Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case is the triggering event for the statute of limitations on childhood sexual abuse actions. Timothy Jones’ estate (Estate) brought negligence and wrongful death claims against the State of Washington. Timothy was born to Jaqueline Jones in 1990. In 2003, Jacqueline lost her home to foreclosure, and Timothy moved in with Price Nick Miller Jr., a family friend. A month later, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) was alerted that Miller was paying too much attention to children who were not his own. After investigating the report, DCYF removed Timothy from Miller’s home based on this inappropriate behavior. In November 2003, Timothy was placed in foster care and DCYF filed a dependency petition. Timothy’s dependency case was dismissed in 2006. Later that year, Timothy told a counselor that Miller had abused him sexually, physically, and emotionally from 1998 to 2006. In 2008, Miller pleaded guilty to second degree child rape connected to his abuse of Timothy and second degree child molestation related to another child. In 2007 or 2008, Jacqueline sued Miller on Timothy’s behalf. The attorney did not advise Timothy or his mother that there may be a lawsuit against the State or that the State may be liable for allowing Miller’s abuse to occur. Sometime in mid-2017, and prompted by a news story about childhood sexual abuse, Timothy and a romantic parter Jimmy Acevedo discussed whether Timothy may have a claim against the State. Acevedo recommended that Timothy consult a lawyer. In fall 2017, Timothy contacted a firm that began investigating Timothy’s case. In June 2018, Timothy committed suicide. Jacqueline was appointed personal representative of Timothy’s estate and filed claims for negligence, negligent investigation, and wrongful death against the State. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the statute of limitations for negligence claims begins when a victim recognizes the causal connection between the intentional abuse and their injuries. The court granted summary judgment for the State and dismissed the Estate’s claims as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence was presented that Timothy made the causal connection between that alleged act and his injuries until August or September 2017, and the Estate filed its claims on March 12, 2020, within RCW 4.16.340(1)(c)’s three-year time period. View "Wolf v. Washington" on Justia Law

Husband Steven McAnulty was married twice: once to Plaintiff Elizabeth McAnulty, and once to Defendant Melanie McAnulty. Husband's first marriage ended in divorce; the second ended with his death. Husband’s only life-insurance policy (the Policy) named Defendant as the beneficiary. But the Missouri divorce decree between Plaintiff and Husband required Husband to procure and maintain a $100,000 life-insurance policy with Plaintiff listed as sole beneficiary until his maintenance obligation to her was lawfully terminated (which never happened). Plaintiff sued Defendant and the issuer of the Policy, Standard Insurance Company (Standard), claiming unjust enrichment and seeking the imposition on her behalf of a constructive trust on $100,000 of the insurance proceeds. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. By stipulation of the parties, Standard was dismissed with respect to this appeal. The only question to be resolved was whether Plaintiff stated a claim. Resolving that issue required the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to predict whether the Colorado Supreme Court would endorse Illustration 26 in Comment g to § 48 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Am. L. Inst. 2011) (the Restatement (Third)), which would recognize a cause of action in essentially the same circumstances. Because the Tenth Circuit predicted the Colorado Supreme Court would endorse Illustration 26, the Court held Plaintiff has stated a claim of unjust enrichment, and accordingly reversed the previous dismissal of her case. View "McAnulty v. McAnulty, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decree and order of the superior court in this probate action, holding that there existed a genuine issue of material fact precluding the grant of partial summary judgment.The decedent's will left her entire estate to a testamentary trust for the benefit of her dog, Licorice, and any other pet she might have at the time of her death. At the time of her death, however, no pet survived the decedent. Under the terms of the trust, the trustees were required to designate a charity to receive the remainder of funds in the trustees' control after the death of all beneficiaries. At issue was whether the remainder of the decedent's estate to charity was valid despite Licorice having predeceased the decent or whether Licorice's failure to survive the decedent rendered the pet trust void. On partial summary judgment, the judge held that the pet trust provision failed because Licorice predeceased the decedent. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding that the provisions for Licorice in the testamentary trust lapsed, leaving a genuine issue of material fact whether there was a clear intention that the charitable remainder not be conditioned on Licorice's survival of the decedent. View "In re Estate of Jablonski" on Justia Law

Defendant owned real property located at 3546 Multiview Drive in Los Angeles, California (the property). That year, he executed two deeds of trust against the property. Defendant obtained a HELOC from National City Bank, memorialized in an Equity Reserve Agreement and secured by a deed of trust against the property (collectively, the HELOC agreement). Piedmont Capital, L.L.C. (Piedmont)—a debt buyer—purchased the HELOC debt. Piedmont sued Defendant. Following a demurrer to the original complaint sustained with leave to amend, Piedmont filed the operative first amended complaint for (1) breach of contract, (2) money lent, (3) money had and received, and (4) declaratory relief. Although Piedmont alleged that the full amount of the HELOC debt Defendant owed totaled $186,587.26, Piedmont conceded that it was “not seeking to collect on any [amounts] that were already barred by the applicable statute of limitations at the time [the] action was filed.”   The Second Appellate District reversed. At issue is whether the borrower’s duty to make a monthly payment under such a HELOC agreement indivisible from the borrower’s duty to pay the full amount such that the statute of limitations to recover the full amount begins to run upon the first missed monthly payment. The court held that the duties are divisible. The court explained that the HELOC agreement in this case—by setting a fixed maturity date for the full amount and leaving it to the discretion of the lender whether to accelerate that date—necessarily contemplates that a breach as to a monthly payment does not constitute a breach as to the full amount. View "Piedmont Capital Management, L.L.C. v. McElfish" on Justia Law

