Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Attorney DeWayne Johnston, on behalf of the late David Knapp, appealed the dismissal entered after the district court denied a motion to substitute Knapp’s widow as plaintiff under N.D.R.Civ.P. 25. Attorney DeWayne Johnston, on behalf of the late David Knapp, appeals from a dismissal judgment entered after the district court denied a motion to substitute Knapp’s widow as plaintiff under N.D.R.Civ.P. 25. This litigation began after the Minnesota Department of Revenue issued a third-party levy on securities held by Edward Jones for Knapp. Knapp sued the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Revenue and Edward Jones in North Dakota seeking dissolution of the levy. Knapp subsequently commenced this lawsuit against Edward Jones requesting dissolution of the levy or a declaration that his securities were exempt from the levy. He also brought a conversion claim and requested damages. The district court ordered the case stayed pending arbitration under terms in Edward Jones account agreements. Knapp died during the stay. Edward Jones served Knapp’s counsel, Attorney Johnston, with a statement noting Knapp’s death. Attorney Johnston filed a motion on Knapp’s behalf requesting Knapp’s widow, Cabrini Knapp, be substituted as plaintiff under N.D.R.Civ.P. 25. The court held a hearing. After the hearing, the court denied the substitution motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court noted that ownership of the securities had transferred to Cabrini Knapp and her “rights are not extinguished by this order and there is no prejudice to her in denying the motion to substitute her as a party.” The North Dakota Supreme Court granted Edward Jones’ motion and dismissed the appeal, agreeing that Johnston could not appeal on behalf of a dead person. If Johnston was not authorized to file this appeal, his motion to substitute on appeal was moot. View "Knapp v. The Jones Financial Co., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting partial summary judgment to the Estate of Gale Iverson (the Estate) on its real property claims against Cherie Davidson-Eaton (Eaton), Mr. Iverson's caregiver, and ordering Eaton to, among other things, provide the Estate with an accounting, holding that there was no error.The Estate filed an action for an accounting and sought to recover property it alleged Eaton unlawfully transferred to herself. In response, Eaton filed a creditor's claim against the Estate, alleging that she had a right to compensation for services she rendered to Mr. Iverson while he was living. The district court consolidated the lawsuits, granted partial summary judgment to the Estate on its real property claims, denied Eaton's claims, found the Estate was entitled to lost rents and profits, and ordered Eaton to provide the Estate with an accounting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law. View "Davidson-Eaton v. Iversen" on Justia Law

Lester Randle died in 2009, and was survived by Dorothy, his wife of twenty-one years, and their son, Raymond Randle. Lester had previously been married to Ruthie Randle. Two children were born of that marriage: Tumika and Sylvester, the Appellants. Ruthie and Lester divorced in 1977 when the children were very young. Lester died intestate. Dorothy was granted letters of administration of Lester's estate in which she noted the “estate consist[ed] of no real property but ha[d] a potential claim for unliquidated damages arising out of” Lester’s death. The petition acknowledged the Appellants, as well as Dorothy and Raymond, as Lester’s heirs at law. Dorothy petitioned for a determination of heirship, adding that the estate consisted of a claim for benefits against the manufacturer of Granuflow/Natural Lyte arising from Lester’s use of the prescription drug. The petition further claimed that the Appellants were “not heirs at law of Lester Randle and [were] not entitled to any of the settlement proceeds,” but rather they “were born to a married man, putative father,” and Ruthie. At a hearing before the chancery court, Cederica Gilliam appeared, claiming to be Lester’s heir; DNA testing was ordered on Lester’s putative children. The chancery court ultimately determined that Cederica was Lester's biological child, and Appellants were not his legal heirs at law based on the cross-referencing of the DNA results. Accordingly, the court adjudged Dorothy and Raymond as Lester’s only heirs at law and awarded them equal shares in any distribution of property. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the chancery court and the Court of Appeals incorrectly considered the settlement proceeds from the wrongful-death claim as an asset of the estate. Second, the lower courts incorrectly considered the petition to determine heirs under Mississippi Code Sections 91-1-1 to -31 (Rev. 2021) instead of a determination of wrongful-death beneficiaries under Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13 (Rev. 2019). The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the appellate and chancery courts and remanded this case to the chancery court to determine the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Lester Randle under Section 11-7-13. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Lester Randle" on Justia Law

While divorce proceedings between plaintiff-appellee Arnold Johnson (Husband) and Jacquelyn Johnson (Wife) were pending, Wife changed the primary beneficiary of her individual retirement account (IRA) from Husband to her adult children, defendants-appellants Dirk Snow and Duff Snow (collectively, Children). She also opened a new individual transfer on death (TOD) account and designated Children as the primary beneficiaries. Wife died before the divorce was granted, and the action abated. Thereafter, Husband filed the underlying declaratory judgment action to enforce the automatic temporary injunction entered in the divorce action. The district court concluded that the IRA and the funds used to open the TOD account were marital property and, therefore, Wife's acts violated the automatic temporary injunction, 43 O.S.2011 § 110(A)(1)(a), and were ineffective. The district court granted summary judgment to Husband and ordered that he be reinstated as the primary beneficiary of Wife's IRA and awarded the proceeds of the TOD account. Children appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that when the dissolution of marriage action abated, the district court was deprived of its jurisdiction to enforce the automatic temporary injunction. "It is undisputed that Children were designated as the primary beneficiaries at the time of Wife's death and, therefore, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." View "Johnson v. Snow" on Justia Law

