Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the district court dismissing this lawsuit brought by Cheryl Mueller to halt the pursuit of a setoff against the share of the estate of Lorine Mueller that would otherwise pass to Cheryl, holding that the merits of Cheryl's lawsuit should not have been entertained.At issue in this dispute over the administration of Lorine's estate (Estate) was whether a Nebraska judgment entered in favor of Lorine and against Cheryl, the widow of Lorine's deceased son, should be set off against the share of the Estate that would otherwise pass to Cheryl. In her complaint, Cheryl sought to halt the pursuit of a setoff by seeking a declaration that an agreement between Cheryl and Lorine's daughter, Margo Loop, precluded setoff. The district court dismissed this action with prejudice on summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the district court abused its discretion to the extent it reached the merits of this action. View "Mueller v. Peetz" on Justia Law

Tamera Erskine, as the personal representative of the estate of Joann Bashinsky ("Ms. Bashinsky"), deceased, appealed: (1) a probate court order awarding fees to the temporary guardian and conservator for Ms. Bashinsky previously appointed by the probate court; and (2) an order awarding fees to a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Ms. Bashinsky in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator filed by John McKleroy, Jr., and Patty Townsend. McKleroy and Townsend separately appealed the probate court's dismissal with prejudice of all remaining pending matters following Ms. Bashinsky's death. Ms. Bashinsky was the widow of Sloan Bashinsky, who owned the majority stock in Golden Enterprises, Inc., and who was the founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of Golden Flake Foods ("Golden Flake"). McKleroy and Townsend, two former Golden Flake employees who had professional relationships with Ms. Bashinsky, alleged that Ms. Bashinsky was incapable of caring for herself and for her assets, which were then valued at approximately $218 million. McKleroy and Townsend's allegations of Ms. Bashinsky's incompetence centered on her request that Level Four Advisory Services LLC, which held approximately $35 million of Ms. Bashinsky's personal assets, transfer $17.5 million to David Heath at investment firm Morgan Stanley. McKleroy and Townsend further alleged that the transferred assets would end up being controlled by Ms. Bashinsky's grandson, Landon Ash, whom they alleged had already accumulated $23.5 million in total indebtedness to Ms. Bashinsky and whom they alleged exerted undue influence upon Ms. Bashinsky. The Alabama Supreme Court granted McKleroy and Townsend's motion to dismiss. The Court determined the order awarding attorney fees was not a "final settlement" of a guardianship or conservatorship, and it was not otherwise a final judgment, and therefore it was not an appealable order. Accordingly, Erskine's appeal was dismissed, and the matter remanded for the probate court to enter a proper final judgment in this case. View "Erskine v. Guin, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Russell Davis, Ian Herzog, Evan Marshall, Debra Wear, Gloria Tedesco, and Stephen Carpenter appealed a March 22, 2021 trial court order, which denied each of their special motions to strike (anti- SLAPP) the corresponding applications for elder abuse restraining orders (EARO) filed by plaintiff-appellant Laura White (White), as cotrustee of the Thomas S. Tedesco Living Trust (the living trust), to protect her father, conservatee Thomas Tedesco (Thomas) from defendants’ concerted efforts to isolate and unduly influence him to change his estate plan for their benefit. White cross-appealed the same order denying her request to hear the EARO applications prior to the anti-SLAPP motions. Defendants contended that: (1) White had no standing to request the EAROs because she was unable to establish that she was either a trustee of the living trust or fiduciary of Thomas; (2) the lower court erred in assuming the conservatorship was valid and White was a cotrustee of the living trust, and relying on the Court of Appeal's opinions affirming the probate court’s actions; (3) the court erred by denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions; (4) their assistance in asserting Thomas’s civil and testamentary rights cannot be restrained by an EARO to prevent them from seeking a judicial determination that will resolve the very issue raised by the EARO; (5) the EAROs had to be stricken because they interfered with Orange County’s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction; and (6) the court erred in proceeding without joinder by Thomas. White asserted Wear’s anti-SLAPP motion was moot given the Court of Appeal's affirmance of the EARO against her, the anti-SLAPP motions were properly denied, and defendants’ remaining contentions lacked merit. In her cross-appeal, she argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to rule on her applications before deciding the anti-SLAPP motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying each special motion to strike; however, it concluded the trial court abused its discretion in failing to utilize its case management tools and prevent a delay in hearing the merits of the applications for EAROs by failing to either: (1) revisit the prior denial of temporary EAROs and grant temporary relief pending the resolution of defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions (through appeal); or (2) decide the applications and the anti-SLAPP motions at the same time. Thus, the matter was remanded for the trial court to proceed to trial on White’s applications for EAROs regarding all defendants except Wear, against whom an EARO was already in place. View "White v. Davis, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the claims brought by the Estate of Owen Thacker against Victoria Timm, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.The parties in this case were involved romantically, lived with each each other, and owned property as joint tenants. After Plaintiffs were appointed co-guardians and co-conservators of Thacker they filed this suit on behalf of Thacker against Timm, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and undue influence. The Estate was substituted as Plaintiff and added a claim for breach of duty as trustee of implied trust. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Timm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. View "Estate of Thacker v. Timm" on Justia Law

