargo argued that the district court had lacked jurisdiction to issue the orders, and that the orders should be vacated because they were manifestly unjust and based on incorrect applications of the law.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Wells Fargo had standing to challenge the orders. The court also held that the district court had erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order in the Estate of Viola J. Heath. However, the Supreme Court remanded for further determination of whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over the parties in the Estate of Viola J. Heath, and whether relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(6).Finally, the Supreme Court held that the district court had abused its discretion in granting Wells Fargo's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the order in the Estate of Caleb C. Heath without sufficient findings related to timeliness. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Heath" on Justia Law

The dispute revolves around which of two oil and gas leases controls the royalty payments for nine wells collectively called the Bernhardt Wells. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant, Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. The plaintiffs, trustees of The Eunice S. Justice Amended, Revised, and Restated 1990 Revocable Trust Agreement, argued that a 1978 Lease entitles them to a 3/16 royalty, while Devon maintained that a 1973 Lease, entitling the Trust to a 1/8 royalty, controls. The court found that the dispute over which lease controls is best characterized as a quiet title claim, subject to a 15-year statute of limitations, which began when the injury occurred in 1978. Thus, the Trust's quiet title claim, filed more than 15 years later, was time-barred. The court also held that the trial court did not err in denying the Trust's motion to compel the production of various title opinions in Devon's possession. View "BASE v. DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION" on Justia Law

In Oklahoma, a woman suffering from various progressive, degenerative diseases executed an advance directive instructing that her life not be extended by life-sustaining treatment, including artificially administered nutrition and hydration. Later, she was hospitalized and a PEG tube was inserted to provide artificially administered nutrition and hydration, contrary to the terms of her advance directive. The woman's sister and children disagreed on whether to keep the PEG tube in place or follow the instructions in the advance directive. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that an incapacitated or incompetent person retains the legal right to revoke their advance directive and that revocation of an advance directive must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had found that the woman had not revoked her advance directive and that the insertion of the PEG tube violated the terms of her advance directive. View "IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF L.A.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Charles Redlin and First Interstate Bank. The case arose out of a dispute involving the Helene M. Redlin Trust. The trust was established by Helene Redlin with the aim to provide for her children in case of financial difficulties. After her death, the trust assets were placed in a low-interest money market account. Kelly Redlin, one of the beneficiaries, sued Charles and First Interstate for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that their failure to properly invest the trust assets constituted bad faith and gross negligence. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Charles and First Interstate, holding that the terms of the trust waived the Prudent Investor Rule, and their decisions to invest the assets in a money market account didn't constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota agreed with the lower court's decision, stating that the trust's waiver of the Prudent Investor Rule allowed the trustees to make investment decisions irrespective of any risk or nonproductiveness. The court found no evidence that Charles or First Interstate acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent in their management of the trust assets. As such, the court concluded that the conservative investment approach adopted by the trustees did not constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty. View "Redlin Trust V. First Interstate Bank" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the case involved Gail C. Tremblay, the plaintiff, and the Estate of Donald D. Bald, the decedent, and Allan Bald, the defendants. Tremblay and Donald Bald were engaged and lived together for over ten years but never married. During their relationship, they executed several agreements stating that if they were living together at the time of Bald's death, Tremblay would receive certain properties. Upon Bald's death, Tremblay initiated legal action, arguing that the agreements were enforceable contracts. The defendants disagreed, asserting that the agreements lacked consideration, and the Superior Court sided with the defendants.Upon review, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that the agreements are enforceable. The court stated that a valid enforceable contract requires an offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds. While the defendants argued that the agreements lacked consideration because the couple was already living together when the agreements were executed, the court disagreed. The court held that the plaintiff's continued cohabitation constituted a benefit to the decedent, thereby satisfying the requirement for consideration. Furthermore, the court stated that either party's ability to end the relationship prior to the decedent's death did not affect the enforceability of the agreements. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tremblay v. Bald" on Justia Law

In the State of Maine v. Dale F. Thistle, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction of Dale Thistle, an attorney, for theft by misapplication of property. Thistle was hired by Donna Friend, personal representative of the estate of Gilman Friend, to explore a potential wrongful death suit against emergency responders. Thistle negotiated a settlement of $390,000, which he deposited into his Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Account (IOLTA). Thistle then misappropriated the funds, failing to distribute the owed amount to Gilman's children, and instead frequently withdrawing money for personal expenses.Thistle appealed his conviction on several grounds, including that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for acquittal due to a statute of limitations defense, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, the State committed prosecutorial error, and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him.The Supreme Judicial Court rejected all of Thistle's arguments. The court found that Thistle had waived his statute of limitations defense by admitting facts that tolled the limitations period. The court also held that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments did not constitute error. Finally, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Thistle intentionally or recklessly failed to pay the settlement funds to Gilman's children and used the money as his own, thereby committing theft by misapplication of property. View "State v. Thistle" on Justia Law