Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in this appeal concerning attorney fees, holding that the court abused its discretion in ordering an eighty-nine-year-old protected person under a conservatorship to pay for two sets of attorneys to litigate the same position in the same litigation.At issue in this contentious intrafamily litigation was whether the trustee of an individual retirement account (IRA) was entitled to recover more than $200,000 in attorney fees from the assets of the IRA for prevailing in its view of who was the property beneficiary of the account. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that fees were potentially recoverable and that $200,000 was a reasonable sum; but (2) the district court abused its discretion in ordering Joan Bittner, the sole beneficiary of the IRA who was under a conservatorship, to pay for both her own and the trustee's attorneys fees. View "Bittner v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and the decision of the court of appeals in this dispute over the beneficiary designation of an individual retirement account (IRA), holding that the designation unambiguously conveyed the IRA to the decedent's spouse rather than an unnamed family trust.Plaintiff, one of four children of the decedent in this case, argued that his father's IRA beneficiary designation designated an unnamed family trust as the primary beneficiary. The beneficiary designation, however, began by stating that the decedent's spouse was the 100 percent primary beneficiary of the IRA. The district court entered judgment determining that the decedent's spouse should receive the entire IRA account outright. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lower courts correctly determined that the spouse was entitled to the IRA. View "U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Bittner" on Justia Law

Angus Kennedy owned real property and mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. In 1960, Angus and his wife, Lois, executed two deeds conveying the surface and “excepting and reserving unto the parties of the first part, their heirs, successors or assigns, all right, title and interest in and to any and all . . . minerals in or under the foregoing described lands.” Lois did not own an interest in the property when Angus and Lois Kennedy executed the deeds. Angus died in 1965, and Lois died in 1980. Angus and Lois did not have children together. Angus had six children from a previous marriage. Angus' heirs executed numerous mineral leases for the property. Lois had one child, Julia Nevin, who died in 1989. In 2016 and 2017, Julia Nevin’s surviving husband, Stanley Nevin, executed mineral leases with Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. In 2018, Stanley sued the successors in interest to Angus, alleging Lois owned half of the minerals reserved in the 1960 deeds. In response, the Angus heirs claimed Angus did not intend to reserve any minerals to Lois because she did not own an interest in the property conveyed in the 1960 deeds. The district court granted Northern Oil’s motion to intervene. Northern Oil appeals the quiet title judgment deciding Northern Oil did not own mineral interests in the McKenzie County property, arguing the district court erred in concluding the deeds at issue were ambiguous as to whether Angus intended to reserve minerals to his wife, Lois. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nevin, et al. v. Kennedy, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from an order of the county court granting summary judgment in favor of the decedent's girlfriend, Lori Miller, in this dispute over the decedent's house, which comprised the majority of his trust's value, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of this matter.In a trust, Michael Hassler, the decedent, devised his house to Miller and bequeathed the trust's residuary to his children in equal shares. The Trustee deeded the house to Miller and allocated inheritance tax resulting from the transfer to the trust's residuary. Plaintiffs, Hassler's children, brought this action against the Trustee and Miller, seeking a determination, among other things, that trust amendments resulted from Miller's undue influence and that the inheritance tax obligations created by the transfer be collected from Miller. The county court granted partial summary judgment for Miller, ordering that inheritance taxes and legal and administrative expenses be paid out of the trust's residuary. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal, holding that the apportionment order was not a final order, and therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of this matter. View "In re Hessler Living Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendant and the law firm (collectively, the lawyers) for legal malpractice on the theory that the lawyers in drafting the LLC operating agreements did not adhere to the intent of their mother’s trust. The lawyers moved for summary judgment on three grounds—namely, (1) they owed Plaintiffs no duty of care, (2) Plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred, and (3) the parties had too contingent of an interest to have standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment. Specifically, the court ruled that Plaintiffs had presented “no evidence of decedent’s” intent to disinherit specific grandchildren from obtaining membership interests in the LLCs, such that the lawyers owed Plaintiffs no duty to effectuate that intent.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the lawyers did not owe Plaintiffs a duty to draft the LLC operating agreements in a way that disinherited decedent’s grandchildren because decedent’s intent to disinherit the specific grandchildren from being assigned any interest in the LLCs was not, as a matter of law, clear, certain or undisputed. Further, the court wrote that because summary judgment was properly granted due to the absence of any duty running from the lawyers to Plaintiffs, the court does not have occasion to reach the alternative grounds for affirmance (namely, that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred or that the parties lack standing.) View "Gordon v. Ervin Cohen & Jessup LLP" on Justia Law

In Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647 (1979), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not be in the zone of danger to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Instead, the Court announced a new rule intended to compensate plaintiffs who were not in the zone of danger but nevertheless suffered emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s negligence. In this case, the Court applied the Corso standard to allegations involving medical professionals’ negligent misdiagnosis, which resulted in the death of Lisa Chartier. Lisa’s husband, Marc Chartier, brought this action against defendants, Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC (Apple Therapy), Four Seasons Orthopaedic Center, PLLC d/b/a New Hampshire Orthopaedic Center (Four Seasons Orthopaedic), and Dr. Heather Killie. He appealed a superior court order granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court found plaintiff alleged he suffered severe emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms from contemporaneously perceiving the sudden, unexpected, and shocking suffering and death of his wife. Under these circumstances, Lisa’s pulmonary embolism constituted the “accident” in line with Corso, and subsequent cases. The Court held the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the basis that Marc’s emotional distress was too attenuated from defendants’ negligent conduct to permit recovery. On remand, the trial court was instructed to apply the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress in a manner consistent with the Court’s opinion. View "Chartier v. Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment concluding that Plains Commerce Bank could not foreclose on certain trust real estate, that the trustee's mortgage on trust real estate was void and unenforceable, and that Plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees, holding that the attorney fee award was an abuse of discretion.Garry and Betty Beck treated an irrevocable spendthrift trust naming their three children as secondary beneficiaries. Their child Matthew Beck took out a substantial personal loan with Plains Commerce and granted a mortgage to the bank on trust real estate as partial collateral. When Matthew defaulted on the loan, Plains Commerce brought a foreclosure action against Matthew in his capacity as trustee. Jamie Moeckly intervened on behalf of the trust. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Jamie and further granted her motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in awarding attorney fees to Jamie as intervenor for the trust; and (2) because there was no mortgage foreclosure the statutory provision in S.D. Codified Laws 15-17-38 authorizing attorney fees "on foreclosure" did not apply. View "Plains Commerce Bank, Inc. v. Beck" on Justia Law

Appellants Amy Gray, Jerry Dickman, Jeffrey Dickman, and Deborah Henderson (collectively Children) brought an action seeking an order declaring Children as the primary beneficiaries of a Profit-Sharing Plan (PSP) and an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) belonging to their father, J. Jerry Dickman (Decedent), based on the language in an antenuptial agreement and two beneficiary designations executed by Decedent. Appellee Linda Dickman, the wife of Decedent (Wife), sought an order declaring her the sole beneficiary based on the order of succession. The district court granted summary declaratory judgment in favor of Wife, determining she was the sole beneficiary of both the PSP and IRA. Children appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed and remanded with instructions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address: (1) whether the antenuptial agreement between Wife and Decedent was broad enough to cover the PSP and to waive any right Wife had to consent to the rollover of assets from the PSP to an IRA and to designate beneficiaries; (2) whether despite the antenuptial agreement, Wife's consent was necessary under federal law to roll over the plan's assets to an IRA and designate beneficiaries; (3) whether the Court should reform the IRA beneficiary designations to give effect to Decedent's intent; and (4) whether the Supreme Court should transfer the remaining assets maintained in the PSP to the IRA. The Supreme Court held that the antenuptial agreement between Wife and Decedent covered the PSP, making it Decedent's separate property. Decedent had exclusive rights to the PSP, including the right to designate beneficiaries. Wife's consent was not necessary under federal law because the PSP was not an ERISA plan. The Supreme Court further held Decedent substantially complied with all the requirements to designate beneficiaries to his IRA account, and the Court exercised its equitable powers to reform the beneficiary designations to disburse the IRA funds per Decedent's intent. However, Decedent never initiated the process of transferring to the IRA the remaining assets maintained in the PSP. The remaining assets should therefore be distributed per the PSP beneficiary designation. View "Gray v. Fidelity Brokerage Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reforming a property deed executed by Lillian and J.C. Singleton, as husband and wife, that divested Appellants' interest in the property, holding that the circuit court misapplied the law in reforming the deed.Lillian and J.C,. who were married and had three children, owned two tracts of land - Tract I and Tract II. The couple later instructed their attorney to prepare two warranty deeds, and the attorney did not know or meet with Appellants - Dennis, Keith, or Kelly - when preparing the deeds. After J.C. died, Lillian filed suit against Appellants asking the circuit court either set aside or reform the Tract I deed to reflect her interest that Dennis not receive a remainder interest in that tract, alleging that the deed mistakenly included Dennis in the conveyance. The circuit court entered judgment in Lillian's favor and ordered the Tract I deed to be reformed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) no mutual mistake occurred in this case, and the mistake was purely unilateral; and (2) under the circumstances, the circuit court misapplied long-standing state law when it ordered the deed at issue be reformed to divest Appellants of their remainder interest. View "Singleton v. Singleton" on Justia Law

The Morenos sought a determination that Bertuccio was not an heir entitled to an intestate share of the Estate of Franco. The probate court granted them summary judgment, finding Bertuccio to be the child of a 1957 marriage between his mother Marilyn and Frank Bertuccio, under the marital presumption. Family Code section 7540(a) provides that “the child of spouses who cohabited at the time of conception and birth is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” Frank was identified as Bertuccio’s father on his birth certificate and paid child support for Bertuccio after he and Marilyn divorced. Marilyn purportedly told Bertuccio that Franco was his father. The court held Bertuccio was not entitled to prove Franco was his natural parent from whom he could inherit in intestate succession under Probate Code section 6453(b)(2).The court of appeal remanded. If Bertuccio were found to be a child of the marriage of Marilyn and Frank, pursuant to the marital presumption, he would not be entitled to prove Franco was his natural parent. However, the probate court erred in applying the marital presumption without first making the requisite finding that Marilyn and Frank were cohabiting at the time of Bertuccio’s conception and birth. View "Estate of Franco" on Justia Law