Appellant Joseph Koepfinger (“Father”) was a nonagenarian and father of several adult children, including Appellee Margaret Koepfinger (“Daughter”). In September 2016, shortly after the death of Father’s wife/Daughter’s mother, Father executed a power of attorney (“POA”), naming Daughter as his agent. The POA gave Daughter the authority to, among other things, create an irrevocable trust for Father; it further provided that Father could revoke the POA but only in writing. Soon after the execution of the POA, tensions began to build between Father and Daughter due to Father’s developing relationship with Madeline Masucci (“Masucci”). In 2017, Father allegedly orally informed Daughter that he revoked the POA and that he executed a new power of attorney, naming his son/Daughter’s brother as his agent. Daughter, however, claimed she was not informed of these events until May of 2018. In the meantime, in April 2018, acting as Father’s agent under the POA, Daughter created an irrevocable trust for Father, placing a substantial amount of his assets into that trust. Daughter named herself as trustee. After Daughter allegedly was informed that Father revoked the POA, she filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment requesting, in relevant part, judicial declarations that: (1) the 2016 POA was not revoked at the time that she created the trust; (2) the creation and funding of the trust was within her scope of authority under the POA; and (3) the trust is valid. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether a judicial determination that a power of attorney was void ab initio invalidated an irrevocable trust created by the purported agent under the void power of attorney. The orphans’ court answered this question in the affirmative, but the Superior Court reversed. The Supreme Court held that, when a court concludes that a power of attorney is a nullity, any action taken under the auspices of the power of attorney is likewise a nullity. Consequently, the Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and reinstated the orphans’ court’s order. View "In Re: Koepfinger" on Justia Law

In this case regarding the reformation of a trust the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying Sally Johnson's request for reimbursement from the trust for her attorney fees and expenses incurred during the underlying litigation, holding that attorney fees were authorized for Johnson efforts to vindicate her father's intent.The trust in this case was created by Fred Peterson, the father of Johnson and Mindy Smith. After Peterson died, Johnson filed petitions seeking court supervision and reformation of one of the trusts, which Smith opposed. The circuit court granted Johnson's request to reform the trust and denied Smith's requests for relief following a trial. Thereafter, Johnson filed a motion for reimbursement of attorney fees and expenses from the trust. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's denial of attorney fees for Johnson's litigation efforts to obtain certain property, holding that attorney fees were authorized under S.D. Codified Laws 15-17-38. View "In re Fred Petersen Living Trust" on Justia Law

Terry Carter and Brenda Ciccone appealed a district court judgment in the informal probate of Allan Froemke’s will. Reginald Froemke, the personal representative of Allan Froemke’s Estate, Terry Carter, and Brenda Ciccone were Allan Froemke’s children. Reginald moved the district court to determine heirs, compute the distribution of the Estate’s shares, determine debts owed by heirs to the Estate, allow the personal representative to sell property, and approve the personal representative’s inventory. The court held an evidentiary hearing and issued findings, an order for judgment, and a judgment. Carter and Ciccone argued the district court lacked jurisdiction over a contract for deed involving Carter. They further argued the court erred in: (1) finding Ciccone owed five thousand dollars to Allan Froemke’s Estate; (2) its evidentiary rulings; (3) failing to address several pending issues; and (4) finding against partitioning property. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Estate of Froemke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Jean Voelker's appeal of a judgment of the probate court concluding that a document proffered by Voelker as the last will and testament of Theodore Ackley (the Decedent) was not a valid holographic will, holding that this appeal was an improper interlocutory appeal.Joseph Ackley, the Decedent's son, filed an application for informal probate of the Decedent's last will and testament. Thereafter, Voelker filed a petition for formal probate and submitted the petition of a purported copy of the Decedent's holographic will. The probate court granted Ackley's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that the document was not a valid holographic will. The court, however, did not render a decision on Voelker's counter-motion for judgment as a matter of law arguing that the document she submitted was valid as a holographic will. Voelker appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal brought from the probate court's interlocutory order, holding that the order was not a final judgment, and therefore, the appeal must be dismissed. View "Estate of Theodore C. Ackley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated a portion of the summary judgment entered by the superior court in this action related to the estate of Patricia Spofford, the mother of Michael Zani and Peter Zani, holding that the Zanis' claim for declaratory judgment was not properly before the superior court.The Zanis brought this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that Spofford lacked testamentary capacity when she executed her will and claiming that Kathryn Read committed fraud when she swore that Spofford had testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution. The superior court entered partial summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order in part, holding (1) the claim for declaratory judgment was within the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction and was not properly before the superior court; and (2) the Zanis failed to establish a prima case for at least one element of their fraud claim. View "Zani v. Zani" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the probate and family court dismissing a petition for formal probate seeking appointment as personal representative, holding that the position of voluntary personal representative charged with administering a small estate pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 3-1201 constitutes a "prior appointment" within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 3-108's exception to the three-year limit.Petitioner, the voluntary personal representative of the decedent's estate pursuant to section 3-1201, filed a petition for formal probate seeking an appointment as personal representative under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 120B, 3-402. After receiving briefing on the issue of whether the position of voluntary personal representative under section 3-1201 constitutes a prior appointment under section 3-108 such that a subsequent formal petition for appointment under section 3-402 could be filed more than three years after the decedent's death, a probate and family court judge dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Petitioner's petition for formal appointment was timely. View "In re Estate of Slavin" on Justia Law