Donald and Marjorie Woodfin married in 1997. At the time, Donald had two adult children, Kathleen (Kathy) Gestner and Ray Woodfin, and Marjorie had two adult children, Julie Divine and Colleen Shiras. Donald and Marjorie created the Woodfin Family Trust, a revocable trust, in 1999. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the 1999 Trust identified the primary beneficiaries as Ray, Kathy, Colleen, and Julie, who would receive a sum of money and any remaining assets in equal shares if either or both settlors were deceased. Marjorie amended the Trust several times following Donald’s death. In 2002, Marjorie’s changes included adding additional successor trustees. Marjorie was diagnosed with breast cancer in 2017. Julie drove Marjorie to meet with attorney Robert Green in Coeur d’Alene regarding another trust amendment. Green met with Marjorie alone. In the meeting, Marjorie explained that she was disappointed in her stepchildren because she believed they had treated her poorly since Donald’s death. Marjorie died on October 12, 2018, at age 92. After learning about Marjorie’s passing, Kathy called Julie to inquire about the Trust and Julie sent Kathy and Ray the May 29, 2018, letter. Kathy and Ray subsequently filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief. Kathy and Ray requested the district court to declare the 2018 amendments were void due to Julie’s undue influence and order Julie to distribute $100,000 to Ray and $100,000 to Kathy. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the evidence “overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that Marjorie had full testamentary capacity when she amended the Trust on May 29, 2018.” Kathy and Ray timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed judgment against Kathy and Ray. View "Gestner v. Divine" on Justia Law

Parker’s daughters sought the appointment of a conservator of their mother’s estate. Schwarcz, a professional fiduciary, was appointed as temporary conservator of Parker’s estate. Following mediation, Parker, her daughters, and Schwarcz entered into an agreement that provided for a less restrictive alternative. The court approved the settlement and terminated the temporary conservatorship. Parker’s counsel emailed Schwarcz’s counsel, requesting “all communications" between Schwarcz and anyone regarding Parker’s estate. Schwarcz’s counsel refused to comply. Parker filed a “Petition for Return of Property,” under Probate Code section 850, seeking communications between Schwarcz and any non-attorney, communications between Schwarcz and her attorney with or without copying or otherwise including another person, and documents related to the temporary conservatorship.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Parker’s petition as not authorized by Probate Code 850. “Personal property” as used in section 850 does not encompass communications and documents from the administration of her temporary conservatorship estate. The section's legislative history and the historical circumstances around the enactment of its predecessor statutes do not suggest the Legislature intended section 850 to be used by a claimant to obtain communications and documents generated by a temporary conservator. View "Parker v. Schwarcz" on Justia Law

A dispute over attorney fees arose from the probate proceedings of Eric Milo Hirning’s estate. Appellants challenged the district court’s affirmance of the magistrate court’s decision to allow the personal representatives to recover their legal expenses incurred in the administration of the estate, pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-3-720. The Appellants also challenged the attorney fees awarded to the Respondents on intermediate appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Uzzle v. Estate of Eric Milo Hirning" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the county court declining to award prejudgment interest to the estate of Madeline A. Adlung (the Estate) following a remand to the county court for a redetermination of damages owed by Defendant, holding that there was no error in the district court's refusal to award interest on remand.Adelung's son, Kent Adelung, appealed from the decision of the county court finding him liable following an action for an equitable accounting sought by the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified. On remand, the Estate sought prejudgment interest. The county court denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court did not err in not applying prejudgment interest under Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-104 to the amount of the modified judgment on remand. View "In re Estate of Adelung" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the S.D. Codified Laws chapter 21-65 does not create a private right of action that survives a vulnerable adult's death and that a predicate theft conviction is not required to maintain an action authorized under S.D. Codified Laws 22-46-13.Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of Richard Hermanek's estate, claiming that Defendants, who previously served as Hermanek's attorneys-in-fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney (POA), breached their fiduciary duties under the POA and converted Hermanek's property to their own use. The district court certified a question of law addressing Defendants' claim that an action alleging abuse of a vulnerable adult does not survive the death of the adult at issue. The Supreme Court answered (1) a vulnerable adult or substitute petition has a private right of action for the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, but the private right of action cannot be commenced under chapter 21-65 after the vulnerable adult's death; and (2) financial exploitation remains actionable after a person's death under section 22-46-13, and a criminal conviction is not required as a predicate to a civil cause of action for exploitation. View "Hermanek-Peck v. Spry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court admitting the will at issue in this case to probate and appointing an administrator for the estate of James A. Townsey but otherwise reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief on counts two and three of the complaint.The circuit court admitted Townsey's will to probate, appointed an administrator for the estate, and awarded the proceeds of a brokerage account to a German charity. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly admitted the will to probate and appointed an administrator for Townsey's estate; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant on counts two and three of the complaint. View "Taylor v. Aids-Hilfe Koln e.V." on Justia Law