In 2017, Michael Tharaldson died and a probate action was opened to administer his estate. Tharaldson was unmarried and had three children, including E.M. The district court found he died intestate. In 2019, Bell Bank filed this action petitioning for a determination of trust beneficiaries and approval of asset distribution. Bell Bank claimed the sole beneficiary was Michael Tharaldson’s brother, Matthew Tharaldson. E.M. objected to the petition. E.M. appeals the ultimate order finding Matthew Tharaldson was the sole beneficiary of the Michael J. Tharaldson Irrevocable Trust Agreement II (“Trust II”) and was entitled to the trust assets. E.M. argues he was a beneficiary under the Michael J. Tharaldson Irrevocable Trust Agreement (“Trust I”), Trust I was unlawfully merged with Trust II, the trustee engaged in illegal trust decanting, and he was entitled to attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Matthew Tharaldson was the sole beneficiary under the plain language of either trust, and E.M. was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. View "Matter of Michael J. Tharaldson Trust" on Justia Law

In this dispute over ownership of some ranchland the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that a grantor conveys an expectancy interest only through a clear manifestation of the grantor's intent to do so, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Father devised his estate, including Cottonwood Ranch, to Widow for life with the remainder upon her death to his children, including Son. Father granted Widow power to sell estate property and to redirect a child's remainder interest to others. Widow, a co-owner of the ranch, later conveyed her separate interest in the ranch to Son and daughter. Thereafter, while Widow was still living, Son conveyed his "right, title and interest in and to" the ranch to his daughters. At issue was whether Son gifted a remainder interest in Father's estate property when he conveyed his present interest in the same property without expressly reserving any remainder interest. Applying the rule set forth in Clark v. Gauntt, 161 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. [Comm'n Op.] 1942), the Supreme Court held that Son did not convey his remainder interest in the estate property. View "Jordan v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.At issue was whether the revocable living trust agreement was effective to establish the decedent's house, his only real property, as an asset of the trust under Nevada law and to the satisfaction of the relevant statute of frauds. The district court confirmed the trustee and the house as trust property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trust agreement effectively funded the decedent's house to the trust; (2) the agreement satisfied the common law statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.205(1); and (3) the decedent's living trust agreement funded the trust with his house. View "In re Trust Agreement of Davies" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's application for attorney fees as a co-trustee under S.D. Codified Laws 55-3-13, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding Appellant nothing in attorney fees.James Endres created an irrevocable family trust, designating his seven children as beneficiaries. The children were later designated as co-trustees. Appellant, one of the children, commenced litigation seeking court supervision of the trust and to remove five of the co-trustees for breach of fiduciary duties. The parties eventually settled all issues except for Appellant's application for attorney fees. The circuit court denied attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to attorney fees under section 55-3-13 for his actions as a co-trustee which were productive to actual benefit of the trust. View "Endres v. Endres" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America (“Allianz”) in Plaintiff’s capacity as a trustee of the Zupnick Family Trust 2008A (“Trust”). Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that an Allianz life insurance policy (“Zupnick Policy”), which Plaintiff contends is owned by the Trust, remains in effect. The district court concluded that the Trust was not the actual owner of the Zupnick Policy under New York law because any assignment of the policy to the Trust failed to comply with the Zupnick Policy’s provision that assignment would be effective upon Allianz’s receipt of written notice of the assignment. The district court held that the Trust lacked contractual standing to sue on the Zupnick Policy, and granted Allianz’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that failure to comply with the provisions of a life insurance policy requiring written notice of assignment cannot, under New York law, render an assignment ineffective.   The Second Circuit certified the question to the Court of Appeals because the argument turns on a question of state law for which no controlling decision of the New York Court of Appeals exists. The court certified the following question: Where a life insurance policy provides that “assignment will be effective upon Notice” in writing to the insurer, does the failure to provide such written notice void the assignment so that the purported assignee does not have contractual standing to bring a claim under the Policy? View "Brettler v. Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Judith ("Judy") Scherber was an intestate heir of ("Decedent") Loch David Crane, who died in 2018 while living in San Diego County. Judy’s petition was based on her relationship with Charles Bloodgood (Charles). In 1951, Charles and his wife Frances Bloodgood (Frances) took two-year-old Judy into their home after she was abandoned by her birth parents, and for the duration of their lifetimes, held Judy out as their own child while domiciled in Indiana. Applying California law to undisputed facts jointly submitted by the parties, the probate court found Judy was the presumed natural child of Charles under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA); that Shannon Wehsener (Shannon), a first cousin of Decedent who had opposed Judy’s petition, had failed to proffer any facts to rebut that presumption; and that Judy therefore was Decedent’s heir through Charles, based on Charles openly holding her out as his own child during his lifetime. Shannon argued the probate court erred in applying California law to determine the existence of a natural parental relationship between Charles and Judy. Shannon argued the court instead should have applied Indiana law, where that relationship was effectuated. And unlike California, Indiana law did not recognize the existence of a natural parent and child relationship for purposes of determining heirship when a parent openly holds out a child as that parent’s own. Shannon further argued that even if California law applied and Charles was the presumed natural parent of Judy, that presumption was rebutted purely on the basis of public policy. Exercising independent review, the California Court of Appeal concluded California law applied in determining parentage between Judy and Charles for purposes of intestate succession. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court further concluded clear and convincing evidence supported the probate court’s finding that Charles was the presumed natural parent of Judy under the UPA; that Shannon did not meet her burden to produce clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption; and that the presumption could not be rebutted purely on the grounds of public policy. View "Wehsener v. Jernigan" on Justia Law